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ABSTRACT 
 
JOSEPH WALLACE: Pagan Fictions: Literature and False Religion in England, 1550–1650 
(Under the direction of Reid Barbour and Jessica Wolfe) 
 
 
 
This dissertation represents an effort to rethink one of the defining problems of the 
European Renaissance: the revival of pagan culture. It was very common for Renaissance 
Christians, from Giovanni Boccaccio to John Calvin, to argue that pagan religions were false 
because they were based on myths created by poets and politicians. But the Reformation 
project of distinguishing true from false versions of Christian religion blurred the boundaries 
between ancient and more recent versions of false religion. The hinge of this reorientation of 
religious values was the argument that certain religions were merely poetic fables, artificial 
fictions created by humans. And while some scholars have discussed the changing meaning 
of religion in the seventeenth century, no one has seen that literary language provided the 
terms for this change. My project corrects this by juxtaposing the religious imagery of the 
poetry of Robert Herrick, John Milton, and many others with contemporary debates about the 
poetic nature of religious imagery. In this way, my project makes a unique contribution to 
Renaissance studies by demonstrating not only that literary categories are fundamental to an 
understanding of religion, but also that the religious revolution of the Reformation produced 
lasting changes in how literary texts create meaning.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Poetry, Pagan Theology, and the Creation of False Religion 
 
In 1781, the historian Edward Gibbon wrote that “The ruin of Paganism, in the age of 
Theodosius, is perhaps the only example of the total extirpation of any ancient and popular 
superstition; and may therefore deserve to be considered as a singular event in the history of 
the human mind.”1 The scourge of paganism was, for Gibbon, the “zeal” of the Christians, a 
zeal that raged against the cooler sense of “human prudence” (2:78). Gibbon laments not the 
loss of paganism’s “superstitious” theology but its social function and its artistic elegance. In 
fact, Gibbon seems to value the fact that paganism reveled in human creations rather than an 
abstracting religious zeal that subsumed all within its spirit. But what most provokes Gibbon, 
in his sarcastically excoriating way, is the way that the forces of laws and empire were 
marshaled to end  what was a deeply ingrained social, political, devotional, and artistic 
system.  
 The destruction of pagan arts had long produced a sense of loss for Renaissance 
intellectuals, too. Lorenzo Ghiberti, for example, in a much-quoted passage from his 
Commentaries, wrote,  
The Christian faith achieved victory in the time of the Emperor Constantine and Pope 
Sylvester. Idolatry was most stringently persecuted so that all statues and pictures, 
noble, and of antique and perfect venerability as they were, were destroyed and rent 
to pieces. With the statues and pictures were consumed books, commentaries, 
drawings and the rules by which one could learn such noble and excellent arts. In 
                                                 
1
 Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. David Womersley, 3 vols. (London: 
Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1994), 2:71. Further references will appear in the text. 
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order to abolish every ancient custom of idolatry it was decreed that all the temples 
should be white. At this time the most severe penalty was ordered for anyone who 
made any statue or picture. Thus ended the art of sculpture and painting and all the 
knowledge and skill that had been achieved in it. Art came to an end and the temples 
remained white for about six hundred years.2  
 
Ghiberti clearly regretted the “false choice between art and religion”3 posed by the early 
Christians, and there is even the sense that he regretted the loss of paganism as an artistic 
mode, or a complete cultural system.  
 I begin by citing these two writers, separated by three hundred years, to demonstrate a 
particular failing in our interpretation of the Renaissance renewal of pagan antiquity, namely 
our willingness to separate the idea of “art” from the religious and political resonances of 
paganism. Neither Gibbon nor Ghiberti thought about the renewal of pagan arts separately 
from the troubling consequences of bringing back the cultural system signified by the place 
of art and fiction within pagan religion. As I will suggest in this introduction and in my 
dissertation, there is a very good reason why scholars hesitate to read pagan fictions in the 
way that they were read in the Renaissance. These fictions were part of a system that 
originated, for Renaissance artists and thinkers, from a mistake, an error with significant 
religious consequences. And while scholars of this period often note the language used by 
those in the Renaissance to describe pagan errors, we rarely parse it, nor do we try to find out 
what it might mean, outside of the grand narrative of Christian history, to claim that pagan 
religion was created by “demons” and that those demons exerted control over the secular 
functions of government and other social institutions. Yet, it is clear that this idea meant a 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in Tilmann Buddensieg, “Gregory the Great, the Destroyer of Pagan Idols: The History of a Medieval 
Legend Concerning the Decline of Ancient Art and Literature,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 28 (1965): 44. 
 
3
 Larry Silver, “Full of Grace: ‘Mariolatry’ in Post-Reformation Germany,” in The Idol in the Age of Art: 
Objects, Devotions and the Early Modern World, ed. Michael W. Cole and Rebecca Zorach (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), 290. 
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great deal to Renaissance writers, who struggled mightily to suppress and reinterpret the 
troubling connotations of a revival of ancient religion at the same time that they accepted the 
grandeur of pagan art. For those writers, ancient polytheism was, among other things, a 
political religion, one in which the fictions of the poets and artists had a symbiotic 
relationship with the priests and statesmen who relied on them to control the imaginations of 
the masses.  
My dissertation is an attempt to yoke together pagan arts and pagan religions once 
again. I do this to argue that the neglect of the genuine and serious religious dimension of the 
renewal of antiquity and its arts has led us to persistently mischaracterize the Renaissance 
notion of ancient culture. Where early moderns saw disruption and conflict, moderns have 
seen synthesis and harmony, albeit produced by an inauthentic kind of classicism. And where 
modern scholars sense a misguided and naïve synthesis of pagan and Christian, there is really 
a consciously constructed suppression of the consequences of taking seriously the religious 
and political dimensions of ancient art—a refusal to speak about what it would mean for 
there to be a true “poetic theology.” 
 The kind of study I am pursuing explains how the interest in the pagan arts 
contributed to and interacted with the religious polemics denouncing polytheism and idolatry 
as trappings of a newly resurgent false religion. Furthermore, it makes the claim that the 
structure of polytheistic arts, their identification of the media of production with divine 
signification, proved to be the linchpin in the gradual transformation of early modern 
religious culture and the rise of comparative scholarship. In particular, my study also argues 
that conceptions of culture that underlie the modern secular state were produced by the 
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interactions among differing religious systems, with Christianity bracketing the devotional 
practices and objects of paganism as products of human, as opposed to divine, art.  
 My project proceeds, however, on a necessarily narrow scale, restraining its scope 
mainly to the literary art of early modern England. But its argument partakes of the wider 
range of investigation outlined above. I argue that we must view paganism and Christianity 
in the Renaissance as more radically opposed than we usually do. The compatibility of 
religious beliefs and practices is of course just as vigorously debated now as it was then, but 
the character of those Renaissance debates is central for understanding the relationship 
between cultural products, which we as literary scholars study, and the religious structures 
that legitimated, regulated, rejected, and ultimately created them. The shifting place of 
human art within religious thought unites the literary artists I discuss with the religious 
writers who debated the nature of false religion and the merits of competing religious values.  
 My study also fits into modern scholarship’s reevaluation of the changes in religious 
culture of the early modern period. There is an influential critical narrative that holds that a 
kind of secular paganism developed in the Italian Renaissance and, through successive 
refinements of post-Reformation scholarship and philology, culminated in the faith in natural 
philosophy and in reason that structured the Enlightenment response to religious enthusiasm. 
Peter Gay’s argument that the Enlightenment saw “the rise of modern paganism” is an 
eloquent expansion of the idea that the legacy of the pagan renewal was to wed the rational 
and natural philosophies of the classical philosophers with a way of living in the present, a 
way of living that used natural knowledge to critique religious enthusiasm and unreason.4 In 
Gay’s narrative, the development of reason is both pagan and key to understanding the 
erosion of Christian belief in Enlightenment, at least among its leading thinkers. 
                                                 
4
 Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism (New York: Knopf, 1966), passim. 
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This narrative does have considerable explanatory force, but it is clear that we have to 
revise it. In fact, the question now is not if we should revise this narrative but how we should 
do it. One avenue has been to ask, as I do in my project, how religious transformations of the 
late seventeenth century might be linked to political and social understandings of religion 
itself. This kind of critical discourse sheds light on what was a key facet the reception of 
pagan religion and myths, the idea that this religious tradition and its rituals were fictional 
and therefore false. To view pagan religion in the Renaissance in this way also allows us to 
find new ways to talk about the power of fiction and myth itself. We need only remind 
ourselves of modern theories of religion—as phenomenon, or as experience—to see how the 
early modern idea of the power of fiction transforms into something else, though similar, in 
the modern world: a way to convert the profane into the sacred. 
As we start to revise the narrative of secularism that takes pagan culture as its avatar, 
it becomes very clear that we should not equate “paganism” with what we now call the 
“secular” realm. But this equation has endured because “paganism” has been on both sides of 
the drive to so-called “secularism.” First of all, there are important ways in which the idea of 
“pagan” religious practices have come to be equated with “popular” religion, an idea latent in 
the medieval critique of lay religious rituals. But secondly, paganism was also part of the 
natural, rational philosophy of the Enlightenment progressives. Thus the “pagan” element in 
the Christian west has been a part of both Gay’s ideal of Enlightenment philosophy running 
against religious enthusiasm and an example of the irrational understanding of religion as 
“enchantment” that gradually ceded to rational, secular forces.5 This dichotomy and the 
                                                 
5
 Among the many studies investigating the fate of popular religion, see especially Peter Burke, Popular 
Culture in Early Modern Europe, rev. ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), 208–16; Leah S. Marcus, The Politics of 
Mirth: Jonson, Herrick, Milton, Marvell, and the Defense of Old Holiday Pastimes (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986); Achsah Guibbory, Ceremony and Community from Herbert to Milton: Literature, 
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narratives supporting it are changing. A wide range of scholarship across disciplines has 
proven disruptive to ideas like “paganism,” “secularization,” and “idolatry,” reminding us 
that they were constructions of a Christian culture that was actively questioning its own 
religious and political boundaries. This body of scholarship has looked to the early modern 
interest in political and social explanations of pagan religion and its rituals to argue for the 
importance of the civil, or political, theology in the religious transformations that took place 
during the Renaissance. This scholarship has also begun to revise notions of religious change 
that were formerly widely accepted, such as the secularization of European culture, the 
decline of religion, and the disenchantment with religious explanations of the cosmos. The 
result has been an inclination to see in religious culture a constantly shifting equilibrium 
between political, social, artistic, legal, and divine forces, a discourse structured by an uneasy 
alliance between belief, reason, and art.6 To summarize the conclusions of this scholarship, 
the key to modern and early modern understandings of the religious transformations of the 
seventeenth century was idolatry: the study of idolatry, and the urge to distinguish true 
                                                                                                                                                       
Religion, and Cultural Conflict in Seventeenth-century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Edward Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
and, most extensively, Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York: Scribner, 1971). 
 
6
 See especially Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Robert Black, "The Donation Constantine: A New Source for the 
Concept of the Renaissance," in Language and images of Renaissance Italy, ed. Alison Brown (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995); Tobias Döring and Susanne Rupp, Performances of the sacred in late medieval and 
early modern England (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005); Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, “Sovereigns, 
Citizens, and Saints: Political Theology and Renaissance Literature,” Religion & Literature 38, no. 3 (2006): 1–
11; Robert D Linder, “Civil Religion in Historical Perspective: The Reality that Underlies the Concept,” 
Journal of Church and State 17 (1975): 399; Julia Reinhard Lupton, Citizen-saints: Shakespeare and political 
theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); John M. Najemy, “Papirius and the Chickens, or 
Machiavelli on the Necessity of Interpreting Religion,” Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (1999): 659–681; 
Lodi Nauta, “Hobbes on Religion and the Church between The Elements of Law and Leviathan: A Dramatic 
Change of Direction?,” Journal of the History of Ideas 63 (2002): 577–598; The Sacred and Profane in English 
Renaissance literature, ed. Mary Arshagouni Papazian (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008); Jonathan 
Sheehan, “Sacrifice Before the Secular,” Representations 105 (2009): 12–36; Guy G. Stroumsa, “John Spencer 
and the Roots of Idolatry,” History of Religions 41, no. 1 (2001): 1–23; Elliott Visconsi, “The Invention of 
Criminal Blasphemy: Rex v. Taylor (1676),” Representations 103, no. 1 (2008): 30–52; and Alexandra 
Walsham, “The Reformation and ‘the Disenchantment of the World’ Reassessed,” The Historical Journal 51 
(2008): 497–528. 
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religion from false, set up the terms in which religion could be defined in anthropological 
terms. As Jonathan Sheehan sums it up, “by embedding idolatry within the matrix of human 
nature and by making religion a matter of practice, the theoreticians and scholars of idolatry 
established the categories for the anthropological investigation of human religion.” For 
Sheehan, this embedding does not diminish the power of religion but rather shows it to be a 
human construct whose terms—like “sacred” and “profane”—suddenly opened up to new 
definitions.7  
The one thing all these studies seem to have in common is that they argue, implicitly 
or not, that the basic idea behind the religious transformations of the early modern period is 
that religion was increasingly seen as something to be manipulated: a human creation that 
existed to foster necessary bonds of polity, society, and community. Another way of arguing 
this is to say that as “religion” came to be defined primarily in terms of interior piety it also 
became separable from the exoteric rituals of popular culture; once this happened, the history 
of religions is best described as a history of fictions, a history of representations, whether 
human or divine. Baruch Spinoza provided a crucial argument of this sort in the late 
seventeenth century, and his influence is evident in a wide range of modern intellectual 
disciplines. Spinoza’s method of interpretation prizes contextualization and natural causation 
to explain the history of religious revelation, which appears as a series of socially useful 
devices accommodated to specific peoples at specific times. Religion, Spinoza argues, is 
principally an internal affair, a product of piety conformed to the universal moral order. He 
calls religion “the universal divine law,” which consists not in “external actions” but in 
                                                 
7
 Sheehan, “Sacred and Profane: Idolatry, Antiquarianism and the Polemics of Distinction in the Seventeenth 
Century,” Past & Present 192 (2006): 63. 
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“simplicity and truth of mind.”8 Consequently, exoteric forms of religion are mutable and do 
depend on use: “Something intended to promote the practice of piety and religion is called 
sacred and divine and is sacred only so long as people use it religiously.”9 Thus the exoteric 
forms of religious practice essentially will be fictions designed to represent this inward moral 
order to the greatest number of people possible.10 As some have recognized, though, this kind 
of argument actually places a lot of weight on the exoteric rituals of a given society as a 
means for attaining knowledge about that society. Religion is both an internal rule 
answerable to the universal moral norm and at the same time a set of practices defined by the 
cultural horizons of a certain time and place.11  
But one can find this explosive idea latent in much of the anxiety about the 
boundaries of false religion in the Reformed tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, localized in discussions of the fictions of pagan religion and myth. Indeed, mythic 
fiction can provide a lens with which to view developments in Renaissance conceptions of 
religion; and vice versa, that changes in religion were also dependent on changing 
conceptions of the fictions and symbolism structuring religious rituals. This is where scholars 
might most fruitfully study the interconnections and intersections between religion and 
literature: the generative, destabilizing energy of literary fictions and their generic 
                                                 
8
 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ed. Jonathan Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
169 and 116. 
 
9
 Ibid., 165. 
 
10
 For the idea that religion increasingly moved inward during the early modern period, producing an ever 
greater divide between intellectual and popular accounts of religion, see especially Peter Harrison, “Religion” 
and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Peter Byrne, 
Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of Deism (London: Routledge, 1989); Peter Burke, 
Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, rev. ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994); and John Bossy, “Some 
Elementary Forms of Durkheim,” Past & Present 95 (1982): 3–18. 
 
11
 For a critique of the “interiority thesis,” see Sheehan, “Sacred and Profane,” 63–65. 
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complexity can help us uncover similar realignments in the religious reinterpretation of 
pagan myths and cultures.  
This is an important problem, because for literary scholars “pagan” and “classical” 
have long been shibboleths for secularism and the process of secularization, itself a highly 
problematic concept with potentially multiple points of origin in the early modern period.12 
The terms for this identification were developed by Jacob Burckhardt, and kept alive by later 
critics as William Elton, Gordon Teskey, and Richard Strier. Elton’s King Lear and the Gods 
is the classic work of the pagan/secular identification: the play’s universe, its natural imagery 
and natural philosophy, showed Elton that the “pagan” setting privileges the interplay of 
classical philosophies that Peter Gay had identified as the basis of the Enlightenment.13 With 
a similar critical horizon, Richard Strier’s The Unrepentant Renaissance is otherwise an 
excellent collection of close readings, happily attempting to refute modern critics who 
emphasize a kind of New Historicist pessimism about the potency of Renaissance 
individualism. But we encounter passages repeating the problematic pagan/secular equation, 
claiming, for example, “Seneca’s De Beneficiis as the primary classical (secular) source for 
Shakespeare’s commitment to ‘the virtue of giving.’”14 The book celebrates the triumph of 
secularism as a “revolution,” rooted in “a conception of life in the world as compatible with, 
even constituting, the highest form of spiritual life.” And so, to “deny ‘utterly’ the medieval 
                                                 
12
 See Jonathan Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay,” The 
American Historical Review 108 (2003): 1061–1080; and Niklaus Largier, “Mysticism, Modernity, and the 
Invention of Aesthetic Experience,” Representations 105, no. 1 (2009): 37–60. 
 
13
 For a similar reading of paganism and natural theology in the sixteenth century, see Alan Sinfield, “Sidney, 
Du Plessis–Mornay, and the Pagans,” Philological Quarterly 58 (1979): 26–39. 
 
14
 Strier, The Unrepentant Renaissance: From Petrarch to Shakespeare to Milton (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 20n48. 
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distinction between religion and secular life is to make (or participate in) this revolution.”15 
This way of thinking about the Reformation as a secularist movement is only half right, 
though. It is more useful to view the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as periods in which 
the relationship between the religious and the secular was continually being redefined and 
readjusted. For example, it is equally useful to look for the kinds of individualism that Strier 
values in Reformation critiques of religion as well as in the space opened up by the debates 
of religious symbolism and political belonging that accompanied the scholarship, poetry, and 
polemic of false religion.  
It need not be difficult to place the discourse of pagan myth and literature within what 
has been described by Ken Jackson and Arthur F. Marotti as a “turn to religion” among 
literary critics.16 This body of criticism nominally eschews the hermeneutics of suspicion, the 
role assumed by the critic of unmasking religions and reducing them to their poetic or 
political elements. As Jackson and Marotti see it, the new favored critical stance toward 
religion is a cautious acceptance of the terms of early modern religion itself, which can 
produce expansive readings of the social, political, and individual consequences of early 
modern religion without reducing belief to illusion. But too often critics are caught up in the 
polemical arguments of the confessional divide, which characterized differing forms of 
Christian religion as poetic fables, false religion masquerading as the true religion of ancient 
Christianity. A study of pagan religion can help to fill in the space that Jackson and Marotti 
describe, a space between acknowledging religion as false and accepting others’ beliefs as 
valid. Pagan religion was obviously “false” for early modern Christians, and so a study of its 
terms actually provided early moderns with the language with which to speak of the common 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 14. 
 
16
 Jackson and Marotti, “The Turn to Religion in Early Modern English Studies,” Criticism 46 (2004): 167–90. 
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origin of all religions outside of confessional strife; pagan myths were especially good at 
encouraging reflection on the symbolic structure of religious signification, and its civil 
implications. Pagan religion and myth thus formed a generative, rather than only a polemical, 
error for early moderns, which is why it can help us to see new forms of religious expression 
outside of the familiar Enlightenment dichotomy of reason and unreason, or between 
“defamiliarizing experiences and familiar knowledge.”17 To dwell on pagan religion as an 
error—as a universally acknowledged fictional religion—and to view its languages and 
stories as a free space, which opens up new realms of religious affiliation, political 
rearrangement, social belonging, and natural knowledge, is the goal of my dissertation. After 
all, the idea of a “pagan renewal” has long structured both scholarly and popular 
understandings of what the Renaissance means, what it was all about. The space between 
popular literary genres and stories and the “false religion” underlying them is the space of my 
project. 
My chapters thus seek out moments of exchange between literary and religious modes 
of thinking about pagan religion and myth, and bring them into dialogue. My first chapter, on 
Arthur Golding’s translation of Ovid and his translations of Calvin, re-imagines Golding’s 
prefaces as strategies for assimilating Ovid’s paganism. At the same time that he translates 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, he is also deeply engaged with some of Calvin’s most interesting 
polemics and commentaries, and heavily invested in understanding the world of the early 
Christians. The idea of the early Christian world, when pagans and Christians mixed and 
mingled, shows up in Golding’s scriptural referents in his prefaces. Perhaps most 
importantly, his long discursus on Titus 1:15, “to the pure all things are pure,” shows 
Golding’s argument that to confront false religion is a bodily, physical endeavor. The fictions 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 182. 
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of Ovid’s myths are physical, certainly, but Golding’s interpretive method emphasizes the 
need to recognize a fundamental material similarity between Christians and pagans as the 
basis for reading the products of another religion. And as Golding’s forays into the vestiarian 
controversy and the religious transformations of the Elizabethan church under Cecil 
demonstrate, the history of Christian encounters with paganism provided the baseline of 
argument for important questions of ecclesiastical organization and the political 
consequences of confronting false religion. 
My second chapter moves from hermeneutics to debates over pagan rituals and their 
place in the Christian church. Richard Hooker, Christopher Marlowe, and William 
Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream appropriate pagan religious customs to argue for 
the place of religion within politics and society. The line between the “secular” and the 
“religious” is rarely more tenuous for these writers; and as they weave their representations 
and arguments about pagan religions, they are also defining the place of religious fictions in 
their society and in their own works. Paganism, read as a fictional, human creation, gives 
these artists and thinkers a free space to construct alternative versions of religious politics 
outside of the actual. But, what I find remarkable and worth revisiting in these writers is the 
fact that pagan religion and its myths remain in the boundaries of religion itself: they are not 
coterminous with the secular. Rather, they provide evidence of the complex discourses of 
political religion and religious fiction in the late sixteenth century. 
My third chapter reconsiders John Milton’s early poetry in the light of arguments 
about religious space, which became the basis for debates about the meaning of the sacred: 
whether it was created by practice and ritual or whether it was an immutable concept. 
Milton’s 1645 poems, filled with images of memorials, monuments, sacred groves, tree 
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nymphs, and genii, provides a surprisingly rich body of material to chart the progress of false 
religion in the 1630s. Milton’s early poetry especially was marked by an ambivalence over 
the materials of worship that he resolved later on in his epics and prose.18 I read Milton’s 
early poetry as self-consciously reflecting on the potential within pagan fictions to remake 
the ritualistic foundations of political and social relationships; the mendacious rituals of 
Comus, for example, demonstrate by negative example that the sacred must be created out of 
the materials of the profane. This impulse in Milton, itself a brief moment in his poetic and 
intellectual career, shows how a powerful imagination could access the scholarly revisions of 
mythographic symbolism and harness them to redefine the relationship between the sacred 
and the profane. 
I find a similar willingness to explore and experiment with the boundaries of religion 
in the poetry of Robert Herrick, the subject of my fourth and final chapter. I argue that 
Herrick’s Hesperides is torn between two conflicting poles of religious culture. As a post-
Laudian poet, Herrick often feels the need to expand the horizons of the sacred into the 
realms of the personal and the social, to suggest that pagan and Christian forms might find 
common ground in their practice in everyday life. However, he also feels compelled to limit 
the sacred, whittling and refining it down to its smallest forms. Hence his obsession with 
“little” things, and the way that devotional objects tend to shrink and diminish in his poetic 
voice. I argue that, far from a diminution of the power of religion, these small forms 
revitalize religion by shifting its force into the realm of the symbolic. Thus, the exoteric 
expansion of mixed rituals in some of his poetry is ultimately subordinated to the esotericism 
of the intricate symbol or the puppet, the efficacious object that takes the place of the human 
or the living within religious rituals. This refinement of religion contributes to other, 
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contemporary revisions of the place of religious symbolism within political and social 
structures. The power of Herrick’s fictions opens up a vista onto an ancient religion suddenly 
made new again in its symbolic economy, a model perhaps for a religious polity torn by very 
real, violent sacrifices.  
In a way, my project forms a revision of the prehistory of comparative religion. 
Instead of seeing the roots of Vico’s social history of religion in the scientific criticism that 
produced powerful distinctions of true and false, I locate the generative, fictive force of false 
religion as the genesis of a renewed symbolist streak in religious thought. In this way my 
project represents a call to attend to the areas where religion and its explanatory power 
becomes contingent, in its interactions with poetry, legal thought, and political identity. And 
as I will go on to argue, we can look to the polemical battles of the early church to provide a 
lens with which to view the interrelations between the poetic force of received traditions and 
eternally mutable forms, and the civil representations of political power, whether in the 
sovereign, the people, or the dead. This way of reading pagan literature in the Renaissance 
both reduces and privileges the place of natural knowledge: naturalism is no longer the only 
source of the secular, but the transformations of natural objects legitimated the newly 
ascendant religion of representations that we find in the seventeenth century. This project 
revises narratives of secularization and the place of the “pagan renewal” in the Renaissance, 
finding in literary fictions an analogue and finally a source for the complexity of modern 
debates about religious history. 
 
I. The Antiquarian Varro and his Three Theologies 
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Renaissance its ideas about pagan religion have their origins in the ancient world, especially 
the period of late antiquity when pagans and Christians co-existed in the same society. 
Indeed, the interaction between Christian and pagan religions in late antiquity provided the 
basis for many enduring religious distinctions in the Renaissance. And indeed there is one 
figure who looms larger than others in Renaissance understanding of pagan religion, namely 
the Roman antiquarian Marcus Terentius Varro. His idea of a tripartite theology was very 
influential in the Renaissance, an idea that we know almost wholly from St. Augustine’s 
discussion of it in his City of God Against the Pagans. Augustine’s book cemented many 
enduring distinctions between the new religion and traditional forms of paganism that he 
excoriates. The heart of Augustine’s critique of the operation of paganism comes in several 
key chapters in book 6, where he adduces the Roman historian Varro’s analysis of pagan 
theology. These passages are, I believe, central to an understanding the early modern 
reception of pagan religion: they set the terms of debate that would set the standard for 
centuries of thinking on the subject of religion’s relationship both to art and to the state. A 
careful consideration of them is compulsory for a study examining the origins of the modern 
and early modern transpositions of religion, art, politics, and culture. 
It is easy to miss just how important these chapters are for Augustine’s larger 
narrative and argument. Varro’s work represented the very heart of intellectual paganism for 
Augustine; it seems to have been a work that attempted a grand synthesis of the various 
forces that the pagan world venerated and incorporated into its religious, political, and social 
institutions. Augustine chooses the very strongest point of Varro’s to attack however: the 
idea that pagan religion united poetic, natural, and civil understandings of both the divine and 
the human. Augustine portrays Varro and his scholarship in generally glowing terms, and he 
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seems genuinely to revere Varro. His presentation of Varro’s ideas is of course skewed to 
Augustine’s perspective, but there is little reason to think that Augustine is using Varro as a 
straw man.  
As Augustine notes, when Varro produced his analysis of pagan religion he was 
writing a history of religious rituals and how those rituals mediated responses to the divine. 
This is why, according to Augustine, he gave precedence to human things: says Varro, “Just 
as the painter exists before the picture and the builder before the building, so do cities 
precede the things instituted by cities.”19 This turns out to be good metaphor for what Varro 
thinks of religion, as Augustine goes on to relate. In the next chapter he introduces Varro’s 
three kinds of theology, or “accounts given of the gods”: “Of these, he calls one mythical, 
another physical, and the third civil” (246). Varro privileges the second kind as that of the 
philosophers, but removes it from popular consideration. The natural allegory of the Greek 
philosophers cannot be readily understood and so cannot function as a socially and politically 
cohesive force. So, in Augustine’s formulation, Varro makes an alliance between the first and 
third kinds of theology, between the “mythic” theology of the poets and the “civil” theology 
of the urban politicians. Augustine seizes on this and expands on what he views as a natural 
association of the arts of the theater and of poetry with the arts of civil religion. Both kinds of 
art are essentially performative. Poets encourage belief in the gods through theatrical 
performances, while priests, according to Varro, administer “the knowledge of which gods 
are to be worshipped publicly,” and they relate “what rites and sacrifices are appropriate to 
each” (248). And “where is the theatre,” Augustine asks, “if not in the city?” (249). 
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Poetry and religious rituals are inextricably bound up with the manipulation of the 
people, Augustine argues: “[B]oth poets and priests are so united with one another in a 
fellowship of falsehood” (249–50). At this point, we are forced to accept Augustine’s 
description of how Varro’s three theologies work together. Augustine also reports Varro’s 
attempt to yoke the three types of theologies together. He quotes Varro as saying that the 
three theologies “differ in such a way that not a few elements of both of them have been 
adopted into the civil theology. We shall, then, describe what the civil theology has in 
common with each of the others, as well as what is peculiar to itself; but we must keep 
company more with the philosophers than with the poets” (251). But Augustine never lets us 
see how Varro would link the civil and natural theologies. Rather, he argues that Varro 
wanted to condemn the civil theology but could not, because he was constrained by 
expectations of his audience. According to Augustine, Varro wanted to demonstrate the 
similarities between “the city” and the “the theatre” in order to “prepare a place in men’s 
minds for the natural theology” (260). But, says Augustine, “Varro was “afraid to speak out 
against the most vicious beliefs of the people” (249). So, evidently it was not Varro’s 
argument that the mythical and civil theologies are both based on malicious and misleading 
fictions, but that is certainly what Augustine argues and is what became one of the 
intellectual legacies of his book.  
 Yet we do get glimmerings of how Varro would have understood the natural 
theology to work together with the others. It seems that Varro found the origins of civil rites 
in the efforts of the first philosophers to reveal the truths of nature through representations. 
Augustine tells us that “Varro commends these naturalistic explanations so highly as to say 
that the men of old invented the images, attributes and adornments of the gods precisely so 
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that, when those had approached the mysteries of the doctrine had seen these visible things 
with their eyes, they might also see with their mind the soul of the world and its parts” (274). 
This invention of images would also seem to be the basis for the creation of religious worship 
among the Romans. Augustine does say a bit later that he will turn to the question of 
“whether he has been able in that book to bring this natural theology into agreement with the 
civil theology” (275). This could indicate that it was Varro’s intent to try to bring the two 
into line. But Augustine is quick to argue that even if Varro could show a basis in nature for 
the civil religion, it would not matter because “not even the natural theology which gives him 
so much pleasure is true” (ibid.). The key to Varro’s system seems, and we cannot be sure, to 
be rooted in the natural origins of religious representation. As Varro argued, the ancients had 
created a system of representation so that natural truths could be understood: an image leads 
its viewer from itself to an idea about nature and divinity that it presents to the viewer. These 
various representations create divisions, because one thing (a natural phenomenon) thus 
comes to be worshipped via a metaphorical symbol or image. This, at least, is what 
Augustine attacks when he notes that on the face of it a god like “Tellus” (the earth) should 
be whole unto itself, and yet we find Tellus divided into Orcus and Proserpina. In turn, they 
are “worshipped as three with their own altars, their own shrines, their own rites, images and 
priests” (295–96). This provenance of religious rituals is at least a coherent account of how 
Varro might have untied the natural and the civil theologies, even though Augustine’s 
commentary is paramount. 
Augustine gives us even more hints about how Varro might have constructed his 
history of pagan religious worship. Varro was inclined, Augustine wrote, to look for 
linguistic origins of the various gods. Augustine quotes him as saying that “Tellus is Ops, 
  
 19
because is improved by work [opus]; Mother, because she gives birth to many things; Great, 
because gives birth to food; Proserpine, because fruits creep forth [proserpant] from her” 
(297). This was a common move in Stoic etymologies, to attempt to find historical origins for 
the gods in the first human utterances.20 There is thus a fundamental truth to be found in the 
names of gods, and this truth is also linked to the ideas about nature set up by the first 
philosophers. But just as those philosophers create images and divide natural objects into 
representations, so does language divide and develop into many different forms. Varro 
explains this phenomenon by arguing that “it is possible . . . for the same thing to be one, yet 
to have many things contained in it” (ibid.). But this multiplication of divinity was what 
Augustine wanted to attack. So he argues that Varro had “misgivings” about what Augustine 
calls “the authority of his mistaken forebears” (ibid.). For Augustine, then, pagan religion is 
defined from the outset by the creation of a symbolic mode of worship that used 
representations to signify religious truths. But, he argues, these representations spin out of 
control, dividing and ramifying into many gods to the point that the original god is lost in the 
sea of names and images. But Varro himself seems to have defended this system by arguing 
that any civilly functioning religious system will have to rely on myths accommodated to the 
people, but that there is still a way to find the truth at the bottom of the religious traditions 
that the Romans have inherited. 
From what Augustine has given us, then, we can venture a description of what 
Varro’s threefold system of theology was designed to do. For Varro, Romans needed all three 
types of theology in order to have a functioning religious state. For an institutionalized civil 
religion to function, it needs both an element of representation and an element of natural 
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philosophy. This is why Varro dismisses the poetic fables as “false” but does not banish them 
from civil society. By juxtaposing mythic theology with natural theology, Varro creates an 
indeterminate realm of what we would think of as culture, in which representations of 
socially significant acts are performed in a realm in which the facts of history are both 
affirmed as true in time and symbolized by beings outside the strict limits of chronology. 
Varro’s civil religion is designed to support the contingent acts of a polytheistic society, in 
which widespread, popular cults coexisted with local cults of hearth and home. Varro seems 
to have been making a concession to the modern civil religion that relied on images and 
representations by arguing that even the first natural philosophers thought one could attain 
wisdom through images. But he also seems to imply that such images should be unnecessary 
for the philosopher. In any case, just what Varro believed is unclear because Augustine has 
not given us enough information. It remains perfectly clear, though, that Augustine is 
critiquing Varro’s symbolic economy of representation, allegory, and ritual; he argues that if 
Varro wants to create a civil religion that is based on representations, then he will create a 
system of worship that is utterly fictional. What is more, Augustine says that Varro’s civil 
religion does not work because it creates a distinction between the learned, who possess the 
truth about nature, and the masses who merely follow the ridiculous representations of the 
poets and legislators. And, what is worse, Augustine thought that this system founders on 
Varro’s own misgivings about the internal divisions of popular knowledge and action.  
In fact, Varro and Augustine were both struggling with the dilemma of popular 
religion. The fact that the poetic myths are “false” is Augustine’s biggest problem with this 
system; it leads the wise pagans, such as Annaeus Seneca, to reject the “rites of civil 
theology” in his “private religion while feigning respect for them in his actions” (263). Yet, 
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Augustine has to grapple just the same with the idea that one’s religious beliefs will never 
perfectly match the external circumstances of the social and political worlds. He ends up with 
the famous formulation of the members of the heavenly city as “pilgrims” in the earthly city: 
Therefore, for as long as this Heavenly City is a pilgrim on earth, she 
summons citizens of all nations and every tongue, and brings together a 
society of pilgrims in which no attention is paid to any differences in the 
customs, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is achieved or 
maintained. She does not rescind or destroy these things, however. For 
whatever differences there are among the various nations, these all tend 
towards the same end of earthly peace. Thus, she preserves and follows them, 
provided only that they do not impede the religion by which we are taught that 
the one supreme and true God is to be worshipped. (946–47) 
 
The difference between Augustine’s pilgrim and the disaffected Seneca is subtle but 
important. Augustine’s pilgrims are united in their own society of the heavenly city, “since 
the city’s life is inevitably a social one” (947). On the other hand, Seneca’s society demands 
the assumption of a certain symbolic economy between fiction, nature, and civic ritual. What 
would be “culture” for Augustine would be either indifferent to salvation or at worst inimical 
to it, whereas “culture” for Varro and even Seneca is the symbolic, representative system that 
reinforces belief and feeds back into the economy of civil, religious life. 
  
Paganism, Art, and Social Control in the Reformation 
One way to examine the continuing influence of Varro’s theology, especially his civil 
theology, is to examine two of his most astute students, Niccolo Machiavelli and John 
Calvin. Machiavelli never cites Varro, but he was one of the great proponents of the civil 
religion that Varro defended and Augustine derided. Machiavelli’s treatment occurs during 
his discussion of Numa Pompilius, ancient Rome’s second king, who introduced religious 
rituals and brought peace to the bellicose Romans. Numa had been, and continued to be, a 
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loadstone for the idea of civil religion, inviting both supporters and detractors.21 Augustine, 
in a strategy that became common, associated Numa’s religion with demons, magical 
hydromancy, and madness (City of God, pp. 310–11). For others including Machiavelli, 
however, Numa was the epitome of a cunning ruler. “[Numa] turned to religion as something 
absolutely necessary for maintaining a civilized society.”22 Religion, indeed, proved to be 
quite “useful” to Rome, “in controlling the armies, in giving courage to the plebeians, in 
keeping men good, and in shaming the wicked” (51). Machiavelli interprets Numa’s 
hydromancy as a shrewd trick: the king “pretended to have a close relationship with a nymph 
who advised him about how he should advise the people.” He did this because “he doubted 
that his own authority was sufficient” (51–52). This form of persuasion works best among 
uncivilized people, Machiavelli writes, employing an artistic conceit: “a sculptor will more 
easily extract a beautiful statue from a rough piece of marble than he can from one badly 
blocked out by others” (52). Machiavelli’s appreciation of the pagan civil religion stems from 
its manipulation of belief among the credulous, but also the way that this religion uses the 
basic propensity for religious devotion and belief among the people.23 
 Indeed, the crux of this religion is the way that the political elites support the 
foundations, arbitrary though they may be. In Machiavelli’s estimation, the fall of pagan 
religion began when its oracles began to sound too political: 
Later, as these oracles began to speak in a way similar to that of the powerful 
and their falsity was discovered by the peoples, men became disbelievers and 
capable of undermining every good institution. The rulers of a republic or a 
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kingdom must, therefore, uphold the foundations of the religion they profess; 
and having done this, they will find it an easy matter for them to maintain a 
devout republic and, as a consequence, one that is good and united. They must 
also encourage and support all those things that arise in favour of this religion, 
even those they judge to be false, and the more they have to do so, the more 
prudent they are and the more knowledgeable about natural phenomena. 
Because this method has been followed by wise men, there has arisen a belief 
in miracles that are celebrated even by false religions; thus, prudent men 
magnify their importance, no matter the principle from which they originate, 
and through the authority of these miracles they gain everyone’s confidence. 
(54) 
 
The manipulation of belief thus proceeds through an encouragement of tradition and the 
natural foundations of “miraculous” phenomena. Thus the rulers are guarded from cynicism 
by revering tradition and the populace reaps the benefits of unity. (Such a solution was 
familiar not only from Varro but also from Cicero, whose De Divinatione explicitly 
recommended such a middle way between elite skepticism and popular belief, or disbelief.24) 
Machiavelli boldly criticizes the dominant Christian institutions of his day for avoiding this 
pagan solution to the problem of religion, arguing that the pagan model of civil religion is 
more conducive to unity and strength. He is unambiguous: “If this kind of religion had been 
maintained by the clergy of Christian republics just as it had been instituted by its founder, 
Christian states and Christian republics would be more united and more happy than they are 
now” (ibid.). The basis for this unity in pagan religion was “the integrity of their religious 
ceremonies . . . because the life of every religion has its foundations in one of its principal 
institutions” (53). Cultic practices, “divine worship,” were the basis of Machiavelli’s civil 
religion, much as they were for Varro. Machiavelli recuperates the mimetic, representational 
importance of worship that Varro had emphasized, especially the symbiotic relationship 
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between natural phenomena and the corroborating evidence of belief found in idols and the 
public approbation thereof. He cites approvingly the case of the sacking of Veii, when 
Roman soldiers entered the temple of Juno and asked the idol if it wanted to come to Rome. 
Some soldiers thought they saw the statue nod approval, and “their opinion and credulity was 
strongly encouraged and supported by Camillus and the other rulers of the city” (54). The 
combination of popular belief, natural phenomena, artistic representations, and the support of 
political leaders is the essence of Varro’s theology. 
 The terms of Machiavelli’s extraordinary arguments, if not their conclusions, were 
part of a widespread reforming impulse in the early sixteenth century. Once again, pagan 
religions form the unstated background context. On this count, John Calvin’s similarities 
with Machiavelli run deeper than might be expected. His Institution of Christian Religion 
begins by accepting the terms, but criticizing the argument, of Machiavelli’s and Varro’s 
theology. One of the foundations of Calvin’s own theology was the idea that the need for 
religious devotion of some kind is universal. He argues that “it is most vaine which some doe 
saye, that religion was devised by the sutteltie and craft of a few, by this policie to kepe the 
simple people in awe.”25 He continues, “I graunt indede that suttle men have invented many 
thinges in religion, whereby to bring the people to a reverence, and cast them in a feare, to 
make their mindes the more pliable to obedience: but this they coulde never have brought to 
passe unlesse the mindes of men had been already before hand perswaded that there was a 
God, out of which persuasion as out of sede springeth that ready inclinacion to religion” (fol. 
4r). Calvin acknowledges, of course, that the common people are easily manipulated, as 
Machiavelli noted, by the inborn desire to worship God and adhere to religious institutions. 
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And as in Machiavelli’s writings, the basis for this devotion is, at least partially, natural 
knowledge as confirmed by the senses: “for asmuch as the unlearned people yea and the 
rudest sort of them, such as ar furnished with the only helpe of their eyes, can not be 
ignoraunt of the excellencie of gods conning workmanship” (fol. 6v). Calvin’s natural 
theology was largely unremarkable, a collection of scholastic commonplaces, though it is 
characterized by more than a little anxiety about how nature might be used to manipulate the 
people and reinforce credulity. This was the case because Calvin could not be sure how or 
what natural phenomena could teach humans about god: it confirmed his existence but 
provided little definite knowledge.  
 Thus Calvin’s thought tended toward the utilitarianism of Machiavelli when it came 
to religion and politics, but with a crucial difference. As William Bouwsma argues, “One of 
the worst abominations of classical antiquity, Calvin thought, had been the cynical 
exploitation of religion by rulers for purposes of social control.”26 The elites merely faked 
their religious beliefs, meanwhile withholding what they thought to be the truth. This is of 
course Varro’s theology, which Calvin saw replicating itself across Europe as “suttle men” 
feigned their religion all over again. This anxiety manifested itself, much as Varro’s had, in 
an uneasiness with the way that natural objects, which otherwise transmit knowledge about 
God’s existence, can be turned into tools for mass manipulation. Calvin even cites Varro’s 
condemnation of the use of images in worship (fol. 24v). “It is a foolish fained invencion,” 
he writes, “whatsoever we conceive of our own sense concerning God” (fol. 23v). Varro 
himself thought, as Augustine has it in The City of God, that “the people on the whole” are 
“more inclined to follow the poets than the natural philosophers.” And this is partially 
because “supposedly prudent and wise men made it their business to deceive the people in 
                                                 
26
 Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 204.  
  
 26
matters of religion” (184). Natural knowledge for Varro was to be kept from the vulgar 
because its truths were too distant from experience; however, for Calvin natural knowledge 
itself proved God’s existence but its manipulation for civil or artistic persuasion was 
abhorrent. Similarly, the crucial distinction between reformed Christianity and paganism, and 
the “parapolytheism”27 of contemporary lay devotion, is the distrust of the products of human 
art no matter how they are put to the service of civil society. Part of Calvin’s purpose in these 
opening pages of his Institutes is to deal with the problems that come from humanity’s inborn 
desire to worship, a desire easily manipulated especially among the “vulgar.” Calvin was 
certainly thinking through the same issues as Machiavelli was, and using some of the same 
terms, though Calvin came to radically different conclusions. 
Calvin’s next lengthy excursus is on idolatry, and there he acknowledges that the 
desire to manipulate natural objects and to set them up as divine substitutes has long been 
taught by custom. But this kind of representation of God divides his will from his creation: 
for that there is nothyng lesse conuenient than to bryng God to the measure of 
fyue fote which is aboue all measure and incomprehensyble. And yet thys 
same monstrous thyng which manifestly repugneth agaynste the order of 
nature, custome sheweth to be naturall to men. We must moreover holde in 
minde, that superstitions are in Scripture commonly rebuked in thys phrase of 
speache, that they are ye workes of mens hande which want the authoritie of 
God: that thys may be certayne, that all these maners of worshipping that men 
do deuise of them selues are detestable. The Prophete in the Psalme doeth 
amplife the madnesse of them that therfore are endued wyth vnderstandyng, 
that they shoulde know that al thynges are moued with the only power of God, 
and yet they pray for helpe to thinges dead and senselesse. But because the 
corruption of nature carryeth as wel al nacions, as eche man priuatlye to so 
great madnesse, at last the holy ghost thondreth wyth terryble curse agaynst 
them saying: let them that make them become lyke to them and so many as 
trust in them. And it is to be noted that a similitude is no lesse forbydden than 
a grauen image, wherby the fonde sutteltie of the Grekes is confuted. For they 
thynke they ar wel discharged if they graue not a God, while in payntinges 
they do more licentiously outrage than any other nations. But the Lord 
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forbyddeth an image not onely to be made by the grauer, but also to be 
counterfaited by any other workman, because such counterfaiting is euill and 
to the dishonor of his maiestie. (fol. 24r) 
 
The “sutteltie” of art is one of Calvin’s favorite ways to denigrate religious fiction for its 
divisive effects on religious worship. However, immediately after his condemnation of art he 
qualifies it, reclaiming at least the mimetic functions of art while worrying over the tendency 
of art to mislead: “And yet am I not so superstitious that I thinke no images maye be suffred 
at al. But forasmuch as caruing and painting are the giftes of God, I require that they both be 
purely and lawfully vsed. . . . It remayneth therefore lawfull that onelye those thynges bee 
painted and grauen whereof our eies are capable: but that the maiestie of God which is far 
aboue the sense of our eies, be not abused with vncomly deuised shapes” (fol. 26v). Calvin 
had previously, and repeatedly, questioned the value of art and linked art to the debasing 
inventions of men applied to religion. The ancient philosophers especially are guilty of 
translating their views of nature into their divinity:  
The Stoikes seemed in theyr owne conceipte to speake very wysely, that out 
of all the partes of nature may be gathered diuers names of God, and yet that 
God beyng but one is not therby torne in sonder. As though we were not 
already more than enough enclined to vanitie, vnlesse a manifolde plentie of 
gods set before vs should further and more violently drawe vs into errour. 
Also the Egyptians mysticall science of diuinitie sheweth, that they all 
diligently endeuored to this ende, not to seeme to erre without a reason. And it 
is possible, that at the fyrst syght some thyng semyng probable, might deceyue 
the symple and ignorant: but no mortall man euer inuented any thing, wherby 
religion hath not ben fowly corrupted. (fol. 10v) 
 
Calvin struggles, just as Augustine did, to replace Varro’s triangulation of fabulous, natural, 
and civil theologies. Varro’s own system, which privileged natural theology, was derived 
from the Stoics, and solved the problem of popular access by granting some measure of 
natural legitimacy to the multitude of gods, which mirrored the quotidian, civil concerns of 
the multitude itself. One reason for Calvin’s struggle to reorient this system is that he never 
  
 28
decided on the value of natural knowledge in the same way that the Italian mystagogues did; 
he never identified a way to transmute the natural into allegorical representations of the 
divine. And so he ended up affirming a limited value for human arts, a mimetic but non-civil 
and non-symbolic use value. 
 Thus, the crucial mediating idea within the discourse of civil religion was the status 
of fiction and poetic making. The religious fiction of Machiavelli and the pagans he admired 
was a version of Plato’s “noble lie,” a religious truth created by the wise for the cause of 
unity. For Varro, the fictions of the poets abetted the fictions of the lawgiver, and this system 
held together because there was a natural legitimacy for multiple gods, even though the 
ultimate truths of this natural theology had to be hidden away. For Calvin on the other hand, 
religious fiction no longer had a basis in nature, which merely set the baseline for religious 
experience, the belief in God, but did not provide concrete truths. And so it made sense for 
Calvin to limit artistic expression to those things that corresponded directly to sensory 
impressions. Anything else verged too closely on a kind of civil religion in which legislators 
turned to poetry and representation for the religious approbation of social and civil policy.   
 
Mythography, Media, and Religion as Culture 
For students of the Renaissance reception of pagan myths and religion, there is no getting 
around the fact that in this period pagan religions were thought, and believed, to be 
completely false. If understood on their own terms rather than syncretically, pagan religions 
and their gods were almost universally thought to be fictional, created by man, and put to the 
purpose of misleading the people; they were absurd and ridiculous, and to study them in 
depth was constantly to be reminded that man creates fictions in the service of religion. And 
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yet, there were ways that this body of religious fiction could be put to the use of Christian 
theology and artistic representation. Mythographers looked for ways to find the kernel of 
hidden truth in the body of lies, to identify the one principle that formed the basis of the 
pagan religions, but from which the pagans deviated. Lilio Gregorio Giraldi’s scholarly 
mythography, De Deis Gentium Varia & Multiplex Historia (1548) takes etymology as its 
principle of differentiation, but Giraldi remains just as vexed by the problem of pagan natural 
theology and religious fiction as his predecessors. Giraldi proposes that the names of the 
gods derive from those things common to all in nature or daily life. But he finds unity in the 
idea that all peoples express the name of God with four letters. This is all fairly 
straightforward; the difficulty arises when one starts to investigate how the pagans’ system of 
religious representation functioned. Essentially, Giraldi, argues, this process is a kind of 
cultural history, or ethnography; it takes into account rituals, laws, ceremonies, names, and 
symbols. It slowly starts to dawn on the reader that when Giraldi talks about pagan religion 
he is really talking about all religions. And so Giraldi at the beginning of his work dwells on 
how religions are created out of what is common to all:  
Sed uti Sol, Luna, Coelum, Terra, Mare, communia sunt omnibus, licet et aliis 
apud alios nominibus appellentur: ita eadem ratione unus est Deus, cuius 
ubique vis est & providentia, omnia alit, sustinet, exornat: alii tamen apud 
alios sunt ritus legibus instituti, aliae caerimoniae, alia nomina, alia symbola, 
obscure quidem e primis auctoribus condita & consecrata, uni tamen supremo 
& praepotenti quae aptari & convenire debent, quorum omnium 
interpretationem & explicationem non facile, nec sine periculo quilibet 
disquirere, vel praesumere potest.28 
 
[But just as the sun, moon, sky, land, and sea are common to all, it makes 
sense that among different peoples they are called by different names. Thus by 
the same rationale there is one God, whose strength and providence nourishes, 
sustains, and enlivens all things. Nevertheless there are various rituals set up 
by laws among various peoples, and various ceremonies, names, and symbols. 
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Those things that ought to be accommodated to the one supreme and all-
powerful being were obscurely set up and consecrated by their first authors; 
and whoever is able to venture an interpretation and explication of such things 
does so not easily, nor without danger.] 
 
 The danger of such work is to remain convinced of one’s own method of distinguishing true 
from false, given the common source of religious traditions. The absurdity and errors of 
pagan religions might easily drift into the realm of Christian experience.  
 Giraldi dutifully rehearses Varro’s threefold theology (p. 18), and especially focuses 
on the problems of the natural theology. All religious imagery, he argues, takes its force from 
deformations of natural objects. But this deformation can lead to greater understanding 
among the wise, if rightly interpreted. Religious fiction works, Giraldi says, by means of the 
idea of the container and contained. A vase contains wine, which signifies Bacchus; 
similarly, a human form contains a rational mind, just as the world contains a rational soul: 
Videtis ne igitur, ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis, ratio sit tracta 
ad commenticos & fictos deos, quae res genuit falsas opiniones, erroresque 
turbulentas, & superstitiones pene aniles. Et formae enim deorum nobis, & 
aetates, & vestes, & ornatus noti sunt: & cetera quae subiungit. Quin etiam 
Varro, Antiquos ait simulacra deorum & insignia ornatusque finxisse, quae 
cum oculis animadvertissent hi qui adiissent doctrinae mysteria, possent 
animam mundi ac partes eius, id est deos veros animo videre: quorum qui 
simulachra specie hominis fecerunt, hoc videri secutos, quod mortalium 
animus, qui est in corpore humano, similimus est immortalis animi, tanquam 
si vasa ponerentur causa notandorum deorum, & in Liberi aedem oenophorum 
sisteretur, quod significaret vinum, per id quod continet id quod continetur: ita 
per simulachrum, quod formam haberet humanam, significari animam 
rationale, eo quod velut vase natura ista soleat contineri, cuius naturae Deum 
volebant esse, vel deos. haec ex Varrone. (p. 19) 
 
[As Augustine writes: don’t you see, then, that explanation is withdrawn from 
natural things that have been found to be useful, and pulled toward deceitful 
and fictive gods, which generates false opinions and disruptive errors, along 
with foolish superstitions verging on old wives’ tales. Indeed the forms of the 
gods, along with their ages, clothing, and accoutrements are well known to us 
(and these things Augustine then subjoins to his work). Later on in 
Augustine’s work, Varro said that the ancients made simulacra, symbols, and 
images of the gods, so that those who wished to learn about the mysteries 
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could use them to look upon, that they might be able to see, with their mind, 
the soul of the world and its parts, which is to say the true gods. And so the 
ancients made images of the gods in human form, because they were anxious 
that the mind of men, which is in the human body, be seen as similar to the 
immortal soul, just as if a dish might be used to represent the gods; or if a 
wine vessel was placed in the temple of Bacchus, which might signify wine, 
the container signifying that which is contained. Thus through a simulacrum 
that has a human form they wanted to signify the rational soul, just as they 
wished God, or the gods, to be of the same nature as that which is contained in 
a dish. Thus argues Varro.]  
 
This passage is taken almost wholly from Augustine, who was rehearsing Varro’s arguments 
about how the natural theology became expressed in the representations that formed the basis 
for the civil theology (cf. City of God, p. 274). Giraldi, perhaps like Augustine as well, seems 
to accept the rationale behind the creation of religious symbols from nature. However, and 
once again, the problem becomes that if one assumes a common principle of symbolic 
function among different religions, all differences begin to seem illusory. Giraldi seems to 
accept Varro’s explanation of religious representation as universally valid, at least in terms of 
the distinction between how the “wise” and unwise approach these representations. But 
Giraldi never quite solves the problem of the “falsity” or “truth” of religious representation; 
rather he attempts to argue that the issue is really one of application. If images and 
representations, which derive from nature, are set up in places of worship and shown in 
public, among the people, then they are apt to be misused and misunderstood: 
Atque adeo hinc est factum, ut mihi in Syntagmatibus his nonnihil 
laborandum sit, ut haec de deorum habitu & ornatu, picturaque antiquroum, 
figmenta patefacerem, irridendi scilicet & exsibilandi causa: quanquam & 
vereor, ne & aliqui mihi (ut hoc nunc tempore permulti sunt, qui alio res 
transferunt, pie institutas) vitio vertant, tot divorum divarumque imagines, tot 
effigies, non in templis modo & sacrarum aedium parietibus parum honeste & 
sancte confictas, sed passim etiam locis publicis & profanis, & irreligiosis. At 
de istiusmodi magis mutire possumus, quam palam loqui. (p. 20) 
 
[But certainly from here it came about, and as I have striven to show in my 
work, that these fictions of the ancients about the appearances, decorations, 
  
 32
and representations of the gods, were set up in order to be laughed at and 
mocked. Although I fear lest anyone (and in this time there are many who take 
things piously done and turn them to other uses) turn these things to ill, all 
these images of gods and goddesses, all these effigies, which were made and 
set up dishonestly and impiously not only in temples and within the walls of 
holy buildings, but also everywhere in places that were profane, irreligious, 
and open to the people. But about these things it is better to be silent than to 
speak openly.]   
 
The real distinction that Giraldi is interested in is the one between the philosophers and the 
people, those who can understand images out of context. And even after rehearsing Varro’s 
three theologies he remains ready to indict the pagans for vulgarizing religious 
representations, the way that the pagans set up idols and images not only in the temples but 
also in public places.  
  To rephrase the problem, Giraldi remains uneasy because he realizes that the natural 
theology cannot contain the impulse to create religious fictions, to create simulacra and 
images that represent social and civil ideas. Natural knowledge can be fictionalized and 
represented, and this is acceptable; but when memories of the dead, and virtuous people, are 
divinized then this is dangerous because it politicizes and humanizes religion through an 
artifice of utility: 
Rudes ergo & simplices homines cum quosdam inter ipsos cernerent, qui 
magna & admiranda vel virtutum, vel caeterarum rerum praeclara facinora 
efficerent, illos ipsos plusquam homines, hoc est Deos putabant: vel ut fieri 
solet, interdum in admirationem praesentis potentiae ac fortunae, sive ob 
beneficia etiam quibus erant affecti, ac bene ad humanitatem compositi. 
Deinde cum reges ipsi his chari fuissent, quibus vitam composuissent, 
magnum sui desiderium mortui reliquerunt: unde & simulachra primum 
eorum finxerunt ad solatium. (p. 20) 
 
[When the rude and simple people discerned some among them, who 
performed great and famous deeds full of virtue, they took these people to be 
more than human, that is to say gods. This came about through admiration of 
their evident power and fortune, or through the graces with which they were 
endowed, and which they brought to human kind. And so when these kings 
were beloved by those whose lives they provided for, their deaths left a great 
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longing for them; whence the people first made simulacra of them for their 
solace.]  
 
Once again, the distinction between wisdom and the lack thereof serves as an explanation of 
the mistakes of ancient religion. But the distinction threatens to remove “religion” entirely 
from the considerations of the learned, a problem for Calvin as well and perhaps the entire 
Reformed tradition.29 And while Giraldi acknowledges the recognition of “unknown gods” in 
antiquity, his focus remains on the exoteric, symbolic religion of the pagans. Still, Giraldi 
remains committed to what is essentially a modified Stoic solution to the problem of 
religious diversity. There is a primal unity, he thinks, and this unity justifies the investigation 
of the multitude of allegories and fictions produced out of it. But there is always the lurking 
sense that the fictions are dangerous, and indeed that all religion depends on artifice. 
 The fictive gods, the lies and artifice of the poets, sit among the mythographers like 
an unwelcome guest. They are to be banished, if possible. It was fiction itself that troubled all 
the mythographers, not just Giraldi. So it is not surprising that one of the most interesting, 
and anxious, treatments of myth in the sixteenth century is Vincenzo Cartari’s work on the 
images of the gods, Le imagini de i Dei degli Antichi, translated into English in 1599 as The 
Fountaine of Ancient Fiction. The ideal of this work is the religion without images, the kind 
of belief that does not require external support. In other words, the natural theology, which in 
Cartari’s work takes the form of an idealized, pre-civilized world in which simple tokens of 
devotion were prized over complex idols made of valuable metals. This original form of 
religion is thus a “natural religion.” What happens next, though, is that a kind of political 
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religion takes over very quickly from the natural religion. The belief that statues and images 
contain gods proves to be a repository for the desires of entire cities and peoples. And 
eventually that leads, argues Cartari, to the veneration of men who invented things helpful to 
human life. He doesn’t mention Euhemerus, and in fact he seems more interested in how this 
kind of human-centered religion tended to perpetuate civic virtue. He comments: 
“wherevpon Eusebius writing of the Ecclesiasticall historie, likewise writeth, That it was a 
generall custome among the Gentiles to honour the greatest personages, and men of best 
demerit, by representing their Ideas by Statues or Pictures, and so by that meanes keeping 
them as it were aliue by the memorious trophies of their neuer-dying worthinesse; wherby 
their succeeding posteritie might euidently perceiue what respectiue regard was had and 
cannonized of those who had in their life time adioined to their valerous approuements, ciuile 
and vertuous conuersation.”30 This was indeed a “civil theology,” which joined with poetic 
fictions to promote a virtuous civil existence. Yet, this kind of civic unity is based on the 
mistake of seeing divinity in civil virtues, which turns these civil virtues into sources for lies 
and misrepresentations of divinity itself.   
Furthermore, Cartari sees a link between the development of civil religion and the 
way that pagan societies viewed natural objects. Following Plato’s original critique of the use 
of metals in religious objects, Cartari cites several ancient authors who argue for a kind of 
golden age of religion devotion, when gods were made from trees and plants rather than from 
iron and gold: “Tibullus speaking of their domesticall gods, whom they called Lares, thus 
sayth of them: Maruell not you foolish men to see these our gods made of stockes of drie 
trees, for such (sayeth hee) in the prosperous daies of our contentfull fathers, when religion, 
faith, and Iustice were sincerely and louingly embosom'd, were reuerenced with truer zeale of 
                                                 
30
 Cartari, The Fountaine of Ancient Fiction, trans. Richard Linche (London, 1599), sig. Biiiv. 
  
 35
vnfained veneration, than are now adaies these gorgeous and gold-composed Statues” (sigs. 
Ciir–v). In pagan image worship, Cartari sees two competing trends, one toward a kind of 
atavism and ancestor worship, which tends to maintain civic virtue through the statues and 
representations of heroes, and another that tended toward corruption, as the natural world 
was misappropriated and misinterpreted to reflect greater social sophistication. To investigate 
the symbolic economy of pagan myth was thus to encounter various narratives of the 
progress of religion, all centered around the way that pagan societies used fiction to prop up 
their religions. 
In Cartari’s introduction we can see two broad categories of pagan religious fiction. 
There is the progressive aspect, the idea that we venerate the creators of useful things with 
our religious devotion. But there is also the perhaps more attractive myth of a golden age of 
primitive and pure devotion, in which nature was more connected to religious expression. 
The first kind tended to demystify religion: it suggested that people made their gods 
according to their various humors and cultural tendencies. Warlike people made warlike 
gods, etc. But the second kind saw in the development of religion in civilized cultures a 
malignant kind of blending and mixing of the religious and the civil, wherein the religious is 
harnessed by the few to control the many; or, where the base instincts for material gain 
influenced the nature of religion itself. Social and civil advancement became another name 
for religion.  
 This kind of equivalence is, to say the least, problematic for maintaining religious 
distinctions. Another way to state Cartari’s dilemma would be to say that religion becomes a 
term for what would later be called culture: the set of beliefs and artistic products that 
express the character of a people or nation. Cartari’s work shows the strength of the alliance 
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between artistic representation and a kind of civil religion. Cartari also shows very clearly 
how writers such as Plato debated the best way to turn nature into religious representations, 
and the appropriate way to express the nature of god within natural materials such as wood 
and stone. His work is intended as a pictorial history of how the natural theology has been 
accommodated to human intellect in the ancient system of representation. Cartari’s is a work 
that meditates, perhaps dangerously, on the unstated and suppressed relationship between the 
poetic and civil theologies on the one hand, and the natural theology on the other. The danger 
that Giraldi worried about is exactly this: that natural objects would be taken from their 
secluded temples and made public and profane and thus a tool of social control by 
demagogues and scoundrels. Nature may have been God’s art, but religion was increasingly 
the province of human art, a corruption of nature and an unredeemable morass of 
contradictory practices and beliefs that was more suited for controlling the masses than for 
gaining access to heaven. The development of a realm of “culture” out of religion depended 
on the increasing divide between an esoteric religion removed from the masses and the 
corruptions, errors, and fictions that showed up in the ritual practices of common people. But 
as Cartari showed his readers, these fictions could actually become, in the hands of skilled 
artists and writers, a self-legitimating site for a new kind of “religious culture.” 
 So far in my discussion of mythography I have been drawing attention to aspects of 
sixteenth-century thinking on pagan myth that are usually attributed only to seventeenth-
century “scholarly” mythographers. And in fact, there is a shift of attention in the seventeenth 
century, away from the search for etymological or philosophical unity and toward the 
direction indicated by Cartari; that is, toward a view of pagan religions and symbols as art, 
but art that was socially and politically functional. My attention to these issues is not meant, 
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however, to deny that some scholars in the seventeenth century were trying to find ways to 
legitimate pagan religion and make it compatible with Christianity. Francis Bacon and 
Edward Herbert are prime examples of writers who investigate pagan mythology to find 
eternal allegorical, symbolic, and scientific truths. But the kind of scholarship I am 
discussing here also had a long history, developing from ideas that had been latent in the 
Varronian construction of pagan religion and thus known from Augustine, to Boccaccio, and 
through Giraldi and Cartari. 
 The scholarship of John Selden and G. J. Vossius, to take two prominent examples of 
scholars working on pagan religions, is both more careful than the sixteenth-century 
mythographies and more ambitious in seeking the origins of religion itself and its roots in the 
political and social life of communities. One of the reasons for this shift in emphasis is that 
Selden and Vossius were more attuned to the difference between exoteric and esoteric 
religions, especially to the ways in which the external trappings of religions—their rituals, 
practices, and symbols—derive from corruptions of natural knowledge to which the more 
intelligent philosophers are privy. In Selden’s De Diis Syris (1617, rev. 1629), this distinction 
is manifest in the conceptual blurriness, among the pagans, between natural objects and the 
gods that they signified. The symbolic instability between a god and its representation caused 
the number of gods to multiply, hence the centrifugal nature of polytheistic worship and the 
division of nature into different gods with different rites. As Martin Mulsow argues, for 
Selden this understanding of the multiplicity of pagan religion as a mistake presumes the 
unity of natural knowledge among the educated elites of the ancient world. Selden refers 
constantly, Mulsow notes, to the differences in the sociology of knowledge 
(wissenssoziologische) between the common people and the most learned, the philosophers 
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and initiated priests.31 This notion of ancient religion as an exoteric corruption of an esoteric 
knowledge allowed Selden to make distinctions, to judge ancient religions based on how well 
they understood natural knowledge. And Mulsow concludes that this is where the 
seventeenth-century obsession with natural knowledge and natural history intersects with the 
history of religions. Vossius, he notes, would carry this project to its extremes, explaining all 
cultures in terms of their categorizations of animate and inanimate things, according to St. 
Paul’s indictment of the multiplication of images of god among the pagans.32  
 For Selden and Vossius both, the exoteric/esoteric divide allows them to make two 
crucial interpretive pivots. First, it allows them to create a framework that legitimates their 
minute and painstaking reconstructions of pagan religious practices; for if the origin of false 
religion lies in the true understanding of natural processes, one can judge what is true and 
what is false in any religion. But secondly, and more importantly, this interpretive method 
realigns the moral and spiritual valence of pagan rituals, practices, and symbols. As Selden is 
at pains to argue, there is a tremendous gulf between erudite and popular religion. This gulf 
makes it seem, however, that the exoteric pagan religions, based as they are on mistakes and 
errors, is not evil but merely fictional. By a natural human propensity toward abstraction and 
multiplicity, the unity of God that natural philosophy teaches becomes splintered, and the 
representations of the supreme being are taken to be divine. If the people could free 
themselves of the lure of the fictional, then they would recognize the absurdity of their 
religion and would admit the truth of the natural theology: “Neque simplicitatem cultus 
patienter turba tulisset, nec gravem Diis suis & inexpiabilem injuriam non fieri censuisset, si 
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sphaeras illas, & reliqua prophetarum & antistium sacra, affaniarum accessione & ridiculis 
admirationis illecebris minus inquinata forte inspexerat” (the masses would not have suffered 
the simplicity of this kind of worship, and would have seen it as an untenable stain on its 
gods, if they could have looked upon the spheres and the sacred things of the prophets and 
forebears, only not so much polluted by the advent of trifling talk and by the laughable 
enticements of unthinking wonder).33 In fact, both Vossius and Selden were worried by the 
evidence of the spread of idolatry into a civil force for control of the many. 
In book 2 of his De Theologia Gentili (1641), Vossius returns to the examples in 
Augustine’s City of God to foreground the civil and fictitious aspects of pagan religion. He 
cites Augustine’s condemnation of the Roman priest Scaevola for shielding the people from 
the fictions of their religion: “The pontiff does not wish the people to know these things 
precisely because he does not think that such things are false. He considers it expedient, 
therefore, that cities should be deceived in matters of religion” (City of God, p. 176). The 
point of this passage for Vossius seems to be that pagans had a different conception of what 
counted as “fictional” in religion; even learned pagans like Scaevola assumed that a 
functional religion, though it is fictional, is actually somehow a “true” religion. Vossius then 
cites Varro’s tripartite theology. What is most striking about Vossius’s interpretation of this 
well-worn locus of pagan religion is that he refuses to make anything allegorical out of it. He 
grounds his interpretation on the social and fictive dimension, keeping his focus on the 
manufactured distinction between exoteric and esoteric understandings of natural mysteries: 
“In triplici hac theologia, nihil fabulari illa poetarum, quemadmodum ex allatis antea 
exemplis paret, fuerit insulsius, nisi ad allegorias recurratur. Atque ideo Dionysius 
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Halicarnassensis in II Antiquit. Roman. in eo Romuli commendat prudentiam, quod 
neutiquam admiserit Graecorum fabulas de Diis. Quae licet vel occultent naturae arcana, vel 
ad solatium superstitum, aut aliud emolumentum, fuerint confictae; vulgus tamen, ut ibidem 
Dionysius censet, non penetrare haec arcana” (In this tripartite theology, nothing is more silly 
than the fabulous theology of the poets, in the ways that have been previously discussed, 
unless it is reduced to allegory. And for that reason Dionysius Halicarnassus in the second 
book of his Roman Antiquities commends the prudence of Romulus, because he never 
allowed the Greek stories about the gods. He grants that these stories were made up either to 
obscure the mysteries of nature, or as a comfort, or maybe even a benefit, to the superstitious; 
nevertheless, the vulgar, as Dionysius thinks, should not be able to see those mysteries).34  
But the real focus of the learned pagans was, as Vossius argues, to prop up the civil 
theology, even though it depended on fictions, and to find a way to dampen the bad behavior 
that poetry presents to the people (poeticae huic theologiae praeferenda est civilis). Varro, as 
Vossius relates from Augustine, would have founded Rome on the principles of nature, had 
he been in the place of Romulus or Numa. But as Vossius concludes, in order to explain the 
natural theology he will also have to show how it is bound up with the other kinds of 
theologies: “Placuit Varroni imprimis Theologia naturalis: quam ipsam deinceps exponam: 
sed sic ut suis misceam locis, quae ad civilem, vel fabularem, melius intelligendam pertineat” 
(309) (Varro liked the natural theology above all, which is the first thing I shall examine; but 
I will mix in those places that will produce a better understanding of the civil and poetic 
theologies too). Vossius is also treading close to Plato’s notion of poetry as a hindrance to the 
ideal city but as inextricably bound up with the functioning of the real city. 
                                                 
34
 Vossius, De Theologia Gentili, seu Physiologia Christiana, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt, 1668), 308 (my translation). 
Further references will appear in the text. 
  
 41
 So it is not a surprise that Vossius understands the fictions and errors of pagan 
religions to play out in the realm of symbolism and in issues of practice and worship. For 
Vossius, what might have been explainable allegorically to other mythographers is thrown 
back into the realm of politics and civil existence. Vossius notes the example of 
Nebuchadnezzar: “Sed posse adorationem civilem commutari in religiosam sive divinam: 
argumento fuerit illa; quam sibi in statuae symbolum praestari voluit Nabuchodonsor” (28) 
(But civil adoration can be changed into religious, or divine, admiration; like that admiration 
that Nebuchadnezzar wanted to supply to himself, by means of the symbol of his statue). But 
Vossius goes on in the next few pages to distinguish between a “symbolic worship” (cultus 
symbolicus), which worships things for what they signify (such as a statue), and “worship 
proper” (cultus proprius), which worships things for what they are. Proper worship seems to 
share attributes with Christian worship: Vossius gives as one example of this kind of worship 
the veneration of the creator of the world (opifex mundi). But such veneration is corrupted 
when it is divided, “vel si Deus colatur in idolo” (31) (if God is worshipped in an idol). 
Vossius’s notion of proper worship is strikingly concrete; as elsewhere, he refuses to 
allegorize pagan religious practices.  
Vossius’s aim is to describe what a “Christian physiology” (Physiologia Christiana), 
which is the subtitle of his book, might look like, and thus his scholarship remains pointedly 
connected to the natural functioning of God’s creation. And as he argues repeatedly, we have 
to judge God’s creation in terms of its function and end, not in terms of its form. To take one 
example among thousands in Vossius’s book, he advises us not to underestimate insects 
because of their size: “Nec censeri debent magnitudine molis, sed virtutis: cum Deus saepe in 
minimis maxima collocarit miracula: unde gemmam praeferimus saxo” (1525) (they ought 
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not to judged by the size of the body, but by its power: just as God often worked the greatest 
miracles by means of the smallest things, and as we prefer the gem to the stone). The highest 
and lowest are often similar if you look at function, a point that also serves as the basis for 
his theology: the idea of natural function replacing the dangers of formal or symbolic 
abstractions. However, this rearrangement threatens to obscure revelation and replace it with 
a religion based on natural “artificium,” a secular space where the workings of nature were 
appreciated for their ends and not their forms, and God was a somewhat absent craftsman. As 
Vossius concludes his chapter on insects, he notes that these small, intricate forms are also 
difficult to manipulate: “In qualibus non dubium est, quin subtilius ac maius sit artificium; 
cum quo minus est materiae, hoc minus sit sequax ac tractabilis ad variorum adeo partium 
figurationem” (ibid.) (in these things there is no doubt that there can be no greater or more 
subtle workmanship; and wherever material is less, it is to that degree less tractable and 
responsive to the shaping of its various parts). The artistry of small forms seems to replace, 
or at least to equal, the mysteries of revelation. This is to found a theology on a functional 
symbolism based on a study of the natural world. 
To what purpose, though? It sounds as Vossius would have us practice a religion 
based on natural functions, which themselves are based on the artistry of God, who often 
does the greatest things with the smallest means. This is not a traditional “natural religion,” 
wherein God and his commands are known intuitively, but an artificial religion mediated by 
knowledge of the way that nature works.35 Investigating the pagan “mistake” of dividing 
nature into devotional objects has led Vossius to an altogether different understanding of a 
religion based on knowledge, nature, and most importantly artifice. Martin Mulsow contrasts 
                                                 
35
 For a reading of Selden’s and Vossius’s views of religious rites as “functional” and “utilitarian,” rather than 
“natural,” see Jonathan Sheehan, “The Altars of the Idols: Religion, Sacrifice, and the Early Modern Polity,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (2006): 669.  
  
 43
this interpretive strategy with Edward Herbert’s, who aggressively seeks out examples of 
Vossius’s cultus symbolicus to argue that, in most cases, pagan worship can be reduced to the 
veneration of abstract principles.36 Indeed, Herbert’s recourse to older, more traditional 
methods of finding religious unity makes Vossius’s method, and Selden’s, seem all the more 
novel.  
But it really was not all that novel, as I have been arguing. There was a much greater 
awareness of just how the pagan religious outlook differed from the Christian, and an 
accompanying fascination with the symbolic economy that structured pagan art and, in a 
related sense, its civil society. This connection, between fiction and civil forms, has been 
overlooked, though it is rapidly attaining modern students. The space between poetry and 
civil religion in the early modern world provides a point at which to examine a redefinition of 
the power and role of fiction in many forms: artistic, religious, political, and literary. My 
study thus attempts to fill in one province, the literary, of a much larger region that is 
currently being occupied by an interdisciplinary group of scholars united around the legacy 
of secularism, religious transformation, and power of fiction and myth in the early modern 
world and our own. 
 
Varro’s Theologies and Renaissance Art in Twentieth-Century Scholarship 
Varro’s theologies, and Augustine’s response to them, set the stage for both modern and 
early modern conceptions of the relationship between pagan art and Christian society. The 
appropriation of pagan arts, especially poetic arts, was justified as long as the deeper truths of 
those arts were kept hidden from the uninitiated vulgar. Giovanni Boccaccio, for example, 
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repeated Varro’s threefold theology in his Genealogy of the Pagan Gods; but the fourteenth-
century poet aligns the best poetry with the “natural” theology, while shunning the fabulous 
and civil theologies as overly accommodated to popular tastes and political necessities. But 
whereas Augustine remained wary of appropriating pagan natural theology, Boccaccio goes 
to considerable lengths to justify it. And again unlike Augustine, Boccaccio has a fairly 
optimistic view of the church’s spiritual and earthly conquests over paganism. Indeed, 
Boccaccio thought that Christianity’s victory over paganism made it acceptable for learned 
Christian poets to study the theology of the gentiles and use the pagan gods to express 
allegorical truths. This victory extends to the present, even implying ownership: “the church 
victorious occupies the camps of its enemies” (victrix Ecclesia castra possidet hostium). But, 
he cautioned, no one should approach the gentile theology until he knew fully about 
Christian religion (plene Christiana religio cognita).37 This very powerful idea became one of 
the defining features of the “Renaissance” in the hands of Jacob Burckhardt. Responding to 
this passage from Boccaccio, Burckhardt comments, “the writer justifies the new relation in 
which his age stood to paganism. . . . This is the argument invariably used in later times to 
defend the Renaissance.” But Burckhardt never lets us forget that this afterlife of antiquity 
had a genuinely troubling history. In the next paragraph Burckhardt becomes rather elliptical 
in proposing a counter-factual hypothesis: 
There was thus a new cause in the world and a new class of men to maintain 
it. It is idle to ask if this cause ought not to have stopped short in its career of 
victory, to have restrained itself deliberately, and conceded the first place to 
purely national elements of culture. No conviction was more firmly rooted in 
the popular mind than that antiquity was the highest title to glory which Italy 
possessed.38 
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It is difficult to know exactly what Burckhardt meant by this. Attentive as he was to the 
potential for demagoguery among Renaissance princes, this is perhaps a warning that the cult 
of antiquity promised a somewhat ahistorical, atavistic justification of power. That this kind 
of power derives from the “victory” of Christianity over its great foe and the appropriation of 
its gods merely reinforces the imperialistic tendencies of this kind of revival of antiquity. 
And indeed, this is how some modern scholars read the pagan gods in the Renaissance: with 
a nod to Burckhardt and the cultural approbation of political authoritarianism.39  
 For the next generation of Renaissance scholars after Burckhardt, the complexity of 
Renaissance allegory seemed to offer a pathway to a cultural history of art that would 
redefine the “revival” of classical art as multiform, an art of movement as it was for Aby 
Warburg.40 The political aspects of this project were sometimes hidden, but there can be little 
doubt that scholars like Warburg and Edgar Wind saw the political implications of their 
investigations into pagan allegory and mysticism.41 For Warburg, Boccaccio’s dictum does 
not quite hold true: the wild, irrational forces of pagan religion and culture will always resist 
the “victory” of Christianity and will always complicate artistic appropriation. Influenced by 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, Warburg saw the dialectical play of Apollonian and 
Dionysian elements in culture as replicating itself in the afterlife (Nachleben) of the classical 
tradition, making art and the artist indices for the larger, conflicting play of forces in any 
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given culture.42 In one sense, though, Boccaccio’s warning against the popular superstition 
that might accompany unlearned access to pagan mysteries continued to influence Warburg 
and his students, Warburg’s own method being a testament to this idea. 
Warburg began his academic career as a student of Hegel’s successors, those scholars 
interested in the forces of civilized development and the processes by which “primitive” 
transforms into “modern.” Warburg’s intellectual development was shaped by the 
psychological Hegelianism of his teachers, the project of determining how sensory 
impressions change individuals and societies and thus condition the artistic forms available to 
them.43 Warburg, though, saw a good deal more contingency in artistic production: for him a 
normative antiquity struggled against the specific uses of antiquity among artists who felt the 
pressure of patrons and princes. But even the “normative” antiquity was a constant in human 
civilization, and so Warburg’s interpretation of the cultural changes in the Renaissance was 
also an interpretation of a familiar dialectical struggle within every culture.44 Thus, to reveal 
the secrets of artistic expression does not necessarily proceed from “primitive” to “modern,” 
but rather testifies to the eternal regression and progression of these tendencies, of which art 
was a fair index. As he remarked after a lecture on the Palazzo Schifanoia, he hoped that his 
methodology might lead others to treat the ancient, medieval, and modern worlds as a 
“coherent historical unity” demonstrating the “international process of dialectical 
engagement with the surviving imagery of Eastern Mediterranean pagan culture.”45 It was 
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not enough, for Warburg, to identify a progression of classical art among the early moderns. 
Atavistic tendencies in any culture always appropriate images and ideas in order to 
dehistoricize and decontextualize them, by way of allegorical or moral traditions. Warburg’s 
project, especially as it was interpreted after the second World War, was to demystify the 
very specific and local appropriations of antiquity in order to show how artistic expression 
alternately mystified and allegorized the past but also made it accessible by making it 
“modern,” that is individual, subjective, and free from the constraints of systematic 
interpretations. 
 This balancing act, between the obscurantist and the progressive tendencies in the 
study of the Nachleben of antiquity, drew the intellectual boundary lines of Warburg’s 
students as well. Edgar Wind’s fascinating and multifaceted career provides a striking 
example of the complexities of Warburg’s project. Wind’s great book, Pagan Mysteries in 
the Renaissance, was formed out of a series of lectures he prepared in the 1940s and 50s and, 
as Rebecca Zorach has demonstrated, became Wind’s response to the political appropriation 
of classical images and allegories that the world had seen in Germany before the war.46 In 
what follows, I rely her on research to sketch Wind’s career and the early history of his book 
on pagan mysteries.  
In the 1930s, Wind lectured on the power of art at the University of Hamburg; like 
Warburg, he was attentive to the irrational forces that art could conjure in the human psyche. 
Images, however, were complex: they naturally resisted the utopian drive to create an 
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orderly, rational state. Images instantiated a tension between reason and ritual, demanding a 
recognition of the potential interplay of conflicting values. This was the basis, Wind 
emphasized, of Plato’s rejection of images; not because they were copies of ideas, but 
because they undermined the state, Plato barred fictions and images from his republic. The 
investigation of images, therefore, could provide a way to gauge conflicting values and, 
ultimately, make a choice informed by history, context, and meaning. The rise of Nazism 
provided a pointed alternative, a society that valued tradition, form, and mysticism at the 
expense of history, reason, and choice. But such was the tension in the study of images: the 
appropriation of their historical content was not always easily recognized as such. 
This tension informed Wind’s response to the American curriculum he encountered 
when he came to the University of Chicago in 1939. The university was embarking on its 
Great Books project in the early 40s, which privileged both ideas and traditions that were 
often and obviously at odds with each other. Wind, a German Jewish exile, saw the flaws of 
this system, which put him in opposition to Richard McKeon, the dean of the humanities 
division and the architect of the new courses. Indeed, one of the most contentious episodes 
from these years accompanied Wind’s title of a series of talks McKeon asked him to give: 
“Pagan and Christian Mysticism in the Art of the Renaissance.” The key terms here are 
“pagan” and “mysticism”; the latter contradicted an urge among professors to identify the 
Renaissance with the advance of reason, individualism, and “pure” art. The implicit 
secularizing drive characterized, and perhaps still does to some extent, the response to the 
idea of the “Renaissance.” 
No less troubling was the term “pagan,” associated as it was with Hitler’s Germany. 
The year was 1942: that same year the Chicago economist John U. Nef published The United 
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States and Civilization, in which he linked Germany’s militarism with its “pagan” culture, by 
which he meant the atavistic worship of an unidentifiable, ahistorical past. He argued that 
“among the Germans, traditions which are pagan and hostile to both Christianity and 
humanism seem to be more powerful than among the other great nations of the West.”47 This 
was a widely held opinion in the years before and during the second World War. The 
historian Arnold Toynbee expressed something similar in an essay from 1937, “The Menace 
of the New Paganism.” He identifies what he calls a “postwar paganism,” which gave rise to 
Communism and Fascism, ideologies that promote the “idolatrous worship of organized 
human power.”48 Such a characterization was ratified by no less than President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in his state of the union address in January of 1942, two months after the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor. FDR famously and forcefully orated that the Nazis wanted to 
enforce “their new German, pagan religion all over the world.”49 In this context, Wind’s 
insistence on keeping both “pagan” and “mysticism” must have seemed strange. Yet, his 
rationale was fairly simple: the element of unreason or mysticism in culture was inextricably 
linked to the idea of cultural change, which usually brought about what he called a “cultural 
revival.” As Wind described this field of study for the Chicago curriculum: 
The student will be expected to form an idea of the general problem of 
cultural revivals, of which the historical period called the Renaissance is only 
one among many examples. The common characteristic of these revivals is 
that the revolt against a given tradition is coupled with the attempt to re-
instate an older, supposedly more “genuine” tradition, so that revolution and 
restitution go hand in hand. To trace the manner in which the traditional and 
novel features interpenetrate and reinforce each other, is the central problem 
of Renaissance studies. (qtd. in Zorach, 202; italics in original) 
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In this passage Wind is critiquing the formalism that depended on clear-cut distinctions of 
“genuine” traditions from other, less “genuine” ones. In other words, the scholar of the 
Renaissance has to examine such things as paganism and mysticism precisely because these 
ideas and terms were fraught with imprecise historical and intellectual weight. The 
imprecision of the idea of cultural revival allowed opportunistic cultural imperialists like the 
Nazis to create false traditions based on ancient culture and label them more genuine than 
others. So, Wind’s curricular imperative to distinguish between different forms of “genuine” 
traditions was his way of fighting the identification of history with culture, a point of view 
that he believed enforced totalitarian appropriations of cultural images and symbols as 
synonymous with historical developments of a given people or nation.  
This perspective did not endear him to fellow Chicago professors, the more eloquent 
of whom argued that Wind’s system would merely replace one cultural judge with another, 
namely Wind himself. Ronald Crane, for example, thought that Wind’s method ignored 
individual cases and tried to impose on the Renaissance a system of interpretation that would 
erase the need for careful interpretation of particular texts and traditions and ask students to 
see it as merely a conglomeration of competing historical paradigms (Zorach, p. 203). And so 
Wind never gave the lectures McKeon asked him to prepare, instead publishing them as 
Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance with Yale University Press in 1958. We can now 
approach this work with a view into the political, social, intellectual, and academic forces 
that were at work on Wind during the time in which the book took shape. This extraordinary 
work continues to exert influence in Renaissance studies, but its complexities are not often 
noted. In particular, it is all too easy to identify Wind with the mystagogues he examines, and 
to assume that Wind wanted to argue that the Neo-Platonic mysteries themselves were 
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positive sources of value for him and for the Renaissance itself.50 Far from it. Wind was 
acutely aware of the implications of the interpretive work he was engaged in, and it seems 
that he took to heart the potential formalist critique of his explication of the historical and 
intellectual content of mystical symbolism. The reward of iconography, he writes, “is that it 
may help to remove the veil of obscurity which not only distance in time (although in itself 
sufficient for that purpose) but a deliberate obliqueness in the use of metaphor has spread 
over some of the greatest Renaissance paintings. They were designed for initiates; hence they 
require an initiation.”51 He sounds an anxious note right from the start: 
I hope therefore I shall not be misunderstood as favouring the doctrine of 
mysteries I am about to expound. The axiom proposed by Pico della 
Mirandola, that for mysteries to be deep they must be obscure, seems to me as 
untrue as the pernicious axiom of Burke that ‘a clear idea is another name for 
a little idea’. But there is no evading the fact, however unpleasant, that a great 
art did flourish on that impure soil. In studying the subject I shall strive for 
clarity, an objectionable aim from the point of view of the Renaissance 
mystagogues themselves. Yet the understanding of these disturbing 
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phenomena is not furthered by succumbing to them, any more than by 
ignoring their existence. (PM, 16) 
 
Wind is investigating “disturbing” phenomena, rooted in an “impure” soil. The Nazification 
of pagan art evidently still bothered him when this book went to press. There is certainly an 
echo of Wind’s earlier worries about investigating the murky historical origins of artistic 
products. Perhaps even more troubling is his strident warning that we not “succumb” to the 
phenomena he is about to describe. Caveat lector! 
 One need not read far in Wind’s book to get a dose of such medicine, and it is from 
the start that Wind subtly recalls the distinctions made influential by Varro, Augustine, and 
their mythographic followers. His first chapter concerns the “Poetic Theology” of Pico della 
Mirandola, who “held that pagan religions, without exception, had used a ‘hieroglyphic’ 
imagery; that they had concealed their revelations in myths and fables which were designed 
to distract the attention of the multitude, and so protect the divine secrets from profanation” 
(PM, 17). Wind’s dismantling of this plank of Neo-Platonic doctrine emphasizes the way that 
so-called “genuine” traditions are created within cultural revivals, and one hears echoes of 
Wind’s Chicago curriculum: 
For the secret affinity which Pico so ingeniously discovered between pagan 
and biblical revelations, the historical cause is depressingly simple. Whether 
neo-Orphic, Cabbalistic, or pseudo-Dionysian, the sources adduced by Pico 
were all late-antique, if not medieval. . . . The pagan revival to which he 
adhered was therefore less a ‘revival of the classics’ than a recrudescence of 
that ugly thing which has been called ‘late-antique syncretism’. . . . He 
persistently claimed, as several romantic scholars have claimed since, that in 
the recondite and often monstrous decomposition which the classical heritage 
suffered in the Hellenistic age the genuine and permanent foundations of the 
classical achievement are laid bare. (PM, 22) 
 
The layers of historical deception coalesce for Pico, according to Wind, in a new kind of 
tradition that depends for its force both on present intellectual needs and its stamp of 
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antiquity. Wind is sharply critical of the historical and natural pretensions of this kind of 
allegory. The next chapter begins with a quotation from John Milton’s Paradise Lost, in 
which the narrator describes the philosophy of the fallen devils in book 2: “Vain wisdom all 
and false philosophy, / Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm” (PM, 26). Wind comments, 
“If allegory were only what it is reputed to be—an artifice by which a set of ideas are 
attached, one by one, to a set of images—it would be difficult to account for its nefarious use. 
Since there is little demand for repeating the simple, and no advantage in doubling the 
complicated, an image designed to duplicate a thought should be either superfluous or 
distracting” (PM, 26–27). The function is allegory is as a “sophistical” device, by which 
“imagination and thought” become irritants to each other (PM, 27). Allegory is a “monster” 
that “often precedes the god” (ibid.). Ultimately, though, Wind remains equivocal about the 
value of this kind of deception. Allegory is “useful,” for its absurdities are an aide-mémoire, 
though just what one is asked to remember is unclear in Wind’s formulation. 
 By the end of the book, Wind has started to give us hints of the political relevance of 
the mysticism that both fascinates and repels him. His interlocutors are the fifteenth-century 
Italian philosopher Nicholas Cusanus and the seventeenth-century English politician George 
Halifax. Cusanus’s pacifism, his professed desire to reconcile competing theological 
traditions within his philosophy, elicits some sympathy from Wind, probably because 
Cusanus had no need for allegory. Indeed, for him all traditions and signification pointed to 
one inexpressible signified; this rejection of “hieroglyphic” meaning limited the possibility of 
expressibility and understanding. The “remembrance” that might make allegory useful is, for 
Cusanus, to realize that all rituals and external expressions of divinity point back to “an 
infinite perfection”; for “‘the signs vary, but not the signified’” (PM, 220). Wind links this 
  
 54
idea to Halifax’s characterization of the world power of Britain deriving from its isolation 
from the rest of the world. Cusanus’s manipulation of center and periphery in his philosophy, 
“pushing the contraries to their extremes,” confirms “the observations of practical politics. 
To be placed outside a political situation is to occupy a privileged position within it” (PM, 
228). As Wind concludes his discussion, “Mystics who yearn for union with God often fail in 
circumspection; and prudent men, while they may be skilled in the art of trimming, are rarely 
propelled by mystical ardours. Yet only those who can combine these two qualities in one 
person could be said, at least in some measure, to achieve the Janus-face of perfection” (PM, 
230). Such a sentiment reveals the never fully resolved tensions of this work, between an 
examination of allegory designed to manipulate, and the practical understanding that the 
critic encourages in unveiling the eccentricities of mystical art and knowledge. 
 Wind’s position encouraged an engagement with politics that was manifestly critical 
of its legitimating mystical imagery. The arts, he thought, must be unveiled and also 
deployed in the service of public life. As Zorach recounts, Wind helped to organize a 
conference on “Art and Morals” at Smith College in 1953; his position was explicitly set to 
counter “those who saw art as an autonomous aesthetic realm separate from the pressing 
needs of politics or economics” (Zorach, 219). He even urged W. H. Auden to use his art to 
become more engaged with civic life. But as Auden pointed out in a poem dedicated to 
Wind, all art addressed to public power must mask itself and ultimately ends up having 
recourse to the impersonal and universal; it replicates the kind of mystical distancing that 
Wind wanted to critique. Of course, on the other hand a fiction that does engage with the 
particular and the human reveals the manipulations of the universalists. Wind wrote this kind 
of tension into Pagan Mysteries, in which reason and unreason continually conflict but 
  
 55
structure not only the mysticism designed to manipulate but also the philosophical systems 
designed to unveil the mysteries and put them to the service of practical politics. 
 A similar tension informs the work of another Warburg-influenced art historian, Jean 
Seznec. He was a resident scholar at the Warburg library in London before and during the 
war, when he wrote his influential The Survival of the Pagan Gods (first ed. 1940). One has 
to derive his reaction to the political circumstances from his work, but this is not very 
difficult to do. Indeed, his work contains familiar misgivings about the nature of allegory and 
the tradition of synthesizing pagan and Christian symbols in the Middle Ages and into the 
Renaissance. For Seznec, the “Renaissance” is that brief moment when humanist science and 
medieval allegory could co-exist; but the two poles, scientific knowledge and allegorical 
moralizing, pull apart inevitably in the later sixteenth century. It is a familiar narrative, but 
what is striking is Seznec’s discomfort with it, his sense, perhaps instinct, that the allegories 
could not be as naïve as he thought, or that comparative mythography should not have proved 
to be so effective at destroying such allegories. As with Wind, Seznec suppresses the civil, 
political theology of the ancients and deflects it into allegory, though he clearly knows that 
the tradition he investigates was never as naïve as he thought. This leads to some awkward 
moments in his work, when he seems willfully ignorant of the real forces at work, especially 
in the Middle Ages. 
 He divides the first part of the book into a version of Varro’s three theologies, but 
renames them. The “physical tradition” remains intact, but we get the “moral tradition” in 
place of the poetic theology and the “historical tradition” in place of the civil theology. By 
historical tradition Seznec means Euhemerism, which was never as influential as he 
represents it, sketching its origins in the ecclesiastical histories of Eusebius of Caesearea. In 
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fact, Eusebius does discuss Euhemerus and his theories as evidence that the pagan gods were 
once men, and Seznec recounts this idea. But he writes that by the time of Eusebius, the idea 
had lost some of its “polemic venom” and had become a legitimate impetus for historical 
investigation, for Eusebius was not only a polemicist but also a historian. Seznec argues that 
by pointing out the synchronism of the god Baal and the war between the Giants and the 
Titans, Eusebius was making an argument about the antiquity of the Judaic religion, indeed 
its historical precedence over the religio gentium. But it is misleading to interpret Eusebius’s 
work like this (or only like this), to say “that Eusebius’s main concern is to show the religion 
of the chosen people as antedating pagan mythology.”52 This is really not Eusebius’s main 
concern, which was to demonstrate how the pagan political system anticipated and indeed 
became the Christian empire, which combined religious and political authority under the 
emperor himself. The historical synchronism, and his passing references to Euhemerus, were 
a way to legitimate the political order of Christian rulers, and to suggest that the pagan civil 
religion, a religion made by men, could be subjugated to Christian history and made to 
perform the same tasks for Christian emperors. That the “historical tradition” that Seznec 
recounts was really a tradition of political authority is never absolutely clear. Like Wind, 
Seznec shies away from speaking directly to the relationship between pagan religion and 
politics. Seznec everywhere talks of “parallelism” between pagan and Christian in the Middle 
Ages, when rulers busied their artists to place them among the pagan pantheon, alongside 
Christian symbols too, of course (28). The problem with all this is that Seznec too readily 
accepts an identification of the pagan gods with “worldly power,” with a secularism that is 
more Augustinian than Eusebian. The point of Eusebius’s history was to set up a parallel 
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political theology for the Christians, in which the sacred and the secular exist not merely side 
by side but on the same plane and in the same person.53 Ignoring this aspect of Eusebius’s 
project results in thinking that there could be a wholly secular “synthesis” of pagan and 
Christian in an arena free from the push and pull of poetic and political theologies. 
 Seznec’s “physical” and “moral” traditions have been pretty well assimilated into 
scholarly writing on the Renaissance, and there is little need to summarize them here. They 
are well presented, but the second part of Seznec’s book should alert the reader as to what is 
missing from the first part. It becomes readily apparent that Seznec has in mind some idea of 
a “pure” classicism to which he contrasts the mythographic traditions of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance, denigrated as uncritical and overly syncretistic. “Our mythographers,” he 
writes, “are even more lacking in historical sense than in critical faculty” (241). For Seznec, 
this corruption of the classics is both somewhat harmless but also potentially dangerous at the 
same time. The very absurdity of the mythographic faith in the analogy between pagan and 
Christian plays with a troubling strain of allegorical deception. Like Wind, Seznec is 
uncomfortable with the naïve allegories of syncretism, which threaten a kind of 
secular/sacred mixture that, in his view, simply did not occur in the Middle Ages, since 
profane erudition existed in the realm of the merely secular. As for the “absurd analogues” 
themselves: 
One can view [them] as the result of a harmless obsession, and smile upon 
them indulgently. Without doubt, many sincere believers who were at the 
same time ardent students of literature associated their profane erudition and 
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their faith naïvely and with no mental reservation. For them allegory was 
merely a flower-strewn path leading from one to the other. But it must be 
admitted that, basically, allegory is often sheer imposture, used to reconcile 
the irreconcilable—just as we have seen it lending decency to the manifestly 
indecent. On both grounds, it is a dangerous fraud. (274)  
 
What Seznec is not quite saying is also what Wind was not quite saying: that allegory is 
dangerous because it threatens to fictionalize genuine political and religious ideas under the 
veil of an ersatz tradition.  
One may summarize Seznec’s conclusions as follows. For Seznec the movement of 
the pagan gods proceeds from the realm of harmless assimilation into secular culture, then 
into a brief time of truly classical worship of beauty and life, and then into a scholarly age 
that cynically deploys the medieval allegories as a religious mask for artistic extravagance. 
The Renaissance is that brief moment when the classical past was present in daily life, when 
there was no need for mythographical explanations of the gods and one merely had to look 
around to experience beauty, nature, and life as continuous with an erudite version of the 
past. But the moment one has to defend such a view of life, one resorts to allegorical 
explanations that obscure the presence of the classical world. The result is a distancing of the 
past, an “era of crisis” (320) in which scholarship intervenes to cool the passions that the 
gods represent. This produces an irreconcilable break with the past in which the classical 
world becomes an ideal Arcadia, accessible only through the compromises of “the demands 
and conventions of morality,” which turn each of the gods into “an edifying symbol” (321). 
Seznec, at the very end of his book, acknowledges somewhat the attractions of formalism, 
which considers the only authentic tradition to be an eternal one, outside the realm of 
historical symbols and mediated interpretations.  
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As he concludes, the Renaissance briefly attained a kind of lived immediacy of the 
pagan past, a synthesis of belief and knowledge, “as if man had at last penetrated to the inner 
meaning of mythology, now that he was engaged in rehabilitating, along with physical 
beauty, the realm of nature and the flesh” (320). This makes sense of his decision to portray 
the medieval appropriation of the gods overwhelmingly in terms of allegory, and to rename 
Varro’s theologies. The history of cultural renewal proceeds, for Seznec, from a period of 
mixture through one of secularism and finally toward one of division. All eras did not have 
equal access to the symbolic structure that would interpret pagan arts in terms of their 
relationship to poetic, natural, and civil theologies, according to Seznec. Again, this explains 
what he did not talk about, the religious reliance on fictions that Wind saw in all allegorical 
thinking. But the reluctance to talk about religion also originates, for both scholars, from a 
reluctance to argue for fiction and allegory as a universal constant of all religions, a 
conclusion to which the careful study of Renaissance paganism might lead the devoted 
initiate. 
Here, then, is the crux of the problem for the Warburg historians whose constructions 
of the renewal of pagan antiquity remain so influential. They saw that the Renaissance 
project of allegorical “synthesis” never worked very well but they did not take the logical 
next step that would have opened up a good deal of Renaissance mythography, art, and 
literature in their contextual complexity. This next step would have entailed examining how 
the Renaissance writers they examined also critiqued the allegorical tradition. Seznec did not 
recognize the degree to which the mythographers struggled with the internal contradictions of 
pagan natural and civil theologies, and the extent to which the allegorical deceptions were 
recognized in the Renaissance and worried over. A truer account of these mythographers, 
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then, would emphasize not naïve synthesis and allegorical integration, but their constant, 
tentative forays into the artistic and religious disruptions working against any kind of 
allegorical synthesis. In fact, often the people who were interested in pagan myths and stories 
were interested in them because of this disruptive power; they approached the myths with the 
intention of using them as negative examples of the dangerous theologies that they 
advocated. But examining ancient religions in the Renaissance blurred the lines between art, 
religion, and politics, throwing into disarray the distinctions that made artistic objects signify 
apart from religious objects.  
The problem for Seznec, and for Wind, is that they both had in their minds an 
untenable concept of an authentic classicism, which, according to them, the Renaissance 
syncretists and allegorists misunderstood and perverted. They were more interested in 
Renaissance attempts to assimilate the classical world rather than other Renaissance attempts 
to differentiate it. And so they overlook one of the most obvious aspects of the reception of 
the classical world because they think it does not matter. That is, they take for granted the 
idea that most Renaissance Christians found pagan myths and religions to be false, 
ridiculous, misleading, and potentially evil. And they also miss their chance to explain the 
consequences of the Renaissance concept of false religion, the way that false religion placed 
artistic representation in the service of politics and social organization. And finally, they miss 
one of the most important developments of the discourse of false religion, which is the 
potential for this discourse to provide the form for later methods of comparative religion. So, 
Seznec rejects the “allegory” because it threatens to erase the historical and scholarly 
distinction he deploys against the Renaissance mythographers, who are in his opinion bad 
historians. Allegory elides different historical periods in a misleading way, which gives rise 
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to different, equally misleading forms of the “idealized” past that is being interpreted 
allegorically. Seznec perhaps saw this process being carried out in Nazi Germany, where a 
fuzzy sense of history led to a stunning allegory of German greatness based on primitive 
myths of an atavistic ideal. I am suggesting, however, that the Renaissance was not 
necessarily always guilty of this kind of misleading allegorical synthesis. Renaissance 
authors had in the idea of “false religion” a discourse ready made to analyze the troubling 
history of political appropriations of religion and its art forms. Indeed, Seznec is aware of all 
the problems with the allegorical tradition, he simply does not discuss how the Renaissance 
also thought through the problems with that same tradition.    
It is remarkable how often this narrative about allegory and the classical past in the 
Renaissance replicates itself among the scholars and critics of Seznec’s generation. Douglas 
Bush, for example, writing on mythology and the concept of the Renaissance in English 
poetry in 1932, similarly lamented the allegorical tradition as one that applied a secret moral 
philosophy to the naturalistic philosophy of paganism. In the seventeenth century, the 
allegorical temper exists beside a philosophical, scholarly approach to myth; both are not 
really pagan, classical, or secular. As Bush puts it, “Although the allegorical theory of poetry 
had enabled Ovid and some Ovidian poems to take on a protective coloring, the best-known 
pieces, like Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s, laid no claim to hidden moral truth. They were 
pagan, and it depended upon the reader’s upbringing whether the paganism were glorious or 
wicked.”54 For those who considered it wicked, allegory served much the same function as 
the demystifying science of Baconian philosophy; it drew myths into the Christian religious 
tradition of separating true from false, divine from secular. In fact, for Bush, “pagan” is 
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another word for “secular,” and the resistance to secularism is the result of a time when 
“culture is rapidly broadening down from ignorance to ignorance, through layer after layer of 
the middle class.”55 Bush may be curt, but there is some depth here. Seznec might have said 
something similar about the way that allegory and science were the two poles of religious 
naivety, a faith in integration on one end and a faith in ultimate distinctions on the other. 
According to Bush, both allegory and science distort “authentic” paganism, which appears in 
the poetry of Marlowe and Shakespeare as an experience of natural life and pleasure 
unmediated by transcendence. Bush has no time for the religious or political complexity of 
this idea, for the ways that the validation of pagan natural religion and art actually proceeded 
out of religious distinctions of true and false rather than from religious naivety.  
Bush’s generation of scholars was relatively coherent in their views of religion and 
the ancient world, which remain influential. Indeed, their influence may have stemmed from 
the force of their convictions and the urgency of the unspoken terms of their defense of 
imaginative literature and tradition against the forces that would rend it into atavistic and 
scholarly artifacts. One senses Bush’s and Seznec’s contacts with the great scholarly currents 
of their time, rushing toward a totalizing explanation of religion and a theory of unity outside 
of religion. Bush and Seznec were both fascinated by what Bush calls “ignorance” and 
Seznec terms a “naïve” mentality: an acceptance of myth as a belief system, despite the 
difficulties posed by natural knowledge, philosophy, or competing belief systems. For both, 
an authentic paganism barely exists, but if it does then it is something like an applied natural 
theology, in which natural knowledge produces not distinctions or fictions but a connection 
to beauty and the immediacy of the natural world. In defending pagan fictions they sound a 
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lot like Varro might have, who underwrites the poetic theology with natural knowledge, 
though they pointedly and problematically ignore his civil theology.  
But the idea of natural immediacy that moves beyond the merely symbolic informs so 
much of mid- twentieth-century understandings of religion as well, especially for those 
devoted to a phenomenological approach. Paul Ricoeur and Mircea Eliade, for example, 
thought seriously about the same problems of naivety and belief when they tried to develop 
their theories of religious symbolism. Ricoeur thought that the conflict between an 
ontological naivety and the demythologization of modern thought produced the “tensive” 
character of metaphor itself. His conception of metaphor is based upon the possibility of a 
“metaphor-faith beyond demythologization,” and a “second naïveté beyond iconoclasm.”56 In 
his journals, Eliade noted his sympathy with Ricoeur because he was also looking into 
religious symbolism as “the key by which modern man can still penetrate into the religious 
phenomenon.”57 For Ricoeur and Eliade alike, religion functions as an intermediary between 
symbols and the myths and stories that manifest those symbols. It is worth noting that 
Eliade’s great work on the idea of the sacred sees it as a fleeting sense of division from the 
“profane,” much like Ricoeur’s second naïveté that proceeds beyond iconoclasm and 
demythologization. Eliade himself sought the basis for all religions in God’s abandonment of 
the world, creating a kind of secular space that he would come to call “profane.” The 
recognition of the validity of paganism in the Renaissance is part of this larger narrative of 
                                                 
56
 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. 
Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 
254. 
 
57
 Eliade, No Souvenirs: Journal, 1957–1969, trans. Fred H. Robinson, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 
68. Further references will appear in the text. 
  
 64
the creation of secularism, which proceeds from a sense of god’s absence and the legitimacy 
of the natural world. On September 2, 1959, Eliade writes: 
I’m reading certain pages of Giordano Bruno. Stunned by the boldness of his 
thought. He recognizes the religious authenticity of paganism. He was already 
urging the mystery of God’s abandonment of the world, the transformation of 
God into a deus otiosus [inactive God]. God, come assoluto, non ha che far 
con noi [as he is absolute, has nothing to do with us] (Spaccio, Gentile edition, 
II, 192). God’s withdrawal or eclipse, which obsesses the theological thought 
of today, is a much more ancient spiritual phenomenon. Moreover, it begins 
with “civilization.” Deus otiosus characterizes all cultures which have gone 
beyond the hunting and gathering stage and have taken up gardening and the 
cultivation of grain. (59; my translations in brackets) 
 
In The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade argues that this withdrawal of God structures the 
experience of all religions, and so the basis for the sacred is the practical effects of recreating 
the same withdrawal from the profane world. Thus the sacred shows itself to us through 
hierophany, and we can only know the sacred through a mysterious act, “the manifestation of 
something of a wholly different order, a reality that does not belong to our world, in objects 
that are an integral part of our natural ‘profane’ world.”58 In Eliade’s insistence of the 
paradox of the sacred one can see an obvious affinity with Ricoeur’s concept of the second 
naïveté, which pushes through iconoclasm to reclaim an experience of religion as both of and 
not of our secular world. 
 Eliade sees in the nature religion that Seznec and Bush admired in Renaissance pagan 
literature evidence for the creation of the modern, profane world in which the forces of life 
itself are worshipped in a framework of immanent relations with the divine. The authentic 
religious experience appears in times of crisis, when the gods of this world are not enough. 
Eliade cites as an example of this phenomenon the ancient Hebrews turning from Yahweh to 
Baal and Astarte, and then back to Yahweh “under the threat of an annihilation determined 
                                                 
58
 Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1987), 11. Further references will appear in the text. 
  
 65
by history” (127). The pagan deities were connected with life and the augmentation and 
continuation of vital functions, but they were not capable of the kind of transcendent power 
that resided with the “Creator Gods” (128). For Eliade, this movement is the beginning of 
modern religion, which is natural, secular, and devoted to the discoveries that better human 
life. Yet, genuine religious experience is that which reveals there to be something above life 
and vital functioning, and this is the realm of the religious symbol, which “conveys its 
message even if it is no longer consciously understood in every part” (129). Eliade can argue 
this because he, along with Ricoeur, sees the religious symbol as an intermediary, allowing 
access to the realm of symbols through the medium of religion, which provides the myths 
and stories that convey the symbols. Experience remains the measure of the sacred, because 
it exists outside of history, which has “not had the power to abolish” the efficacy of symbols 
(138). As Ricoeur put it in the essay Eliade admired in 1959, “Le symbole véritablement 
ouvre et découvre un domaine d'expérience” (the symbol truly opens and discovers a realm 
of experience).59 Eliade recounts a conversation about theology between an American 
philosopher and a Shinto priest in 1958: the philosopher told the priest, named Hirai, “I see 
the temples, I attend the ceremonials, the dances, I admire the costumes and the courtesy of 
the priests—but I don’t see any theology implied by Shintoism. Hirai reflected a second and 
answered: We have no theology. We dance” (31). The ceremonies and rituals are not objects 
of a theology, a rational explanation of the interaction of the divine and the world, but are 
symbols functioning as intermediaries between religion and the experience of the divine. 
In drawing a parallel between Seznec and Bush, and Ricoeur and Eliade, I want to 
emphasize how scholars have constructed paganism and its Renaissance revivals as largely 
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secular, encouraging a relationship with the divine that is not, ideally, mediated by the 
deceptions of allegory or the cold explanatory mechanisms of a demythologized scientific 
mentality. The worship of natural beauty and human life, and an eternal play of symbols, 
characterizes this kind of paganism and its religious myths and rituals. Eliade’s and Ricoeur’s 
phenomenological models of the sacred assume a secular realm that the sacred transforms in 
order to make itself known to the profane world. The natural world of human society is thus 
also, to return at last to Wind, the basis for the symbolic unmasking and unveiling of 
allegories that the historian practices in the present. This kind of hermeneutics—Ricoeur 
might have called it a “hermeneutics of suspicion”60—can construct a history of the moments 
at which the sacred has been differentiated from the profane, as in Eliade’s example of the 
Hebrews’ vacillation between Yahweh and Baal. This kind of symbolism guards against 
interpreting the history of religions merely as a history of deceptions by insisting on the 
eternality of symbols and the fundamental identity of the natural theology and the modern 
explanatory force of secular philosophy.  
I did not want, in recounting one line of scholarship and criticism that has influenced 
our conceptions of Renaissance paganism, to blunt the force of the secularist narrative of the 
development of myth and pagan religion in the Renaissance. This narrative has influenced a 
particular kind of hermeneutics of suspicion, evident in Giorgio Agamben’s portrayal of the 
very idea of the sacred as an originally political or legal idea, whose purpose was the 
differentiation of natural life and the subjection of life to politically organized human 
power.61 For Agamben, the worship of natural forces that Eliade saw in the Hebrew worship 
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of Baal is the origin of the sacred, which is a purely human concept that simultaneously 
protects and curses a sacrificial victim, and thus not really divisible from what we call 
profane. But Agamben traces this naturalistic concept of the sacred back to early pagan 
Rome, and the equation of pagan religion as a force that united natural life and political 
authority without divine mediation might as well be an extension of the Renaissance creation 
of a naturalistic paganism of lived experience. Agamben sees in the pagan idea of the sacred 
the origin of secular power’s myth of social and political control, based on the divisions of 
natural life rather than on a myth of the unity of human and divine in the person of the ruler 
or in political society.62 However it terminates, then, the idea of a pagan natural religion 
continues to have explanatory force as a narrative of the history of how the secular world and 
its institutions evolve alongside and finally become detached from the structure of revealed 
religion.  
I do want, however, to suggest that there are dimensions of the Renaissance 
engagement with pagan antiquity that this narrative does not address. The secular conception 
of pagan myth and religion is based on naturalism, specifically Varro’s notion that the natural 
theology expressed the closest thing to the truth of the cosmos for the pagans, and that the 
Renaissance seized on precisely this aspect of pagan religion for its greatest and best 
expressions of its own culture. There is some truth in this, and considerable explanatory 
appeal: Varro himself was convinced, almost, of the self-sufficiency of the natural theology. 
But what about the degree to which pagan religion signified, in the Renaissance, the 
absurdities, errors, and fictions of false religion? Under this rubric we would find the poetic 
and civil theologies, discounted or suppressed even by the Renaissance mythographers 
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themselves, no less than modern critics who were interested in the construction of the secular 
space of imaginative literature and political culture.  
The countervailing formalism to which a consideration of the poetic/civil theologies 
might lead was, nevertheless, a necessary topic of discussion for Renaissance mythographers, 
scholars, and artists. I use “formalism” here to mean the idea that symbols themselves have 
no eternal truth but whose value is determined by the form in which they are represented. 
But the implications of seeing all artistic representations not as eternally authentic symbols 
but as self-conscious fictions were troubling. To admit as much would be to see all religions 
as based on the fictions of representation rather than on natural life or historically contingent 
symbols. In this interpretation, religion and its myths become the kind of secret philosophy 
that Seznec lamented and which Bush attributed to ignorance, the opposite of a natural 
religion of lived experience. But of course many in the Renaissance thought that pagan 
religions were not really nature religions so much as they were based on fictions of nature. 
This is a very powerful idea and one that could potentially be applied to any religion or even 
any social or political structure. 
The modern apostle of this kind of theological-political formalism is Leo Strauss. He 
illuminates a certain strand of religious thought that is important to recognize in the 
Renaissance relationship to ancient religion and its fictions. In “The Problem of Socrates” 
(1970), Strauss describes a situation recognizable from Seznec and the narrative of secular 
paganism: the divisions of nature as the key to religious experience. Only, Strauss 
emphasizes not the experiential force of natural life but its tendency to serve as a basis for the 
fictions and “fundamental untruth” upon which political life is founded. This untruth is based 
on two things, Strauss argues. The first is “the replacement of the earth as the common 
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mother of all men, and therewith of the fraternity of all men, by a part of the earth, the land, 
the fatherland, the territory, and the fraternity of only the fellow citizens.” The second part of 
the untruth “consists in ascribing divine origin to the existing social hierarchy, or, more 
generally stated, in identifying the existing social hierarchy with the natural hierarchy; that is 
to say, even the polis according to nature is not simply natural.”63 The problem, as Strauss 
expresses it, is that for the Greeks religion must conflict with nature, knowledge of which 
was called “philosophy” among the ancients.  
He sees evidence for this conflict between religion and philosophy in Hegel, who 
characterized Greek religion as an “art-religion” in his Philosophy of Spirit, by which he 
meant a religion that exists within the fictional confines of ritual and human subjectivity. The 
problem for Strauss is that when the art religion bases its fictions on natural knowledge it 
must conflict with political authority. The reason is that natural theology provided the truth 
behind the fictions of the poets and civic leaders, but could not be widely known. Strauss 
sees the kind of individualism that the natural theology promotes as a symptom of political 
corruption. Hegel’s “art-religion” was the basis for later conceptions of the pagan revival of 
the Renaissance as a kind of natural religion that ended in the glorification of the individual 
as the possessor of knowledge about the beauty and immediacy of natural life. But for 
Strauss, the dilemma becomes one of squaring philosophy with politics, for “philosophy does 
not have a political or civic existence” (118). Strauss argues that Hegel had glossed over the 
degree to which the artistic liberation of the individual in Greek religion was based on the 
possession of natural knowledge, and that Hegel did not recognize the importance of the idea 
that fictions were simply fictions and not expressive of a deeper kind of naturalism. Fictions, 
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not nature, Strauss would argue, form the basis of all religions and thus political life. This 
Hegelian mistake might be extended, if one were to agree with Strauss, to the later scholars 
of Renaissance naturalism. 
Strauss’s thought shows the clear line from certain Platonic ideas of politics and 
religion down to the Stoic theologies of Varro. For Strauss, religion cannot be natural, 
because it has its origins in the fictional; it is inextricably bound up with the necessity of the 
“noble lie” (160) for creating political life. He did find something to like in Hegel’s idea of 
the “art religion,” which sees religion as a way to manage human relationships. But Strauss 
sees the claims of transcendence and subjective liberation in the art-religion as based, 
problematically, on natural knowledge, which has no political existence. So, to relate to 
others on a political level, one must view religion not as composed of inward knowledge but 
of outward-looking fictions and representations. Strauss argues that this is what Plato means 
in his allegory of the cave:  
According to Herodotus, Homer and Hesiod created what we could call Greek 
religion. Plato has expressed this thought as clearly as he could in his simile of 
the cave. The cave-dwellers, that is to say, we humans, see nothing other, that 
is to say, nothing higher, than shadows of artifacts, especially of reproductions 
of men and other living beings moving around on high. We do not see the 
human beings who make and carry these artifacts. But as is shown clearly by 
Plato’s demand for the noble delusion, he himself is far from disapproving 
altogether of the poet’s activity. In principle the poets do exactly the same 
thing as Plato himself. (179) 
 
What, then, are the symbols of the Greek religion but the shadows and reproductions of men? 
The point is extendable to the very idea of religion, which must perforce be a collection of 
fictions and representations, created by poets. But as Strauss is at pains to emphasize, Plato’s 
anxious discussions of poets and poetry underscores the reliance of the legislator on a certain 
kind of poetic creation, a self-conscious manipulation of the ideas belonging to men and the 
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city. Poetry is intimately allied with the legislator for Plato, and his denigration of poetry 
speaks to the impracticality of natural philosophy. But ultimately, argues Strauss, poetry is 
the Platonic philosophy because this philosophy is concerned not only with nature but with 
the movements of the soul beyond nature. This is formalism applied to politics and religion, 
wherein the forms of poetic fictions, the very fact of their being representations of mutable 
human psychology and motivations, undergird the political function of religion itself. 
I cite Strauss simply to argue that his theological-political philosophy might provide a 
way to complicate our reading of the Renaissance engagement with pagan religion and its 
literary myths. However, Strauss’s work is not a perfect model. He is utterly contemptuous of 
materialist philosophy and its historical influence. And he does not give much attention to the 
idea that religious fiction and poetry could create universally valid symbols whose histories 
are recoverable as evidence for the continual interactions of the sacred and the profane. Not 
this, for Strauss: he decried the materialist philosophy of liberalism as erasing distinctions of 
good and bad; in seeking to historicize religious phenomena especially, he argued, one would 
have to know the “nature of God,” and “natural theology is the technical name for that” 
(267).  
However, Renaissance mythographers took natural theology very seriously, and they 
also often perceive a fundamental unity of religions in linguistic and natural symbols. But we 
also see in them an incisive critique of pagan religions as religions of fiction, and the 
constant, almost obsessive worry that such fictions represent the political and popular 
foundations of all religions. One has to wait for Spinoza for a well-argued, optimistic 
interpretation of the drive to historicize religious revelation, but one can find a multitude of 
examples that this problem informed so many of the writers who bent their minds to the 
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renewal or revival of paganism and the attendant problem of religious relativism. Ultimately, 
Renaissance authors provide both support for and a critique of Strauss’s notions of religious 
representation as political philosophy. In fact, as I will argue in the proceeding chapters the 
Renaissance discourse of false religion provides a way to complicate our own understandings 
of the relationship between art, religion, and the state. The place of pagan myths and 
religions in particular, concepts that were at times both reviled and revered, reveals the 
continual readjustments between literary fiction and its religious and political effects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 2 
Arthur Golding and the Interpretation of Paganism in Elizabethan England 
 
This chapter is about the role of paganism in the religious conflicts of Elizabethan England, 
as seen through the eyes of Arthur Golding and his translations, especially that of Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses. More generally, though, it is about the interpretive strategies of conciliation 
and accommodation that responded to foreign or heretical religious practices in this period. 
Rather than focus on one or two specific heresies or pagan religious practices, I take as my 
purpose the construction of an intellectual history of the early-Elizabethan response to 
foreign religions, especially of the classical world, from a wide variety of sources that 
Golding and his circle would have known and studied. Golding forms the center of the 
chapter because he and his version of Ovid were deeply enmeshed in the struggle to define 
Protestantism for England in the mid-sixteenth century. His protean translating acumen often 
aligned him with competing paradigms of religious identity, but it is precisely this 
competition and struggle to define one’s identity against and through the assimilation of 
foreign, unfamiliar practices that characterizes Golding’s Protestantism and that of his circle. 
This chapter locates itself within familiar debates over the proper role of tradition in religious 
worship, the employment of ceremonies, and the possibility of interaction with unbelievers. 
At the same time, it argues that reading the interplay between pagan religious practices and 
Christian ones provided a way for English readers to interpret the conflicting religious 
disciplines that resulted from the proliferation of Protestant ideologies. It also argues that this 
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method of reading laid the groundwork for later models of confronting the diversity of 
religious practices.       
Arthur Golding had a well-connected circle of friends, family, and patrons. He and 
his family associated with, and married, some of the wealthiest, most powerful, and most 
influential people in the church and government of Elizabethan England. His half-sister 
Margery married John de Vere, sixteenth earl of Oxford. Henry, his brother, became the 
steward of the earl’s household in 1553 and was elected to Parliament in 1558. Edward de 
Vere, the seventeenth earl, was Arthur Golding’s nephew; the young earl was also the ward 
of William Cecil, to whom Golding had strong ties, translating for him and often residing at 
his house.  
As a prolific translator, Golding’s works necessarily reflect the ecclesiastical, 
political, and cultural turmoil negotiated by the Elizabethan governing classes. In this chapter 
I discuss his translation of the Metamorphoses and its place in English religious culture. I 
focus on the interpretive strategies—which Golding outlines in the prefaces and represents in 
the stories themselves—for confronting and converting the pagan religions that the poem 
portrays. These strategies in his prefaces are specifically designed to take into account the 
poem’s paganism, to turn it into something useful for Ovid’s Christian readers. The religious 
literature of this period is filled with references to “heathens,” “infidels,” and “gentiles,” 
sometimes referring to contemporary Catholics or radicals but just as often to the pagans of 
the past and present. The reformers so often discussed the early church as a paragon of 
organization that the problems of the early church to assimilate unbelievers similarly came to 
the fore in sixteenth-century England. Golding’s religious translations display an awareness 
of the problem of allowing ceremonies, of maintaining the decorum of worship in the face of 
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aesthetic temptation, and of incorporating differing religious practices and beliefs into one 
coherent system. As it turned out, Golding’s interpretive theory is quite personal and 
individualistic, rooted in the specifics of bodily exchange, digestion, assimilation, and 
change, appropriately enough for a poem that emphasizes the continual physical changes that 
characterize pagan religious devotion.    
By 1567, Golding had developed a network of patrons sympathetic to his own views 
of religious community. He dedicated his translation of Leonardo Bruni’s work on the 
expulsion of the Goths to William Cecil in 1563, and his translation of Trogus Pompeius’s 
history to Cecil’s ward, Edward de Vere, in 1564. Cecil asked Golding to complete a 
translation of Julius Caesar’s commentaries, which he did in 1565. Also in 1565 he dedicated 
the translation of the first four books of the Metamorphoses to Robert Dudley, Earl of 
Leicester. From his dedications, we can track Golding’s residences in these early years of his 
career as a translator. He lived at Cecil’s house on the Strand in London in 1563, and 
probably continued living there sporadically for the next four years. His translation of Caesar 
wad dedicated from “Powles Belchamp,” the town where Golding was born, in East Anglia. 
 In 1566 and 1567, Golding was translating in “Barwicke,” an estate owned by the de 
Vere family in White Colne, Essex, about fourteen miles from his native town of Belchamp 
St. Paul. His translation of the complete Metamorphoses did not, as is sometimes argued, 
cleanly mark the end of his classical translations and the beginning of his period of religious 
translations. He translated a short work by John Calvin on “Offences” in 1566 and dedicated 
it to Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford, member of the privy council, and “Governour of 
Barwicke.” Russell was charged with the governorship of the Northern town of Berwick 
because he was the liaison between Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots during the former’s 
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attempts to marry the latter to someone in the English court (possibly Robert Dudley).64 The 
homonymous relationship between Golding’s place of residence and the residence of his 
dedicatee purposely underscores Golding’s sympathy for the religious views of the distant 
earl.65 
Golding’s religious convictions in the late 1560s and early ‘70s are difficult to pin 
down with any precision. Nevertheless, it is clear that we must do away with the term 
“puritan” once and for all, and perhaps even the blanket term “Protestant” as well. While he 
was certainly a Protestant, what kind was he? The prolific translator of Calvin also translated 
Lutheran and Philippist authors such as David Chytraeus and Neils Hemmingsen. How 
closely did he follow the Protestant infighting in Germany after Luther’s death? How 
committed was he to Geneva and its doctrines and discipline? In the years between 1567 and 
1570, Golding translated Calvin, Ovid, Chytraeus, and Hemmingsen. The reasons were partly 
economic and partly ideological, which suggests that Golding was no firm partisan of any 
one Protestant sect. The questions are complicated further by Golding’s patrons and 
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dedicatees, who, like the earl of Bedford, also patronized and read the works of exiled Italian 
reformers in England. 
 The earl was a devotee of many Italian reformers that were popular in England in the 
1560s (due in large part to the earl’s patronage), among them Bernardo Ochino and Peter 
Martyr Vermigli; the latter gained a lectureship at Oxford through the earl’s influence and 
was eventually given patronage by Robert Dudley as well. Russell’s books were catalogued 
in 1584, and his shelves were even then lined with the Italian reformers he had been 
acquainted with in the ‘50s and ‘60s.66 Another author prominent on his shelf was Jacob 
Aconcio, the author of Satan’s Stratagems, a work urging unity and peace among competing 
sects. Aconcio also dedicated a treatise on history to Robert Dudley, who became his patron 
in 1564, shortly before Aconcio’s death. Golding’s introduction to his translation of Calvin’s 
treatise seems tailored to the earl’s interest in the Italian reformers, Aconcio especially 
(though he does not mention him by name). Golding writes that “Sathan by all meanes 
séeketh in stayinge the sincere preachinge of Gods most holy woorde, to scatter the people 
into sectes & Scismes.”67 Aconcio’s ideas were not of the mainstream in England, and so he 
published his book in Basel in 1565, but nonetheless his notion of a diverse and wide-ranging 
religious liberty had much in common with other works floating around the Leicester and 
Bedford circles. 
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 Aconcio believed in diversity and liberty of religious opinion, which, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, promotes religious unity as dissenting ideas are tested and the best come 
to the forefront. He writes, 
Ac illud quidem occurit primum, quod, si integrum sit cuique, quam maxime 
velit religionem colere ac tueri, cum maxima sit ingeniorum iudiciorumque 
diversitas, fiet, ut opinionum sententiarumque permagna etiam sit diversitas, 
utque nemo non habeat, qui ab se dissentiat sibique contradicat; cumque 
nemini propemodum non contradicatur, necesse fuerit multos in dubium 
venire, quid potissimum probent sequanturque. Qui dubitat autem, is ad veri 
inquisitionem extimulatur, et multis inquirentibus mirum, ni aliquis invenerit; 
inventa porro veritate si disserendi sit libertas, facta sententiarum collatione, 
illa superior evadat necesse est. Ex quo quidem efficitur cum opinionum de 
religione libertate consistere Satanae regnum diu non posse.68          
 
[It happens first, indeed, that if there is a wholehearted desire in each person 
that religion may be fully protected and observed, and when there is a great 
diversity of minds and judgments, then it will come about that there will be a 
huge diversity in opinions and ideas, so that everyone has someone who will 
dissent from his opinion and contradict him; and whenever there is pretty 
much always someone to contradict another, necessarily many are thrown into 
doubt as to what they should approve and follow above all else. But he who 
doubts is goaded to search for the truth, and with many such seekers it would 
be amazing if the truth were not found; if the truth is at last reached with a 
freedom of discussion, and with a joining of ideas, then the highest truth will 
come to the fore. From which it certainly comes about that when there is a 
freedom of opinions about religion, then the kingdom of Satan cannot stand 
for long.] 
 
Aconcio imagines an ideal religious community in which contradictory opinions are 
eventually strained out and the truth emerges only after free discussion (“disserendi . . . 
libertas”). And yet, conflicting opinions could lead to sectarianism if there is no liberty of 
discussion, that is, if each conflicting opinion is hardened into institutional dogmatism. Just a 
few lines later he concedes that this great quantity of dissenting opinions often provides 
occasions to remove religious liberty and unite it under a false unity. The problem often lies 
with “institutions” that propagate corrupt doctrines as if they were pure ones. Good 
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contention is distinguished from bad contention in that the good kind rests with individuals 
seeking after the truth among conflicting opinions; whereas the bad kind originates with 
individuals struggling under laws and institutions that create competing sects that canonize 
their narrow, partial truths.   
 Francis Russell knew the kinds of conflict caused by institutional religious warfare 
firsthand. He was exiled to Venice and then Zurich during Mary’s rule, and was assigned to 
deal with the religio-political maneuvering that came about from Mary Queen of Scots’ claim 
to the English throne. The occasion for Golding’s translation was not only Bedford’s mission 
in the north but also the recently concluded Council of Trent, wherein, to Golding’s eyes, the 
very height of institutional error had been perpetuated. “It is not unknown,” he writes, “what 
hath bene concluded in the Councell of Trent . . . what pollicies, what practises bothe at 
home, and abroade, have bene, and are dayly put in execution, to hinder the course of the 
Gospell.”69 Calvin praises the Italian reformers in his book: “whom,” he asks, “shall the 
Italians set against Bernardine Ochine, or Peter Vermill?”70 His book would have appealed to 
Bedford because of Calvin’s ideas of how the gospel should be spread, and the pitfalls of 
such evangelism. Just as Bedford sought to expand the true religion to Scotland, the apostle 
Paul had sought to expand and unify the extent of Christendom. But offences went with him: 
“when Paule was goynge of his harde souldierfare in countries farre of: when through a 
thousande daungers he endeuored to enlarge the kingdome of Christe: hauinge continuall 
conflictes with sundry enemies, runnynge hither and thither of purpose & desire to gather 
nations farre distant asunder, into the vnitie of the faith: cowardly and currish whisperers 
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burdened him behinde his backe with vndeserued slaunders.”71 In the New Testament, Paul 
often intends the word skandalon (“offence” or “stumbling block”) to represent the 
inflexibility of opinions hardened by institutional tradition.72  Though they both excoriated 
institutionalized customs, Calvin’s treatise was certainly more mainstream’s than Aconcio’s 
book. Nevertheless, each portrays an ideal Christian reader, and preacher, who remains 
constant and is able to see his way through the external trappings of different viewpoints to 
the truth behind them.  
 This urgent conception of the hindrances that might keep people from the faith also 
informs Golding’s translation in 1569 of Niels Hemmingsen’s “Postil,” an explication of 
gospel passages commonly recited in churches. Hemmingsen himself was a follower of 
Melancthon, and his postil reflects the Philippists’ concern for conciliation and harmony 
among competing sects.73 The title page provides a “warning . . . to the Ministers of Gods 
word . . . least any beeing offended at the varietie of opinions and multitude of sects, might 
eyther forsake their profession, or do their duetie more slouthfully.”74 “Offence” typically 
springs up, Hemmingsen suggests, when there are multiple ways of worshipping, or multiple 
ways of conceiving some aspect of devotion. Feast days were especially tricky; he writes, “It 
is necessarie that wée bée put in minde what things are too bée considered in euery seuerall 
feast, least either with the wicked and Heathenish world we abuse them too the dishonor of 
God, or else solemnize them with lesse deuotion than it béecommeth vs, not without the 
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offence of many.”75 As is the case with many of Golding’s translations from this period, the 
reconciliation of diverging opinions, and practices, proves the best way to avoid the bogey of 
“offence.” The translation of Hemmingsen also has a practical bent that can be attributed to 
the circumstances in which it came about. The prolific printers Lucas Harrison and George 
Bishop essentially commissioned it and a second volume of postils a year later, because they 
saw the market for works that would help the faithful navigate the contemporary maze of 
religious sects and practices.76  
 Before he translated Hemmingsen’s thoughts on feasts, though, Golding worried that 
his translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses might also provide an occasion for offence. In the 
epistle to Leicester, Golding asks that his readers not “offend / At vices in this present woork 
in lyvely colours pend” (420–21).77 The threat of offense goes hand in hand with the threat of 
infection; his prefatory materials are his guard against the infection that the pagan text might 
spread among the faithful. And yet, Golding is also persistent in his belief that the text offers 
something important for his readers: a method of discrimination between the true and the 
false, and a method of putting to good use material that at first glance seems to present a 
conflict to the believing mind.  
Golding likes to imagine the text as being both something to encounter visually, 
perhaps not surprisingly, but also as something to be confronted, converted, ingested, and 
processed. The fact that Golding employed this language tells us something important about 
how the pagan world, and indeed other cultures whose values might conflict with those of 
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Golding’s and his contemporaries, was experienced and conceived by Tudor writers. Golding 
used the recent and continuing controversies and conflicts within Protestantism in order to 
articulate his vision of the ideal imbiber of Ovid and the pagan world. He refers to the 
controversy, only recently hatched in print, over vestments and outerwear in church services; 
he brings up the wide-ranging Protestant debate about what kinds of food are permissible to 
eat; and throughout he is attentive to the way that pagan religion forms a necessary link 
between the moral, physical, disciplinary side of religious belief and the god-given spirit and 
grace that allow the Christian believer to contextualize ritual behaviors within a narrative of 
salvation. 
Golding’s Calvinism and his translations of Calvin provide a philosophical and 
theological key that will help to explain Renaissance interpretations of pagan mythology and 
religions.78 Even though Golding, his patrons, and his dedicatees were not always strict 
Calvinists, nevertheless the stage must be set by a brief discussion of the French theologian 
himself and the interpretive problems presented by his theology. John Calvin often interprets 
“heathen” customs and religion as just one way that the inborn natural propensity for 
worshipping God has been corrupted. Calvin, like many other theologians, maintained that in 
terms of our physical natures, all humans are the same. But this physical sameness is actually 
a curse, rather than a basis for agreement: “as in respect of our first creation, there is no 
difference betwene the Iewes, the Turks, the Heathen men, & vs. Wee are al of vs taken out 
of one Lump, wee are al the children of Adam, yea wee are all heyres of Gods wrath, and 
cursed by nature.”79 This same curse that makes us more like animals than men, according to 
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Calvin, also has the effect of creating and maintaining superstitions that are derived from the 
pleasures of feeding the body. Through custom, what was common to everyone came to 
substitute for the unseen power that was only evident, or revealed, to a few. The common 
physical nature of all men thus invalidated historically grounded rituals and ceremonies that 
had long been tools of education, among pagans and Catholics alike.80 Where Calvin’s 
Catholic enemies identified a continuous and dialectical progression of ceremony and belief 
toward modern Catholic practices, Calvin maintained the eternal struggle of the wise elect 
against the superstitious vulgar.81 
 These diverging interpretations of the ancient past show up frequently in the 1560s. 
That decade saw a protracted debate between John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, and Thomas 
Harding, an English Catholic forced into retirement in Louvain. The subject of this particular 
episode was the views of the primitive church toward communion and the sacraments. The 
early church obviously had to differentiate its rituals from those of pagans. In an extended 
discussion of the nature of the sacraments, Harding adduces Augustine’s claim that pagans 
mistook Christian sacraments for the worship of Bacchus and Ceres (wine and bread), 
“Whereof may iustly be gathered an argument, that in those daies faithful people worshipped 
the Bodie, and Bloud of Christe in the Sacrament, vnder the Formes of Breade, and Wine. 
For els the Infidels coulde not haue suspected them, of dooinge Idolatrie to Bacchus, and 
Ceres.” Harding assumes, logically, that early Christian ritual must have looked much like 
pagan rituals. Jewel, however, has something else in mind: 
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For the very children in Grammar Schooles can tel him, that the Heathens, 
that Adoured Bacchus, and Ceres, as their Goddes, yet notwithstandinge neuer 
gaue godly honour to Breade, and Wyne. And Cicero him selfe, beinge an 
Heathen, was hable to say, Quis tam stultus est, vt id, quo vescitur, credat esse 
Deum? Who is so very a foole, that wil beleeue, the thinge, that he eateth, to 
be his God?82 
  
Both disputants claim continuity with the pagans, but they go about it in radically different 
ways. Harding argues that pagans saw numinous qualities in the food and drink produced by 
the gods, while Jewel thinks that the pagans were guided more by natural reason, though still 
deficient in its ignorance of grace, and that they never actually believed gods were in their 
cups and on their plates. Jewel’s thesis was influenced by Calvin’s conception of the natural 
reason of the pagans that could carry them a long way toward virtue. But Harding assumes 
that religious rituals have continuity along a historical spectrum, with only the intentions and 
the salvation status of the participants changed. On the other hand, Jewel quotes a learned 
Roman to describe pagan religious practices. The two sides of this debate are replicated over 
and over during the 1560s and 70s, with moderates often espousing a view of continuity 
similar to Harding’s; eventually Presbyterians such as Cartwright would quote Jewel 
approvingly when he wrote of the complete separation of the disciplines of Christians and 
Gentiles. 
Golding’s own position, to judge from his translations, migrated during these years. 
Part of Ovid’s appeal for Golding was that the Roman poet could provide a critique of the 
historical origins of religious rituals; but at the same time, Ovid’s poem often sees the value 
of ritual in sustaining civic religion. The reader thus stands in a peculiar place in Golding’s 
prefaces, caught between Golding’s prefaces and Ovid’s own complicated poem. Golding 
creates, and does not fully resolve, a tension between the “simple sort” that might get the 
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wrong idea from Ovid and the learned reader who has the ability to put Ovid’s stories to 
good use. But Golding also wants to make an ideal reader who exists between the two. Just 
how the pagan world, and indeed all those of different beliefs, might be of use to Protestant 
Englishmen, was a question with a complicated answer.   
It might be contextualized partially in the familiar dynamic of flesh and spirit in 
which paganism was decidedly a fleshly sort of belief. But physical infection and 
degeneration was seen as a common threat posed by unbelievers, even those long dead like 
the classical authors. Golding portrays in his prefaces a variety of readers who are variously 
susceptible to the infection of aberrant religious practices and beliefs. The dynamic was 
further complicated because the healthy Protestant had to expose himself to others and had to 
exercise his mind and body in a constant struggle to maintain the internal form of true 
religion.83  
Max Weber long ago linked Protestantism to earlier ascetic religious thought that 
emphasized the necessity of training, exercise, and variety in forming and maintaining 
belief.84 Weber identifies a complicated tension within the reformed religions of northern 
Europe that informs my own study. According to him, as the sacraments were rejected, 
rejection of worldly concerns went hand in hand. And yet, he notes that “the long-term 
endurance of scripture as manifest in the daily lives of the faithful” was the most importance 
corollary to such a rejection of sacramental “magic.” The test of an individual’s faith thus fell 
into the world and into the management of worldly concerns. As some eventually argued, the 
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“inner light” of “continuing revelation” manifest in nature could actually produce salvation 
for those who had never known the “biblical form of revelation.”85 The liberty of conscience 
so important for many Protestants was often accompanied by a profound concern for the 
materials of everyday existence; in fact, these materials gained a religious component as 
well, as Christians found salvific significance in what they ate, how they cared for their 
bodies, and what they read, not because of external authority but because of their own 
consciences.    
More recently, Michael Schoenfeldt has argued persuasively that regimens of dietary 
control often governed not only physical but also ethical and moral conceptions of the self. 
The early modern world, he argues, found in regimes of self-control a way to liberate the 
individual to take in, change, and assimilate the great variety of the external world that might 
disagree and conflict with an individual’s religious beliefs or received ideas. The stomach, in 
particular, was crucial for Golding as a Protestant thinker concerned with the relationship 
between Christians and the pagans of Ovid’s culture and poem. Schoenfeldt believes that 
“the stomach is at the center of an organic system demanding perpetual osmosis with the 
outside world.”86 Furthermore, and importantly, “the stomach . . . supervises the necessary 
discrimination of edible from inedible matter, a discrimination that is ethical as well as 
physiological.”87 I would add that this discrimination is also trans-cultural. Golding, as we 
will see, liked to imagine the reader as a consumer, taking in foreign matter and converting it 
into usable nutrient. The consumer, however, is changed by the encounter, and the very 
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process develops into an indispensable way for Protestants to experience paganism and come 
out stronger. Golding is joined by classical authorities (Seneca, Galen) as well as Christian 
(St. Paul), but his interpretive paradigm is, I will show, thoroughly embedded in the needs 
and obsessions of his immediate cultural milieu. 
Golding’s Protestantism, and that of many of his contemporaries, was characterized 
by doubt in the face of conflicting opinions, sects, and disciplines. Accordingly, Golding’s 
language overflows with metaphors and images of religious differences that emphasize the 
process of spiritual growth, especially the processes of digestive conversion and assimilation 
that could be located in and on the frail, mutable bodies both of his Protestant readers and of 
his mythological subjects. Indeed, in his prefaces Golding often returns to the theme of the 
fallibility of the body and its senses in order to suggest the difficulty of converting, and 
translating, pagan culture into Christian culture. The sense of sight seems especially 
vulnerable in the epistle to Leicester. The pagan poets “shadow” the truth of scripture with 
their “gloses.” The job of the translator and reader is to pluck the clear truth from the 
darkened version of it. He writes, 
Behold, by sent of reason and by perfect syght I fynd 
A Panther heere, whose peinted cote with yellow spots like gold 
And pleasant smell allure myne eyes and senses to behold. 
But well I know his face is grim and fearce, which he dooth hyde 
To this intent, that while I thus stand gazing on his hyde, 
He may devour mee unbewares. Ne let them more offend 
At vices in this present work in lyvley colours pend, 
Than if that in a chrystall glasse fowle images they found, 
Resembling folkes fowle visages that stand about it round. 
        (420–21) 
 
Golding argues that pagan culture distorts the truth but that it is dangerous because it is 
arresting, even sublime. The Christian reader reads at a remove from the pagan world, 
though. He sees the mirror from a distance, and the figures reflected in it are those of the 
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pagans, their own faces distorted by vice. But the pagan mysteries are also beautiful and 
enticing, like the golden panther, which represents the pleasures of idolatry and the senses. 
The pagan world needs to be converted, translated, pacified, and even transubstantiated in 
order for it to be useful to Christians. 
 So, Golding introduces another set of metaphors at the end of his epistle. He describes 
Ovid’s poem as  
This worthy worke in which of good examples are so many, 
This Ortyard of Alcinous in which there wants not any 
Herb, tree, or frute that may mans use for health or pleasure serve, 
This plenteous horne of Acheloy which justly dooth deserve 
To beare the name of treasorie of knowledge. 
        (421)  
 
Again, he hopes that “every wyght that shall have pleasure for to sport / Him in this gardeine, 
may as well beare wholesome frute away / As only on the pleasant flowres his rechlesse 
senses stay” (421–22). The text becomes food to be consumed and processed, for health as 
well as pleasure. The variety represented in the readers’ gardens is also the variety that the 
Christian man has liberty to enjoy.   
 This liberty was an essential part of Golding’s interpretive strategy in the prefaces, 
and reveals what was at stake in that strategy. In the preface “To the Reader” (first published 
in 1565), Golding writes of how superstition took over the world after the Fall and drove men 
to worship God’s creatures instead of him: “The which by custome taking roote, and growing 
so to strength, / Through Sathans help possest the hartes of all the world at length” (423). 
This was a commonplace of Protestant reactions to other religions, especially those of the 
new world. Richard Eden wrote an introduction to his translation of Peter Martyr Anghiera’s 
De Orbe Novo, in which he writes that everyone can agree that the conversion of the natives 
is a good thing:  
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I thinke then no trewe Chrystian men that do not reioyce with the Angels of 
heauen for the deliuerie of these owre brootherne, owre flesshe, and owre 
bones, from the handes of owre commune enemie the oulde serpente who hath 
so longe had them in hys possession, vntyll the fulnesse of the gentyles be 
accomplysshed accordynge to the time prefinite by hym.88 
 
Here too it seems that the natives share a common humanity with Christians, except that 
tradition, the “oulde serpente,” has corrupted their good qualities. Golding, too, 
acknowledges the mutability of custom in his prefaces and its deleterious effect on the 
pagans, but it is important that the source of corruption is not the pagans’ souls; rather, 
tradition has corrupted them instead. Logically, if the Indians could be converted, so too 
could the classical pagans, post factum. The gods in the Metamorphoses are decidedly 
mutable objects of devotion, but they can serve as a touchstone for “righteous” religious 
devotion in those who know how to interpret them. After giving a brief list of what the major 
gods represent, Golding writes, “I knowe theis names to other thinges oft may and must 
agree / In declaration of the which I will not tedious bee, / But leave them to the Readers will 
to take in sundry wyse, / As matter rysing giveth cause constructions to devyse” (424). 
Despite Golding’s provision of specific moral interpretation in the prefaces, these lines give 
license to the reader to apply his own interpretations to the stories. And as the subject matter 
becomes more difficult, the interpretation should become more complex as well. As he writes 
in the epistle to Leicester, even though he provides some examples of specific interpretations, 
he has not added “curiously the meaning of them all, / For that were labor infinite” (414). For 
Golding, the pagan religions themselves are difficult because they are mutable, various, and 
copious, like the human body, a “lumpe of flesh and bones” (ibid.) all jumbled together.  
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 This variety can be helpful to the Christian reader who knows how to interpret it. In 
fact, the variety of rituals and encounters with different opinions are necessary for the 
Protestant reader. Golding actively encourages the experience of cultural transformation and 
assimilation, illustrating the principle with a familiar metaphor. In his preface to the reader he 
writes,  
Then take theis woorkes as fragrant flowers most full of pleasant juce, 
The which the Bee conveying home may put to wholesome use: 
And which the spyder sucking on to poison may convert, 
Through venym spred in all her limbes and native in her hart. 
         (427) 
 
The bee goes out into the garden and chooses from among the variety there, while the spider 
sits at home on her web, rotten to the core. Golding was accessing a long tradition of 
classical thought that recommended just this variety of reading, learning, and travelling 
among competing ideas and cultures. In his eighty-fourth epistle, for example, Seneca writes 
about the necessity to read widely and to assimilate that reading into a coherent whole: 
“Interchangeablie this is to be exchanged with that, and the one is to be moderated with the 
other; so that whatsoever is gathered together by reading, the pen may reduce into a bodie. 
We ought, as they say, to imitate Bees, which wander up and downe, and picke fit flowers to 
make honie.”89 Seneca goes on to compare this process of selective interpretation to bodily 
digestion: 
Nourishment which we have taken, so long as it abideth in quality, and 
swimmeth solid in the stomacke is a burthen; but when it is changed from that 
which it was, then at length it passeth into strength and into blood. The same 
let us doe in these things wherewith wits are nourished: that whatsoever wee 
have gotten, we suffer not to be whole, nor to be other mens. Let us concoct 
them, otherwise they will go into the memory, not into the wit. Let us 
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faithfully agree unto them, and make them ours, that one certaine may be 
made of many things.90    
 
Seneca uses the medical language of authors such as Galen in order to compare what goes on 
in the stomach to what must happen to the imbiber of ideas. The important point for Seneca 
and for Golding is that the stomach and the bee take what they find and somehow make a 
single, coherent thing out of the variety of materials they gather.    
  Golding also mixes Galenic medical discourse with biblical aphorism to explain the 
model of interpretation he envisions. He sets up a division between those who are able to 
process pagan culture and those who are not: 
 For to the pure and Godly mynd, are all things pure and cleene, 
And unto such as are corrupt the best corrupted beene: 
Lyke as the finest meates and drinkes that can bee made by art 
In sickly folks to nourishment of sicknesse doo convert. 
And therefore not regarding such whose dyet is so fyne 
That nothing can digest with them onlesse it bee devine, 
Nor such as to theyr proper harme doo wrest and wring awrye 
The thinges that to a good intent are written pleasantly, 
Through Ovids woorke of turned shapes I have peinfull pace 
Past on untill I had atteyned the end of all my race. 
        (427) 
 
Golding quotes from Titus 1:15, “to the pure, all things are pure,” in order to make a 
distinction between the clean and unclean. But it is unclear exactly how the rest of this 
extended metaphor is supposed to apply to text and readers. Is Ovid’s text one of the “best” 
that are corrupted by the corrupt? Does the poem correspond to the “finest meates and 
drinkes that can bee made by art”? This would certainly invalidate Golding’s claim that 
pagan poets made their poetry by distorting and twisting God’s truth. But on the other hand, 
Golding does say that Ovid’s poem is not “devine” and thus he is not writing to those who 
can only read divine things. Golding shows his Erasmian side when he starts to talk about the 
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necessary accommodation of impure pagan ideas to Christian readers. He goes on to write 
that “If any stomacke be so weake as that it cannot brooke, / The lively setting forth of things 
described in this booke, / I give him counsell to absteine untill he bee more strong” (428–29). 
Golding’s language of purity, eating, abstention, and the senses locates his interpretive 
strategy within debates over the proper role of ceremonies and rituals in Elizabeth’s new 
ecclesiastical polity. 
 Golding’s language also reveals his debt to Galen, whose work On the Natural 
Faculties had been translated into Latin by Thomas Linacre in 1523. In that work, Galen 
devotes significant discussion to the stomach and its functioning as he attempted to prove, 
pace other Greek doctors, that the stomach does fundamentally change what it takes in. And 
this process of digestion, in which the stomach converts and processes nutriment, has much 
in common with Golding’s notion of his ideal reader as well as his “sickly” reader. Galen, 
discussing those with weak stomachs, writes, 
Cum imbecillus est, quacumque parte complecti exacte, assumpta non valet: 
hic laxum quoddam spacium efficiens, permittit ea quae in se continent 
humida, pro figurarum varietate ex alio loco in alium transire, ac 
fluctuationum sonitus edere. Rationabile itaque est, qui hoc symptomate 
laborat, ne concoctionem quidem sufficientem sperare. Neque enim potest qui 
imbecillus venter est, probe concoquere.91 
 
[When it is weak, however, being unable to lay hold of its contents accurately, 
it produces a certain amount of vacant space, and allows the liquid contents to 
flow about in different directions in accordance with its changes of shape, and 
so to produce gurglings. Thus those who are troubled with this symptom 
expect, with good reason, that they will also be unable to digest adequately; 
proper digestion cannot take place in a weak stomach.]92 
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Those with weak (imbecillus) stomachs cannot properly “concoct” what they take in. And the 
cause of this problem is the “variety of shapes,” which it cannot process. On the other hand, 
the strong stomach has little difficulty with variety: 
Itaque quod in cibis optimum est, id halitus specie et paulatim sibi attrahit, 
atque in tunicis suis reponit, iisdemque adiungit. Ubi abunde saturatus est, 
quidquid reliquum nutrimenti est, veluti onerosum aliquid rejicit. Quidque ex 
eo quod cum ventriculo habuit commercio, ipsum quoque consecutum est 
salturare aliquid. Neque enim fieri potest, ut duo corpora quae ad agendum ac 
patiendum sunt nata, ubi convenerunt, non vel simul patiantur agantque, vel 
alterum agat, alterum patiatur. Quippe si pares iis vires sunt, ex aequo tum 
agent, tum patientur. Sin longe superset vincatque alterum, magnum quiddam 
et quod sensu percipi posit in id quod patitur efficient. Ipsum vero vel 
exiguum aliquod et quod sensu deprehendi non posit, vel omnino nihil 
patietur. Porro in hoc potissimum dissidet nutrimentum, a medicamento 
venenoso. Hoc namque vim corporis vincit, illud ab hac vincitur. Minime 
igitur potest conveniens animali nutrimentum esse, quod ab iis quae in animali 
sunt qualitatibus, non vincitur. Porro vinci aliud non est, quam alterari.93  
 
[Thus it attracts all the most useful parts of the food in a vaporous and finely 
divided condition, storing this up in its own coats, and applying it to them. 
And when it is sufficiently full it puts away from it, as one might something 
troublesome, the rest of the food, this having itself meanwhile obtained some 
profit from its association with the stomach. For it is impossible for two 
bodies which are adapted for acting and being acted upon to come together 
without either both acting or being acted upon, or else one acting and the other 
being acted upon. For if their forces are equal they will act and be acted upon 
equally, and if the one be much superior in strength, it will exert its activity 
upon its passive neighbour; thus, while producing a great and appreciable 
effect, it will itself be acted upon either little or not at all. But it is herein also 
that the main difference lies between nourishing food and a deleterious drug; 
the latter masters the forces of the body, whereas the former is mastered by 
them.]94  
 
According to Galen, the healthy stomach is like a good interpreter of nutrients. It takes what 
is good and jettisons what is bad. Something that provides nutrients to the body is that which 
is “conquered” by the body, whereas a poison conquers the body in turn. And as Galen 
triumphantly concludes, “for something to be said to be conquered is none other than to say it 
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is altered.” The stomach alters what it takes in, just like Golding’s interpreter of pagan 
culture. Galen, like Golding, portrays the stomach’s action in terms of a contest, striving to 
conquer what is foreign and to assimilate it.  
  Golding had another source for this interpretive metaphor, one that ties digestion to 
the confrontation of foreign religions. It is likely that he also had been influenced by John 
Calvin’s commentary on the passage from Titus 1:15, which relates his version of Christian 
liberty to the customs of other peoples. For Calvin, the Christian is at liberty to eat whatever 
he wants because his body can convert the food to good use. The “sick,” on the other hand, 
cannot. Indeed, this metaphor gains depth by the general trend after the Reformation of 
restricting the kinds of food that were thought to be good for you. For Reformation 
physicians, it was often the variety of foods that created problems for the eater.95  
Whereas Golding is more circumspect about the liberty to ingest, Calvin, at least in 
his commentaries, often advocates absolute liberty, both for the body and the conscience. 
Calvin relates the Pauline notion of purity to the Jewish concern with purity of foods, 
garments, and ceremonies: “Accordingly, this must be true till the end of the world, that there 
is no kind of food which is unlawful in the sight of God; and, therefore, this passage is fitly 
and appropriately quoted in opposition to the tyrannical law of the Pope, which forbids the 
eating of flesh on certain days.”96 Calvin writes that Paul “upholds Christian liberty” in this 
passage: “All things are, therefore, pronounced by the Apostle to be pure, with no other 
meaning than that the use of all things is free, as regards the conscience” (ibid.). Calvin’s 
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words set up the familiar conundrum of religious liberty: freedom of conscience often forbids 
the voluntary participation in some ceremonies, but not others.   
Yet another set of quotations from the epistle to Titus argues for Golding’s 
knowledge of Calvin’s commentary on it. In Titus 1:12 Paul quotes Epimenides to the effect 
that the Cretans, to whom Titus was an emissary, are always liars and evil beasts, and that 
they have “slow bellies” (γαστέρες άργαί, qtd. in Calvin’s commentary, 21:300). Calvin 
translates the line in Latin as “venter iners,” with “iners” connoting a range of meanings, 
from “slow” and “weak” to “incompetent” and “useless.” The meaning is that the Cretans are 
fickle regarding what they want to take into their bodies and minds and convert to good use. 
Similarly, Golding is not writing for those who are too particular about their food, but rather 
for those who can convert many different foods to good use. Golding, too, often sets up an 
opposition between the “weak” and the strong, or the unlearned and the learned. 
But to cite the familiar passage from Titus at all was to enter into a broad, long-
standing debate surrounding the liberty of selecting food, and consequently the debate 
surrounding the Church’s injunction to eat fish on Fridays. This was a wide-ranging 
controversy, maybe nowhere better illustrated than in Erasmus’s popular Colloquia. In the 
dialogue “The Profane Feast,” the character “Christian” argues that even though Christians 
do have the liberty to eat what they will, “We sometimes chastise the immoderate Use of 
pleasant Things, by the Pain of Abstinence.”97 On the other side, the character “Austin” 
argues that the choice of meats is of no consequence. Erasmus’s dialogue dramatizes a larger 
point about feasting, however. The “profane feast” is meant, after the manner of ancient 
pagan feasts, to be a place where ideas are freely exchanged and debated. In The Godly 
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Feast, the character Eulalius (“the well spoken”) sets out succinctly the problems inherent in 
this kind of liberty: 
It was lawful, it seems, to eat of all Meats whatsoever, and all Things that are 
Clean to the Clean. But the Question remaining is, Whether it be expedient or 
no? The Liberty of the Gospel makes all Things lawful; but Charity has 
always a Regard to my Neighbour’s Good, and therefore often abstains from 
Things lawful, rather chusing to condescend to what is for another’s 
Advantage, than to make Use of its own Liberty.  
 
The “choice of meats” was thus both a metaphor for intellectual conversation and a byword 
for the conflict between freedom and decorum, individual religious practices and the 
avoidance of offenses and scandals that would retard inclusiveness. 
 Part of the problem hinged on the variations inherent in ceremonial worship. In yet 
another dialogue, Erasmus presents a fishmonger and a butcher, who debate the Church’s 
stance on eating meat. The Fishmonger ends up arguing that “Christian Liberty” does not 
mean that Christians can do whatever they want, but rather that they must obey human laws 
and ordinances with zeal and pleasure. The Butcher of course responds that to do one’s duty 
only because he is forced is not to have any choice in the matter, and is still to be under the 
“Old Law.” The Fishmonger seems to think that the New Law consists in spreading the 
gospel abroad to everyone, not just select men and prophets. He is basically saying that as of 
now the truth of the Christian religion is available for all to see, and he wonders why all do 
not acknowledge it. Affection blinds men to the truth of the gospel, and these affections 
result in diverging ceremonial practices. 
Erasmus’s characters find common ground when they lament the rule that would 
expel a priest for wearing incorrect robes but would excuse him for terrible moral vices. The 
two conclude by trading stories that illustrate instances when the circumstances of the 
individual body should trump the papal ordinances forbidding consumption of meat. Calvin 
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does not share the same concern with the body, but he thinks that injunctions against flesh do 
restrain the individual conscience. Calvin’s and Golding’s point is that each should consume 
what is right for him to consume, and abstain where they should abstain. Calvin’s position 
mediates between the two of Erasmus’s speakers as he internalizes the distinction between 
pure and impure. Whereas in Erasmus’s dialogue, Austin maintains that fish is literally 
unhealthy for the body, Calvin argues in terms of the conscience, writing that “the use of all 
things is free, as regards the conscience” (21:305). “Thus, if any law binds the consciences to 
any necessity of abstaining from certain kinds of food, it wickedly takes away from believers 
that liberty which God had given them” (21:305–6). But other writers were as conscious as 
Calvin was that such liberty must always be conscious of social circumstances.  
The influential Protestant theologian Thomas Becon weighed in on the issue of 
fasting with similar advice. For him, fasting was about social decorum. Becon rehearses 
scriptural arguments about liberty of eating and the hypocrisy of those who would “strain out 
a gnat and swalow doun a Camel.”98 Of course it hardly mattered what the Christian did or 
did not eat. Rather, the community and charity that resulted from communal fasting was 
crucial for its social value. As Becon argues, “God hath put the goods of this worlde into the 
ritche mens hands, that they shuld distribute part of them to the pore people” (sig. [Evir]). In 
fact, there were some fasts in England “called ‘political fasts’ intended purely pragmatically 
to keep a good supply of meat at a low price.”99 For Becon, this is an important part of the 
Christian liberty of Protestant believers, that because they could eat anything they wanted, 
they also should use that liberty for the benefit of the entire community. But Becon is careful 
to restrict the variety of food that Christians should eat, emphasizing instead techniques to 
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maintain temperance amidst too much variety. In fact, he criticizes “papists, whych in theyr 
fastes abstain from grosse fleshe, & deuoure all kynde of deinty and fine fishe, whiche make 
theyr bodies muche more prone to lewdnes, then the eatyng of flesh, and also bringeth the 
spirit into miserable seruitute & bondage” (sig. [Gvir]). Catholics fall into the trap of 
overindulgence in a variety of fish and sweets, a variety that actually restricts their ability to 
process food, both physical and spiritual. 
It is easy to identify Becon’s erroneous fasters with Paul’s unbelievers, for whom 
everything is polluted by their own sickness, and with other representations of pollution 
through food in the 1550s that inform Golding’s “sickly folks,” who cannot process what is 
not purely divine. This problem is put into relief by contemporary ideas about exercise, 
eating, and the role of variety in both. The well-known physician Conrad Gesner published a 
short treatise on food and health in 1556 that advocates a variety of experience and of 
exercise, but also a strict regimen of food. “Sanus homo, qui & bene valet, & suae spontis 
est, nullis obligare se legibus debet: ac neque medico, neque alipta egere. Hunc oportet 
varium habere vitae genus, modo ruri esse, modo in urbe, saepiusque in agro: navigare, 
venari: quiescere interdum, sed frequentis se exercere” (the healthy is one who lives well and 
of his own accord, and who does not bind himself with any laws; he does not need a doctor 
or a trainer. This person should have a diverse kind of life, sometimes in the country, 
sometimes in the city, and often in the field: sailing, hunting, resting now and then, but 
frequently exerting himself).100 Gesner’s classical sources counsel an eclectic moderation 
when it comes to what one should do and eat. According to them, the stomachs of those 
living in cities, and indeed almost all those who love literature, are weak. Celsus 
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recommends a variety of activities for the weak scholar, unless that is, he is a complete 
weakling (perquam imbecillum) (14). 
But at the same time, Gesner is quite clear that variety in food is to be shunned along 
with association with Catholics and heretics. In his own words, “Nos interim, qui non modo 
homines, sed Christianos, id est sanctos & pios nos profitemur, ingluvie, luxuque 
conviviorum & comessationum, tum bestiis plerisque, tum hominum illis, qui religionis 
nostrae veritatem vel olim, vel hodie non agnoverunt, sumus deteriores” (For us in the 
meantime, who are not only men but Christians, that is, who profess ourselves holy and 
pious, we are made worse by gluttony and the luxury of banquets and feasts, as well as by 
those many beasts, those kinds of men who once acknowledged the truth of our religion but 
today do not)  (18–19). For Gesner, as for many others, the choice of food was not exactly a 
thing indifferent, but carried with it precise moral valences. He begins his work with the 
epigraph, “contra luxum conviviorum,” which does not exactly condemn feasts, but does 
condemn their excesses. While anything might be permissible to the Protestant, promiscuity 
of diet was certainly not advisable.  
While a variety of habits and lifestyle might be good for you, variety of food might be 
bad. Presumably, exercise helps someone maintain a healthy relationship with his 
environment. But at the same time, Gesner thinks that the “alimenta quoque varia crassaque 
& cum iis condimenta” (foods that are diverse and rich, along with their seasonings) (20) are 
painting Christians in a bad light when compared to the frugal Turks and even abstemious 
pagans such as Epicurus, who lived on bread and water. These various and massy foods 
affect the body like drugs, impairing its ability to process good food. Again, Gesner seems to 
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indicate that those who eat rich food are too weak to correctly process it. Variety is good for 
some, bad for others.  
But Gesner does admire those who guard themselves against variety and 
immoderation, and his short treatise on food thus nicely encapsulates the problem for the 
discerning Protestant. On the one hand, variety of experience could be good. Processing 
experiences could make one a better interpreter of God’s word. But too much variety could 
also be bad, especially when it came to the physical matter that was processed. And thus 
several influential Protestant writers come to different conclusions as to the amount of 
pollution and infection shuttled toward the Protestant by the physical rituals of different 
religions. Because of the weakness of most believers, moderation was opposed to variety, in 
Golding as in Gesner. But Golding’s interpretive strategy sought to reconcile them, not 
further their opposition.  
 In accessing this debate, Golding also gestures at a larger one surrounding not only 
church rules about eating but also about the relationship and proximity between believers and 
unbelievers. The question, as it was posed by others of Golding’s era, involved whether or 
not the faithful were polluted by contact with the unfaithful. Obviously, such questions were 
underpinned by the essential, or non-essential, differences perceived to separate groups of 
people in the early modern world. Protestants were especially open to criticisms of insularity 
and willful separation from other believers. For example, Thomas Dorman opens his 1564 
treatise attacking John Jewel with an epigraph from Augustine: “Nequé enim communicas 
omnibus gentibus, & illis ecclesiis Apostolico labore fundatis,” which Dorman translates, 
“for thou doest not communicat with all Nacions, nor with those churches founded by 
the’apostles labour.” Dorman makes the obvious connection between the denial of 
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communication and the denial of communion.101 It is true that Protestant writers were often 
vexed by what they saw as the problem of mingling with unbelievers, fearing both physical 
and spiritual pollution, contamination, and infection. 
 This concern for cleanliness was often worked out through the various ceremonies by 
which other religious groups had expressed their beliefs and created their identities. Peter 
Vermigli’s 1555 treatise on the issue of “cohabitation” is a rather extreme example of 
Protestant insularity, but nevertheless shows the logical conclusion of many arguments for 
purification of body and mind.102 The treatise is an English translation of part of Vermigli’s 
lectures on the book of Judges, and the aggressively separatist tone of that book comes 
through in the treatise. Indeed, when Vermigli’s commentary on Judges was published in 
1564, the publisher John Day dedicated the anonymous translation to the earl of Leicester. In 
his commentary on Judges, Vermigli exercises himself on questions such as “Whither it be 
lawful for Christians to seeke for helpe of infidels.”103 Vermigli spends several folio pages 
answering in the negative. It is true that Christians can live in peace with unbelievers, he 
says, “especially if [the peace] be concluded for the peaceable defending and keping of the 
bondes or borders on ether syde” (fol. 99v). Christians can only deal with infidels if the result 
is that the borders between the two are reinforced. But Vermigli is adamant that the ungodly 
cannot help the godly at all: 
For if Paule will have us rather to suffer wronge and hurt, than that we 
shoulde go to the judgement seats of the infidels when we are in controversy 
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with our brethren, how much lesse is it lawfull to use the helpe of the ungodly, 
to deliver us from other Christianes, which unjustlye oppresse us. (fols. 99v–
100r) 
 
The volume was a lavish production, and, in what probably would have caused Vermigli 
some concern had he known, the title page is adorned with classical philosophers. The motto 
proclaims that “truth flowers in adversity” (virescit vulnere veritas). The very next year 
Golding would publish his partial translation of the Metamorphoses and confront the problem 
of using the classical philosophers to access Christian truth. But Vermigli is quite clear that 
even the classical philosophers were not free from stain.     
In the 1555 treatise, Vermigli’s language, mirroring his scriptural sources, is full of 
the “filth,” “pollution,” and “plagues” that the faithful might receive from the unfaithful. He 
worries that some might think that because of the various scenes in scripture where the 
faithful mix with the unfaithful it might be allowable for Protestants to so mix as well. Not 
completely true, he says. Jesus dined with pagans, Paul allowed marriages between believers 
and unbelievers, and some heretics even now may dwell among the faithful because the civil 
laws do not require that they all be put to death.104 Vermigli argues that the faithful can have 
some contact with the unfaithful, but only in order to convert them. Strikingly, the faithful 
cannot have “familiar conversacion with the unbelievers for their own cause as for their 
recreacion or for their gayn and profite.” Of course, Vermigli restricts access to the unfaithful 
to those who are learned, and those learned men of course must never participate in rituals 
and ceremonies of the unbelievers, because it is an immutable rule that “Euell things ar not to 
be doone that goode maye comme therof” (fol. 4v). 
But what about the “weake and unlearned man” (fol. 6v)? Vermigli asks if it is 
allowable for someone to learn from an “unfaithful master.” He answers in the negative, 
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because “Yt is a very dangerus thinge to use them which ar unbeleavers as Masters and 
teachers.” Vermigli concludes, “that such a weakling shuld use an unfaithfull Master I 
thincke that he shuld abstayn alltogether from suche” (fol. 7v). Vermigli finds the language 
of infection useful to drive home his advice to abstain. Doctors advise their patients not to go 
near the sick, and the lesson applies equally to those not sure in faith (fol. 9v).  
The scope of Vermigli’s argument quickly expands beyond the individual to 
encompass the “cohabitation” of entire societies. “The histories of the heathen do teache us 
the same thinge” (fol. 12r), in the story of Alexander the Great succumbing to the influence 
of Persian culture and forgetting his Macedonian customs. But about the Jews and Jewish 
culture he is most explicit. It appears to Vermigli that God wanted the Jews to be separated 
from the gentiles, and thus set up the rituals and customs by which the Jews distinguished 
themselves from other peoples. Vermigli sees in the practice of tying a yellow ribbon around 
their elbows evidence that God wanted the Jews separate not only physically, by 
circumcision, but also in their clothes (fol. 14r). And it is especially important for Vermigli 
that the weaker sort of Christians have no contact with the Jews: “Neither shuld the weaker 
sort of Christians haue ony familiaritie with them but only such Christians as be learned and 
constant in the truithe.” Vermigli is adamant about the visibility and obviousness of their 
separate status: “it is meete and convenient that they shuld be known from the Christians by 
their araye or som suche outwarde signe les ony man at unwares shuld be conuersaunt with 
them as though they wer Christians” (fol. 56r–57r). Again Vermigli contrasts the learned 
with the unlearned and tries to devise elaborate protections for those who could possibly be 
lost from the faith. Like Golding, Vermigli is on the lookout for the “simpler sort” of people, 
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who are constantly apt to misinterpret and misunderstand different religious customs and 
beliefs.           
One finds a mixed reception of these ideas in the works that Arthur Golding 
translated. He translated David Chytraeus’s treatise on the Pauline epistles and holiday 
liturgies in 1570, in which Chytraeus expresses his view, similar to Vermigli’s, that the 
faithful and the unfaithful make a poor match. Chytraeus was a Lutheran centrist; and, 
contrary to the Philippists, he could not bring himself to advocate proximity to unbelievers. 
Like Calvin in his treatise on offences, Chytraeus worried over the possibility for offence 
offered by the intermixing of pagan and Christian cultures. For him, Paul’s epistle to the 
Corinthians urges the faithful away from the “infection of worshipping Idols, and specially 
from eating meates offred unto idols.”105 He expounds on this scriptural locus: 
The occasion wherof is this: It was a custome in sacrifises too burne part of 
the offering vpon the Altar, and to set parte of it too eate before them that 
bestowed the offering. Vnto these feasts resorted certein of the Corinthians 
that wer conuerted to the true knowledge of Chryst: who vaunting of their 
lerning and wisdome, reasoned that Idols were nothing, and that it was laufull 
too vse indifferent things as men listed: and that it is a thing indifferent to eate 
fleshe offered too idolles, or not to eate it. (ibid.) 
 
Chyrtraeus agrees with Vermigli that no evil may ever be done to good purpose. In fact, 
conversion is a complicated process and does not simply depend on a good will, or good 
intentions. Paul says that “the godly ought in no wise to be present at such feasts where flesh 
sacrifised to idols is set uppon the table, bycause that by their example the worshipping of 
Idols myght bee confirmed, and the consciences of the weak might be offended and 
wounded” (ibid.). In theory Chytraeus does accept the commonplace of the New Testament 
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that all the gentiles are called to salvation despite their religious practices. In his explanation 
of verses usually read on Epiphany, he writes, 
in the doctrine of the calling of the Gentyles these three articles are alwayes 
too bee considered. First, that the promise of the Gospell is vniuersall, and that 
God is not an accepter of persones, but is indifferent too all men according too 
that one rule expressed in the Gospell (50). 
 
But in practice Chytraeus was less assured in the capacity of the faithful to remain uninfected 
by pagan customs. Even though doctrine held that all are called to salvation, Chytraeus, like 
Vermigli, advises separation between Protestants, Jews, and pagans on the basis of the 
potential for physical and spiritual contamination.    
 But not all of the writers Golding translated believed that such separation was even a 
practical necessary. Indeed, one should not deny the very real impulse toward negotiation 
and inclusion in Tudor intellectual culture. Even the fairly conservative Bishop of Salisbury, 
John Jewel, argued in 1567 that reading pagan books could help the Christian to salvation, 
citing St. Augustine himself: “the waies, whereby either to procure Goddes Mercie, or to 
enkindle our Faithe, are many and sundrie. . . . S. Augustine saithe, He was sturred up to 
comme to Christe, by reading a Heathen Booke written by Cicero.”106 Vermigli’s treatise was 
perhaps so adamant because he and his translator saw alternative theories that would govern 
the interaction of believers with unbelievers.107 John Calvin’s sermons on Paul’s epistle to 
the Galatians contain some statements that indirectly contradict Vermigli’s and Chytraeus’s. 
Calvin is more evenhanded and political than the other two theologians, advocating not only 
contact with Jews but also accommodation.  
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 Golding frames Calvin’s commentary on Galatians as a rebuttal to the necessity of 
ceremonies, but Calvin’s text often belies the absolute necessity of rejecting ceremonies. At 
one point, Calvin takes up the question of why Paul circumcised Timothy but not Titus. It 
was, Calvin argues, completely a case of accommodating religious customs for a greater 
good:  
Saint Paule therfore had circumcised Timothie: and the reason why, was for 
that hee sawe manye weaklings, whiche woulde haue bene offended bycause 
they were not yet throughly confirmed in the knowledge of the Gospell, but 
thought that it behoued them to keepe still the ceremonies of the Lawe. And it 
is sayd, that wee must yeeld one to an other, for charitie byndeth vs thervnto. 
Euery man must not do what he him self thinks good, to the trubbling of his 
neybours: but we must so fashyon our selues one too an other, as none maye 
bee offended through our faulte. St Paule then forbare in hauing respect too 
the poore Ignorant weaklings, who not withstanding myghte bee brought to 
knowledge in tyme.108  
 
Again, our author mentions the weak and advocates concessions for them. But more 
importantly, Calvin argues that we should accommodate our actions to those around us, and 
“fashyon our selues one too an other” in order to minimize offense. Calvin’s is a time-bound 
ethic, though. Christian liberty lasts forever, and it is only for a short time that believers have 
to participate in unclean rituals. Calvin makes it clear that eating flesh or fish is a thing 
indifferent to salvation, and yet he also argues that Christians should adapt their eating habits 
to Jewish customs: “Yea and when wee haue to do with any Iewes, which are not acquaynted 
with our customes, and that we go about to winne them and draw them to the obedience of 
the Gospel: we must for a tyme (in being conversant with them) abstein from the things 
which they think to be forefended” (fol. 63v). In other words, in Calvin’s view the Protestant 
believer must sometimes abstain from things that the Jews prohibit. Vermigli and Chytraeus 
never said that the believer had to sometimes partake in rituals not his own. This would be, 
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for Vermigli, to do evil to accomplish good. Yet Calvin thinks that the believer may 
participate in rituals of different religions, as long as those rituals are illustrative of non-
essential cultural differences. But Calvin constructs this participation as done for the benefit 
of the weak, or those who cannot understand why Christian habits must trump those of other 
beliefs.  
 Calvin also used the example of circumcision and what it represented to respond to 
one of the scriptural loci that most challenged his view of predestination. 1 Timothy 2:4 says 
that God would have all men saved, but Calvin thought that it only meant that God would 
have those saved who came to the knowledge of the Gospel. And of course, knowing the 
Gospel required being taught the Gospel and finally understanding the Gospel. But not all 
people could do that. “Yet so it is,” he writes in his commentary on 1 Timothy, “that there 
are many which do not profite in the Gospell: but rather become worse by it, yea even of 
them to whome the Gospell is preached, whiche are not all saved.”109 He uses the example of 
circumcision to further illustrate the point. Circumcision among the Jews was “a sure and 
undoubted gage, that God had chosen that people for his owne. . . . And yet, was there not a 
speciall grace for some of that people? . . . Not all they that came of the race of Abraham 
after the fleshe are true Israelites.”110 His point is that although circumcision represents the 
outward sign of a real covenant, it does not represent salvation. Rather, external rituals and 
signs only imperfectly represent God’s will. Though God’s grace certainly extends to all 
people, “special grace” attends on some places and people more than on others. Calvin 
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basically defends his theories by arguing for the specificity of God’s saving grace on some 
people but not others.  
The key point, though, is that God must work through the human vessels he has 
appointed to spread his word, his prophets and apostles. In fact, this is a tense moment in his 
theology, which is why he spends so much time worrying it. Calvin has to concede that 
extending grace to all people requires attention to the specific human beings that will hear 
and interpret his words. He insists that God does not actually damn us: even among the elect, 
correct interpretation is not assured. This is the reason that Paul was sent to the Cretans in the 
first place: to reform their slow bellies that could not handle knowledge of God.111     
Just as Golding writes to those who can process complex foods, Calvin and a host of 
other Protestant writers advocate liberty of eating as a metaphor for the freedom from 
canonical and papal restraints. Another issue that loomed large in debates about liberty was 
that of vestments and their role in Protestant ceremonies of worship. The vestiarian 
controversy, largely carried out in print between the returning Marian exiles on one side and 
the bishops, especially Matthew Parker, on the other, revolved around the stance of believers 
toward things indifferent, or those matters not strictly necessary for salvation.112 The 
ministers who protested against certain holdovers from Catholic liturgy, such as the wearing 
of the surplice during services, wanted the liberty to do away with what they disliked about 
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the service. But Parker and the bishops wanted to maintain the order and conformity of 
services.113  
Robert Crowley was enlisted by the ministers to publish his contribution in 1566, and 
his treatise describes how they view the problem: “Wee graunt, that of themselves, they be 
things indifferent, and may be used or not used, as occasion shall serve, but when the use of 
them will destroy, or not edifie, then cease they to be so indifferent, that in such case we may 
use them.”114 Thus, Crowley concludes that the worst thing about forcing conformity is that it 
makes strangers and foreigners out of those who used to be one’s neighbors and friends. By 
this he means that instead of relating to people on one’s own terms, conformity invents 
causes for dissension and conflict. He goes on: “we hope therefore, that our Prince and all 
good men, will like well with this our doing, understanding by Christian libertie, that 
freedome that Christ hath brought us unto, by beating downe the particion that was betweene 
the Jewes and gentiles, which was the law of ceremonies contained in the law written” (sig. 
[Biiiv]). Crowley wants a degree of sameness among Protestants and he fears the hierarchies 
of social distinction and separation that other writers had advocated in order to divide 
believers and unbelievers. 
Crowley thus rejects the dynamic of Titus 1:15, appealing to the absolute authority of 
God rather than the process of conversion that the pure man uses to put evil things to good 
use. Crowley seems more worried about the effect of the minister’s example on others. If the 
use of things indifferent creates offense, then it should not be used: “It is good (sayth S. 
Paule) not to eate fleshe, nor to drink wine, nor to do any other thing, wherat thy brother doth 
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stumble, or is offended, or made weake.” He also advocates separation from the unbelievers, 
because “what parte can a faithfull man have with an infidell?” Crowley’s argument is not 
one that allows accommodation or compromise; it respects divisions of believers and 
unbelievers even as it throws out artificial distinctions of hierarchy represented in garments 
and external rituals.  
Such clear-cut calls for uniformity through diversity, for a kind of negative liberty, 
demanded an intellectually sophisticated response that would discuss both scriptural 
precedents and justify uniformity of outward apparel in terms of its usefulness for the 
community. It was a long-standing question, whether or not religious unity could be 
maintained in the face of a variety of rites, and was mulled over by scholars such as Nicholas 
of Cusa.115 Archbishop Matthew Parker’s treatise displays the same fear of creating scandals 
and offenses for the believer, but concludes that such scandals are best avoided by engaging 
and converting strange rites. He begins by citing a letter of Augustine: “For I haue 
perceyued, euen to my great sorow and heauynes, much disquietyng of the weake to be 
caused by the contentious stubbernes and superstitious feare of certayne brethren, which 
rayse vp so braulyng questions, that they thynke nothing to be well done but what they do 
them selues.”116 The contentions arise from some people overly fond of their own customs, 
and who mistake those customs for reason. And yet Parker ultimately affirms the value of, if 
not custom itself, but the perception of custom and its role in the fabric of society. He cites 
Augustine again at one point, who learned that “Many thynges muste be borne [multa 
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tolleranda], when orderly meanes do not serue to cut them of” (sig. **4v). Also, “some 
tymes profitable alteryng of such thynges as were long accustomed, bread trouble in the 
Churche by newenes of chaunge.” Parker takes seriously the value of maintaining historical 
continuity in a religious community.  
He also certainly does think that the purity of believers gives them license to use 
formerly unclean ceremonies, rituals, and spaces. “The histories Ecclesiasticall also haue 
diuers experiences, howe much our auncient fathers increased Christes Churche by such 
godly pollicie. Hence it was, that they plucked not downe all the Jewyshe Sinagoges and 
Heathenyshe Temples, but turned them to the seruice of God: that they altered theyr feast 
dayes: that they chaunged their rites to Godlye purposes” (sig. ***1v). But for Parker, the 
laws established by a godly society are the instruments of purification. They make it 
allowable to give offense to some who do not like certain rites and ceremonies. Even more 
importantly, Parker refutes the idea that conversation between different groups is forbidden. 
People in England do not really have to worry about bumping into pagan sacrifices in the 
street, but they do have to worry about encountering differences in religious beliefs and 
practices:  
And yf there be in a Church where Christes Gospel is purely preached and his 
sacraments rightly ministred, some euyl among the good, as in one net diuers 
sortes of fishes, in one fielde wheate and tares, in one barne corne and chaffe: 
yet the good are not sayde to communicate or be defyled of the badde, as long 
as they consent not to theyr wickednes, but depart from among them, not by 
corporall separation, but by dissimilitude of life and diuersitie of maners, 
though they both vse the same temple, the same table, the same sacraments. 
(sig. [***4r]) 
 
In other places, Parker discusses most of the major scriptural loci that deal with liberty of 
eating, dressing, circumcision, and worship. Parker maintains throughout that Christian 
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liberty entails permitting a wide variety of rites, so long as they fall under the aegis of the 
governing body of the church. His is a kind of positive liberty of religious practice. 
Suffice it to say that, in the years before Golding published his translation of Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, Protestant scriptural commentary and controversy had been enjoying a print 
explosion in England. Golding would have found a range of issues and ideas against which to 
position his own method of interpreting alien religious practices. But his method is itself 
various. His translations do not reveal his sympathy for any one branch of Protestantism. Any 
attempt to set into ideological camps the various opposing groups in the religious community 
of early-Elizabethan England will be frustrated by the shifting positions they maintained. 
Sometimes Calvinists agreed with Lutherans, and sometimes even with Philippists, and 
sometimes they all disagreed with each other and the established English church. The one 
thread uniting them all is that they saw in the variety of available ecclesiastical disciplines a 
potential source of doubt and conflict.   
 Following from Golding’s own translations and the writings of his contemporaries, 
we must read Ovid’s poem in terms of the religious practices that its characters continually 
desecrate and re-sanctify. Golding tells us in the preface to the reader that Ovid’s poem 
contains “darke and secret misteries,” and he sets out a hitherto unused method of reading 
those mysteries. He writes, 
And even as in a cheyne eche linke within another wynds, 
And both with that that went before and that that follows binds: 
So every tale within this booke doth seeme to take his ground 
Of that that was reherst before, and enters in the bound 
Of that that folowes after it: and every one gives light 
To other: so that whoo so meanes to understand them right, 
Must have a care as well to know the thing that went before, 
As that the which he presently desires to see so sore. 
         (428) 
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This method would have seemed strange because heretofore Ovid’s tales had mainly been 
read as isolated morality plays that illustrated one particular vice and its punishment. The 
idea that the reader had to look for connections between stories was new.117 Golding’s 
convoluted language mimics the confusion of the reader going back and forth between what 
he has already read, suggesting that Ovid’s language repays re-reading, but also that such a 
reading is crucial to avoid becoming corrupted by its tantalizing surface. So, a reading 
sympathetic to Golding’s purpose must look not only for connections between stories but 
also for the mixture of pure and impure. It would look for the places where the Christian 
reader might encounter a difficult interpretive hurdle as he confronts pagan religious 
practices. 
 A prime example of the difficult religious situations offered by the text is the story of 
the first transgression against the gods. Lycaon is the first to break divine law, by planning to 
kill Jupiter, but first killing and cooking his other guests. Like many of the stories in the 
poem, this one revolves around the materiality of infection and corruption and the eventual 
purging and reconstitution of the community. Lycaon’s sin involves his need for physical 
proof of divinity. Even though Jove “gave a signe that God was come,” Lycaon was not 
satisfied. He thought to kill the disguised Jove to determine, “By open proufe, ere long I 
minde to see, / If that this wight a mighty God or mortall creature bee. / The truth shall trie it 
selfe” (10). Lycaon wants verifiable proof: he will test out (experiar) the divinity of Jove and 
he expects that “nec erit dubitabile verum” (the truth will not be doubtful).118 Lycaon’s 
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attempt to substitute his own reasoning for that of the gods’ would have been a familiar sin in 
the eyes of Golding’s readers as well. Arthur Brooke, an early Protestant apologist of the 
Elizabethan Church, wrote in 1563 that “men may not ryse aboue the Oracles and reuelations 
of God, for howe maye a man knowe hys meanyng and councell any farther than those 
thynges whyche by hym haue beene reueled vnto vs.”119 Jove does in fact give the people a 
“signe,” but Lycaon flaunts his ratiocinative powers in the face of such revelation. His doubt 
sets the tone for the way that many mortals experience the action of the divine. While they 
want it to conform to reason and the senses, it never does but remains dubious and slippery. 
So, for his crime Lycaon, along with the entire world, are destroyed. But, the gods 
still need people to worship them, so Jupiter creates a new race from Deucalion and Pyrrha. 
They are saved because they listen to the gods, specifically Themis and her oracles. The 
contrast with Lycaon is clear: the virtuous couple respects the rituals and, more importantly, 
the sacredness of the space of Themis’s chapel. Lycaon did not trust in the “signe” that 
Jupiter gave at his arrival, whereas Deucalion and Pyrrha trust in the oracle from which they 
receive the command to repopulate the earth by throwing stones over their shoulders. And 
because of this, they too make a “proufe,” but theirs is successful (16).        
 They are also respectful of the decorum of religious ritual. When they arrive at the 
river Cephisus, its “sacred liquor straight they tooke and sprinkled with the same / Their 
heads and clothes.” Themis’s altar stands “Without one sparke of holie fyre or any sticke of 
wood” (15), and the couple rekindle the fire. Themis, the mother of justice, answers their 
prayers with an obscure expression. The oracle, like many from the classical world, is a test 
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of religious interpretation. Oracles ask their hearers to square what they know of the gods’ 
power and goodness with the unclear, human words that they hear uttered. As with any 
attempt to accommodate the divine to the human world, something is lost in translation. 
Golding was certainly familiar with the idiosyncratic nature of oracles in the ancient world. 
In 1564 he had translated Justinus’s abridgement of Trogus Pompeius’s history, in which the 
author describes the cave at Delphos: “Out of the whiche a certayne colde breth, driven up as 
it were in a certain winde, ascending upward, stirreth up the minds of the Prophets into a 
madnesse.”120 There is madness, too, in Themis’s oracle; alongside the later oracles, her 
oracle taps into the primal, elemental forces of the earth to test its human interpreters. While 
Pyrrha worries that the goddess is asking her to commit sacrilege against her “Graundames 
bones” (16), Deucalion successfully interprets the riddle in a way that avoids profanation. 
Unlike the literal-minded Lycaon and Pyrrha, Deucalion has no trouble reconciling divine 
mandate with human action; his is an early (in the poem) compromise between the human 
and the divine realms. And as we have seen in Golding’s prefaces, the translator clearly 
wants his readers to behave much like Deucalion, taking the dead matter of the poem and 
transforming it into something living. Like Deucalion, Golding’s reader should not assume 
that divine commandments are either inscrutable or meant to be taken literally: rather, most 
often they present some problem of interpretation that requires their human interpreters to 
reconcile and assimilate conflicting imperatives. 
 The stories of Lycaon and Deucalion, so opposed, provide a pattern for Ovid’s later 
representations of the tensions inherent in religious rituals that attempt to interpret and 
accommodate the will of the gods on earth. In book 2, Mercury appears as a trickster that 
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likes to test humanity’s weaknesses. He entrusts his herd of cattle to an old “churl” named 
Battus, and then disguises himself and tricks Battus into offering to sell the herd to him. 
Having shown man’s perfidy in the economic sphere, he observes the same perfidy in 
religious devotion. Mercury sees a troupe of worshippers devoted to Minerva and falls in 
love with the most beautiful of the worshippers, Herse, the sister of Aglauros. Much like 
Leander being turned on by seeing Hero practicing solemn rites, Mercury seems aroused by 
the contrast between his physical desire and the forbidding nature of the ritual. “She was the 
verie grace / And beautie of that solemne pompe” (55), writes Ovid. By way of contrast, 
Mercury’s lust is compared to a slingshot (Balearica . . . funda), which Golding upgrades to a 
gun: “in case as when the poulder / Hath driven the Pellet from the Gunne, the Pellet ginnes 
to smoulder” (ibid.). But when Mercury tries to visit Herse at her home, her sister Aglauros 
wants a bribe from him before she will betray her sister and alienate her from the service of 
Minerva. Aglauros of course is paid back by all-seeing Minerva with a curse from Invidia, 
but the point had been made: religious devotion is subject to the same frailties of the flesh as 
is everything else. Participating in the rituals of devotion only made Herse, along with many 
other women throughout the poem, more vulnerable to lust. External worship, because 
performed in public, has the added liability of being subject to public scrutiny. What 
concerned the reformers also concerned Ovid, however jokingly: that public ceremonies and 
rituals often had the effect of vulgarizing the beauty of holiness and perverting it to other 
ends.  
 The poem’s characters are often presented with such puzzling contradictions when 
faced with the divine. The gods themselves, like the religious sects they came to represent in 
Ovid’s time, want their own rites to be practiced and respected, sometimes at the expense of 
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human laws and public order. The story of Pentheus, Bacchus, and his followers, recounted 
in books 3 and 4, shows humans adjusting to the incursion of divine worship into their cities 
and streets. But even more, it points out the problem of religious enthusiasm and ceremonial 
celebration running up against a rational state power that distrusts such ecstasy, as well as 
more ascetic religious groups that also distrust mutable, external worship. The story of 
Bacchus would have presented several interpretive difficulties for the reader attuned to the 
religious complexities both of Ovid’s text and sixteenth-century Protestant religious culture. 
Bacchus was associated with foreign, Indian religious customs, even though he was 
originally a Greek deity. Thus, the god might represent a native who supports foreign 
religious rituals in his native country (like a Catholic Englishman). Alternatively, he might 
represent the allure of superstition, which drives people to accept irrational modes of 
worship. Ovid begins book 3 by recounting the civil conflicts that arose along with the city of 
Thebes itself; Bacchus’s conflicts with his native land are only an extension of the conflicts it 
cannot seem to avoid. But it is undeniable that Pentheus and those who resist Bacchus are 
punished either with death or metamorphosis. If the moral of the stories is that resistance to 
divine commands are futile, then those very divine commands are seriously undermined by 
enthusiasm and superstition.  
Ovid goes out of his way to emphasize just how alien the rites of Bacchus appear to 
native Greeks. Acetes, the sailor who recounts Bacchus’s appearance to Pentheus, describes 
the god’s travelling companions: “at his feete there seemed for to crouch / Of Tygers, Lynx, 
and Panthers shapes most ougly for to touch” (84). The outward rites of Bacchus are 
similarly uncouth and frantically various, full of “noyse and howling loud” (85). Yet, there is 
still something sacred and divine about the rituals; Pentheus watches “these holie rites with 
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lewde prophaned eyes.” Though he originally went to the mountains to condemn the rites, 
when he is discovered “He now condemnes his owne default, and says he was too bolde.” Of 
course, he is torn limb from limb by his own mother.  
On one level, the story represents the superstitions of the unlearned masses. Golding 
in his preface to the reader says that “By Bacchus all the meaner trades and handycraftes are 
ment” (425). So, Bacchus could represent the way rituals easily degenerate into inspired 
superstition in the hands of the unlearned. (This is also the conclusion reached by Johann 
Spreng in his 1563 edition of the Metamorphoses.121) Golding does counsel us to pay 
attention to the continuities between stories, and indeed what follows the Bacchus story 
seems to reinforce the interpretation of Bacchic rites as inspired nonsense. The daughters of 
Minyas are somewhat ascetic and refuse to honor Bacchus at the beginning of book 4. They 
are “bent of wilfulnesse, with working / Quite out of time to breake the feast” (87). They go 
on to pass the time by telling stories, instead of celebrating in the streets along with the rest 
of Thebes. The stories they tell are similarly ascetic, emphasizing the dangers of physical 
desire and lust. Pyramus and Thisbe, and Salmacis and Hermaphrodite, are brought down by 
physical attraction and the tendency to misinterpret physical signs from the body (Pyramus 
by the lion’s blood that he mistakes for Thisbe’s, and Salmacis by Hermaphrodite’s glittering 
and glistening limbs). Their stories anticipate later ones in which human lovers are often 
betrayed by their attempts to manipulate the physical world to solve their problems. Indeed, 
most attempts to address the numinous by means of the carnal meet with disaster.   
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Similarly, Bacchus’s divine power eventually reaches the daughters of Minyas: “The 
house at sodaine seemde to shake, and all about it shine / With burning lampes, and glittering 
fires to flash before their eyen, / And Likenesses of ougly beastes with gastfull noyses yeld” 
(99). They are turned into birds, a symbol of their alienation from the physical instantiation 
of divine power, forever caught between heaven and earth.  Even though the main thrust of 
the story for Golding involved the superstition of Bacchus’s followers, Pentheus and the 
Minaids are still punished in the end. So, the story also represents the rightful role of 
accommodation within a religious community. The daughters refused to participate in what 
were lawful, temporary expressions of religious ecstasy and release.  Whether or not we 
identify Minyas’s daughters with true-blue Protestants, their situation might remind those 
Protestants of the duty to square conscience with practice. Golding even calls their refusal of 
Bacchus’s divinity “heresie,” translating the more benign Latin word “impietas,” which 
usually signifies neglect of duty, not a total change in belief. Golding, too, probably realized 
that the story could be applied to the problem of accommodating religious rituals to the 
vagaries of the flesh: they could be somewhat mediated by virtuous withdrawal, but 
ultimately there had to be some mixture, some sort of mitigation of what was foreign and 
strange. 
In later books of the poem, the gods play less and less of an overt role, and the 
conflicts move inward. However, the framework of a society governed by rituals and 
religious devotion is never wholly forgotten. So it comes as no surprise when the rites of 
Bacchus intrude in the middle of the story of Tereus, Philomela, and Procne. The story is 
familiar: Tererus weds Procne, who then wants her sister to visit his kingdom in Thrace. 
Tereus is enflamed by lust at the sight of Philomela, and when he wins her over by guile he 
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rapes her and cuts off her tongue to silence her. She weaves a cloth that tells of what 
happened to her and sends it to her sister. Procne immediately falls into a kind of madness, 
and is aided by the license granted to her by the rites of Bacchus that were being celebrated: 
It was the time that wives of Thrace were wont to celebrate  
The three yeare rites of Bacchus which were done a nighttimes late. 
A nighttimes soundeth Rhodope of tincling panes and pots: 
A nighttimes giving up hir house abrode Queene Procne trots 
Disguisde like Bacchus other froes and armed to the proofe 
With all the frenticke furniture that serves for that behoofe. 
         (156) 
 
The rites of Bacchus provide not only a cover for Procne but also an excuse for the horrible 
revenge they exact on Tereus, cooking his son Itys and serving him to his father.122  
 The scene is meant to resonate with other Bacchic rituals. In Ovid’s Fasti, Bacchus is 
said to be the first to have offered “roast flesh” (viscera tosta) of oxen; also, “fathers 
commend to thy care and divine keeping the pledges that they love, their sons”; and “a freer 
life is entered upon under thine auspices.”123 Itys acts as a sacrifice to Bacchus on behalf of 
Tereus, who has neglected his religious duties. Ovid wrote the story with a cyclical logic of 
generation, ingestion, and metamorphosis. What Tereus ate was in a sense the fruit of his 
own crime; since he had corrupted the mouth of Philomela, his own mouth was corrupted in 
turn and with his own offspring. The “moral” of the story is thus more complex than simply a 
warning against lust; in actuality it enacts a version of “to the pure all things are pure,” in that 
Tereus’s punishment is a metaphor for those readers who are blinded by their own 
limitations. Ovid emphasizes his blindness throughout: “O God, what blindnesse doth the 
heartes of mortall men disguise?” (152) (quantum mortalia pectora caecae noctis habent); 
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and “so blinded was his heart” (158) (tantaque nox animi est). He is trapped inside his own 
body, in a way, and certainly trapped by his inability to see outside of his own desires. 
Whereas the communal, celebratory dimension of religious devotion assists Procne, it seems 
never to affect Tereus or enter his mind.    
 Tereus, like a bad reader, or someone with a weak stomach, is unable to process what 
he takes in and therefore he is unable to see the consequences that his actions have on his 
society at large. Indeed, there is little sense of a real society surrounding the characters in the 
middle books of the poem, which deal mainly with isolated individuals whose lusts and 
passions often adversely affect their nameless subjects or countrymen. Religious ecstasy 
exists on the margins of society; it has not yet been standardized or brought into accord with 
rules of civic life, and so it is wild. In book 11, Orpheus ends up torn apart by Bacchantes, 
women in the throes of religious passion. Their description is one of a marginalized group 
operating outside of the bounds of both their city and their god. The Bacchic women took 
umbrage at Orpheus when he criticized all women after he lost Eurydice. “Frantik outrage 
reigned” among them, and they blow horns and beat drums, “bedlem howling out” (273). 
They are “cruell feends,” and in the process of murdering Orpheus they also kill oxen 
working in the field (274). Even Bacchus himself is angry at their excesses and eventually 
turns them all into trees. The story presents a clear contrast between Orpheus, who can charm 
savagery and turn it into civility, and the Bacchantes, who represent the slightly different 
savagery of untamed, inspired religion.124 There has not yet been a détente between civic 
society and the more outré dimensions of religious worship.  
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But this situation starts to change when Ovid begins to recount the Trojan War, which 
shows for the first time the dire consequences for civilization of passions run amok. The war 
of course sets in motion the founding of Rome; so Ovid shifts his emphasis from the isolated 
individual effects of the passions to the ways in which the passions are channeled through 
religious practices and their effects on the commonwealth. The twelfth book introduces the 
cause of the Trojan War in a single line: “within a whyle with ravisht wife he brought a 
lasting warre” (299). Immediately thereafter, Ovid gives us a scene that shows the crucial 
importance of religious rituals in waging the resulting war. The prophet Calchas told the 
Greeks that they had to sacrifice to Diana in order to calm the angry seas, and the victim is to 
be Agamemnon’s own daughter, Iphigeneia. This story receives a familiar twist, though, as 
Iphigeneia is saved at the last minute by Diana and replaced by a deer.  
The entire ritual is described as the triumph of reason over emotion. Golding 
translates, “pitie yielded had to cace of publicke weale, / And reason got the upper hand of 
fathers loving zeale” (300). It is revealing that Golding invents the word “reason” in that 
phrase as he translates Ovid’s “rexque patrem vicit” (the king conquered the father [in him]). 
Ovid sees Agamemon’s two roles, as king and father, competing against each other, and 
Golding interprets “rex” to mean “reason”; in Golding’s view, reason here tells Agamemnon 
that the greater good must come before his personal love for his daughter. The whole scene 
is, for Golding, thoroughly rational: religious devotion is inextricably tied to the prosperity of 
the state, and it is only fitting that it be attended.  
However, this scene stands out for its portrayal of the complex relationship between 
the individual and the collective community bound together through often nonsensical 
religious ceremonies. This scene provided the occasion of Lucretius’s famous criticism of all 
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superstitious religious practices, especially sacrifices, in his De Rerum Natura (1.80–101). 
Ovid may have shared Lucretius’s dislike of superstitious ritual—later on Pythagoras voices 
a similar critique—but Ovid’s poem does not entirely discount the value of these rituals. The 
story does point out just how inextricably linked are religious rituals and public benefits in 
the minds of the Roman people. Similarly, in his 1563 edition Spreng reads the story as a 
fable of public concerns trumping private ones: “Publica privatis excellunt commoda rebus, / 
Est nihili solum qui sibi vivit homo” (Public benefits come before private matters, and a man 
is worthless if he lives for himself alone).125 Ovid’s tale presents religious ritual as being a 
kind of necessary compromise that nonetheless links the individual to the larger community 
of humans and gods, but often at the expense of that individual’s personal well-being. It 
represents the poem’s embarkation upon the modern world, the world that saw the rise of 
civilizations still in existence in Ovid’s lifetime. And so much of the rest of the poem 
examines the effects of religious devotion on human society.  
Book 15 begins with the figure from early Rome that most epitomizes the ideal of a 
ruler both civically and religiously minded. This is Numa, the Roman king who set down 
both legal and religious standards in the wake of the inter-cultural conflict represented by the 
rape of the Sabine women. Numa was thought to have gotten advice from Pythagoras, and 
the king soon recedes as he listens to an old man tell him about the wisdom of Pythagoras, 
and it is with Pythagoras that the poem reaches a conclusion. Pythagoras and Numa 
represent, appropriately for Golding embarking on a career of religious translation, the desire 
to finally standardize religious precepts and make them acceptable to society. Pythagoras 
himself takes many of the poem’s recurring images and motifs and criticizes, refashions, and 
examines them in his exposition of his philosophical positions. 
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Pythagoras and his ideas were very attractive to Protestants in the sixteenth century. 
A few years after Golding published his complete translation of the Metamorphoses, he 
translated the Dutch Prince of Orange’s justification of his war against Phillip II, written in 
1568. The treatise is a list of the crimes of the Duke of Alva and the prince’s justification for 
opposing the oppressive tactics of the Spanish-appointed governor.126 Part of his self-defense 
consists of examples of the harsh injunctions that the Charles V had introduced into the Low 
Countries, by which various books were banned from being published. Alongside works by 
authors such as Eobanus Hessus and Sebastian Munster, the author lists “the commentaries 
uppon the poetry of Pythagoras.”127 Presumably the author of the injunction intended 
Hierocles’ commentaries on the “Golden Verses” of Pythagoras, which contained advice 
about how to purify the body and soul through the regimens of the Pythagorean religion.  
This kind of rigorous regimen was exactly what Numa was looking to import into the 
Roman state. An old man recounts to him about the origins of the Pythagorean community in 
Italy as well as the teachings of Pythagoras himself. The first part of Pythagoras’s speech is 
the most important for my purposes, and besides seems to be the part that interested Golding 
the most. Pythagoras criticizes the religious practices that many of the characters in the poem 
have lived by, especially the practice of sacrificing flesh on altars. Readers of the poem 
would have seen countless examples of sacrifices to the gods throughout the work, some that 
produced results and some that did not. In fact, Ovid rarely shied away from describing the 
sacrifices in all their gory, offhand detail, as when Achilles feasts with the other princes in 
book 12: 
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    there came a day of joy, 
In which Achilles for his luck in Cygnets overthrow, 
A Cow in way of sacrifyse on Pallas did bestowe, 
Whose inwards when he had uppon the burning altar cast 
And that the acceptable fume had through the ayer past 
To Godward, and the holy rytes had had theyr dewes, the rest 
Was set on boords for men to eate in disshes fynely drest. 
The princes sitting downe, did feede uppon the rosted flesh, 
And both theyr thirst and present cares with wyne they did refresh. 
        (303–4) 
 
Pythagoras, of course, enjoined abstinence from eating meat, as the old man recounts in book 
15: 
 He also is the first that did injoine an abstinence 
To feede of any lyvying thing. He also first of all 
Spake thus: although ryght lernedly, yit to effect but small: 
Ye mortall men, forbear to frank your flesh with wicked foode. 
        (379) 
 
Pythagoras draws a connection between the rise of eating meat and the fall from the Golden 
Age, which was full of “freendshippe, love and peace” (380). And again, he derides the 
practice of sacrificing animals to the gods. He indicts the superstition of men who think that 
the gods delight in sacrifices or who think that the secrets of the gods can be discovered by 
the haruspication of animals.  
 Pythagoras is pulling at a thread that runs throughout the Metamorphoses as well as 
the Fasti. The logic of sacrifices was notoriously murky; Ovid himself appears skeptical of 
their efficacy, but nevertheless includes an origin story for sacrifices in book 1 of his poem 
on the Roman calendar. His account there mirrors Pythagoras’s criticism in the 
Metamorphoses in that it opposes the corruption of modern sacrificial practices to the purity 
of the golden age: 
The knife that now lays bare the bowels of the slaughtered bull had in the 
sacred rites no work to do. The first to joy in blood of greedy sow was Ceres, 
who avenged her crops by the just slaughter of the guilty beast; for she learned 
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that the milky grain in early spring had been routed up in the loose furrows by 
the snout of bristly swine. (27) 
 
Pythagoras too links the origins of sacrifices to affronts against plants dear to the gods. “The 
Goate,” he says, “for byghting vynes was slayne at Bacchus altar whoo / Wreakes such 
misdeeds” (380). But the great majority of modern sacrifices are done for no reason at all, 
according to him. Oxen, for example, are guiltless, and their sacrifice is shameful: “They 
father / Theyr wickednesse upon the Goddes. And falsly they doo gather / That in the death 
of peynfull Ox the Hyghest dooth delight” (381). Pythagoras’s vegetarianism comes as a 
result of his critique of superstition, especially the belief that we must placate the gods to 
avoid eternal damnation. But because the soul is immortal, it simply inhabits various bodies 
in a continual cycle. It was these two dimensions of Pythagoras’s thought, vegetarianism and 
metempsychosis, that most intrigued and provoked Protestant thinkers, including Golding 
himself in his epistle to Leicester. 
 Golding devotes about 45 lines to Pythagoras’s philosophy, correcting it but also 
testing its viability. He links Pythagoras’s idea of metempsychosis to the three-tiered soul: 
that is, generative, sensual, and rational. There is a fourth, moral kind of soul that 
distinguishes good people from bad people, according to Pythagoras.128 But Golding 
vacillates in his portrayal of Pythagoras’s argument. First, he says that animals cannot 
partake of reason and so cannot share in religious salvation. But, then he does “graunt that 
when our breath dooth from our bodies go away, / It dooth eftsoones returne to ayre: and of 
that ayre there may / Both bird and beast participate, and wee of theirs likewyse” (406). This 
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commonality, however, has nothing to do with man’s divine soul, which animals do not 
share. Protestants like Golding were divided over the reception of this aspect of the 
Pythagorean lifestyle. On the one hand, the philosopher was often praised for counseling 
abstinence and living a sober life. On the other hand, his notion of metempsychosis sounded 
too much like Purgatory to the ears of some, and even seemed to enforce certain behaviors 
(like abstinence from flesh) that Protestants took to be in the realm of Christian liberty.  
 The reception of Pythagoras reveals a fundamental tension in Protestant ideas about 
religious ceremony and quotidian behavior. Many Christians, not just Protestants, approved 
of the sobriety of the Pythagoreans. Their rules of living counseled frugality, a care for their 
surroundings, and an attention to diet. But Protestants especially balked at some of the 
restrictions that the ancient religion maintained. Protestant religion was more hierarchical, 
attending to the boundaries between “degrees”: man and beast, Christian and heathen, and so 
on; whereas the Pythagoreans flattened such degrees by maintaining that souls could enter 
animals and even other people throughout time. For Protestants, being in their specific degree 
granted them a liberty that the ancients lacked; they conceived of themselves as free to use 
God’s creatures, and the material world, as they saw fit. The same liberty extended to the use 
of heathen, pagan, and otherwise non-Christian cultural materials, such as Ovid’s poem. We 
have seen Golding advocate the liberty of the “pure” to use impure materials, but evidence of 
this tension can easily be found in other writers responding to the discipline of the 
Pythagoreans.       
 It was a commonplace to comment on the Pythagoreans’ reputation for sober living. 
In Eden’s translation of Anghiera’s treatise on the new world, he recounts a story about 
natives people who belong to “a secte of men whiche liued solytarily in the desertes and 
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wooddes and ledde their lyfe in sylence and abstinence more straightly then euer dyd the 
phylosophers of Pythagoras secte, absteinyng in lyke maner from the eatyng of al thynges 
that liue by bludde contented onely with suche fruites, herbes, and rootes as the desertes and 
wooddes mynistred vnto them to eate.”129 The Catholic Anghiera and the Protestant Golding 
agree that the abstinence of the Pythagoreans is praiseworthy, if we can judge their opinions 
by what they translated. In Justinius’s abridgement of Trogus’s history, which Golding 
translated in 1564, we can find another example of the beneficial effect of Pythagorean 
mores. Trogus tells us a story about the people of Cortona, Pythagoras’s home in Italy and 
the same place Numa went to learn about the philosopher. They would have fallen into vice 
if not for Pythagoras, who reformed the manners of the people. In particular, “How much he 
was able to way with thother youth of the city, the bridling & overcoming of the stobern & 
froward stomakes of the women dothe wel declare.”130 Pythagoras changed their taste for 
clothing and delicate food into frugality and temperance.  
 But this strict regimen also conflicted with the idea of Christian liberty, that believers 
could turn anything to good use, so long as they themselves were pure. When Philemon 
Holland translated Plutarch’s Moralia in 1603, he included Plutarch’s “Whether it be Lawfull 
to Eat Flesh or No.” In his introduction to the treatise, Holland writes that Plutarch did not 
seriously maintain Pythagoras’s opinion, even though he seems to in the text. Plutarch’s 
sophistical argument 
ought not to be taken so, as if it favoured and seconded the errour of certeine 
fantasticall persons, who have condemned the use of Gods good creatures: for 
in the schoole of Christ wee are taught good lessons, which refute sufficiently 
the dreames of the Pythagoreans, and resolve assuredly the good conscience 
of all those that make use of all creatures (meet for the sustentation of this 
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life) soberly and with thanks giving, as knowing them to be good, and their 
use cleane and pure unto those whom the spirit of regeneration hath sanctified, 
for to make them partakers of that realme which is not shut up and inclosed in 
meats and drinks.131  
 
As Calvin wrote in his treatise on offences (and Golding translated), “we denie that the 
kingdome of God consisteth in meate and drinke.”132 The sententia ultimately comes from St. 
Paul, who was advocating the freedom from overly restrictive dietary regulations among 
Jews, Gentiles, and competing Christian sects. 
So, the reception of Pythagoras’s moral code was ambiguous. He could be seen as the 
critic of superstitious rituals, but he could also be portrayed as overly fastidious and 
restrictive. In fact, Pythagoras’s speech in the Metamorphoses has puzzled classical scholars 
because it seems to hijack the poem and derail its momentum at a crucial point, just as Ovid 
begins to describe the development of Roman culture.133 Golding writes that “The oration of 
Pithagoras implyes / A sum of all the former worke” (413), but why put this summary before 
the real ending of the poem? The poem ends with the rise of Augustus and the deification of 
Julius Caesar, not with the philosopher. The real object of Pythagoras’s speech is Numa, to 
whom it is reported secondhand. Numa is left hanging while the old man speaks, and then is 
summarily dismissed in a few lines:  
Men say that Numa furnisshed with such philosophye  
As this and like, returned to his native soyle, and by 
Entreatance was content of Rome to take his sovereintye. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
      this Numa did begin 
To teach Religion, by the meanes whereof hee shortly drew 
That people unto peace whoo erst of nought but battell knew. 
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        (391) 
 
Numa, though, had a more important role in the reception of Roman culture than Ovid’s brief 
account implies. The final vision of Rome in Ovid’s poem is one in which the gods and men 
have come to a kind of uneasy peace, but peace nonetheless. “Jove rules the heavenly 
spheres, / And all the tryple shaped world. And our Augustus beares / Dominion over all the 
earth. They bothe are fathers: they / Are rulers both” (403). In a shaky rapprochement, 
religious and civic identities exist side by side at the end of the poem.  
 And it is precisely this sort of compromise between religious devotion and civic 
duties that greatly interested those involved in the creation and buttressing of the Elizabethan 
Church in its early days. Numa Pompilius could easily stand in for the godly monarch, 
importing the principles of learned compromise into a community rived by doubt. In 
Plutarch’s “Life of Numa,” translated by Thomas North in 1579, Numa appears as a godly 
king, able to introduce new religious customs to the formerly savage Roman people. Plutarch 
writes,  
I doe finde, that which is written of Lycurgus, Numa, and other suche 
persones, not to be without likelyhood and probabilitie: who hauing to 
gouerne rude, churlishe, & stiffe necked people, and purposing to bring in 
straunge nouelties into the gouernments of their countries, did fayne wisely to 
haue conference with the godds, considering this fayning fell to be profitable 
& beneficiall to those themselues, whom they made to beleeue the same.134     
 
Numa took on the task of civilizing the Romans and teaching them how to worship the gods:  
Numa iudging it no small nor light enterprise, to plucke downe the hawty 
stomacks of so fierce and violent a people, and to frame them vnto a sobre and 
quiet life: dyd seeme to worcke it by meanes of the goddes, with drawing [ E] 
them on thereto by litle and litle, and pacifying of their whotte and fierce 
corages to fight, with sacrifices, feastes, dauncings, and common processions, 
wherein he celebrated euer him selfe. (71) 
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He sets up a public religion inspired in large part by the teachings of Pythagoras, many of 
whose “ceremonies” Numa adopted as his own, putting on the “outwarde showe and 
semblaunce of Pythagoras holiness” (ibid.). Numa also banished images and representations 
of the gods from Roman temples. Those few ceremonies that he did allow were performed in 
accordance with Pythagorean precepts: he did not sacrifice animals and insisted that public 
ceremonies be carried out in silence. 
   Numa represents a sovereign who harnesses the power of custom, ceremony, and 
ritual in order to help his country cohere. Plutarch writes that Numa won his people to the 
worship of the gods “through custome” (77). But the coherence he helped to bring about was 
not just spiritual, it was also physical. He set up a temple to the god Terme, or the god of 
boundaries, and was the first king to delineate the boundaries of Rome (78). He wanted 
Romans to focus on the defense of what was their own not the conquest of foreign peoples. 
Ovid describes him in the Fasti as combining legal and religious force in order to compel the 
Romans to civilized behavior. The social contract proceeds inevitably from religious reform: 
“Hence laws were made, that the stronger might not in all things have his way, and rites, 
handed down from the fathers, began to be piously observed” (141). As in Plutarch’s 
account, Numa comes to represent the conjunction of religious and civic identity. By 
consolidating the religious customs of the Rome, he also consolidates their civic unity. By 
setting boundaries, he unifies the people civically, and by instituting ceremonies he unifies 
them religiously. Numa’s policies were aimed at bringing about civic harmony by means of 
religious practices, which were inculcated into the collective mind of Roman people through 
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 The mixture of civic duties and religious rituals that Numa brought about mirrored 
the kind mixture that apologists of the Elizabethan Church saw as necessary for a godly 
society. In 1573, John Bridges was a theology student at Oxford, enjoyed the patronage of 
Francis Russell, and published a treatise defending the right of monarchs to legislate religious 
matters in their own countries. Numa plays a role as a conspicuous example of a “heathen 
prince” who had combined civic and religious discipline. Bridges writes that “Numa 
Pompilius hath his chiefest commendation not so muche for making ciuill lawes and pollicies 
to the Romaynes, as for his lawes about theyr religion, theyr Priestes, theyr Nunnes, theyr 
Sacrifices. . . . The Romaine Princes them selues woulde labour principally for the office of 
the chiefe Bishoppe.”135 The historical parallel also extended to the nature of the episcopal 
office. In 1574 the ecclesiastical moderate John Whitgift was busy defending his Answer to 
the Admonition from a reply by Thomas Cartwright. Like Archbishop Parker during the 
vestiarian controversy, Whitgift argues that Christian liberty gives believers the right to take 
impure things from other religions and turn them to good use. And like other moderates, 
Whitgift reasons that the external similarity of various rites and offices between pagans and 
Christians is no reason to reject those rites and offices. On the contrary, in the case of 
Archflamins and Archbishops, the similarity actually helped convert the gentiles to 
Christianity: it became a “meanes to plucke them from all their superstition and Idolatrie.”136 
The moderate position on pagan customs was that their external similarity did not affect 
Christian discipline negatively; on the contrary, moderates argued that recognition of 
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similarities between pagans and Christians bolstered the faith of the latter because it taught 
them how to better reconcile foreign religious practices with their own. 
 Golding’s translations show a mixed sympathy with the moderate positions in the late 
1560s and early 70s, but gradually he became more allied with the moderates. His initial 
forays into religious translation were Calvin’s work on offences and the two postils by 
Hemmingsen and Chytraeus. The postil by Chytraeus, as we have seen, was less tolerant than 
other works Golding translated; Chytraeus was, unlike Hemmingsen, a Lutheran centrist and 
not a Philippist. His advice to separate the faithful from the unfaithful in all matters was not 
shared by Calvinist moderates and certainly not by Philippists. But the translations of 
Chytraeus seemed to have been an afterthought in Golding’s mind; a sequel to the profitable 
postil of Hemmingsen, it was commissioned by Lucas Harrison and George Bishop, who 
undoubtedly expected profit. Golding’s real successes as a religious translator came when he 
translated Calvin’s commentaries on Galatians in 1574 as a payment to William Cecil for his 
assistance with “that long continued sute of mine in the Exchecquer.”137  
Golding makes it clear that this work will present his feelings about Christian liberty, 
cleverly allying himself with the moderate Calvinism that had only recently become the 
position of the official church. In the preface Golding uses phrases that would have been 
immediately recognized as statements of his moderate position. He writes that scripture helps 
men “be perfect and foreward to al good workes: in so much that it is the power of God 
tending to the welfare of all that beleeve, both Iewes and Gentyles.”138 We have seen that in 
this commentary Calvin does advocate compromise between Christians and gentiles, a 
selective acceptance of certain rites and practices to facilitate assimilation and reconciliation. 
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Other examples of Calvin’s moderate ideals abound in the works Golding translated in the 
1570s and ‘80s. In his commentary on Deuteronomy, Calvin argues for concord between 
heathens and believers, in a digression on the gift of mount Seir to Esau. This gift created a 
rift between the different peoples of the region, and allows Calvin to ruminate on kinship and 
commonality: “True it is that there is not fleshly kinred betweene all men, to make them so 
neere of bloud as they might call one another cousins . . . yet is there a certain common 
kinred in generall, which is, that all men ought to think how they be fashioned after Gods 
image. . . . Even the heathen men knew that very wel.”139 This vein of Calvin’s thought, 
cautiously advocating the mixing of Christian and heathen, appealed to those in Cecil’s 
circle. Golding dedicated his translation of Calvin’s Deuteronomy commentary to Thomas 
Bromley, who in 1583 was the Lord Chancellor and had strong ties to the earl of Oxford and 
Cecil himself as a former recipient of patronage. 
 Other writers also recognized Cecil’s desire to see works that promoted a moderate 
concord and compromise between different cultures and religions, especially classical and 
Christian. A notable example of this kind of work was produced in 1577 by Henry Dethick, 
then studying for a bachelor of civil law degree at Oxford. His Feriae Sacrae (Holy 
Festivals) is a collection of poems celebrating important moments and figures in Christianity. 
The Latin poetry is in elegiac meter, meant to recall Ovid’s Fasti, which is also a poem about 
festivals written in elegiac. But in both Dethick’s preface and the prefatory poems, there is a 
careful delineation of what the author has taken from pagans and how he has transformed it. 
Moving beyond even that worthy goal, Dethick says in his preface that he is interested in 
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reconciling human society and its practices with the divine and that his collection tends to 
that purpose: 
Ego, cum intellexeram, optimam in notis harmoniam, tum fieri demum, cum 
membra, capiti: appetitus, rationi: humana, divinis pareant, & obsequantur. Ita 
certe Civili prudentiae, feriam navabam operam, ut coelesti simul sapientia, 
tanquam moderatrice quadam, eandem regerem, & ita pulchre cum Iustiniano, 
Mosen, & prudenter coniugerem.140 
 
[I had learned that the best kind of harmony in music comes about only when 
the members obey the head, appetite obeys reason, and human things follow 
the divine. And so I did my best to guide my work on festivals to civil 
prudence, with celestial wisdom serving as a moderator, and thus happily, and 
prudently, to join Moses with Justinian.] 
 
He goes on to argue, “si delectant nonnullos, in carminibus Ethnici, cur non arrideant 
quibusdam, in carminibus Christiani? Igitur in bona materia, voluntas summa sit declarata, 
quamvis facultas similis, non exhibita: pateat affectus animi, etsi effectus causae non adsit” 
(if some take pleasure in pagan music, why should certain of those not like Christian music? 
Just as in good material the will of the maker is evident, even though the means are not 
apparent, thus the movement of the mind may be known, even if the effect of the cause is not 
present) (sig. Aiiv.). Dethick uses the four Aristotelian causes here to suggest the connections 
between the pagan form that he uses and its spiritual content. But he also suggests that pagan 
culture itself exists on a continuum with Christian culture. And indeed, it is the notion of 
mixing unlike things that gives the edition its force. In his prefatory poem, the physician 
Christopher Johnson plays throughout on the similarity between “seria” (serious things) and 
“feria” (festival) (sigs. Aiiir–Aiiiir); he encourages readers to see the seriousness in the 
elegiac mode, which was usually known for handling light or lower subjects. But the 
seriousness also proceeded from the effort it took to combine two cultures that were in many 
                                                 
140
 Dethick, “Epistola,” in Feriae Sacrae, Octo Libris Comprehensae, in Quibus, Naturae, Tabularum, & 
Gratiae Leges Exprimuntur (London, 1577), sig. Aiir. References to this edition will appear in the text; 
translations are my own. 
  
 136
ways incompatible. In book 6, Dethick makes the most famous Roman poets speak a pastiche 
of their most famous lines, ceding authority away from their subject and toward his. He 
wishes Lucan “imbellis” (not warlike) and Juvenal more serious, criticizing the poet for 
whom all human affairs were simply an occasion for literary style (sigs. Oiiiir–v). But like 
Golding’s effort in his translation of Ovid, and Calvin’s in his commentary on Galatians, 
Dethick’s effort to understand pagan cultures pays off in a more muscular, fortified 
Christianity that gains strength from engaging with and sometimes parodying pagan culture. 
The edition itself was clearly tailored to Cecil’s interests in 1577. In the years 
following the Admonition controversy, he sought to advance the interests of moderation in 
all the areas of cultural production he influenced, which were many and included the 
university. But, in the last translation he produced, Golding moved away from Cecil’s 
moderate positions. His translating career went in the other direction, away from compromise 
and mixture and into the stratosphere of rationalism, when he took on a translation for the 
Sidney circle in 1587, Philippe de Mornay’s Trewnesse of the Christian Religion. This work 
represented a major statement of the Sidney circle’s views on different religions and their 
relationship to Christianity. It is not a work of moderation, which is understandable. Mornay 
narrowly escaped death on St. Bartholomew’s day and probably went on to compose all or 
part of the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. He was not interested in making concessions in 
religious matters, but he was interested in finding convincing ways to unite Christianity 
intellectually. 
 Even though the subtitle of this work states that it was written against “Atheists, 
Epicures, Paynims, Iewes, Mahumetists, and other Infidels,” it is actually an extended 
attempt to convince and convert them. In many ways, the Trewnesse is a throwback to 
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earlier, scholastic works that advertised themselves as handbooks for missionaries among the 
infidels. The most famous example is Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, a four-
book tome that seeks to confirm the truth of Christian doctrine without using revelation. This 
methodology held obvious allure for Christians embattled by competing sects and 
contentious, partisan debates. As Mornay says in his preface, this work is “more needfull 
now adaies (yea euen (which I am ashamed, to saie) among those which beare the name of 
Christians) than euer it was among the verie Heathen and Infidels.”141 Some modern 
unbelievers seem to correspond to the “paynims” of the subtitle:  
They thinke there is a God, and that of him man hath receiued an immortall 
soule: that God gouerneth all things, and that man ought to serue him. But 
forasmuch as they see both Gentiles and Iewes, Turkes and Christians in the 
world, and in diuerse nations diuerse Religions, whereof euery one thinketh he 
serueth God, and that he shall find saluation in his owne Religion: These (like 
men at a stoppe where many waies meet,) in steed of choosing the right way 
by the iudgement of reason, do stand still amazed, and in that amazement 
conclude that all comes to one, as who would say, that South and North lead 
both to one place. (sig. **iiiiv) 
 
Mornay presents this portrait as one of false toleration; that is, these people confuse social 
customs with religious truth. Diversity represents, however, a fundamental status quo for the 
student of religions. Mornay’s solution, the reliance on reason above all else, strikes me as 
anachronistic, a nostalgia for a scholastic Summa that would once and for all unite Jew and 
Gentile, Christian and unbeliever under the common umbrella of rational discourse.  
 But in this Mornay presents only one side of Calvin’s tortured thinking about 
heathens and pagans. On the one hand, they are endowed with reason that does reveal God to 
them, albeit through natural means. On the other hand, they have rituals and customs that 
must somehow be assimilated, or avoided altogether. The practical side of Calvin’s thinking 
                                                 
141
 Mornay, A Worke Concerning the Trewnesse of the Christian Religion, trans. Philip Sidney and Arthur 
Golding (London, 1587), sig. **iiiir. Further citations of this work will appear in the text. 
  
 138
is largely absent from Mornay’s treatise. He asks that we take the common nature of Gentile 
and Jew as the basis for his argument that they are equally capable of being moved by reason. 
He is not interested in asking for compromises with heathens. For example, in chapter 22 one 
finds the familiar Euhemeristic argument that the gods of the pagans were simply real men 
who had been deified (383). (This argument was notably absent from Golding’s prefaces to 
Ovid.) In Mornay’s work, Numa appears not as a religiously minded leader who helped his 
people but as a beguiler, a charlatan who pretended to learn from a witch the ceremonies he 
used to dazzle his subjects (380).142 The more rational of the Romans, such as Varro and 
Cicero, are adduced to argue for the absurdity of their nation’s rituals. Mornay targets 
religious discipline for a severe assault; instead of engaging it, he sidesteps and condescends 
in most familiar ways. Mornay, Sidney, and Golding all must have felt that this approach was 
necessary to heal Christendom’s divides: not cultural anthropology but geometrical certainty. 
Mornay attempted to reduce cultural complexity not get into the middle of it.  
Indeed, he vilifies those who are overly fascinated by cultural customs on their own 
terms and look to find some common end in competing religious disciplines. His has none of 
the specificity of the work of his contemporary Jean Bodin, whose unpublished Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres contained highly evocative and particular accounts of religious practices and 
cultural customs. Mornay’s is not a work of comparative religion as Bodin’s is, but the fact 
that they were written nearly contemporaneously shows us that Mornay’s was not the only 
game in town. And in fact, the most famous defender of the established church used methods 
more similar to Bodin than Mornay. Richard Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity is not 
afraid to discuss contentious matters of religious devotion in a highly specific, context-driven 
                                                 
142
 Mornay’s source was probably book 7 of St. Augustine’s City of God; see Of the Citie of God with the 
Learned Comments of Io. Lod. Viues, trans. I. H. (London, 1610), 293–94.  
  
 139
manner. Hooker’s work often pointedly addresses pagans and the relationship of pagan 
customs to the discipline of the early Christians. Paganism once again represented a 
challenge to the decorum of religious interpretation and practice. Literature of the 1590s 
reflected the fascination with pagan customs and their challenge to religious decorum and 
integrity. The next chapter examines William Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
and Christopher Marlowe’s Hero and Leander alongside Hooker’s Laws and other 
contemporary texts that struggled to define pagans’ place in Christian culture and society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3 
Paganism, Festivity, and the Forms of Religious Discipline in Late Elizabethan England 
 
This chapter examines notions of what constituted allowable “forms” of religious worship, 
and correlates those notions with literary works that similarly interrogate the problem of 
shifting and morphing forms. By the 1590s, arguments over form were especially important 
for defenders of the power of the established church to adapt mutable forms of worship to its 
particular circumstances. Similarly, the Ovidian fascination with formal ambiguity found 
expression in literary works that represented the consequences—social, aesthetic, religious—
of a world in which the forms that governed daily life were not set but rather unstable and 
fluid. These processes often played out in terms of pagan inheritances, both in the religious 
sphere where pagan forms of worship were up for debate, and in the literary realm where 
classical genres provided complex underpinnings for early modern literature itself. This 
chapter shows that so much of what is distinctive about the literature of the 1590s—its 
portrayal of worlds alive to the senses, and their drawbacks—flowed from the origins of 
classical genres in pagan religious practices, coupled with the tense religious polemic that 
argued over the correct interpretation of these same pagan forms of worship. 
 In yoking together generic literary forms with forms of religious worship, I am 
arguing that there was an essential similarity between the way that the early modern world 
viewed both of them. Rosalie Colie’s argument several decades ago still seems to hold true, 
that the Renaissance found in “ancient culture . . . structures as well as styles to be imitated 
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in . . . humane letters.” But Colie also argued that our reliance on “forms and formulae” 
structures the way that we learn about and experience the world, so much so that “we often 
entirely fail to recognize them for what they are.”143 The 1590s, however, was a decade in 
which writers drew attention to the forms that were providing the structure for their culture. 
And the forms of worship and devotion from the pagan world naturally interpenetrated both 
literary genres and ecclesiastical polemic. What I am examining is more than just a 
coincidence, though: if we ignore the developments of literary genres like pastoral in the 
1590s then we will also miss the distinctions being made about the proper models of 
religious devotion. And the reason is that both literary genres and church history were 
converging around the correct interpretation of pagan religion, its myths and its cultural 
apparatus. 
 
I. Richard Hooker and his Defense of Ritual 
Richard Hooker’s work is responsible for an important English version of a powerful yet 
adaptable religious institution that could incorporate divergent human forms of worship and 
synthesize them with God’s numinous commands. This is the case because his vision of 
ecclesiastical polity allows for the mixture of ritual forms inherited by the modern church 
from earlier churches and even non-Christian religions. His view of pagan religious practices 
emerges especially in books 2–5 of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, as he addresses the 
specific complaints of his opponents Thomas Cartwright and Walter Travers, who often cite 
historical examples to prove that the early church accepted nothing from Jews, Gentiles, and 
other non-Christians. Hooker delves into the same historical circumstances in order to show 
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that while the early church did separate itself from other religions in order to maintain its 
internal coherence and laws, it was clear that the church rarely forbade the importation of the 
forms and practices of paganism and Judaism. The reason was simple, Hooker thought. 
While the visible, sensible church represents an earthly manifestation of god’s eternal, 
spiritual church, the two can never fully co-exist, and so it was allowable for earthly churches 
to institute their own rules and customs according to the many sources of earthly wisdom that 
God had provided. In other words, if earthly churches were going to be sensible, they should 
embrace that very sensibleness. But they also have to accept the consequences and 
compromises that a visible church rooted in human customs entails. This compromise 
accompanied in the 1590s the uneasy acknowledgment that the imaginative church was 
subject to the debility and variety of the imagination itself.  
 The play of surfaces, forms, and materials is thus the most importance dimension of 
the late-Elizabethan engagement with pagan customs and the one that best locates that 
engagement within contemporary English religious and social experience. Whereas in the last 
chapter we saw Golding and his contemporaries utilizing inward-looking interpretive 
strategies that located the test of interpretation on and within the body of the Christian reader, 
in this chapter we will observe writers taking an interest in the externals of religious practice 
in an expansive and playful way. That is, they locate the test of interpretation on the surface, 
the part exposed to the judgment of society, but a part also conducive to ornamentation and 
expressions of decorous ritual.  
 My argument begins with Hooker himself and his theory of the proximity of different 
religious practices and their place in an autonomous religious community. As Achsah 
Guibbory has argued, “the very notions of harmony, community, and mixture were fraught 
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with danger” in the intellectual climate of the late-sixteenth century, on both sides of the 
ecclesiastical debate.144 We have seen in the last chapter that those responding to Calvin, and 
even Calvin himself, often held complex positions regarding what kinds of religious mixtures 
were allowable and what kinds were not. Hooker falls on one end of the spectrum, clearly, 
but what kinds of mixture did he allow and advocate? The answer lies partially in Hooker’s 
dual visions of decorum and variety. The makeup of his ideal ecclesiastical community 
would be decorously mutable. He strongly believed in the decorum of ecclesiastical practices 
that conformed to the immediate needs of the ecclesiastical community. 
Hooker’s sensible church takes as its basis the beauty of variety and the shifting 
forms that exist in the external world.145 In book 1 of his Laws, he writes, “The general end 
of Gods externall working, is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant virtue: 
Which abundance doth shew it self in varietie, and for that cause this varietie is oftentimes in 
scripture expressed by the name of riches.”146 Later on, in book 3, Hooker links the variety of 
God’s ways to the variety of human customs. Instead of insisting on the exact historical 
parallels between early and modern Christians, Hooker thinks that “A more dutifull and 
religious way for us were to admire the wisedome of God, which shineth in the bewtifull 
varietie of all things, but most in the manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of those 
wayes, whereby his Church upon Earth is guided from age to age, throughout all generations 
of men” (1:253). In book 2 he writes, “The boundes of wisedome are large and within them 
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much is contayned.” Accordingly, “As her waies are of sundry kinds, so her maner of 
teaching is not meerely one and the same” (1:147).  
From here Hooker launches into a discussion of St. Paul’s thoughts on how Christians 
should relate to those of other religions. Paul was well-known for trying to “please all men” 
(1:148) in everything he did, and asked his followers to “be inoffensive both to Jewes and 
Graecians” (1:149). Hooker forms these statements into a general standard for Christian 
behavior. Arguing against those who would make scripture the absolute criterion of moral 
judgment, Hooker puts the case of early Christians who were charged with preaching to the 
heathens: 
The Churches dispersed amongst the Heathen in the East part of the world, are 
by the Apostle S. Peter exhorted, to have their conversation honest amongest 
the Gentilles, that they which spake evill of them as of evill doers, might by the 
good workes which they should see, glorifie God in the day of visitation. . . . 
Seeing therefore this had beene a thing altogether impossible, but that infidels 
themselves did discerne, in matters of life and conversation, when beleevers 
did well, and when otherwise; when they glorified their heavenly father, and 
when not: it followeth that some thinges wherein God is glorifyed, may be 
some other way knowne, then onely by the sacred Scripture; of which 
Scripture the Gentiles being utterly ignorant, did notwithstanding judge rightly 
of the qualitie of Christian mens actions. (1:149–50; italics in original) 
 
This is an important passage early in Hooker’s work; “conversation” here means something 
like the manner of living in society and the world, or one’s actions among other people. 
Having commerce with non-Christians provides a standard of behavior that expands beyond 
scriptural precedent.  
 Many of Hooker’s examples, following those of his opponents, come from the early 
church, when pagans and Christians still regularly mixed and rules governing their 
interactions were up for debate. In book 4 Hooker’s purpose is to argue that the reason some 
ceremonies were forbidden in the early church was not their similarity with heathen rituals, 
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but rather their absolute iniquity. For example, when it came to the injunction against cutting 
one’s hair to mourn for the dead, Hooker writes, “The very light of nature it selfe was able to 
see herein a fault; that which those nations did use, having bene also in use with others, the 
auncient Romane lawes do forbid” (1:291–92). In other words, simple proximity to those of 
different religions was not the reason for the Levitical laws and prohibitions among the Jews. 
Rather, there were specific circumstances that led to those particular prohibitions. Hooker 
argues that nearness to heathens and their rituals is not in itself a cause of infection to the 
faithful. Certainly, some rituals practiced by non-Christians are alien to Christian doctrine, 
and those should be banned. But in things indifferent, similarity to those of other religions 
makes no difference among the faithful and is thus allowable. This familiar account of 
Hooker’s view of ceremony points out his tolerance of the congruence of Christian, pagan, 
and Jewish “forms” of church polity and of worship.  
 But underlying this defense of external methods of worship is Hooker’s evocation of 
a “sensible” church that relies on the objects of sense in order to communicate its doctrines. 
“Sundry sensible meanes,” he writes, “have . . . seemed the fittest to make a deepe and a 
strong impression” (1:274). “We must not think,” he goes on to say, “but that there is some 
ground of reason even in nature, whereby it commeth to passe that no nation under heaven 
either doth or ever did suffer publique actions which are of waight whether they be civil and 
temporall or els spiritual and sacred, to passe without some visible solemnitie” (ibid.). It is by 
this reasoning that Hooker contextualizes and mitigates what may seem to his contemporaries 
to be ridiculous or pointless rituals from other cultures. He cites both Roman and Hebrew 
civil and religious customs; indeed, in both civil and religious actions these rituals “have 
their necessary use and force.” For support he quotes Pseudo-Dionsyius: “the sensible things 
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which religion hath hallowed [τά µέν αίσθητώς ίερά], are resemblances framed according to 
things spiritually understood, whereunto they serve as a hand to lead and a way to direct” 
(ibid.). Numa Pompilius is also a representative of Hooker’s sensible church, he who 
commanded his priests to perform ceremonies with their right hands covered, signifying that 
the right hand is the seat of faithfulness and must be defended. At this moment, two of 
Hooker’s guiding ideas collide uneasily. On one side there is his rational historicism, his 
notion that past societies and cultures instituted laws and rituals to address specific 
circumstances and in the context of specific needs and values.147 On the other side there is his 
Christian Platonism, his assurance that the sensible objects of religious worship lead the 
devotee toward the higher truths encountered on the rungs of an orderly universe.148 As 
Debora Shuger has argued, this conjunction characterizes Hooker’s uneasy union between 
the sensible and the transcendent in his work. By defining the church as a body at once 
sensible and mystical, Hooker “posits an empirical association (a ‘visible body’) structured 
by non-empirical (‘mystical’) relations.”149 This conflict recurs throughout the Laws and 
tends to crop up at the most important moments of Hooker’s argument.150 
But, when he has to argue a point closely, Hooker most often relies on the more 
familiar philosophy of Aristotle, especially his Metaphysics and De Anima. Much of 
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Hooker’s theory of the sensible church was founded on his understanding of the diversity of 
forms that give shape to the visible world. Hooker states, very nearly explicitly, that in this 
case he is not Platonizing: “we are not of opinion therfore, as some are, that nature in 
working hath before hir certaine exemplary draughts or patternes, which subsisting in the 
bosome of the Highest, and being thence discovered, she fixeth her eye upon them, as 
travelers by sea upon the pole-starre of the world, and that according thereunto she guideth 
her hand to worke by imitation” (1:66–67). Rather, Hooker follows Aristotle when he writes 
of works of nature that “do so necessarily observe their certaine lawes, that as long as they 
keepe those formes which give them their being, they cannot possiblie be apt or inclinable to 
do otherwise than they do” (1:67). His marginal note to the word “formes” in this passage 
states that “According to the diversitie of inward formes, things of the world are 
distinguished into their kinds.” Hooker does not expand on this explanation by discussing 
Aristotle, but that is probably because the Aristotelian context would have been very familiar 
to his readers.  
Aristotle famously disagreed with previous philosophers over the relationship 
between “form” and “matter.” In book 1 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle disagrees with Plato, 
who separated “form” from the matter that it shaped. “Yet what happens is the contrary,” 
Aristotle writes. “For they make many things out of the matter, and the form generates only 
once, but what we observe is that one table is made from one matter, while the man who 
applies the form, though he is one, makes many tables.”151 Because matter is mutable and 
therefore an underlying principle of differentiation, the forms join to the matter in many 
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different ways. Renaissance commentators made it clear that this was a matter of 
disagreement between the two philosophers. Pedro da Fonseca’s commentary on the 
Metaphysics, originally published in 1577, lists this passage as an “Impugnatio” (attack). 
Fonseca explains, “Ostendit Platonem non recte posuisse duo principia ex parte materiae, & 
unum ex parte formae: cum magis consentaneum esset, ut poneret duo ex parte formae, & 
unum ex parte materiae” (he claims that Plato did wrong in labeling matter as plural and form 
as singular; rather, it would have been better had he labeled form as plural and matter as 
singular).152 Later on in the Metaphysics Aristotle expands his disagreement and states 
clearly his stake in the debate: “Again it must be held to be impossible that the substance and 
that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, can the Ideas, being the 
substances of things, exist apart?” (1567). While Hooker did not rely on Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism in any systematic way, it clearly underpins his conception of the visible 
church that exists in a variety of forms and yet still teaches the fundamental matter of 
doctrine. 
Aristotle’s ideas also inform Hooker’s discussion of the faculty of the imagination, 
which was crucial in his defense of religious rituals in the church.153 Hooker cites Aristotle in 
book 5, when Hooker is defending the efficacy of religious rituals that rely on the senses. The 
imagination, he writes, takes in sensory data and stores it up in the memory (2:306–7). For 
support he cites Aristotle’s De Anima, where Aristotle writes that thinking is a “form of 
imagination or [is] impossible without imagination” (642) and discusses the “faculty of 
thinking,” which “thinks the forms in the images” (686). Hooker cites these passages in order 
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to describe the necessity of external, sensible rituals for the conveyance of religious doctrine. 
The imagination is rooted in sensible images, and so relies on the rituals and practices that 
provide the forms, which in turn provide the basis for thought itself.  
Hooker was thus a fairly traditional Aristotelian in his evocation of hylomorphism, 
the idea that matter is the basis for differentiation via formal qualities. He extends his 
hylomorphism into the social realm as well, as he must in order to defend the church rituals 
that were under attack. For Hooker, to defend ritual was first to recognize its basis in 
decorum, which itself flows from the created order of nature. Hooker’s concept of decorum is 
inextricably linked to temporality and the expression of time-bound ethical principles. In 
book 5 of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, he provides a brief history of human festivity and 
suggests why certain times and places are sacred and some are not. In previous chapters 
Hooker discusses the very practical details of his vision of church governance, but in chapter 
69 he pauses to offer a general theory of ceremony, festival, and religious practices. His 
argument is that since God is infinite, “besides him all thinges are finite both in substance 
and in continuance” (2:359). Time is simply a measurement of the motion of the heavens and 
is only differentiated by the events that happen within the circular motion of years, days, and 
hours. So, even God’s works occur at specific, differentiated times, and those times are 
specially hallowed by the occurrence of those works. Indeed, all places and all times are not 
alike in God’s eyes, Hooker argues, but God has ordained that some be holy and some not. 
All of this follows from Hooker’s original division of things into infinite and finite. Since we 
live in a finite, fractured world, our relationship with the infinite is necessarily mediated by 
our piecemeal experience of finite events that occur within time. The elevation of certain 
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events and places above others is an inevitable consequence of our separation from God on a 
hierarchy of essences. 
 Hooker continues to press the consequences of his argument into the realm of 
anthropology. His general theory of how differences come about also takes into account 
differences of human experience, with those differences also mandated by the specific, time-
bound expression of divine authority. Ecclesiastes, he writes, “compareth herein not unfittlie 
the times of God with the persons of men.” Just as God separates some days from others, so 
too he separates men, even though their physical natures “are all one substance created of the 
earth” (2:362). In the next chapter, Hooker argues that the differentiation of days by God 
should find its counterpart in human efforts to provide a shape and a form for those days, 
“whereby their difference from other dayes maie be made sensible.” “The hallowinge of 
festival daies,” he writes, “must consist in the shape or countenance which wee put upon 
thaffaires that are incident upon those daies” (2:363). In other words, rituals and festivals 
only get their meaning from the “shape” that humans apply to the already holy, but time-
bound, events that occur every year. And it is through this application that the needs of each 
ecclesiastical polity and each individual devotee gel into coherent communal structures.154  
Hooker’s explanation and defense of the celebration of festival days reach back to 
channel the experience of the ritual year in the late-medieval church. As Eamon Duffy argues 
of the record of pre-Reformation life produced by Roger Martin, a churchwarden in Suffolk, 
“what is striking . . . is the convergence between inner and outer, private and public, the 
timeless and meditative on one hand, the seasonal and external on the other.” In fact, he goes 
on to argue, “This integration of personal devotional gestures into the seasonal pattern of the 
                                                 
154
 On this point, see Shuger, “’Society Supernatural’”; she writes that Hooker’s “chapters on public worship 
celebrate the liturgical exfoliation of inwardness into community” (131). 
  
 151
liturgy was a universal feature of late medieval religion.”155 Hooker believes that lay, 
Protestant parishioners could have such a fulfilling religious experience not by denying the 
efficacy of sacred space and time, but by acknowledging that the “difference” introduced by 
sacred time can allow for unique, personal expressions of devotion. Every festival day will be 
different because the “shape or countenance” that humans put on those days will also be 
different. Throughout book 5, Hooker continues to argue that human religious rituals at their 
best integrate the interior, meditative space of the individual with the variety of changing 
forms that nature, and God, have created. 
 This argument has important consequences for Hooker’s response to his opponents, 
especially when they argued that the rituals of the church were too similar to pagan rituals. 
One of Cartwright’s favorite authorities was Tertullian, and so Hooker often found himself 
responding to the patristic author’s arguments against mixing with pagan forms of worship. 
In book 2, Hooker describes the context of Tertullian’s De Corona Militis (On the Soldier’s 
Crown), which was written to argue that Christian soldiers should not wear crowns of 
flowers as the Roman soldiers did. The larger question turns on whether or not Christians can 
do things that are not expressly forbidden by scripture. Hooker eventually agrees with 
Tertullian that the long-standing custom of the church not to wear crowns should prohibit 
Christians from doing so, but Tertullian thinks that the laws contained in scripture extend 
even further into the realm of human action. Tertullian argues that the mere fact of using 
natural objects for religious expression is inherently wrong, while Hooker disagrees. 
Tertullian’s argument deserves to be quoted at length because of its importance as a negative 
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criterion for Hooker’s own argument and for its ramifications through English literary and 
religious culture in the 1590s: 
Utere itaque floribus visu et odoratu, quorum sensuum fructus est; utere per 
oculos et nares, quorum sensuum membra sunt. Substantia tibi a Deo tradita 
est, habitus a saeculo, quanquam nec habitus extraordinarius ordinario usui 
obstrepit. Hoc sint tibi flores, et inserti, et innexi, et in filo, et in scirpo, quod 
liberi, quod soluti: spectaculi scilicet et spiraculi res. Coronam si forte fascem 
existimas florum per seriem comprehensorum, ut plures simul portes, ut 
omnibus pariter utaris, jam vero et in sinum conde, si tanta munditia est: in 
lectulum sparge, si tanta mollitia est: et in poculum crede, si tanta innocentia 
est, tot modis fruere, quot et sentis. Caeterum in capite quis sapor floris? quis 
coronae sensus? nisi vinculi tantum: quo neque color cernitur, neque odor 
ducitur, nec teneritas commendatur. Tam contra naturam est florem capite 
sectari, quam sonum nare. Omne autem quod contra naturam est, monstri 
meretur notam penes omnes, penes nos vero etiam elogium sacrilegii in 
Deum, naturae dominum et auctorem. 
Quaeris igitur Dei legem? habes communem istam in publico mundi, 
in naturalibus tabulis, ad quas et Apostolus solet provocare, ut cum in 
velamine foeminae, Nec natura vos, inquit, docet (1 Cor. 11:14)? ut cum ad 
Romanos (Rom. 2:14), natura facere dicens nationes ea quae sunt legis, et 
legem naturalem suggerit, et naturam legalem.156 
 
[Use flowers thus for their sight and smell, which are the senses by which they 
should be experienced; use them through the eyes and nostrils, which are the 
instruments of those senses. The substance has been given to you by God, the 
way of using it you get from the world, although an extraordinary way of 
using flowers does not prevent their being enjoyed in the usual way. So, when 
flowers are inserted, tied up, in bands and woven together, let them be to you 
what they are when free and loose: things both to behold and to breathe in. 
You think that it is a crown, perhaps, when flowers are woven together in 
rows, so that you can carry many at once, and so you can enjoy them all at the 
same time. Well then, lay them in your lap, if there is so much purity in them. 
Throw them on your bed, if they are so soft. Put them in your cup, if they are 
so harmless, and enjoy them in as many ways as you have senses to enjoy 
them. But what is the savor of a flower on your head? What is the feeling of a 
crown except of its band? You cannot distinguish color with your head, nor 
can you smell it or feel its softness. It is just as much against nature for the 
head to desire a flower as it is for the nose to want sound. Everything that is 
against nature deserves to be labeled a monstrosity by all men, but for us 
especially it should be called a sacrilege against God, who is the creator and 
lord of nature.  
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 So, do you want to know God’s law? You have it yourself in common 
with the rest of the world, in nature’s tables, to which the Apostle was 
accustomed to call upon, as when he spoke of women’s clothing, “Does not 
nature,” he said, “teach you?” (1 Cor. 11:14); and when, addressing the 
Romans (Rom. 2:14), saying that the gentiles by nature do things that are 
lawful, he thus suggests a law that is natural, and a nature that is lawful.] 
 
Tertullian claims that the natural law revealed in the gospels prohibits turning the materials 
of nature to other uses besides their original ones. Thus, because flowers appeal to the senses, 
to deprive them of this appeal is to behave contrary to nature and thus contrary to nature’s 
law. And so even the very fact that the pagans turned natural objects into expressions of 
human hierarchies and distinctions was odious for Tertullian, who, Hooker writes, was 
overly attuned to all those who are “carnally minded” (1:296).   
Hooker rejects Tertullian’s logic in these passages. He argues that because Tertullian 
wrote this work in the “heate of distempered affection,” one can often sense “imbecillitie” in 
the arguments. “Such is that argument whereby they that wore on their heads garlands, are 
charged as transgressors of natures lawe, and guiltie of sacrilege against God the Lord of 
nature, in as much as flowers in such sort worne, can neyther be smelt nor seene well by 
those that weare them: and God made flowers sweete and bewtifull, that being seene and 
smelt unto, they might so delight” (1:164–65). The reason this argument is flawed is the 
same that his main argument is flawed. Just because scripture says you cannot do something, 
that does not mean you can do only those things mentioned in scripture. Similarly, it is 
acceptable to use the natural objects of sense for other purposes than mere sensory 
enjoyment. In other words, Hooker saw no problem with importing sensible things into the 
rituals that expressed religious and cultural significance to a particular society.  
Indeed, Hooker’s view of “nature’s law” also differed from Tertullian’s. For Hooker, 
“natural law” was a combination of recognizing God’s laws and allowing for the necessity of 
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humans to interpret and apply those laws to their own society. The reason that making 
crowns from flowers does not transgress natural law is that the act is not perverting nature 
itself, only changing the form of a natural object to express certain values and ideas. As 
Hooker would go on to argue in book 5, God himself had created differences in places and 
times, and thus had instituted the mechanism by which human societal values could take on a 
variety of forms and yet remain godly.  
In book 4, Hooker’s reaction against Tertullian again buttresses his argument for the 
“conformity” of English religious practices with those of other cultures. Tertullian, he points 
out, was a Montanist, which meant that he belonged to a group within the early Christian 
world that thought the church was making too many concessions to the pagans, conforming 
to some of their rituals. Hooker cites Cartwright’s argument that some Councils of the early 
church had prohibited conformity with pagans. Cartwright wrote, “it was decreed in another 
Councell that they should not decke their houses with bay leaves and greene boughes, 
because the Pagans did use so, and that they should not rest from their labour those dayes that 
the Pagans did, that they should not keepe the first day of every month as they did” (1:295). 
Hooker responds by noting that in the early days of the church, the “constancy” of Christ’s 
followers was of the utmost importance in maintaining cohesion. This was all the more 
important because his followers sometimes found it convenient to conform to pagan rituals: 
his Saints, whom yet a naturall desire to save them selves from the flame 
might peradventure cause to joine with Pagans in externall customes, too far 
using the same as a cloake to conceale themselves in . . . for remedie hereof 
those lawes it might be were provided, which forbad that Christians shold 
deck their houses with boughes as the Pagans did use to do, or rest those 
festivall dayes whereon the Pagans rested, or celebrate such feastes as were, 
though not Heathnish, yet such that the simpler sort of Heathens might be 
beguiled in so thinking them. (1:295) 
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In other words, there was a necessity in those days to make ecclesiastical laws forbidding 
similitude of rituals between pagans and Christians. Tertullian, Hooker concludes, was 
simply overzealous in his persecution of those who accepted pagan rituals. He “over-often 
through discontentment carpeth injuriously” at the Catholic Church itself even when the 
church had already made laws forbidding conformity (1:296). If we accept that these laws 
continue to be in effect even after their circumstances have expired, we will have to conclude 
that people can be “condemened . . . only for using the ceremonies of a religion contrary unto 
their owne.” It will have to follow, he argues, that “seeing there is still betweene our religion 
and Paganisme the selfe same contrarietie, therefore we are still no lesse rebukeable, if we 
now decke our houses with boughes, or send Newyeares-gifts unto our friends, or feast on 
those days which the Gentils then did, or sit after prayer as they were accustomed?” (ibid.).157  
Hooker responds to Cartwright’s list of prohibitions from the early church with his 
own list of English customs that have little to do with the context of the early church. Indeed, 
his opponents conflate the “spiritual difference” between believers and unbelievers with the 
“difference in ceremonies,” even though the similar ceremonies may be far removed both in 
time and place (1:296). Just as Hooker notes that the very heavens themselves make it 
necessary that some times and places are more holy than others, so too has time invalidated 
the prohibitions against conformity with pagan ceremonies. The variety of forms of worship 
and religious practice mirrors the variety of sacred places and days that serve to express the 
needs of the particular communities that worship in those places and on those days. For 
Hooker, such variety ultimately is an expression of the “bewtifull varietie of all things” 
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(1:253) that underlies religious worship itself. Hooker’s variety structures an “imagined 
community” that at once exists in the prescribed forms of worship of a changing 
ecclesiastical institution and in the “affective interiority” of its members.158 
 
II. The Literature of Festivity 
The arguments that Hooker used to respond to the anti-ritual faction in the church echoed 
among the literati of Elizabethan England. They too found that they had inherited forms and 
ideas from the pagan world and that their own artistic expressions were often couched in 
terms of foreign customs and practices. Rather than let that be a stumbling block, though, 
they found along with Hooker a way to turn pagan forms into representations of solidarity 
and community that also bolstered religious and civic society.   
 The mechanism by which such representations might create community and support 
was, however, hotly contested in the culture of the late-sixteenth century in England. 
Historians of festivity in this period have argued persuasively that attitudes toward the 
diversity of religious rituals and customs were largely mediated by ideological and 
intellectual disputes among Protestant authorities. Ronald Hutton concludes his study of the 
“ritual year” by arguing that the mutations of ceremony and local ritual had little to do with 
changes in the “basic structure” of English society from 1500 to 1700, which, “despite 
economic strains,” “remained remarkably unchanging.”159 Rather, “religious and political 
factors” were responsible for the changes to and polarization of concepts of ceremony. 
Theological, ideological, and economic conflicts among the intellectual and social elites were 
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responsible for many changes to and suppressions of ritual celebrations.160 He also argues 
that the perceived pagan inheritances of religious culture were not true inheritances but rather 
intellectual constructs by the literary and scholarly classes that accorded with the tastes of 
“sophisticated society.”161 Most of the correspondences between very old, pagan festivals 
and Christian ones were incidental, owing to the long accretion of ornaments and 
beautifications that adorned the medieval Church and medieval society.162  
Another historian of festivity, Francois Laroque, has reprinted and analyzed many 
accounts of rustic ceremonies from this period; his study makes two points that are especially 
important for this chapter. One is that early modern writers were interested in thinking about 
festivities and ceremonies in complex terms that noted the trans-cultural and trans-historical 
similarities between the forms of worship of disparate peoples.163 The other is that literary 
representations of traditional ceremonies tended to be multivalent because early modern 
writers were conscious of the wide variety and diversity that religious practices could take 
on.164 Almost every local instantiation of familiar popular rituals was different, he argues. 
But since early moderns were already conditioned to compare different rituals to others that 
were distant both in time and purpose, but similar in form, I would extend that point to the 
intellectual culture that appropriated classical forms.  
Perhaps the most popular example of such a comparative frame of mind was Polydore 
Vergil’s in his De Inventoribus Rerum, a work that went through thirteen editions in the 
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sixteenth-century. His juxtaposition of Christian and pagan habits consistently emphasizes 
their similarities. The structure of Vergil’s discussion is usually the same in every chapter: he 
first discusses pagan manifestations of a given ritual or practice but then goes on to locate the 
origin further back in time in the Hebrew world. At the same time that he locates the 
provenance in Jewish practices, he also shows how similar rituals arose all over the ancient 
world. This kind of formalism demonstrates that any perceived borrowings of pagan by 
Christian culture were, actually, superficial and were based originally on Jewish 
dispensation, or else simply arose outside of that dispensation in other, pagan societies. 
Nevertheless, his work posed the fundamental question: is a ritual action affected by those 
who perform it, or can it simply be an example of an impulse found in human nature and 
tempered by social concerns? Certainly, his early chapter on the origin of religion argues that 
the development of religious ritual looks similar whether among pagans or not. In the 
beginning, he writes, people “began praising their first kings and giving them new honors 
until they made celestial beings of them.”165 Religion as we now think of it arose later, when 
some divine or quasi-divine figure teaches the people new rituals and ways of worshipping 
gods properly recognized as divine. Vergil thinks that “those who maintain that the gods 
have been worshipped since the beginning are therefore mistaken” (71). The “true God” 
similarly reveals how he wants humans to worship him. Among pagans there were several 
divinely inspired innovators who introduced rituals, among them Orpheus, Cadmus, and 
Numa.  
This similarity extends to the development of religious ritual in both Christian and 
pagan societies. The nature of “religion” for Vergil pulls in two directions. According to 
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Lactantius, it is the mechanism by which we are “bound and linked to God by this chain of 
piety.” But for Cicero, religion derives from “relegere, to go over,” denoting “those who 
carefully [diligenter] practiced and, as it were, went over everything having to do with the 
worship of the gods” (71). Yet, both definitions foreground careful (Cicero’s diligenter) 
practice and discipline as the hallmarks of modern religion, as opposed to uncivilized king 
worship. Vergil ends his account by writing that the “sons of Adam” first sacrificed to God, 
and that their sons sacrificed “without initiation in any rites until God established the 
priesthood” (75). In both cases, pagan and Judeo-Christian, there is a development from 
uninitiated, spontaneous worship to a mode of worship that employs rites dictated either by 
demigods, quasi-divine leaders, or even God himself.   
 Vergil also criticizes what he perceives as overly intrusive borrowings from pagan 
culture in Christian forms of worship. But his criticism is always suffused by the awareness 
that the origin of most religious customs came from the Hebrew world, and thus pagan 
developments were simply accretions on the Hebrew base. His chapter of “wreaths” begins 
by noting that “Moses . . . made many golden wreaths,” which Josephus links to priests’ 
vestments in his own day (303). The rest of the chapter is taken up by descriptions of wreaths 
in pagan culture, and ends by noting the similarity between them and the ones worn by 
English priests in their celebrations of feast days (309). “Heavens above,” he writes to his 
brother Gian Matteo, “how many practices of our own religion have been adopted and taken 
over from pagan ceremony” (17). But the thrust of the rest of his work is to show the 
similarities between Hebrew, pagan, and Christian rituals and to note that they all flowed 
from the dispensation given by God to the Jews. Indeed, Protestant or reforming Englishmen 
could take Vergil’s indictment of pagan similarity as a criticism of Catholicism and still note 
  
 160
that the less overt similarities between their own religion and paganism arose naturally. 
Ultimately, the comparative, synthetic spirit of the work triumphs over the critical edge that 
Vergil occasionally plays along; his book shows that rituals develop and adapt in 
complicated ways and often independently of each other. The result is an implicit argument 
that the forms of religious worship are often similar across cultures even if the intentions of 
their practitioners are wildly divergent. 
Vergil’s work thus contributed to the ambiguous status of ceremonies and pagan 
culture in the literary culture of the sixteenth-century. As classical culture and poetry became 
intensely fashionable in the 1590s, print was flooded with representations of the very rituals 
and ceremonies that Vergil had described, refracted through literary forms that gave the 
pagan world contemporary significance. Literary classicism gave many writers a way to 
channel the ecclesiastical and religious tensions of their moment into a world that was at 
once removed and relevant. It was removed in time and place; but it was close in the sense 
that the classical world could provide writers with a society steeped in highly formalized 
social and religious rituals that mediated their denizens’ relationships with each other and 
with the natural world. If the religious conflicts of the 1590s were principally about what 
kind of form ecclesiastical polity would take, then that decade’s classical fantasias were well 
equipped to reflect such conflicts in their depictions of a world of changing and unstable 
forms. 
The intellectual and imaginative links between the literature of the 1590s—which 
often featured pagan gods and figures in starring roles—and the religious culture of the same 
time proved to be strong. Hooker had realized that his ecclesiastical community had to be 
built upon the affective responses of its members both to the sensible objects of worship and 
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to each other. This kind of devotion was very similar to the kind that writers were depicting 
through the popular literary forms of the decade. Giles Fletcher’s sonnet sequence Licia 
expresses the link between erotic devotion and religious community and controversy 
enigmatically, in the playful manner of the distracted aristocrat who is wasting time writing 
frivolities. But there is a vein of religious controversy lurking, however ludic it might be, 
beneath the surface. Writing to his patron, Lady Molineux, he says, “the present jarre of this 
disagreeing age drive me into a fitte so melancholie, as I onely had leasure to growe 
passionate. And I see not why upon our dissentions, I may not sit downe idle, forsake my 
study, and goe sing of love, as well as our Brownistes forsake the Church, and write of 
malice.”166 Fletcher draws a tenuous comparison between himself and the separatists: just as 
they remove themselves from public life, so he removes himself from the same. But both are 
correctives to the “present jarre of this disagreeing age”; both are forms of retreat intended to 
ameliorate life in contentious times. What is needed, Fletcher implies, is some imaginative 
distance from the controversies consuming the church. 
In fact, Fletcher sees the variety of interpretation that the vaguely classical, pagan 
world of the sonnet sequence affords as a virtue in a time in which seemingly every word 
was searched for its polemical significance. In his letter “To the Reader,” Fletcher plays with 
those looking for specific interpretations of his verses:  
Thue (Reader) take heede thou erre not, aesteeme Love as thou ought. If thou 
muse vvhat my LICIA is, take her to be some Diana, at the least chaste, or 
some Minerva, no Venus, fairer farre; it may be shee is Learnings image, or 
some heavenlie vvoonder, vvhich the precisest may not mislike: perhaps 
under that name I have shadowed Discipline. It may be, I meane that kinde 
courtesie vvhich I found at the Patronesse of these Poems; it may bee some 
Colledge; it may bee my conceit, and portende nothing: vvhat soever it be, if 
thou like it, take it. (sig. Br) 
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The term “precise” was another word for “puritan,” and C. S. Lewis suggests that by 
“Discipline” Fletcher intends Walter Travers’ Defense of the Ecclesiastical Discipline 
(1588), one of the sparks that kindled Hooker’s Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.167 Fletcher 
constructs, comically, a distinction between his own poetry and the more publicly minded 
religious polemic that was ongoing in print and in the universities. The variety inherent in the 
interpretive strategy is noteworthy: Fletcher makes sure not to fix his meaning, just as those 
to whom he refers were arguing strenuously about the meaning of symbols and images 
involved in religious devotion. But the very act of “shadowing,” or representing, “Discipline” 
in poetry was antithetical to Travers’ purpose. While he insisted on biblical literalism, 
Fletcher morphs Travers’ concept of Discipline into a literary conceit. The very structure of 
this allusive poetry is supposed to disperse interpretive authority; it is playful and various, 
and Fletcher mocks the “precisest” by implying that he has included allegories that will 
please them. Obviously he thinks that the most “precise” would not be interested in reading 
complicated representations of ideas masked by pagan gods. 
 The first poem in the collection enacts a distinction familiar from Hooker’s response 
to Tertullian’s De Corona Militis. The speaker writes that, in composing poems to Licia, he 
is building a church: “I build besides a Temple to your name, / Wherein my thoughtes shall 
daily sing your praise: / And will erect an aulter for the same.” But, he acknowledges that 
this human building would be an approximation of the natural, divine lodging of Licia’s 
virtue: “But heaven the Temple of your honor is, / Whose brasen toppes your worthie selfe 
made proude: / The ground an aulter, base for such a blisse / With pitie torne, because I 
sigh’d so loude.” On the contrary, it appears that nature herself is the only appropriate place 
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for the worship of Licia. But, as in the case of Tertullian’s flowers, humans mangle the 
natural order by their attempts to turn it into art, or expressions of affective relationships. The 
speaker goes on, “And since my skill no worship can impart, / Make you an incense of my 
loving heart” (1). Religious ritual suffuses the language of Licia because the cultural and 
ecclesiastical tensions of the moment cannily inform the tensions that the speaker feels in 
creating imaginative art to please his beloved. On the one hand, building a temple or 
otherwise specifying a site of religious worship necessarily limits the illimitable and 
extensive virtue and grace that God, or the beloved, possesses. On the other hand, such 
manifestations of hierarchy are inescapable, and so human art falls back on a decorum that 
simultaneously comes from heaven and from human interpretations of the divine. 
 The erotic, passionate demands of lovers thus test the boundaries of decorous worship 
expressed through rituals. And there are few better representatives of this imaginative test in 
the 1590s than Marlowe’s Hero and Leander and George Chapman’s continuation. 
Chapman’s continuation, especially, seems to have been influenced by Hooker’s conceptions 
of ceremony and ritual. In an influential essay, D. J. Gordon links Chapman’s goddess 
“Ceremony,” who appears in the third sestiad, to Hooker’s comments about ceremony in his 
Laws. Gordon adduces the passage in which Hooker maintains that no nation has ever 
allowed public actions of weight to pass without some sort of “visible solemnitie” (1:274). 
He agues that Chapman develops Hooker’s notion of ceremony by calling his goddess 
“Thesmos,” a Greek word that, in the sixteenth century, applied “specifically to institution, 
custom or divine rites.”168 Gordon also argues that Chapman is following Hooker’s 
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Aristotelian defense of ceremony as providing forms that shape the matter of devotion.169 
Chapman’s continuation is meant, thus, to complete the intellectual enigma set up by 
Marlowe’s original. The social and cultural function of religious formalism is of paramount 
importance to both Marlowe’s and Chapman’s poems, in which erotic love and over-busy 
imagination threaten the decorum of devotion. Marlowe’s glee in questioning this decorum, 
and Chapman’s in augmenting it, forms a crucial nexus for debates over the relationship 
between the imagination and religious culture in the 1590s.  
 Much of Marlowe’s interest in these topics surely came from Musaeus’s original 
poem, which, in its Hellenistic delight in a rhetorical effervescence that is also deeply 
skeptical, questions the efficacy of a religious polity to contain desire within social customs. 
The pagan social setting is thus unavoidably interwoven with the philosophical and religious 
complexities of the lovers’ situation. It is also important that Renaissance authors generally 
thought that Musaeus was a very ancient author, predating even Homer. Thus, the rituals and 
religious tensions in the society depicted in his poem would have seemed foundational for 
Greek culture and also the transmission of religious values to later societies.170 Ancient 
Sestos was indeed a society that made its sexual mores the stuff of religious ritual. At the 
beginning of Marlowe’s poem, annual festival of Adonis forms the setting for Hero and 
Leander’s meeting: 
The men of wealthie Sestos, everie yeare, 
(For his sake whom their goddesse held so deare, 
Rose-cheekt Adonis) kept a solemne feast. 
Thither resorted many a wandering guest, 
To meet their loves; such as had none at all, 
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Came lovers home, from this great festivall.171 
      (1.91–96) 
 
The festive atmosphere provides license for the dissolution of vows and the construction of 
new erotic relationships, as the ensuing action shows. Hero and Leander are both, of course, 
extremely beautiful. But it is Hero, more than Leander, who is clothed with external 
ornaments. Her clothes are, partially, the markers of her status as “Venus nun” (1.45), and 
representative of formal religion with its elaborate codes of symbolic imagery: 
Upon her head she ware a myrtle wreath, 
From whence her vaile reacht to the ground beneath. 
Her vaile was artificial flowers and leaves, 
Whose workmanship both man and beast deceaves. 
       (1.17–20) 
 
But, like so many Renaissance objects of male desire, she is unattainable, ensconced in 
Venus’s temple, a virgin. 
And yet Venus’s temple is adorned with representations of the lust and eroticism for 
which the Greek gods were known. “There might you see the gods in sundrie shapes, / 
Committing headdie ryots, incest, rapes” (1.143–44). For some critics, this juxtaposition 
between Hero’s purity and the very impure surroundings in Venus’s temple points out 
Marlowe’s ironic view of religion’s efficacy to restrain desire. Thus, William Keach argues 
that Marlowe portrays the lovers’ courtship ironically and “turns their wooing into something 
like a parody of formal religious ritual.”172 John Mills notes of Hero, “she is a devotee of sex, 
surrounded by the symbolic paraphernalia of sexuality, dedicated, as  the word ‘nun’ implies, 
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to chastity.”173 More recently, Patrick Cheney extends the insight into the irony of the poem’s 
religious imagery to argue that Marlowe was reacting against the socially integrative vision 
of chastity and religious ritual found in Edmund Spenser’s works. Cheney sees the religious 
tensions as a critique of “England’s queen and her erotic cult of chastity.”174 Marlowe’s 
challenges to religious ritual and religious formalism were indeed strong; and they took as 
their basis something like Hooker’s conception of a church founded in the visible and the 
sensory. Marlowe’s naturalist, materialist arguments against ritual, or at least those of 
Leander, in fact look strikingly similar to Hooker’s own musings about the role of the senses 
in religious practice. Neither Marlowe’s nor Hooker’s works are systematic; rather, they are 
both imaginative constructions that ruminate on the effects of variety and metamorphosis on 
a religious community. Chapman’s poem is more systematic, an attempt to tie all the threads 
of Marlowe’s poem together in a Hookerian knot, but Marlowe’s poem is powerful precisely 
because it leaves many supposed criticisms unresolved. 
In the centerpiece of the first sestiad, Leander’s speech stands as a thorough 
indictment of the logic of religious devotion and ritual. His arguments question the way in 
which divine law becomes manifest in human societies, specifically through religious 
practices that claim to interpret divine law. These arguments are ultimately a recapitulation of 
sophistical arguments over physis and nomos. From the point of view of physis, humans are 
governed by nature and ultimately unruly natural drives that resist the authority of law, or 
nomos. The adherents of nomos, however, maintain that positive law, whether divine or 
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human, represents the necessary compromises of progress and community.175 Clever orators, 
however, could destabilize these general categories in various ways. Arthur Kinney has 
remarked on the interest generated in the 1590s by the “Second Sophistic,” a rhetorical 
movement of the first two centuries AD. The movement created a kind of “philosophic 
rhetoric” that endeavored to set mental traps for its audience through the deliberate confusion 
of categorical knowledge.176 Nevertheless, orators employed this confusion to defend 
traditional customs and beliefs. Hero and Leander, however, yokes this style to Leander’s 
argument against Hero’s religious devotion. In both Marlowe’s and Musaeus’s versions, 
Leander produces a kind of philosophic rhetoric that forces custom and tradition to 
undermine Hero’s obedience to her formal religion. In Musaeus’s poem, when Leander wants 
to persuade Hero, it is to marry him, to replace one set of laws and rites with another: 
Come, conduct the mystery, the marriage laws [θεσµά] of the goddess; 
It is not fitting a virgin attend on Aphrodite. 
Cypris takes no pleasure in virgins; if you are willing 
To learn the amorous laws [θεσµά] of the goddess, and her goodly rites, 
Here is our couch, our wedding; but you, if you love Cythereia, 
Embrace the tender law [θεσµόν] of the heart-beguiling Loves, 
And gather me up, your suppliant, and if you will, your husband.177 
 
Leander’s repetition of forms of “thesmos”—a flexible term that connotes divine, unwritten, 
spiritually binding law as opposed to human, written law—indicates his acknowledgement of 
the power of such unwritten laws to move Hero.178 In effect, he is trying to suggest that these 
                                                 
175
 For an extensive discussion of this debate in ancient Greek philosophy, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of 
Greek Philosophy, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 55–134. I rely on Guthrie’s 
discussion throughout my subsequent analysis. 
 
176
 Kinney, Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric, and Fiction in Sixteenth-Century England (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 317. 
 
177
 Musaeus, Hero and Leander, ed. Thomas Gelzer, trans. Cedric Whitman, Loeb Classical Library 421 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 362–65. 
 
  
 168
unwritten laws should override her own vows, which correspond to formal religious 
discipline.  
 In Marlowe’s version, Leander’s famous speech takes a slightly different tack, though 
it similarly clothes its arguments for natural interest in the guise of the communal good. 
Leander’s key idea is that “use” should determine worth: 
Vessels of Brasse oft handled, brightly shine, 
What difference betwixt the richest mine 
And basest mold, but use? for both not us’de, 
Are of like worth. Then treasure is abus’de, 
When misers keepe it; being put to lone, 
In time it will returne us two for one. 
     (1.231–36) 
 
For Leander, the ultimate value of things has to do with their use value, even their trade 
value. He envisions a society in which mutual trust guarantees the worth of things in their 
role as exchangeable commodities. That is, he removes Hero’s worth from the province of 
the religious cloister and into the realm of society and commerce. But Leander goes on to 
divorce this concept of nomos as custom or tradition from nomos defined as a legally 
accepted norm of behavior. In some confused reasoning, he says, 
This idoll which you terme Virginitie, 
Is neither essence subject to the eie, 
No, nor to any one exterior sence, 
Nor hath it any place of residence, 
Nor is’t of earth or mold celestiall, 
Or capable of any forme of at all. 
     (1.269–74) 
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But several lines later, he chastises Hero for conforming to Venus’s rites, which he terms 
“regular and formall puritie” (1.308). Clearly virginity is capable of a form. But the real 
question is whether Hero’s worship of Venus is natural or merely a human institution.  
 His terming virginity an “idol” muddies the issue, especially because this usage is not 
what we would expect to find at the end of the sixteenth century. Vincenzo Cartari’s Le 
Immagini degli Dei Antichi, translated into English by Richard Linche in 1599, begins by 
arguing that idolatry first came about because people mistakenly made their gods material: 
For at the first, the corruptible sottishnesse, and faith wanting 
weaknesse of man was such, as illustrating the heauens and their 
reuolutions, the earth and her encrease, the sea with her strange 
courses, onely with the externall eies of their faces, not admitting the 
same to anie contemplation or soule obseruance, the vulgars, and such 
as blindfolded went groping vp and down in the dark for knowledge, 
were entangled in such an intricate garden and Labyrinth of error, that 
they were firmely persuaded that there was a god in this Statue, 
another in that picture of earth, stone, and other mettals, and 
oftentimes in painted Images: from whence it proceeded, that there 
were then in such friuolous and superstitious reuerence, so 
innumerable multitudes of gods among the auncients.179   
 
Leander’s argument is that Hero’s “virginity” is not a real idol because it cannot be perceived 
with the senses. In fact, he seems to be proposing that constructing a real idol might be better 
for Hero, since only that which can be touched, sensed, and exchanged has any value. In 
Leander’s conceit, a different kind of idol would extend Hero’s obligation laterally to her 
community and away from the exclusive, quasi-divine authority of “virginitie.” The fluidity 
of nature is Leander’s criterion of persuasion: since nature is in flux, the “regular and 
formall” cannot serve to contain it. Leander makes strange allies of custom and nature, 
suggesting that by placing something in the realm of custom one is bowing to the 
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metamorphic nature of things because customs are based on “use,” which involves the 
changing values of objects. 
 Leander’s challenge to formal religious discipline is thus at once based on 
materialism and tradition. And Leander, as a pagan, makes a subtle, pagan argument about 
the nature of idolatry and religious ritual. As Cartari wrote, idols were simply representations 
of social phenomena and technological progress, to which the pagans gave physical form: 
For not onely the seuerall humours of diuerse Nations, but euerie 
particular Cittie, caused their Image that they would worship, so to be 
framed, according as they were then to craue and request some 
especiall and extraordinarie boone of their wooden deities, or hauing 
alreadie obtained it, entended thereby to manifest their thanksgiuing 
and gratefulnesse. And being (as it were) rockt asleep with the 
pleasing conceit of this their superstition, it grew so farre vpon them, 
that in the end they worshipped and deuoutly adored men like vnto 
themselues, such as were knowne to haue inuented and found out some 
speciall good and adiuvament for their easie and quiet liuing, or to 
haue (as it were) hewen out and forced from their deepe-searching 
capacities some strange and vncouth art, science, or profession.180   
  
 
For Leander, too, idols should concretize some sort of socially accepted set of values, such as 
marriage. He reasons much along the lines of Cartari’s pagans, that religion should revere 
deeds, fame, and social recognition: 
What vertue is it, that is borne with us? 
Much lesse can honour bee ascrib’d thereto, 
Honour is purchas’d by the deedes wee do. 
Beleeve me Hero, honour is not wone, 
Untill some honourable deed be done. 
      (1.278–82) 
 
Like a sophist, he praises social progress in the form of usages and customs set up by 
innovators and then developed through time.181 And like his counterpart in Musaeus’s poem, 
he thinks that this kind of idolatry would best express the “thesmos” of Venus’s worship. As 
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Marlowe’s Leander says, “Then shall you most resemble Venus Nun, / When Venus sweet 
rites are perform’d and done” (1.319–20).  
 This reasoning represents a significant challenge to an ecclesiastical community, 
because it denies the community autonomy in the form of internally maintained laws. For 
Leander, if a law does not conform to nature, or long-accepted custom, then it may be 
broken. Hooker had of course confronted this problem by arguing that an ecclesiastical polity 
must conform to nature in the form of sensible means of devotion; must conform to tradition 
in the form of principles handed down; but must also be free to establish its own rites that 
respond to the exigencies of social circumstances. The conflict inherent in Hero’s chaste 
worship of Venus inside a temple that is marked with unchaste images is designed to point 
out the difficulty of maintaining internal religious laws in the face of social customs. The 
festive atmosphere of the poem makes it seem inevitable that Hero will forsake what Leander 
calls her “heedlesse oath” (1.294). 
 The recuperation of the material world into a ceremonial context was the object of 
Chapman’s continuation of the poem. As Richard Neuse has argued, Marlowe’s Hero and 
Leander actually shared much in common with the genre of works that he terms “the Ovidian 
banquet of sense,” after Chapman’s poem of the same name. He argues that “Ovid’s banquet 
sets the Socratic banquet—as understood by Renaissance Platonists—on its head.”182 The 
Ovidian poetry of the late-sixteenth century, he writes, “assumes the autonomy (more or less) 
of the senses and yet may imply that something like spirit can be sublimed from them.”183 
                                                 
182
 Neuse, “Atheism and Some Functions of Myth in Marlowe’s Hero and Leander,” Modern Language 
Quarterly 31 (1970): 424; for similar arguments about the role of Ovidian narratives in the erotic epyllion, see 
Jim Ellis, Sexuality and Citizenship: Metamorphosis in Elizabethan Erotic Verse (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003); and Lynn Enterline, The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
183
 Neuse, “Atheism and Some Functions of Myth,” 425; see also Raymond B. Waddington, The Mind’s 
Empire: Myth and Form in George Chapman’s Poems (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 
  
 172
Leander’s arguments made an alliance between the materials of sensory perception and the 
licit social rituals through which physical longing was traditionally channeled. This argument 
is a subtle inversion of the usual defense of ritual, which begins with the endpoint and works 
down to matter. Leander implies that matter, and the value it obtains by exchange, actually 
structure religious discipline and make that discipline subservient to the social circumstances, 
manifest in custom or “use,” in which it finds itself. 
 Chapman’s poem, on the other hand, delocalizes ceremony and “thesmos,” making 
them both deities outside of time that nevertheless provide the structuring form for the 
circumstances with which they interact. Chapman describes his “Thesme” as “the Deitie 
soveraigne / Of Customes and religious rites” (3.4–5). Immediately in the third sestiad, time 
and ceremony establish control over the events of the poem. In opposition to Leander’s 
concept of “use” that governed time-bound customs, Chapman writes that time itself must be 
guided in order to legitimate action:  
Times golden Thie 
Upholds the flowrie bodie of the earth, 
In sacred harmonie, and every birth 
Of men, and actions makes legitimate, 
Being usde aright; The use of time is Fate. 
     (3.60–64) 
 
Chapman’s “Ceremony” then redirects the senses from social custom to divinely ordained 
and ordering authorities: 
She led Religion; all her bodie was 
Cleere and transparent as the purest glasse: 
For she was all presented to the sence; 
Devotion, Order, State, and Reverence, 
Her shadowes were; Societie, Memorie; 
. . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Her face was changeable to everie eie; 
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One way lookt ill, another graciouslie; 
Which while men viewd, they cheerfull were and holy: 
But looking off, vicious, and melancholy: 
The snakie paths to each observed law, 
Did Policie in her broad bosome draw. 
     (3.117–21, 125–30) 
 
The goddess chastises Leander’s “violent love” (3.146) for “Not being with civill formes 
confirm’d and bounded, / For humane dignities and comforts founded” (3.151–52). 
Ceremony urges that the civically and religiously instituted laws must form a part of 
conceptions of sacred law. And, importantly, she relies on the help of Policie to guide her 
followers through the “snakie paths to each observed law.” Policie may be a glance at 
Hooker’s own Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity in that both seek to reconcile instituted laws with 
the higher realm of sacred law. “Ceremony” acknowledges that observed law is often 
difficult to interpret and even more difficult to live within, especially when nature and 
custom must also be respected. But Chapman’s goddess deals with the question of nature by 
remaining open to the senses; and she addresses the question of custom with her shadows, 
“Societie” and “Memorie.” 
 Chapman’s resolution of Leander’s problematic linkage of materialism and custom 
results in a union between instituted law and sacred law by arguing that the difficulties of 
living in accordance with “observed laws” are necessitated by their complicated provenance 
from the divine. Channeled through the senses and further enmeshed in tradition, they require 
some sort of governing authority that mediates both, in this case the deities “Ceremony” and 
“Policie.” In terms of the contemporary ecclesiastical conflicts of the 1590s, it made sense 
for these questions to be set against a classical, pagan backdrop since the problem of 
disciplines inherited from the classical world continued to needle and inflame English 
authors. Metamorphic, Ovidian materialism further proved to be a fruitful basis for 
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representation since the mutable materials of religious discipline were also a subject of wide 
debate. Alongside Ovid’s transforming matter, Aristotelian hylomorphism explained how 
matter became endowed with form. This process of matter receiving form was crucial for 
defenders of religious discipline, and could be metaphorized in the process of fitting human 
law to sacred commands, or even in the imaginative dilation of the materials of worship into 
the rituals that gave them form. Classical genres thus attained a height of relevance to 
contemporary ecclesiastical debates precisely in proportion to their representation of the way 
that the unruly natural, material world interacts with civilizing forms of custom, law, and 
social circumstances. 
 
III. Ancient and Early Modern Pastoral 
While Ovidian strains of classical genre certainly were dominant in the decade, Virgilian 
pastoral also provided a source for complex representations of pagan religious practices. Just 
as the erotic epyllion dramatizes the tension between the rituals of religious and erotic 
devotion and the demands of transcendent, inexpressible virtue, the genre of the pastoral 
eclogue further heightens this tension by locating its rituals within a green world of natural 
immediacy. Michael Drayton’s Idea the Shepheards Garland, like other poems of its kind, 
relies on the pagan world to provide the structure for its disaffected shepherds to rail against 
love and its enormous requirements. His eclogues are influenced primarily by Baptista 
Mantuanus’s eclogues; Mantuan employed the eclogue form to criticize the Catholic Church 
and to delineate the kind of alternative ecclesiastical and social community that might replace 
the corruption of the church. Drayton inherits the multifaceted directives of this type of 
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poetry, and his shepherds, like those of his predecessors, are enmeshed in a world of rituals, 
sacrifices, and beautiful natural ornamentation.  
Mantuan’s collection was especially popular in sixteenth-century England, in part 
because of its critiques of papal excess, but also because of its earthy, rustic language and 
easy Latinity.184 Examples abound of his adaptation of the trappings of classical religious 
ornamentation throughout his poetry. He often imitates Vergil’s Eclogues and Georgics, both 
of which contain many examples of rustic gods and deities that intermingle with the 
shepherds’ lives and thus structure the formal rituals that the shepherds institute in the 
countryside. As Mantuan’s sixteenth-century editor Jodocus Badius noted, his third eclogue, 
which recounts a failed courtship, mines Vergil’s fifth eclogue for details of the rituals with 
which the shepherds lament the death of Daphnis.185 In Mantuan’s poem, Amyntas asks 
Sylvanus, god of the forest, to keep the flowers safe for the funeral of Amyntas’ beloved: 
“Ista precor domine, servate in funera nostra. / Tunc omnis spargatur humus, redolentia serta 
/ Texite quae circa tumulum, supráque iacentem / Componantur heram” (fol. 21v) (Reserue (I 
pray you) them tyll néede / to decke the Herse withall / Of my swéete wench when she by 
stroke / of dreadfull death shall fall. / Then, then let all ye ground be strowde, /let garlands 
then be plide: / At tyme of death aud buriall of / my Loue hir Herse to hide).186 In Vergil’s 
poem, Menalcas makes promises to his beloved Daphnis in the form of rites that he will 
celebrate every year in his honor: 
                                                 
184
 See Lee Piepho, “Mantuan's Eclogues in the English Reformation,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 25 
(1994): 623-32. 
 
185
 Mantuanus, Baptistae Mantuani Carmelitae Theologi Adolescentia seu Bucolica, Breuibus Iodoci 
Badij Commentarijs Illustrata (London, 1590), fol. 22v. All quotations from Mantuan’s poetry are from this 
edition and will be cited in the text. 
 
186
 The translation is by George Turberville, in The Eglogs of the Poet B. Mantuan Carmelitan, turned into 
English Verse (London, 1567), fol. 23v. Translations will be from this edition and will be cited in the text.  
  
 176
haec tibi semper erunt, et cum sollemnia vota 
reddemus Nymphis, et cum lustrabimus agros. 
dum iuga montis aper, fluvios dum piscis amabit, 
dumque thymo pascentur apes, dum rore cicadae, 
semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt. 
ut Baccho Cererique, tibi sic vota quotannis 
agricolae facient: damnabis tu quoque votis.187 
 
[these rites will always be yours, when we make our traditional vows 
to the Nymphs, and when we cleanse the fields by sacrifice. While the 
boar seeks the mountains and the fish the streams, and while bees feed 
on honey and cicadas on dew, so long will your name, your renown, 
and your praise remain. Just as the farmers make yearly vows to 
Bacchus and Ceres, so they will to you, and you will bind them to 
those vows.]   
 
Menalcas links the rites of Daphnis to the rustic version of the ambarvalia, the yearly 
celebration in May that honored Ceres with sacrifices and a procession around the crop-
bearing fields.188 The link between the harvest, Ceres, and religious ritual recurs in Vergil’s 
Georgics, where in book 1 he instructs famers how to praise the gods, especially those of the 
land: 
in primis venerare does, atque annua magnae 
sacra refer Cereri laetis operatus in herbis 
extremae sub casum hiemis, iam vere sereno. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
neque ante 
falcem maturis quisquam supponat aristis 
quam Cereri torta redimitus tempora quercu 
det motus incompositos et carmina dicat. 
      (40) 
 
[first and foremost, revere the gods, and give great Ceres her annual 
rites as you work in the field, and as winter now ends and already calm 
spring arrives. . . . And let no one put the scythe to the ripe corn until 
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he has encircled his brow with twisted oak leaves in honor of Ceres 
and has sung her songs and danced unthinkingly.]  
 
For Vergil’s shepherds and farmers, their rustic religious customs are meant as memorials 
that bind together everyone in the countryside in mutual remembrance and celebration of the 
harvest. Just as human expressions of lament or joy are occasional, so too are nature’s 
rhythms punctuated by moments of fruition or dearth. And as Hooker argued in book 5 of his 
Laws, it is precisely this circumscribed variety that provides the basis and rationale for 
religious rituals and the expression of human feelings in terms of the natural world.   
 The commentary on Vergil available in the Renaissance also tended to highlight 
holistic religious experience in the pastoral world. Anyone with Latin and a library could find 
exhaustive ancient and modern commentary in the great 1586 Basel edition of Vergil’s 
works. This edition functioned as a kind of variorum; it included Servius’s commentary as 
well as that of Pomponius Sabinus, Juan Luis Vives’s Christian allegorical interpretation, and 
many others both classical and modern. Writing on Eclogue 5, Servius makes sure to explain 
the religious rites that Menalcas gives to Daphnis. By including descriptions of leaping 
satyrs, for example, Vergil meant that “sane ut in religionibus saltaretur: haec ratio est, quod 
nullam maiores nostri partem corporis esse voluerent, quae non sentiret religionem: nam 
cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis” (it is right that one should leap 
about when worshipping. The reason is, that our forefathers wished that every part of the 
body should feel religious worship; and so the song pertains to the mind and the movement to 
the body).189 The unity produced by religious worship in the eclogues also extends to the 
community of the shepherds and indeed all living people. He writes that Bacchus and Ceres 
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“numina communia sunt mortalibus cunctis” (col. 61) (are deities that all mortals have in 
common), meaning that their effects, and their rites, are felt by everyone. This unifying force 
also applies to the human vows and contracts that deities can set up because of their ability to 
bind people together in mutual devotion. In the same eclogue, when Menalcas says that 
Daphnis will bind men to perform his rites, Servius explains:  
cum tu deus praestare aliqua hominibus coeperis, obnoxios tibi eos 
facies ad vota solvenda: quae antequam solvantur, obligatos & quasi 
damnatos homines retinent. (col. 61) 
 
[when you as a god begin to provide anything to men, you make them 
responsible to you that their vows are kept: so that until they are kept, 
they will oblige and bind men to their completion.] 
 
The entire eclogue turns on the ability of the gods of nature to create lasting bonds in the 
community of shepherds and, indeed, all people. Vives applies this sense of binding and 
ceremony to the Christian church in his allegorical interpretation of the eclogue. The rites, he 
says, signify that “Sacrificium Christi, & cultus eius in Ecclesia, non accipiet finem, nisi cum 
humano genere, & vicibus naturae rerum” (col. 66) (Christ’s sacrifice, and its worship in the 
Church, will have no end, until the human race dies out or the nature of things changes). 
Furthermore, the gods Bacchus and Ceres, because they represent necessities common to all 
people, also prove necessary to the religious life of mankind in the Christian version of 
things: “ut diis maximè necessariis in vita, & sine quibus homines propagare non possunt 
aevum, ita & tibi fient vota” (ibid.) (vows will be made to you, as if to those gods that are of 
highest importance for life, and without which men are not able to reproduce). The upshot of 
both sets of commentary is that both Vives and Servius link the rituals of formal religion with 
the natural world, “natura rerum.”  
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 Commentary on the Eclogues also included speculation on the origin of pastoral 
poetry itself. The origin is various, but the first story usually given connects pastoral poetry 
to the political and social circumstances of Greece after the Persian War.190 This origin story 
probably appealed to Protestant writers looking to yoke visions of pastoral community to 
their vision of national identity united around common objects of devotion and obligation. 
Servius’s relation of this story is brief, but Pomponius Sabinus expands on it in the 
prolegomena of the 1586 edition: 
Xerxe per Graeciam furente, Graeci in diversa loca fugîre. Quo victo 
apud Marathonum, Laecedaemonii reversi in patriam, die forte quo 
festum Dianae Caryattidis erat, sacra fecerunt. Et quoniam virgines 
deerant, pastores ex vicinia contraxerunt, & per eos sacra 
expediverunt, adhibitis rusticis carminibus. Ritum autem sacrorum 
Bucolicon appellarunt, quod solum boum custodes interfuissent. (n.p.) 
 
[When Xerxes was raging through Greece, the Greeks fled to different 
places. When he was defeated at Marathon and the Greeks returned to 
their country, it happened to be on a day sacred to Diana Caryatid, and 
so they performed her rituals. And because there were no virgins there, 
the shepherds came in from nearby and through them the rituals were 
carried out and their rustic songs were added to the rituals. They called 
this rite “Bucolic” because the cowherds were the only ones present.] 
 
This story emphasizes the reunification of the country after international conflict through 
traditional sacred rites. Furthermore, the shepherds take it on themselves not only to perform 
the ceremonies but also to add their own voices to them. There is a participatory dimension 
to this story that must have appealed to early modern authors of pastoral, not to mention 
Vergil himself. Pastoral poetry was thus meant, from its inception, to integrate a society in 
turmoil under the auspices of mutable rites of religious devotion.  Despite the tendency of the 
pastoral genre in the Renaissance to depict the lone intellectual exiled from power, the genre 
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was also concerned with the reintegration of a society under attack, with the shepherds 
leading the unification through their unique perspective and poetry.191 The pastoral genre is 
also partially a mixed one, in that it mixes the mystical and sacred ceremonies with the 
humble strains of shepherds’ music, the “sollemnia vota” alongside the “motus 
incompositos” of Vergil’s shepherds and farmers. 
It was easy, therefore, for early modern authors to link Vergil’s sense of licit social 
and religious mixture to a critique of exclusive, totalizing systems of religious worship. 
Mantuan turned Vergil’s ideal, rustic nostalgia into a critique of modern, unidirectional 
systems of gift giving and ecclesiastical obligation. In his third eclogue, Fortunatus laments 
that, these days, his innamoratas all seem to prefer gold to garlands:   
Quisquis amat, dominae munuscula mittat oportet. 
Tu verò, cui vix tectum fortuna reliquit, 
Sub quo luce habitat, sub quo pernoctat egestas, 
Quid poteris cupidae gratum donare puellae? 
Mittere mala decem satis esse solebat amanti. 
Purpuerei [sic] flores: & raptus ab arbore nidus, 
Gramen odoriferum, memini quo tempore magnae 
Credebantur opes: ventum est a gramine ad aurum. 
Regia res amor est: hac tempestate recessit 
Mos vetus, & quaedam mala lex inolevit amandi. 
       (fol. 20v) 
 
[Who so doth loue, vnto his Lasse  
must many presents sende:  
But thou whom scarce a house to dwel  
would cruell Fortune lende:  
Where day & night is want of wealth  
and lacke of golden sée:  
How canst thou shift to send thy Trull  
ought that may gratefull bée?  
Eare this suffisde vnto a Mayde  
ten appels gay to bring,  
A Garland freshe of fragrant floures,  
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a Neast of byrdes to syng.  
I knew when in as great a price  
the countrie maydes did holde  
A Garland as a better gyfte:  
but now from grasse to golde  
They are ascended, Loue is now  
become a stately thing:  
The auncient custome is decayde  
new lawes do dayly spring  
As touching trade of gréedy Loue,  
they gape for greater gayne.] 
      (fol. 22r)  
 
In later poems, Mantuan associates this loss of ancient custom with the new order of greedy 
and acquisitive shepherds, who represent the Catholic Church. In eclogue 8, Mantuan reveals 
the “Virgin” as the true ruler over nature and the shepherds, and in eclogue 9 he goes on to 
associate corrupt churchmen with the misuse and greedy exploitation of the bounty of the 
rustic landscape. While the Virgin exists easily side-by-side with the shepherd’s pagan 
customs, the greedy pastors actually upset the natural order through subservience to Rome, 
symbolized by the foreign animals that intrude upon the calm landscape of the eclogues. 
Thus, without the informing order of the social and religious devotional rituals that both 
physically and symbolically keep natural variety in check, the earth brings forth new, 
horrible forms: “Saepè etiam miris apparent monstra figuris, / Quae tellus affecta malis 
influxibus edit” (fol. 74v) (And oftentimes appear / fell uglie shapes to sight) (fol . 89v). In 
the hands of corrupt priests, rituals are no more than idolatry, as Faustulus says: 
Fama est, Aegyptum coluisse animalia quaedam: 
Et pro numinibus multas habuisse ferarum. 
Ista supersititio minor est quàm nostra ferarum 
Hic aras habet omne genus, contraria certè 
Naturae res, atque deo 
       (fol. 75r) 
 
[In Aegypt men report  
they honourd certaine beasts  
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And sundrie coumpted Gods to be  
with pompe and solemne feasts.  
That superstition was  
deseruing lesser blame  
Than ours, for we to euery beast  
a seuerall Altar frame:  
A thing contrary quite  
to God, and lawes of kinde.] 
      (fols. 89v–90r) 
 
Mantuan’s shepherds decry the indiscriminate application of ritual observances to the great 
variety of the natural world. In Mantuan’s ideal version of ceremonial society, however, the 
Virgin subsumes and controls the wildness of Ceres, and ritualistic practices bind humans 
through mutual vows and gifts that are given at specific times, instead of binding them to the 
“shapes” generated indiscriminately in nature.  
   Drayton was no Carmelite friar like Mantuan, but he did find something attractive in 
Mantuan’s vision of a community of shepherds united around the structuring rituals of the 
landscape. The question throughout Drayton’s Shepheards Garland is similar to that of 
Mantuan’s poetry: what purpose do the rituals, vows, and sacrifices serve? The shepherds 
criticize uncaring lovers and the corruption of the modern world while praising their 
patroness, all against the backdrop of a highly ritualized, rustic society. The classical rituals 
that Drayton inherited from Vergil, filtered through Mantuan and Spenser, serve a similar 
purpose to those in his predecessors’ poetry: they associate the occasional outpourings of 
human devotion with the festival calendar and the “garlands” that represented human art 
applied to natural variety. When classical authors such as Pliny the Elder remarked on the 
origins and significance of wreaths, crowns, and garlands, it was often accompanied by the 
uneasy delineation of licit natural, ceremonial objects from the accretions of human pride and 
affectation that attach to those same ceremonial objects. Pliny notes that flowers are 
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representative of ephemerality, perfect for expressions of temporary, ceremonial rites. As 
Philemon Holland translates:  
whereas she [Nature] hath given unto those fruits of the earth which 
serve for necessities and the sustentation of man, long life and a kind 
of perpetuitie, even to last yeares, and hundreds of yeares; these 
flowers of pleasure and delight, good only to content the eye or please 
the sence of smelling, shee would have to live and die in one day.192  
 
Originally, garlands were very small and made of flowers and leaves; they were claimed by 
priests for their rituals and by military commanders for their triumphal processions. Soon, 
though, the tastes of civilized society demanded artificial flowers made from silver and gold. 
Flowers and garlands became prizes in the games, and “those Chaplets woon and gotten at 
the solemne Games for some worthie feats of activities performed, caried alwaies the greater 
credit & authoritie.”193 They became markers of status and authority, and yet Pliny observes 
that Roman laws were very clear that “such Guirlands otherwise though they were not woon 
at games of prize, but only made for pleasure and pastime, might not come abroad ordinarily, 
nor bee commonly worne; for the law was very strict and severe in this case.” Indeed, 
throughout his Natural History Pliny addresses the relationship between original artistic 
inventions that benefited the public and their subsequent degradation into private status 
symbols.194 This familiar narrative of natural objects declining to human vanity, and their 
regulation by “discipline and severitie,”195 helped construct Drayton’s position on natural 
rituals in his eclogues. His shepherds’ garlands represent a Protestant compromise between 
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licit ceremonial outpourings for public figures on the one hand, and, on the other, the austere 
limitation of ceremonial trappings to garlands of real flowers, awarded for virtuous reasons 
and inextricably linked to religious devotion. 
Drayton’s garlands thus solemnize the community of shepherds by suggesting the 
affinity between the natural world and the social and religious order to which they belong. 
The shepherds live in the country, and so their expressions of religious devotion are similar 
to those over which Cartwright and Hooker, as well as Tertullian, argued in an ecclesiastical 
context. In part these practices, such as garlanding and gift-giving, are a kind of native 
English nostalgia, but they are also inherited directly from the rustic piety of classical 
pastoral poetry. To suggest that these rituals have some significance for sixteenth-century 
English Protestants, Drayton, like Hooker, must defend them in terms of their formal 
qualities and the capacity of their “forms” to change and adapt. And so Drayton conjoins the 
word “idea” with the word “garland” in his title in order to emphasize the variety of 
devotional forms that his poetry depicts.  
 The philosophical and literary significance of the word “idea” is, however, murky 
throughout. “Idea” could be the shepherd’s garland itself, and thus represent a human, 
attainable goal that the shepherds aspire to, the recognition that would come in the form of a 
poetic or pastoral prize. Indeed, allegorically Idea probably stood in for Anne Goodere, the 
daughter of Drayton’s childhood patron. However, “idea” could also represent a 
metaphorical, or metaphysical, kind of garland that is not available to the natural, rustic 
world that the shepherds inhabit. Drayton’s enigmatic name for his collection thus partially 
recuperates the contentions between Aristotelian and Platonic “forms.” As a real woman, 
Idea is often scornful of the shepherd’s attempts to make “trophies” for her out of the 
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materials of the natural world. So, she comes to represent the neo-Platonic insistence on the 
ideal, the totalizing Form that provides an unattainable pattern for material objects, to which 
they never fully join; but she also represents the mutable forms that proceed from the natural 
world. The shepherds make things for her and the other objects of their affections, fashioning 
both physical sacrifices and garlands as well as poetic praise. 
Because of the ambivalence regarding Idea’s significance, the poems continually 
vacillate on the value of ritual ornamentation, which is often channeled through the practice 
of garlanding and sacrificing and often associated with the value of the shepherds’ songs 
themselves. The first eclogue recounts Rowland’s efforts to fashion an acceptable gift for his 
mistress, and the difficulty of doing so. His pleas take the form of religious rituals: “And let 
those prayers vvhich I shall make to thee, / Be in thy sight perfumed sacrifice: / Let smokie 
sighes be pledges of contrition, / For follies past to make my soules submission.”196 The 
shepherds also apply the language of sacrifice to their praise of “Beta,” “The Queene of 
Virgins” (15), a stand-in for Queen Elizabeth. Perkin ends his praise by asking for yearly 
observance of her sacred place in the shepherds’ world: “Beta long may thine Altars smoke, 
with yeerely sacrifice, / And long thy sacred Temples may their Saboths solemnize” (18). 
The closing motto of the eclogue, in the words of Ovid, promises, “Ipse ego thura dabo, 
fumosis candidus aris: / Ipse feram ante tuos munera vota pedes” (19) (I myself, standing in 
white in front of your smoking altars, will provide incense; and I will place votive offerings 
before your feet). This language was familiar from Virgil’s Eclogues. In his eighth eclogue, 
burning incense on altars is also a way of praising one’s beloved: “Effer aquam et molli cinge 
haec altaria vitta / verbenasque adole pinguis et mascula tura, / coniugis ut magicis sanos 
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avertere sacris / experiar sensus” (22) (Bring water and surround these altars with soft bands, 
and burn rich boughs and incense, so that I may try to change the sober mood of my beloved 
with these magical rites). Just as in Virgil’s poem, the shepherds employ their “magic rites” 
in a kind of hopeful vein, hoping to use natural, ritual magic to effect change in their beloved, 
or to worship some quasi-divine entity with appropriate and decorous human rites.  
As in many of Mantuan’s poems, Drayton’s shepherds often rely on the 
ornamentation they gather from the natural world in order to express communal, festive 
values. Partly this is native, English tradition and partly it has been gleaned from classical 
culture. In Drayton’s second eclogue, the shepherds debate the power of poetry to translate 
divinity into the objects of sense and experience. The young shepherd Motto asks of divine 
poetry, 
Who doth not helpe to deck thy holy Shrine,  
With Mirtle, and triumphant Lawrell tree?  
Who will not say that thou art most diuine?  
Or who doth not confesse thy deitie?  
               (9) 
The traditional reward for poetic achievement is imagined to be coterminous with the rustic 
environment that the shepherds inhabit. They are rewarded not with gold, but with leaves 
from the trees that surround them. But as the older, wiser Wynken laments, poetry is not 
often rewarded even with this kind of social recognition. Indeed, Motto forsakes “his 
companions and their flocks, / And casts his gayest garland at his feete” (10).  
 Idea, though, inspires the shepherds to set up elaborate ornamental rituals to express 
their devotion to her. When they compose poetry to her, “Thy Temples then shall with greene 
bayes be dight” (31). In Rowland’s song, Idea appears as a Temple, built by heaven as a 
sacred space of religious devotion:  
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And those fayre Iuorie columnes which vpreare,  
That Temple built by heauens Geometrie,  
And holiest Flamynes sacrifizen theare,  
Vnto that heauenly Queene of Chastitie,  
Where vertues burning lamps can neuer quenched be.  
       (32) 
 
Like Fletcher’s Licia, Idea is a “Temple,” a sacred space and a repository of sacrifices made 
by priests especially devoted to its goddess. The physical “Idea” demands formal rituals of 
worship; she has been formed through geometry and thus demands the physical 
manifestations of recurring worship. But, as Motto points out, “She sees not shepheard, no 
she will not see, / her rarest vertues blazoned by thy quill, / Nor knowes the effect the same 
hath wrought in thee” (35). On some level, there is a disjunction between the temple and the 
goddess. She either does not need or does not care for the devotional practices of the 
shepherds and “holiest Flamynes.”  
 This is not the case, however, for “Pandora” in the sixth eclogue, who probably 
represents the countess of Pembroke and who delights in the kinds of ritual recognitions that 
Idea scorns. Perkin evokes her as a bedecked goddess of nature and poetry: 
The Graces twisting garlands for thy head,  
Thy Iuorie temples deckt with rarest flowers,  
Their rootes refreshed with diuinest showers,  
Thy browes with mirtle all inueloped,  
shepheards erecting trophies to thy praise,  
lauding thy name in songs and heauenly laies.  
      (41) 
 
Pandora ends up as Britain’s patron goddess. This is Drayton’s attempt to translate the 
classical customs (the garlands, the temples decked with flowers, the brows encircled with 
myrtle) into British customs. In his and his shepherds’ opinion, the glory of the nation comes, 
at least, partially, from the kind of decorous ornamentation that is represented in and by 
poetry itself, and by which extends the nation’s fame across the waters.  
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And indeed, in the next poem Drayton seems to suggest that the reason these rituals 
might easily be translated into a British context is because of their derivation from the eternal 
rhythms of the natural world. Eclogue 7 is partially a debate between an allegro and a 
penseroso, with the youthful Batte reveling in the fecundity of the natural world in the 
opening stanzas: 
See how faire Flora decks our fields with flowers,  
and clothes our groues in gaudie summers greene,  
And wanton Uer distils rose-water showers,  
to welcome Ceres, haruests hallowed Queene,  
Who layes abroad her louely sun-shine haires,  
Crown'd with great garlands of her golden eares.  
       (45) 
 
For Batte, the change of the seasons provides a rational for festivity and celebration. In his 
personified nature, Ceres wears garlands and Flora “decks” the fields with flowers much like 
the temples decked with flowers and leaves in earlier poems. In Ovid’s account in his Fasti, 
Flora represents physical, expansive nature that is common to all; thus, she is worshipped in 
rituals that partake of cyclical, ephemeral, and ultimately comic natural processes. As Ovid 
writes,  
non ex difficili causa petita subest. 
non est de tetricis, non est de magna professis, 
volt sua plebeio sacra patere choro, 
et monet aetatis specie, dum floreat, uti.197 
       
[She is none of your glum, none of your high-flown ones: she wishes 
her rites to be open to the common herd; and she wants us to use life’s 
flower, while it still blooms.] 
 
Batte invokes Flora and Ceres because they link natural cycles that the shepherds observe 
with formal rituals that are open to all. The concept that nature was there to be used also took 
on political and social connotations in Ovid’s poem. Flora’s games, he writes, were set up to 
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mark the occasion when the Publician consuls defended the integrity of public land against 
the encroachment of unlawful private wealth. Says Flora, “vindice servabat nullo sua publica 
volgus” (Common folk had no champion to protect their share in public property).198 Batte, 
too, celebrates the common people and their land. Indeed, his invocation of the pagan deities 
accords with contemporary accounts of harvest festivals that described the ceremonies in 
terms of their symbolic significance. The German traveler Paul Hentzner described such a 
ritual in 1598: “their last load of corn they crown with flowers, having besides an image 
richly dressed, by which perhaps they would signify Ceres.”199 Even though Borrill thinks 
Batte is naïve, he too thinks that nature should direct the shepherd’s mind, but toward the 
discovery of “What sundry vertues hearbs and flowres doe yeeld” (46). According to him, 
Batte should “learne the shepheards nice astrolobie [sic], / To know the Planets mooving in 
the skie” (ibid.). They are really talking about the same thing, the changing of the seasons 
that form the basis for the communal life of the shepherds. They simply disagree about the 
form that the knowledge of nature should take. 
 The expressions of love and devotion that flow from and are structured by natural 
objects become even more fraught with tension and significance in the last two eclogues. 
One of the running themes of this pastoral world is the rustic immediacy of the shepherds’ 
expressions of religious and social devotion. Their temples are more often decked with 
flowers than with gold, and the rewards of good poetry are more often myrtle than monetary. 
Nature provides them with their structuring rituals and rewards. In the eighth eclogue, Gorbo 
recounts the “golden age” as a rebuke to those in his own time who write for money and 
fame. In familiar imagery, he says, 
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The tender grasse was then the softest bed,  
the pleasant'st shades were deem'd the statelyest hals,  
No belly-god with Bacchus banqueted,  
nor paynted ragges then couered rotten wals.  
 
Then simple loue with simple vertue way'd,  
flowers the fauours which true fayth reuayled,  
Kindnes with kindnes was againe repay'd,  
with sweetest kisses couenants were sealed.       
       (57) 
 
The point is that in this time people truly did live according to nature in that they allowed 
nature to structure their social relationships. “Flowers” were payment and “kisses” were 
contracts. But the deeper significance is that the natural world acted as a basis and a 
justification for the expression of social rituals that governed affective relationships. To be a 
good shepherd, Gorbo implies, one has to know about the natural world and how it works, 
and especially how it might serve as an alternative standard to worldly ambition and honor-
mongering.  
The upshot of this pastoral philosophy for Drayton’s poem is that such immediate 
links between the natural world and human society do not always function as neat, 
efficacious units of devotional expression. Virgil’s shepherds also often felt “displaced from 
a simpler mode of existence,” a realization that accompanied a kind of alienation from the 
natural rituals that constituted pastoral virtue.200 The ninth eclogue is Rowland’s long lament 
that Idea does not give his beautiful, natural ornaments their due regard. He says,  
Those gorgeous garlands and those goodly flowers,  
wherewith I crown'd her tresses in the prime,  
She most abhors, and shuns those pleasant bowers,  
made to disport her in the summer time: 
She hates the sports and pastimes I inuent,  
And as the toade, flies all my meriment.  
       (68) 
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This passage, near the end of the entire collection, brings together many of the ritualistic 
themes into a bitter denouement. Shepherds’ arts are only those that involve making beautiful 
things out of nature; they follow natural rhythms in their customs and in their “sports and 
pastimes.” The pastoral world, whether it be the world of Virgil, Mantuan, or Drayton, is 
alive with religious actions and significance. Altars smoke, yearly vows are made, and 
garlands signify the special significance of time-bound celebrations. Idea, it seems, does not 
acknowledge these as markers of religious devotion. She is like those whom Fletcher called 
the “precisest,” who scorn the ornaments and trappings of pagan religious celebrations 
because of their narrow interpretations. Idea, too, “stops her eares as Adder to the charmes” 
(69). Rowland certainly, and Drayton perhaps, thinks that Idea is acting against her own best 
interests here. Idea seems at once formless and the pinnacle of unattainable form. She 
certainly inspires the shepherds to play with the variety of nature to express their love. But, 
Idea would be better served if she condescended to enjoy natural beauty and participate in the 
expressions of time-bound, because mortal, devotion. What the shepherds most desire is the 
union of their rustic lifestyle with some higher realm of significance and meaning, the union 
of the sensible expressions of devotion with the mystical realm of “ideas” and forms. If 
“Idea” can be said to represent religious devotion, or even the church itself, she is rather 
harsh and dismissive of beauty, and yet inspires her worshippers to invent beautiful things. 
But without the informing presence of Idea, the shepherds’ world becomes incoherent; each 
shepherd, without his beloved, forgets his flock and his friends.  
If there is religious allegory here, it seems to be that the shepherds’ plain way of life 
is meant as a test for the notion that social and religious rituals—whether English, pagan, or a 
combination—might bolster divinely ordained social order in the human realm through their 
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presentation of natural objects of sense in devotional contexts. The plainness of the 
shepherds’ lives surely was meant as a critique of Catholic excess, as was common in 
Protestant pastoral. But there is also a positive dimension for English society. The natural 
objects that the shepherds command and change with their art serve to bind the members of 
the pastoral community in mutual remembrance and effort. “Idea” is portrayed as too 
singular, too unwilling to accept that the variety of devotional expression can actually 
approach the transcendent “form” that she represents. If “the shepheards garland” represents 
the decorous mutability of human expressions of religious and social devotion, then “Idea” 
represents the difficulty of such various rituals to appropriately convey their participants into 
mystical transcendence. This is a distinctly Protestant formulation of the problem of religious 
ritual; Mantuan certainly does not invent a figure as austere as “Idea.” His “Virgin” exists 
easily beside Ceres and Bacchus, the classical instantiations of festival. Drayton’s poems do 
not possess the “easy primacy” of previous pastoral poetry; the rustic rituals address a world 
outside the pastoral one, a higher realm of court, society, and even church.201 Nevertheless, 
the conflict between an abstract, removed sense of informing grace and the physical, earthy 
remnants of a pagan, natural religion fired Drayton’s imagination, along with several other 
writers of the 1590s. 
 
IV. A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
William Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream shares with Drayton’s sophisticated 
pastoral the uneasy shifting between the world of civilized human authority, with its 
attendant ritual forms, and the world of unstable natural forms, which both mirror and 
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challenge the status quo of the other world. The world his play presents is a great hybrid of 
forms: classical, native, continental, and obscure. As Leonard Barkan argues, in this play 
“Shakespeare creates a new mythology that bridges the domestic and the pagan.” 
Structurally, by linking the human mythical world (in the figures of Theseus and Hippolyta) 
with the spiritual mythical world (in the figures of Oberon and Titania), Shakespeare sets up 
parallels that “may help to resolve disorder in a cosmic plan of correspondences, but they 
also stand as a disquieting arena of doubleness, a secret or nether side that lurks under the 
show of harmony, in just the way that ‘deeper’ meanings lurk under the integumentum of 
pagan fable.”202 The drama continually asserts the sensitive, natural world of the pagan 
deities as tests for the ordering rituals of Theseus and the court. By accessing a tension that 
pagan spirituality shared with Christianity, namely the always unstable containment of 
numinous forces within mutable social rituals, Shakespeare could also pose complicated 
questions to his own ecclesiastical polity. Indeed, the questions his play asks about religious 
and social community, the role of the imagination and natural religion, and the place of 
sensible objects in a ceremonial society are all familiar from Hooker and much of the 
literature that mined the classical world for its structure and themes.  
The critical account of the play that has emerged often deals with the ceremonialist 
debates within early modern culture alongside the play’s relationship to ritual and ceremony 
broadly conceived. As one critic summarizes the relationship between ritual and the comic 
form,  
Ritualistic comedy is the belief in and celebration of man’s 
participation in a recurrent pattern of renewal; it affirms a reality 
beyond the workaday world which confines identity and confounds 
desire. To ritualize experience is to replace the sense of everyday 
living, or living in a given society in immediate time, with a symbol of 
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another sense of living, of living in communion with the natural and 
the divine in suspended or transcendent time.203 
 
C. L. Barber has also interpreted the continually shifting perspectives of comic form in terms 
of the ritual dilation of identity beyond the everyday world:  
The teeming metamorphoses which we encounter are placed . . . in a 
medium and in a moment where the perceived structure of the outer 
world breaks down, where the body and its environment interpenetrate 
in unaccustomed ways, so that the seeming separateness and stability 
of identity is lost.204 
        
However, scholars have also pointed out that the play is embedded in the specifics of its 
immediate social and historical context. David Wiles, among others, has argued that the play 
was written for the wedding of Elizabeth Carey and Thomas Berkeley in early 1596.205 The 
festive atmosphere of the play thus anchors it in the social world of Shakespeare’s day at the 
same time that it presents viewers with scenes of ritualistic escape and transcendence. I, too, 
wish to stress the social significance of the rituals and ceremonies of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, but with a difference. Wiles believes that “The seasonal/festive discourse which 
Shakespeare exploited was under attack from puritanism, certainly, but it gained a new 
vitality by virtue of being under threat.”206 However, we cannot assume that this discourse 
was itself whole and fully formed as Shakespeare conceived it; Shakespeare the playwright 
was not a polemicist for ceremony, though he was interested in asking the questions about 
religious ritual that would have intrigued and tested his audience. In fact, the ritual world in 
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the play is highly unstable; the numinous, natural forces of its pagan setting consistently 
disrupt the traditional rituals and social arrangements of its human inhabitants. The religious 
institutions of the play are themselves relatively new, as Theseus, at least in Plutarch’s 
account of his life, had been a great innovator. But just as Hooker’s mutable church could 
introduce new forms as needed, so Theseus’s rituals change and adapt to the transformations 
that fill the play.  
 The spirits, especially Oberon and Titania, are representatives of the forces of change 
that continually buffet human society from within and without. When we first hear about 
Oberon’s interest in the human world, it is in the form of his indulgence in literary tastes 
shared by many Englishmen of the 1590s. In act 2 Titania criticizes Oberon for playing the 
shepherd and composing love lyrics of the pastoral variety: 
but I know 
When thou hast stol’n away from fairyland 
And in the shape of Corin sat all day, 
Playing on pipes of corn, and versing love 
To amorous Phillida.207 
 
The image is meant to be insultingly ridiculous, because Oberon is the king of the fairies; his 
control over the natural world is vast and the idea that he would want to use a corn pipe to 
compose poetry is absurd. And as is soon made clear, Oberon has the power to completely 
control the objects of human affection. Why does Oberon do it, then? Part of the reason is 
that Oberon is an unrepentant shape-shifter; his metamorphoses, and those of the other 
fairies, are representative both of the mutability of the natural world and of the informing 
spirit power of nature to affect the world of human society. But it is also apparent that 
pastoral poetry, like Shakespeare’s play, often takes as its subject the relationship between a 
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pretend world of immediate natural virtue and a serious world through which it is refracted. 
For pastoral poets of the 1590s, as we have seen, were determined to teach their readers a 
kind of performative virtue that at once respected decorum of devotion and rejected its more 
egregious manifestations. Oberon’s masquerade as a shepherd only emphasizes the strange 
relationship between the pastoral and the real worlds: he escapes from fairy land, a pretend 
world, into the real world of the shepherds that is itself a pretend world for human society. 
David Ormerod rightly has suggested that we must read the play as a “dual-locale comedy,” 
oscillating between court and wood.208 However, the “locales” of the play are not just the 
physical settings but also the permeable genres and stories that Shakespeare mixes 
throughout. The hall-of-mirrors of generic abstraction emphasizes the interconnectedness of 
both worlds and the mutual benefit or harm they can cause each other. As Shakespeare 
suggests, even the wild, numinous spirits yearn for decorum and degree, while the socially 
stratified and hierarchical society of Athens yearns for dissolution and transcendence. To 
respect both, without yielding too much to either, is the always distant goal. 
Oberon’s time spent as a shepherd thus helps us to understand a fundamental tension 
throughout the play. T. Walter Herbert has argued that representations of nature in the play 
vacillate between “animist” and “naturalist” perspectives.209 On the one hand, nature often 
appears to be animated by powerful, shape-shifting spirits that act almost like passionate 
beings themselves. On the other, nature can also seem like a mechanism divorced from 
feeling and impelled by irresistible and unchanging cosmic forces. Shakespeare mediates 
between the lovers’ passions and the skeptical distrust that arises from the mechanical view 
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of nature. He was certainly aware of the context of the guiding myth of Pyramus and Thisbe 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which sets up this same opposition between religious ritual 
conceived as passionate transcendence and ritual conceived as social enormity. In the 
Metamorphoses, the story of Pyramus and Thisbe is told by one of the Minyads, daughters of 
Minyas who remain inside during a Bacchic festival. As Ovid writes,  
festum celebrare sacerdos 
inmunesque operum famulas dominasque suorum 
pectora pelle tegi, crinales solvere vittas, 
serta coma, manibus frondentis sumere thyrsos 
iusserat.210 
 
[The Priest had bidden holiday, and that as well the Maide  
As Mistresse (for the time aside all other business layde) 
In Buckskin cotes, with tresses loose, and garlondes on their heare 
Should in their hands the leavie speares (surnamed Thyrsis) beare.]211  
 
The festival is of course a fertility ritual, with women excused from their work to let down 
their hair and carry phallic rods through the town. The daughters of Minyas are dubious: 
while outside there is “clamor iuvenalis et una / femineae voces inpulsaque tympana palmis” 
(180) (the noyse / of gagling womens tatling tongues and showting out of boyes) (87), inside 
“solae Minyeides intus / intempestiva turbantes festa Minerva” (180) (Alonly Mineus 
daughters bent of wilfulnesse, with working / Quite out of time to breake the feast, are in 
their houses lurking) (87). In Ovid’s account, one of the daughters says that instead of 
attending to the “commentaque sacra” (180) (false rituals) of Bacchus, they should instead 
tell stories to pass the time. The Minyads’ skepticism of Bacchus’s power extends to the 
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rituals that the people practice in his name; in their opinion, the rituals are distracting and 
pointless. 
The Minyads respond to rituals as a kind of temporary disturbance of their normal 
lives; the stories they tell are designed to warn against passionate transport. But they are 
eventually integrated into the ritual themselves, as the power of Bacchus reaches them and 
they are turned into birds as a punishment. The Minyads’ skepticism has its place in the play, 
though, as an example of the rational response to ritual. They represent, for both Ovid and 
Shakespeare, the unease that the upper classes felt about ceremonies. They feared, especially 
in Shakespeare’s time, that enthusiastic ceremonies would lead to social unrest and disorder. 
Philip Stubbes expresses this anxiety in his Anatomie of Abuses, often framing it in terms of 
rituals celebrated for the pagan gods. His account of “Church-ales” is typical of his 
preoccupations: 
The manner of them is thus, In certaine Townes where 
drunken Bachus beares all the sway, against a Christmas, an Easter, 
Whitsonday, or some other time, the Church-wardens (for so they call 
them) of euery parish, with the consent of the whole Parish, prouide 
half a score or twenty quarters of mault, wherof some they buy of the 
Church-stock, and some is giuen them of the Parishioners them selues, 
euery one conferring somewhat, according to his abilitie, which mault 
béeing made into very strongale or béere, it is set to sale, either in the 
Church or some other place assigned to that purpose.  
Then when the Nippitatum, this Huf-cap (as they call it) and 
this Nectar of lyfe, is set abroche, wel is he that can get the soonest to 
it, and spend the most at it, for he that sitteth the closest to it, and 
spends the moste at it, he is counted the godliest man of all the rest, 
but who, either cannot for pinching pouertie, or otherwise wil not stick 
to it, he is counted one destitute bothe of vertue and godlynes. In so 
much, as you shall haue many poormen make hard shift for money to 
spend therat, for it, béeing put into this Corban, they are perswaded it 
is meritorious & a good seruice to God. In this kinde of practise, they 
continue six wéeks, a quarter of a yéer, yea half a yéer togither, 
swilling and gulling, night and day, till they be as drunke as Apes, and 
as blockish as beasts.212 
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For Stubbes, this kind of celebration is a form of social trickery. The clever wardens fool the 
poor into spending money that ostensibly goes to the church, but actually goes to adorn the 
“mansion places” of the priests (sig. M6v). Stubbes’s dialogic representative Philoponus 
echoes the Minyad’s distrust of festivals that draw people away from their work. He rejects 
what would come to be Hooker’s defense of sacred time when he inveighs against 
celebrations held for wakes: “But why at one determinat day, more than at another (except 
busines vrged it) why should one and ye same day continue for euer, or be distinct from other 
dayes, by the name of a wake day?” (sig. [M7v]). More importantly, he argues that these 
ritual celebrations lead to social disorder and unrest:  
I thinke it conuenient for one Fréend to visite another (at sometimes) 
as oportunitie & occasion shall offer it selfe, but wherfore shuld the 
whole towne, parish, village and cuntrey, kéepe one and the same day, 
and make such gluttonous feasts as they doo? And therfore, to 
conclude, they are to no end, except it be to draw a great frequencie of 
whores, drabbes, theiues and verlets together, to maintaine whordome, 
bawdrie, gluttony, drunkennesse, thiefte, murther, swearing and all 
kind of mischief and abhomination. For, these be the ends wherto 
these feastes, and wakesses doo tende. (sig. [M8r]) 
 
“Philoponus” means “lover of work,” and it comes as no surprise that he links rustic, quasi-
religious rituals with an abandonment of duty by the populace and a misappropriation of 
funds by the clergy. Ronald Hutton attributes this anxiety to “the growth in poverty and 
social polarization consequent upon population and monetary inflation in the sixteenth 
century.” These forces “created a much more general and constant fear of famine and social 
unrest among the local élites of late Elizabethan England and a much greater propensity to 
regulate the behaviour of the populace and to reduce the opportunities for unruly crowd 
activity and sexual encounters which might result in bastard or pauper children for whom the 
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parish would have to pay.”213 The Ovidian context of the myth structuring Shakespeare’s 
play thus highlights the underlying cultural and social tensions that attended on festive 
activity and were enlivened by skeptical critiques of its practical worth. Shakespeare, writing 
for an aristocratic audience, had these thoughts and tensions in the forefront of his mind, and 
they show up in the ambivalent responses to the fantastic events of the forest and in the 
uneasy ritual and theatrical reintegration of Athenian life in the last acts.  
The interpretive pull between “animist” and “naturalist” interpretations of religious 
ritual clearly informs both the action of the play and the social context. Many would ask, 
along with Shakespeare, if it were possible to have decorous religious culture that respects 
ceremonies and their attendant sensory delights without taking the sensible objects too 
seriously, on their own terms. Was it possible to have an animistic concept of ceremonial 
transcendence while at the same time acknowledging the natural, regular cycles to which 
humans attached arbitrary significance? The hermeneutic quandary shows up throughout the 
play, especially when the spirit realm interacts with and affects the human realm. The fight 
between Oberon and Titania has certainly affected the balance of nature, and yet the spirits 
themselves use natural drugs that seem to act indiscriminately on the lovers’ bodies. 
Additionally, Athenian society relies on the lunar calendar to structure its social and religious 
rituals; however, the timeline and chronological setting of the play are undeniably 
confused.214 It often seems that some parts of nature can act against others that have no 
agency. As Titania says, the winds, “as in revenge” have brought in contagious fogs (2.1.89), 
while the “green corn / Hath rotted” (2.1.94–95). In this play of shifting metaphors, the 
animism of nature sometimes appears to mirror the unruly passions of the humans lovers. 
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Sometimes it seems as if the orderly cosmos exists as a mere surface ornament to the deeper 
forces of animated nature; and sometimes the opposite seems to hold true, that the mutable 
spirits exist on top of a deeper structure of unchanging natural order. 
 This account of the shifting senses of nature in the play is familiar, but important, as 
the intentionally fragile natural world of the play foregrounds the efforts of the humans to 
find a reliable basis for the rituals by which their society functions. The play has been read, 
persuasively, as an attempt to locate the forces of individual identity within the de-
individualizing powers of nature and custom, and thus to suggest that rituals based on natural 
forms could adapt to the unique, and yet recurrent, cycles of procreation.215 Shakespeare, 
however, never allows the natural world to remain still; the humans are always seeking to 
understand the significance of the shifting forms they see and sense. Helena remembers when 
she and Hermia “like two artificial gods / Have with our needles created both one flower, / 
Both on one sampler, sitting on one cushion” (3.2.203–5). The two friends used to have the 
power to reduce wild nature to a pattern, to bring it into intelligible being through art. But 
this process is of course disrupted by the confusion of the forest, which threatens to “rend our 
ancient love asunder” (3.2.125). The questions that the play asks would have been familiar, 
and troubling, to Richard Hooker, because they are similar to the ones that troubled him the 
most in his own work. To somehow unite the visible objects of devotion within a mystical 
framework of transcendence required the imagination to refine the matter of devotion into 
intelligible forms that could then function as shorthand for the reintegration of the divided, 
fallen natural world by God himself.216 It should, as Helena says of love, “transpose” things 
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“base and vile” “to form and dignity” (1.1.232–33). Shakespeare’s play takes this fragile 
process and continually questions its power and reveals its debility. Crucially, the world of 
the play exists apart from the Christian God; it is full of undirected natural processes that 
nonetheless form the rationale for the ways in which the human community orders its 
collective life and views its customs and traditions.    
 And it is precisely the pagan setting that lets Shakespeare play so effectively with the 
nature of social and religious institutions throughout. Indeed, religious institutions are 
measured by their efficacy in controlling both unruly human passions and unruly natural 
processes. The experience of the lovers in the forest, and their eventual return, recalls the 
origin of pastoral poetry in the exile and return of the Greeks, when new forms of worship 
were added to the religious life of the entire people. In fact, the most intriguing intersection 
between pagan and Christian components in the play might lie in its insistence on the 
mutability of “forms” and their relevance and importance for the construction of a 
meaningful religious polity. 
 In one of his first speeches, Theseus sets up the relationship between divine power 
and the bestowal of forms on the world of human figures. Egeus comes to Theseus to 
complain that his daughter Hermia wishes to marry Lysander instead of Demetrius, the man 
Egeus had selected for her. When Hermia confirms this, Theseus replies: 
What say you, Hermia? Be advised, fair maid. 
To you your father should be as a god, 
One that composed your beauties, yea, and one 
To whom you are but as a form in wax, 
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By him imprinted, and within his power 
To leave the figure or disfigure it. 
      (1.1.46–50) 
 
Theseus’s notion of the father as the sole giver of forms is seriously questioned by the rest of 
the action, however. The idea that wax, like children, takes the shapes it is given is certainly 
proverbial, but it also clearly echoes Aristotle’s discussion of the senses in his De Anima. In 
fact, Theseus unwittingly undermines the argument he is trying to make by introducing a 
destabilizing metaphor, one fraught with philosophical accretions whose importance becomes 
clear as the play progresses.  
 In the first place, the idea that Hermia is a “form in wax” only serves to remind us 
that wax is thoroughly mutable and takes any shape impressed upon it. Theseus imagines 
Egeus as a giver of a singular form that he can impress upon matter, but matter proves to be 
more receptive to different forms than such a unidirectional model might imply. Indeed, the 
conflict has arisen because Hermia has proven able to diverge from the “form” that her father 
has given her. Her senses have been affected by Lysander, not Demetrius. Egeus claims that 
Lysander has “stol’n the impression of her fantasy” (1.1.32); but, as Hermia pleads, “I would 
my father looked but with my eyes” (1.1.56). According to Aristotle, it is the definition of a 
“sense” that it “has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the 
matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes the impress of a signet-ring without the iron 
or gold” (674). In other words, the wax of the physical organ is impressed by the form of the 
ring but does not take on its matter. This allows for the mutability that is troubling the 
Athenian court. As Theseus says, Egeus has the power to “disfigure” Hermia, but he is 
certainly not the only one. The characters’ imaginations are all easily fooled and changed by 
sensory input. As Hooker had argued when citing Aristotle’s work on the soul, the 
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imagination was a crucial force for applying forms to material objects and thus linking the 
objects of devotion to their higher religious purposes. So too, Theseus hopes that Hermia’s 
father will be a “god” to her and that her imagination will fall into line with his. But the 
inherent mutability of the forms that matter can take on destabilizes both Hooker’s and 
Theseus’s visions of a religio-political community based on conjoining numinous forces with 
human rituals such as marriage, which depends on a congruity between the set forms of 
tradition and the changing forms in the wax of later generations. 
 Theseus’s political and religious community was especially vulnerable to 
destabilization because his reign ushered in new rituals and forms of religious and political 
life. Shakespeare’s source for the details of Theseus’s life, Thomas North’s translation of 
Plutarch’s Lives (via the French of Jacques Amyot), paints Theseus as an innovator, someone 
who completely reformed Athenian life. His exploits provided the basis for many rituals and 
ceremonies that were contemporary with Plutarch, who gives a remarkably full account of 
the rituals practiced by Theseus’s Athenians. In Shakespeare’s play, too, every time Theseus 
appears he obsesses about the upcoming nuptial ceremonies. In act 1 he tells Philostrate,  
Stir up the Athenian youth to merriments. 
Awake the pert and nimble spirit of mirth. 
Turn melancholy forth to funerals— 
The pale companion is not for our pomp. 
      (1.1.12–15) 
 
He tells Hippolyta that though he courted her in battle, he will wed her “in another key— / 
With pomp, with triumph, and with revelling” (1.1.18–19). The next time we see him, in act 
4, he meets the lovers in the woods and thinks, “No doubt they rose up early to observe / The 
rite of May, and, hearing our intent, / Came here in grace of our solemnity” (4.1.131–33). He 
decides that all the couples will be married “in the temple,” and he will afterwards “hold a 
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feast in great solemnity” (4.1.179, 184). Later, back in Athens, he wonders “what masques, 
what dances shall we have . . . what revels are in hand?” (5.1.32, 36). His parting words 
promise that “A fortnight hold we this solemnity / In nightly revels and new jollity” 
(5.1.360–61). Theseus remains focused on the function of ceremonies and rituals for his 
commonwealth through all the changes and transformations of affections.   
 Plutarch’s Theseus similarly busies himself in establishing rituals and customs that 
were indicative of his unifying and transforming effect on the Athenian state. Theseus 
famously rescued Athenian children who had been sent to Crete to be sacrificed to the 
Minotaur; upon his arrival back in Athens, his father Aegeus kills himself when Theseus 
forgets to raise the white sail that would indicate his survival. Plutarch recounts a story that 
could well serve as an epigraph for Shakespeare’s play: 
The vessell in which Theseus went and returned, was a galliot of thirtie 
owers, which the ATHENIANS kept vntill the time 
of Demetrius the Phalertan, alwayes taking away the olde peeces of 
wodde that were rotten, and euer renewing them with new in their 
places. So that euer since, in the disputations of the Philosophers, 
touching things that increase, to wit, whether they remaine alwayes 
one, or else they be made others: this galliot was alwayes brought in 
for an example of doubt. 217 
 
The rule of Theseus in Athens functioned much like the Athenians’ care of his ship. Theseus 
took the native piety and rituals of the Athenians and formed them to his own idea of what 
his Athens should look like. The changes in form and even matter that occur in 
Shakespeare’s play have a similar function. Their transformations all take place within the 
ritual framework represented by the court of Theseus and Athenian society. The changing yet 
stable ship could also be an emblem for Hooker’s church, rooted in the forms of the past but 
updating them with new matter and forms that are approximations of the old forms.  
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 Theseus’s innovations in Athenian society thus strive to maintain a continuity with 
the past even while remaking it. Plutarch’s accounts of Theseus founding ceremonies follow 
this pattern. When he arrives on shore from Crete, Theseus performs sacrifices, and a herald 
is dispatched to inform him of his father’s death. The herald wraps the garland intended for 
Theseus around his staff instead of placing it on his head. Because of this, writes Plutarch, 
“to this day, at the feast called Oscophoria (as who woulde say at the feast of boughes) the 
Herauld hath not his heade but his rod onely crowned with flowers” (11). In A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream Theseus similarly changes funereal melancholy into a celebration of a more 
positive event. As he tells Philostrate, “Turn melancholy forth to funerals— / The pale 
companion is not for our pomp” (1.1.14–15). Flowers have a special significance for 
Theseus, as the founder of a festival that was celebrated in Athens annually. Flowers also 
cause problems for the lovers, when the faeries use flowers and herbs to create the drugs that 
bewitch their vision. However they are used, though, they remain apt symbols of the relation 
between cycles of natural change—Pliny called them reminders of ephemerality—and the 
ritual celebrations of change in human society. Plutarch’s account portrays Theseus as 
particularly good at instituting rituals: everywhere he goes and everything he does seems to 
become the setting and subject of an enduring ceremony. This blend of piety, discipline, and 
social conscience was the reason, Plutarch’s narrative implies, for Theseus’s success. 
The most important dimension of Theseus’s religious reforms is that they were 
inclusive and rectifying. He also set up a temple , “and he him selfe ordained, that those 
houses which had payed tribute before unto the king of CRETA, should nowe yearely 
thenceforth become contributories towardes the charges and of a solemne sacrifice, which 
shoulde be done in the honor of him” (12). Theseus’s strategy in setting up new ceremonies 
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is to maintain a sense of social justice in the minds of the people. Francis Bacon remarked 
that Theseus illustrated the principle that is “almost generall in all states, that their law-givers 
were long after their first Kings, who governed for a time by natural equity without law; So 
was Theseus long before Solon in Athens.”218 And it is in this spirit of “natural equity” that 
Theseus sets up the participatory religious and civic life that turned Athens into a 
commonwealth. Much like the later reunification of the country after the Persian War, 
Theseus “brought all the inhabitantes of the whole prouince of ATTICA, to be within the 
citie of ATHENS, and made them all one corporation, which were before dispersed into 
diuerse villages, and by reason thereof were very hard to be assembled together, when 
occasion was offered to establish any order concerning the common state” (12). He followed 
this unification of the people with new ceremonies and rituals that he hoped would concretize 
Athenian identity in mutually inclusive rituals: 
Afterwardes he instituted the greate feast and common sacrifice for all 
of the countrye of ATTICA, which they call Panathenea. Then he 
ordeined another feaste also vpon the sixtenth daye of the moneth of 
Iune, for all strangers which should come to dwell in ATHENS, which 
was called Metaecia, & is kept euen to this daye. That done, he gaue 
ouer his regall power according to his promise, and beganne to sett vp 
an estate or policye of a common wealth, beginning first with the 
seruice of the goddes. (13) 
 
He appointed “noblemen as judges & magistrates to judge upon matters of Religion, & 
touching the service of the godds” (13). Theseus replaces the old institutions of justice and 
religious observance with his own versions and staffs them with his newly formed citizenry. 
The authority governing his Athens is, then, more religious and communal than authoritarian, 
though of course Theseus retains ultimate control over the polity. But he shrewdly realized 
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that for such a community to function, it would have to rely on the oaths, vows, and 
allegiances between the citizens themselves.  
 Theseus’s faith in oaths as the binding that holds together his city becomes clear after 
he defeats the Amazons and brings Hippolyta back to Athens as his wife. Even though 
historians disagree about the events of the war with the Amazons, Plutarch writes, “it is most 
certain that this warre was ended by agreement. For a place adioyning to the temple of 
Theseus, dothe beare recorde of it, being called Orcomosium: because the peace was there by 
solemne othe concluded” (15). “Solemn,” as we have seen, was a staple of Theseus’s and 
Hippolyta’s dialogue. One of her first lines declares that “the moon, like to a silver bow / 
New bent in heaven, shall behold the night / Of our solemnities” (1.1.9–11). Just as Hooker 
assured his readers that no society has ever functioned without public actions being 
accompanied by some sort of “visible solemnitie” (1:274), so Athens’ leaders also are 
especially obsessed by their public and private “solemnities” throughout. The word connotes 
a very specific set of meanings having to do with religious rituals. It means not only 
ceremonies and festivities, but ceremonies that have a serious religious purpose and that are 
observed carefully. It also connotes, especially when used in its Latinate sense, of something 
that is done yearly or at least regularly. The solemnities of the play, then, have the dual 
function of sanctifying a special occasion and linking that occasion to the larger traditions 
and customs of the community. It is this sense of custom inherent in the “solemne othe” that 
Theseus swears in Plutarch’s account that is most important to him in his role as unifier of 
Athens. Theseus clearly has faith in oaths to preserve the city and further unite it with its 
enemies through his own marriage.  
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      Plutarch’s Theseus brings peace to Athens through oaths, and yet oaths trouble the 
confused lovers in the forest and thus trouble the basis of Athenian religion and political 
society. Oaths serve a double function for Athens. They are natural and social, pointing 
toward the relationships of people in society, who make agreements by law and expect them 
to be honored. But they are also religious and metaphysical, pointing toward the numinous 
foundations of social relationships and the otherworldly bond that they create out of 
seemingly breakable human promises. Oaths, of course, held a pervasive significance for the 
early modern mind; as the historian John Spurr observed of oaths in the seventeenth century, 
“Oaths bind lovers, just as they adjudicate between litigants. They are constitutive of 
communes, gilds, fraternities, professions and institutions. They are at the heart of 
convenanting communities and bonds of association.”219 The spirit world tests the tensile 
strength of the humans’ oaths through visions and drugs, thus also testing the political 
stability of Theseus’s religious commonwealth.   
Oaths and vows are consistently introduced into the dialogue only to be undermined 
at every turn. Theseus gives Hermia a choice either to marry Demetrius “or to abjure / For 
ever the society of men” (1.1.65–66) and consign herself “To death or to a vow of single life” 
(1.1.121). The four young lovers, however, are certainly conscious of how easily love’s vows 
and oaths are made, then broken as quickly. Hermia even swears “By all the vows that ever 
men have broke” (1.1.175) that she will meet him in the forest. Helena, spurned by 
Demetrius, is a victim of oath breaking. Her speech at the end of the first scene traces the 
cause of such mutable love oaths to the way that love muddies the relationship between 
vision and the mind. Shakespeare plays with “eyes” and “sight” throughout the first scene, 
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and it becomes clear by the end that the “oaths” sworn by lovers are subject both to the 
mutable sense of sight and to the imagination that sometimes overrules the sense. Helena 
says, 
As waggish boys in game themselves forswear, 
So the boy Love is perjured everywhere. 
For ere Demetrius looked on Hermia’s eyne 
He hailed down oaths that he was only mine, 
And when this hail some heat from Hermia felt, 
So he dissolved, and showers of oaths did melt. 
      (1.1.240–45) 
 
The multiplying oaths of the lovers stand in contrast to the solemn oaths that Theseus 
believes cement political authority and social stability. And indeed, Shakespeare links the 
lovers’ oaths to the mutability of the imagination itself, the very thing that Hooker thought 
would help place sensible objects into a ceremonial, and eventually transcendent, framework. 
Helena wants love to look “not with the eyes, but with the mind” (1.1.234), but, as she 
observes, the eyes often do not perfectly accord with the mind. The instability of the 
imagination in Athens is also linked to the transformative power of the natural world itself, in 
which sensible objects are subject to transformation. 
 If the basis of Theseus’s religious commonwealth is communally recognized rituals 
and ceremonies, and the binding power of oaths, then it is severely shaken by the events in 
the forest. Oberon has proven himself an inconstant lover in his masquerade as the shepherd 
“Corin” wooing Philida. Of course, his love oaths cannot be kept, and his infidelity to Titania 
inaugurates the liquidation of vows in the forest. In the midst of Robin Goodfellow’s 
mischief, he proclaims that “fate o’errules, that, one man holding troth, / A million fail, 
confounding oath on oath” (3.2.92–93). About to watch the confusion unfold between Helena 
and Lysander, Robin invites Oberon to watch “their fond pageant “(3.2.114). The 
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confounding of oaths itself has a kind of ritualistic quality for Robin and Oberon: “Lord, 
what fools these mortals be!” (3.2.115). The mortals are, in Robin’s mind, fools of fate, a 
force that does not respect the mutable affections and passions of mortals. Lysander, though, 
believes that his emotions seal his vows. He says, “Look when I vow, I weep; and vows so 
born, / In their nativity all truth appears” (3.2.123–24). For the clear-thinking Helena, though, 
oath breaking is nonsensical because it asks truth to compete with truth: 
You do advance your cunning more and more, 
When truth kills truth—O devilish holy fray! 
These vows are Hermia’s. Will you give her o’er? 
Weigh oath with oath, and you will nothing weigh. 
Your vows to her and me put in two scales 
Will even weigh, and both as light as tales. 
       (3.2.128–33) 
 
What is the basis of Lysander’s oaths? It is, as Helena suggested in act 1, the sensory input 
from his eyes rather than his mind. But her lament suggests a fundamental problem with the 
function of the senses to convey the “truth” into the imagination, where it can feed the mind. 
Lysander responds by saying that “I had no judgement when to her I swore” (3.2.134). He 
mistakes his rational faculties for his sensory and imaginative faculties. Previously, though, 
Hermia had commiserated with Lysander over the fact that her father wanted her “to choose 
love by another’s eyes” (1.1.140). Lysander, now under the spell of Oberon’s flower, chooses 
love by another’s eyes and totally confounds his previous oath on the basis of his present 
choice. As he told Hermia then, and which proves prophetic in act 3,  
Or if there were a sympathy in choice, 
War, death, or sickness did lay siege to it, 
Making it momentany as a sound 
Swift as a shadow, short as any dream. 
(1.1.141–43) 
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The ephemeral quality of the lovers’ oaths stands in contrast to the eternally binding power 
of the “vow of single life” with which Theseus threatened her, and thus in contrast to 
Theseus’s faith in oaths that last a lifetime. 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that Theseus has trouble believing the visions that the 
lovers report to him and Hippolyta after their night in the woods. The shifting allegiances and 
the strange visions they recount test the boundaries of his society. Theseus certainly has some 
conception of the role of the imagination in a religio-political community. After all, the 
rituals he is so fond of play to the imagination with their outward, visible pomp and 
ceremony. But Theseus tries to distinguish between two types of imagination in his 
conversation with Hippolyta in act 5. On the one hand, there is the faculty that “apprehends,” 
that senses the forms and shapes of one’s immediate surroundings. Apprehension is also the 
emotive faculty, one that seizes on whatever is closest at hand. Then again, there is the 
faculty that “comprehends,” which imagines the source of the immaterial forms and shapes 
that the other faculty presents. And yet, Theseus’s critiques of the excesses of the 
imagination come just before his own imaginative festivals take place. As he complains to 
Hippolyta: 
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, 
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
More than cool reason ever comprehends. 
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
Are of imagination all compact. 
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold: 
That is the madman. The lover, all as frantic, 
Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt. 
The poet's eye, in fine frenzy rolling, 
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven, 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 
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Such tricks hath strong imagination 
That if it would but apprehend some joy 
It comprehends some bringer of that joy; 
Or in the night, imagining some fear, 
How easy is a bush supposed a bear! 
     (5.1.4–22) 
 
Theseus’s skepticism bears strong resemblance to the anti-ritual writers and even to Ovid’s 
Minyads. But his conception of the “poet’s eye” sounds much like the operation of religious 
rituals that mediate the commerce between heaven and earth.220 While the “poet’s pen” takes 
abstract forms and supplies them with shapes and names in the manner of a neo-platonic 
demiurge, proper “solemnities” would take observed experience and endow it with new 
“forms of things unknown.” Theseus also criticizes the imagination for presuming to deduce 
a cause from an effect; this impulse, he implies, is what makes people create gods from their 
own emotions. More troubling than this, though, is his implication that the imagination 
produces “fear,” which in turn creates phantasms and thus leads to superstition. 
 The terms of Theseus’s critique are familiar from Cecropia’s critique of superstitious 
religion in the versions of Sidney’s The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia that were published 
in the early 1590s. In book 3, Cecropia tries to convince Pamela that religion was invented by 
“politicke wittes.” She continues: 
Feare, and indeede, foolish feare, & fearefull ignorance, was the first 
inuenter of those conceates. For, when they hearde it thunder, not 
knowing the naturall cause, they thought there was some angrie body 
aboue, that spake so lowde: and euer the lesse they did perceiue, the 
more they did conceiue. Whereof they knew no cause that grew 
streight a miracle: foolish folkes, not marking that the alterations be 
but vpon particular accidents, the vniuersalitie being alwaies one. 
Yesterday was but as to day, and to morrow will tread the same 
footsteps of his foregoers: so as it is manifest inough, that all thinges 
follow but the course of their owne nature, sauing onely Man, who 
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while by the pregnancie of his imagination he striues to things 
supernaturall, meane-while hee looseth his owne naturall felicitie.221 
 
This inability to distinguish the true cause of natural effects is much the same as the inability 
to distinguish between real and false shapes that Theseus dislikes. Theseus, too, advocates a 
kind of natural theology that would clarify the apprehension of “joy” in the comprehension of 
some natural cause. The “imagination,” for both Theseus and Cecropia, blinds people to the 
real causes of both positive and negative mental states. 
 Of course, this position was hardly tenable in Shakespeare’s play, just as it was not in 
Sidney’s romance. In the forest it is not “fear” but Oberon’s magic flowers that make even 
spirits mistake one thing for another. Theseus laughed at mistaking a bush for a bear, but as 
Oberon describes the effects of his drug on Titania: 
Having once this juice 
I’ll watch Titania when she is asleep, 
And drop the liquor of it in her eyes. 
The next thing when she waking looks upon— 
Be it on lion, bear, or wolf, or bull, 
On meddling monkey, or on busy ape— 
She shall pursue it with the soul of love. 
     (2.1.176–82) 
 
Theseus, if we accept that he defeated an actual minotaur—not just one of Minos’s guards, as 
Plutarch presents as a possibility—would have known the capacity for natural shapes to 
transform and mix. As the events of the forest suggest, the cause of the fanciful effects that 
Theseus hears about is actually the power inherent in natural objects that have been endowed 
with special power by the nature gods of pagan myth. The origin of Oberon’s flower, it will 
be remembered, lies in Cupid’s attempt at a “fair vestal thronèd by the west” (2.1.158). But 
his arrow misses, “And the imperial vot’ress passèd on, / In maiden meditation, fancy-free” 
(2.1.163–64). The “vestal” is, of course, not a candidate for marriage and thus foreign to the 
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festivities that Athens is preparing throughout the play. Further, the “vot’ress” remains 
“fancy-free,” exempt from the vagaries of the imagination (from the Greek “φαντασία”) that 
all lovers experience. The imaginative flights that Theseus decries are in fact necessary 
corollaries to his taste for ritual celebrations and “solemnities.” The process of imaginative 
trickery that Theseus describes is the reverse of Hooker’s “imagination,” which would takes 
things with a “local habitation” and abstract them from their immediate context in order to 
create a kind of communal religious experience.  
 And indeed it is the communal dimension of the fairy tales that Hippolyta seizes on in 
her response to Theseus. She replies, 
But all the story of the night told over, 
And all their minds transfigured so together, 
More witnesseth than fancy’s images, 
And grows to something of great constancy; 
But howsoever, strange and admirable. 
      (5.1.23–27) 
 
Her argument is that the communal dimension of this shared imaginative transport at least 
partially negates the solipsistic, overly individualistic bent of Theseus’s concept of the 
imagination. The shared experience of the images, rather than the truth value of the images 
themselves, seems to Hippolyta the most important dimension of the events in the forest. 
This shared experience by which several people are united by “fancy’s images” is essentially 
the basis for the religious and social rituals that Theseus so loves. And the essential nature of 
those images hardly matters; the point is that they become totemic forms around which unite 
the collective activities of human minds bent on seeking meaning beyond those imaginative 
forms. In his speech, however, Theseus comes dangerously close to the “politick wittes” that 
Cecropia described in Sidney’s Arcadia. That is, he seems to deny the function of 
imagination to place the objects of sense into a framework of religious transcendence.  
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Hippolyta’s critique also touches on Theseus’s past as an unfaithful lover. We are 
probably supposed to contrast her phrase “something of great constancy” with Theseus’s 
long history of being an inconstant lover. As Plutarch writes in his comparison of Theseus 
with Romulus, Theseus was constantly stealing women (and then losing interest in them): he 
“dyd attempt it very often” (43). Furthermore, his marriages did not bring peace to his city: 
“The ATHENIANS contrariewise, by Theseus mariages, dyd get neither loue nor kynred of 
any one persone, but rather they procured warres, enmities, & the slaughter of their citizens” 
(ibid.). The key point that Plutarch makes is that Theseus lacked consistency, especially 
when it came to his own relationships, and that that inconsistency led to bad governance. 
However, it is one of these relationships that Theseus is solemnizing in the course of this 
comic play. It stands at the moment of the play as an emblem for concord and a suggestion of 
the power of ritual to concretize national consciousness, but it was also a reminder of the ill-
fated product of their union, whom Theseus would later murder.222 The fundamental 
contradiction in Theseus’s conception of rituals lies in his attempt to rationalize and then 
memorialize his sexual exploits in ceremonies that always have something irrational and 
fantastic about them. His civic, state religion relies on strict aristocratic control over the 
mechanisms of religious observance. (As Plutarch reminds us, he left the nobility in charge 
of maintaining religious rites.) However, Shakespeare sets his play in a moment before his 
downfall, and arguably at his highest point as leader of Athens. Hippolyta’s criticism is 
perhaps aimed at preventing him from becoming a tyrant that cannot empathize with the 
collective fantasies of his people. Shakespeare can use the neat conjunction between the two 
state religions, that of Athens and that of England, to suggest that such a state religion must 
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acknowledge the power of the imaginations of its citizens. Thus, the act of bestowing “a local 
habitation and a name” on the forms that the imagination produces comes to seem as 
potentially normative and unifying for a religious state that respects ceremony but 
nonetheless remains skeptical of ritual transport and transformation. 
The basis of the experience of ritual transport, though, remains the senses, whose 
relationship with the imagination is consistently troubled by events in both Shakespeare’s 
play and the play put on by Quince and his company. The company is composed of artisans, 
and as such they appear to be comfortable discussing the physical changes that accompany 
theatrical productions. As a social class, they have a special status as ill-defined outsiders 
both in Theseus’s Athens and Shakespeare’s England. Plutarch wrote that Theseus divided 
up the city into nobility, husbandmen, and artisans, with the husbandmen being the wealthier 
but the artisans the more numerous. In England, artisans represented an emerging class that 
sometimes commanded wealth but was hard to pin down outside of the various 
professions.223 The role of Shakespeare’s artisans seems suited to express their ambiguous 
social position: they are not fully integrated into the social structures in which they 
participate, but nonetheless their play, at once skeptical and enthusiastic, reflects the 
strengths and weaknesses of Theseus’s rituals of state religion.  
Bottom, in particular, delights in the transformative options the theater allows him. 
He says of playing Pyramus, “I will discharge it in either your straw-colour beard, your 
orange-tawny beard, your purple-in-grain beard, or your French-crown-colour beard, your 
perfect yellow” (1.2.83–86). Later on, the players become anxious that these transformations 
may fool the audience of the play, and so Bottom devises a prologue, which will, “for the 
                                                 
223
 See David Cressy, “Describing the Social Order of Elizabethan and Stuart England,” Literature and History 
3 (1976): 37–38.  
  
 218
more better assurance, tell them that I, Pyramus, am not Pyramus, but Bottom the weaver. 
This will put them out of fear” (3.1.18–20). Shakespeare’s artisans, like Ovid’s Minyads, are 
sceptical of the effects of transformation; they are more comfortable with the transformations 
of wool, as they busy themselves inside, “aut ducunt lanas aut stamina pollice versant / aut 
haerent telae famulasque laboribus urguent” (180) (And there doe fall to spinning yarne, or 
weaving in the frame, / And keepe their maidens to their worke) (87). Shakespeare’s artisans 
are enthusiastic about the possibilities for transformation that theatrical ritual offers, but 
remain worried about the potential misinterpretations that the transformations may bring 
about.    
In later acts, the status of the senses becomes important, especially for Bottom and the 
production in Theseus’s court. When Bottom is changed back to himself at the end of act 4, 
he misquotes scripture by misaligning senses with their organs: “The eye of man hath not 
heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, 
nor his heart to report what my dream was” (4.1.206–10). 1 Corinthians 2:9–10 makes the 
distinction that while the senses are often inadequate to understand divine truth, the spirit is. 
Bottom seems partially to understand this, while in the next scene Theseus rejects spiritual, 
imaginative attempts to reconcile fantasy and physical reality. During the performance of 
“Pyramus and Thisbe,” Bottom continues to confuse the senses. “I see a voice,” he says as 
Pyramus, “Now will I to the chink / To spy an I can hear my Thisbe’s face” (5.1.191–92). 
However, at the crucial moment when Pyramus finds Thisbe’s bloody mantle, Bottom gets 
the senses right:  
But mark, poor knight, 
What dreadful dole is here? 
Eyes, do you see? 
How can it be? 
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   (5.1.271–74) 
 
The moonlight may be to blame for this sight that is at once true and false; for the moon has 
been a force of instability and doubt throughout the play. Nonetheless, when Bottom finally 
attributes the right sense to the right organ it is precisely when his character is being betrayed 
by his senses. His senses produce the wrong kind of imagination; the physical remains of 
Thisbe’s mantle are extrapolated as signs of her death through an act of imagination.  
This ambivalence surrounding the imagination in the production makes sense if we 
remember that in Ovid’s poem this story is told by one of the Minyads in order to criticize 
the imaginative transports of the Bacchic revelers outside their house. Shakespeare’s play 
seems similarly to share an Ovidian ambivalence about enthusiastic rituals. On the one hand, 
their celebrations are licit, especially when set up by civic and sacred authorities and remain 
temporary expressions of the harmony of man and nature. But, their celebrations are often 
not decorous, and indeed are apt to mislead both their participants and their spectators. This 
is the compromise represented in Theseus’s Athens, which is indicative of the larger response 
to pagan religious culture in the 1590s. Civilized pagan culture represented for early moderns 
a culture in which sacred and civic experience were almost always coterminous; and yet both 
existed within a single social framework.224 Greek culture did not separate church and state, 
nor did it make one subservient to the other. However, this coexistence caused obvious 
problems when one side encroached into the other. But in imagining the potential tensions 
and pitfalls of maintaining decorous rituals within a society of laws and equity, Shakespeare, 
along with his contemporaries, could delineate and address the problems that such a 
maintenance presented in his own time.  
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Taking my cue from Shakespeare’s complex evocation of pagan cultures, in my next 
chapter I expand on the early modern response to the interrelation of sacred and civic in 
pagan society. I also position literary texts alongside responses to paganism in other strands 
of early modern culture: colonial encounters, travel, antiquarianism, classical scholarship, 
and ecclesiastical conflict. The chapter suggests that as pagan forms of thought became more 
and more interwoven in early modern culture, they began to play increasingly crucial roles in 
early modern self-definition. This process played was especially important for arguments 
about the nature and function of sacred spaces and places, a particularly vexing problem for a 
nation undergoing a crisis of national and religious identity in the 1630s and 40s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Locating the Sacred: Pagan Spaces and Places in John Milton’s Early Works and 
Seventeenth-Century Religious Culture  
 
As Richard Hooker argued, and I discussed in the last chapter, all religious rituals are 
justified by the idea that some times and places must be invested with greater significance 
than others. The division of time and space, in the human world, forms the corollary of the 
selective divine investment in the world. Here was a major point of contact between pagan 
and Christian religious systems, and Hooker was well aware of the extent to which even the 
modern, English church had inherited forms of worship from non-Christian religions. 
Hooker’s was not the first (though it was the most articulate) treatise that would spawn many 
more considerations of religious discipline and its effects on society, politics, and history in 
the seventeenth century. In fact, as this discourse developed in the 1630s it came more and 
more to incorporate legal and political debates about the relationship between religious 
practices and state power. In both the historical sources and contemporary culture of English 
religious discipline, state regulation of religious space formed a crucial battleground for the 
fight over the power that the state should exercise over the church itself.  
As I argue in this chapter, this discourse looked backward, both to the ancient 
Israelites’ interactions with surrounding polytheistic societies and to the early years of the 
institutional Christian church and its incorporation into the Roman empire under Constantine. 
The ways in which the early Christians dealt with competing, and sympathetic, claims for 
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sacred existence from pagans inform many seventeenth-century arguments over sacred space. 
At stake in these competing claims was the political and institutional axis of God’s action 
toward his creatures and his creation. Places gave God’s will not just a location, but also 
material, legal, national, political, and ultimately historical dimensions that had to be 
examined and determined. Indeed, the history of the worship of God in specific places was 
highly relevant to much religious debate in this period. And this history had to take into 
account the differing spatial theories of pagans and Christians. On one level, paganism’s 
investment in sacred spaces contrasted obviously and strikingly with Christian practice. To 
consign a “god” to a particular place was to confuse the operation of Christian ideas of grace 
and accommodation. But on the other hand, the force of divine accommodation, via natural 
law or positive laws of worship, could be discerned in the conversion of pagan spaces into 
Christian. Furthermore, the historical transmission and transformation of pagan practices into 
the institutionalized Christian church proved a contentious arena for debate precisely because 
such transmissions were apparent, even obvious.  
As becomes clear in this period, the tense relationship between pagan and Christian 
forms mediates arguments over the proper role of institutionalized Christian religion. 
Looking to the discourse of sacred spaces, both pagan and Christian, thus helps to lay bare 
the heart of institutional religion and the shape of reform: defenders of established forms 
focused on correcting external rites, assuming an inward righteousness of intention; 
reformers positioned corruption as an internal defect, a contagion to be fought. For some, 
pagan forms were acceptable for the simple fact that they were historically derived and then 
transmuted by Christian communities under the light of nature. For others, history did not 
matter so much as the fact that pagan forms represented the propensity of idolatry to lead to 
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institutional corruption and to a mixture of sacred and profane. Thus, a de-institutionalized 
poetics would look for ways to conceive of pagan forms as manifestations of culture and art, 
and then to put them in the service of the land, local communities, and the nation as a whole. 
This was very different from a poetics that found in rituals and practices a method of 
converting pagan religious forms while still recognizing their inherent religiosity. In this 
chapter I focus on the early works of John Milton because there we can find both kinds of 
poetics and thus can chart their development in the context of a wider religious discourse. 
Milton’s early work forms my locus of investigation because at this point in his career 
his ideas, like those of many of his contemporaries, were especially fluid. This is particularly 
evident when we look to his later, mature poetic output, because by the time Milton wrote 
Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, he had settled for himself the question of the value of 
sacred spaces. To set up one particular place as somehow more fundamentally sacred than 
others was to misunderstand the omnipresence of God and the proper way to express 
devotion to him. Adam memorably makes this very misunderstanding on his way out of Eden 
in Paradise Lost. As he laments to Michael: 
This most afflicts me, that departing hence, 
As from his face I shall be hid, deprived 
His blessed countenance; here I could frequent, 
With worship, place by place where he vouchsafed  
Presence divine, and to my sons relate; 
On this mount he appeared; under this tree 
Stood visible, among these pines his voice 
I heard, here with him at this fountain talked: 
So many grateful altars I would rear 
Of grassy turf, and pile up every Stone 
Of lustre from the brook, in memory, 
Or monument to ages, and thereon 
Offer sweet smelling gums and fruits and flowers.225 
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For Adam, because every place in Eden seemed especially blessed, it appeared to him that 
the sacred was distributed “place by place where he vouchsafed / Presence divine.” But as the 
archangel Michael replies, this is not quite correct, because God’s presence is equally 
everywhere at once: 
Not this rock only, his omnipresence fills 
Land, sea, and air, and every kind that lives, 
Fomented by his virtual power and warmed: 
All the earth he gave thee to possess and rule, 
No despicable gift; surmise not then  
His presence to these narrow bounds confined  
Or Paradise or Eden. 
      (11.336–42) 
 
Confining God’s essence to “narrow bounds” is a mistake caused by reverence for custom 
and tradition; in this case, Adam has already begun to revere the accustomed places of 
devotion in the garden. Indeed, he had already begun to think about how he would take his 
sons to God’s wonted places and instruct them thence in their religion. Michael’s advice, on 
the other hand, is for Adam not to direct all of his devotion toward one place, not to settle on 
“this rock only.”226 
 Yet, in Paradise Regained, Satan challenges this straightforward notion of divine 
omnipresence. At the end of book 1, he argues to Jesus: 
Thy father, who is holy, wise and pure, 
Suffers the hypocrite or atheous priest 
To tread his sacred courts, and minister 
About his altar, handling holy things, 
Praying or vowing, and vouchsafed his voice  
To Balaam reprobate, a prophet yet 
Inspired; disdain not such access to me. 
     (1.486–92) 
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Just as Adam mistakenly thinks God “vouchsafed” his presence to a particular place, Satan 
argues that God’s working in the human world reveals that he must necessarily restrict his 
presence to certain persons or places. Both Satan’s arguments and Adam’s and Michael’s 
brief exchange have their roots in the religious culture of the 1630s and 40s, when Milton’s 
religious imagination was forged in the cultural controversies over sacred space. 
 
I. Baal and the Places of Idolatry in Biblical Scholarship and Milton’s “Ode” 
Satan’s language, especially, bridges the gap between Restoration religious controversy and 
the cultural polemics of the ‘30s and ‘40s, where much of the arguments over sacred spaces 
were constructed around notions of what properly formed a Christian church and its practices 
and what were pagan or non-Christian accretions on Protestant religious discipline. The two 
sets of passages quoted above raise two important problems whose development will guide 
this chapter. The first is the obvious problem of the localization of divine presence, which, as 
both Adam and Satan indicate, was often expressed in the form of altars and their proper role 
in the church. The altar controversy, as will be made clear later on, was itself part of a larger 
cultural debate about the mobility and permeability of the institution of the English church. 
The tradition and history of altars, as both pagan and Christian, complicate arguments over 
their correct usage. The second problem is more subtle and troubling, though. As Satan 
argues, God has sometimes seemingly allowed his presence to be “vouchsafed” to heathens 
and reprobates, or those outside of the Christian, or Jewish, dispensation. Adam, too, thought 
that God might “vouchsafe” his presence to certain places more than others. This was one of 
Milton’s favorite terms in his epics, because it expressed the ambiguous method of God’s 
interaction with the human world; to vouchsafe often implied condescension, which could 
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signal a kind of accommodation of divinity within the earthly realm. This seems to be what 
Satan implies when he brings up the figure of Balaam, an unwilling prophet whom God 
appropriated for his own purposes. 
 In fact, Balaam and the circumstances of his story in Numbers played an important 
role in the religious controversies of the 1630s and ‘40s. Balaam was a diviner, though not an 
Israelite. When the Israelites came to the land of Moab, the Moabite King Balak requested 
that Balaam curse the encroaching Israelites. God himself prevented Balaam, frustrating 
Balak’s attempts to curse his people by making Balaam speak blessings instead of curses (cf. 
Numbers 22–24). Balaam himself was associated, both etymologically and ideologically, 
with the notorious idol of Baal-Peor. Milton, in his Of Reformation (1641), employs this 
association in his criticism of the Laudian church. In what had by then become a 
commonplace, Milton links the idolatry of Baal-Peor to Balaam’s pernicious influence and 
links both to the current state of the English church: “Thus did the Reprobate hireling Preist 
Balaam seeke to subdue the Israelites to Moab, if not by force, then by this 
divellish Pollicy, to draw them from the Sanctuary of God to the luxurious, and ribald feasts 
of Baal-peor.”227 It appears in Numbers that Balaam was eventually slain by Moses and his 
forces, because Balaam had counseled Israelite women “to commit trespass against the Lord 
in the matter of Peor” (31.16).228 The story of Balaam involves idolatry, to be sure, but even 
more importantly Balaam represents the notion that God, especially the Hebraic God, does 
indeed respect some places and peoples more than others.  
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 Interested readers could find this dimension of the Balaam story discussed in Henry 
Ainsworth’s extensive commentary on the Pentateuch, first published in England in 1627. 
Ainsworth was a famous separatist who lived his adult life in Amsterdam; he was also one of 
the finest biblical scholars of his day. According to Ainsworth, Balak’s purpose in cursing 
the Israelites was to weaken their relationship to God and thus to win over the Hebrew God 
to the side of Balak and the Moabites. As Balak says to Balaam: “Behold, there is a people 
come out of Egypt, which covereth the face of the earth: come now, curse me them; 
peradventure I shall be able to overcome them, and drive them out” (Numbers 22.11). To 
curse an enemy before attacking them was, Ainsworth explains, a common practice 
throughout the ancient world, and especially for the Romans, whose thoughts in this regard 
were well documented: 
As Balak sought to turne the favour of God from Israel, and to bring his curse 
upon them by Balaams meanes: so other nations are said to use, before they 
warred against any people, to endevour by prayers, sacrifices, and 
inchantments, to turne the favour of God from them. Before the Heathen 
Romans besieged any Citie, their Priests called out the god, under whose 
tutelage the Citie was, and promised him more ample honor or place among 
them Plinie. hist. lib. 28. cap. 2. The same is also by others; and the manner of 
doing it is recorded to bee first with a supplication to the gods, and that god 
specially which had taken upon him the defence of the citie, that he would 
forsake the people, citie, places, temples, and holy things· & having stricken a 
feare and forgetfulnesse in that people and citie, would come into Rome to 
accept of them, their places, temples, holy things, and citie, and to be provost 
unto them, their people and souldiers, vowing if so he would doe, to honour 
him with temples and games.229     
 
Ainsworth sees parallels between the behavior of the ancient Israelites and other ancient 
peoples, especially when it came to the idea that some places could be the repositories of 
God’s presence. The conflict that Baalak engineers involves the “favour” of God, and 
Ainsworth compares the idea of favor to a similar idea in polytheistic religions that god or 
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the gods might bestow their favor on one people or place more than others, and furthermore 
that this difference of bestowal is constitutive of social order and even of civil power. After 
describing the Roman beliefs, Ainsworth argues that  in these “heathenish opinions and 
practices, there may some footsteps be seen of the ancient true Religion, for when God would 
deliver up Ierusalem into the hands of the Chaldeans, he first by a signe to his Prophet, 
signified his departure from, and forsaking of his Temple that stood herein” (p. 143). Balak’s 
curse was thus a symptom of a deeper set of cultural values in the ancient world, which 
revered certain places as the repositories of God’s power. 
 So strongly was Balaam associated with the abuse of sacred places, that he became a 
polemical term of abuse in the hands of those mired in the controversy over altars, which 
represented an early modern incarnation of the problem of locating the divine in a specific 
space.230 But Balaam was also notable as the first gentile prophet to foretell the birth of 
Christ. This aspect of the Balaam story emphasizes his role in calling the gentiles to 
knowledge of Christ’s birth and to their eventual conversion. In the commonplace book of 
Gilbert Frevile, a bishop in Durham in the early seventeenth century, the compiler has copied 
a poem on the subject of “the calling of the gentills,” which begins with the image of the 
“starr which Baa’lam foresaid should appear.”231 William Austin describes Balaam’s 
privileged position as first of the gentile prophets in his Devotionis Augustinianae Flamma 
(1635), which he willed his wife to publish posthumously. He also willed that she send 
presentation copies to John Selden, Thomas Farnaby, and Ben Jonson, which provides an 
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indication of his scholarly ambitions. Like Selden especially, Austin was very interested in 
the relationship between Christianity and non-Christian religions, especially those included 
in the general category of gentility. Balaam attains considerable importance for Austin, 
because in fact it was Balaam who first suggested that the gentile magi would be called by 
means of a star that is simultaneously a seed: 
when Christ was (first of all) Promised to Adam; hee was called 
(Semen) the Seede of the Woman. And, when the Promise was iterated 
to Abraham; he was againe called, by the name of Seede; and God said, he 
would make his Seede, as the Starres; which are (as it were) the Shining 
Seede-Pearle of heaven. After which, when Balaam (who was the first, that 
ever divulged it to the Gentiles) came to speake of this Seede, which should 
come of Iacob, (Abrahams Grand-child) he called it a starre [Orietur Stella in 
Iacob, saith he,] There shall rise a Starre of Iacob.232 
 
As Austin begins to discuss the nature of the calling of the gentiles, though, he is conscious 
of the idolatrous connections of the heathen prophet. Accordingly, he argues that God 
intentionally obscured the origins of the pagan magi, so as not to set up their country as 
preeminent over all the rest of the world. He toys with the idea that they may have been from 
Aram, Balaam’s own country; but, he insists, the matter “stands unconcluded; since 
(peradventure) God would not have it certainely knowne; lest that Countrie (or Citie) whence 
the first-fruits of the Gentiles came to Christ, should (for that cause) claime Precedencie or 
Supremacie, over all the rest” (73). In contrast to Balaam, the idolater of Baal-Peor, future 
gentiles should have no potentially idolatrous sites of devotion. 
 The relationship between sacred spaces and heathen religion provides important 
background for Milton’s poem about the transition from paganism to Christianity. In his 
“Ode on the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” the action of Christianity displacing the pagan 
gods and emptying its temples generates the conflict and ambiguity that many scholars and 
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critics have tried to explain. Most have concluded that there is at least a little anxiety and 
hesitation about Milton’s poetic dismissal of the pagan gods in the final stanzas.233 Many 
have also remarked that the poem presents some sort of crisis or turning point that involves 
the problem of tearing the gods from their shrines, which itself stands for the long process of 
converting paganism to Christianity.234 The very specificity of Milton’s language in these 
stanzas, of altars, urns, temples, demonstrates the most difficult aspect of such conversion, 
namely the physical, and intellectual, ruins that paganism left behind after the sudden 
apparition of Christ. Scholars have only recently begun to discuss the mechanisms and 
implications of the conversion of pagan deities in their full, contextual complexity. Jason P. 
Rosenblatt has led the way, forcefully reminding us of the extent to which Milton relied on 
John Selden’s De Diis Syris (1617; 2nd ed. 1628) for many of the more obscure pagan deities 
in the concluding catalogue of the poem and in his later catalogue in Paradise Lost.235 
Rosenblatt also argues, rightly, that some of Selden’s scholarly sympathies inform Milton’s 
catalogue in his ode. An examination of some of Selden’s scholarly insights will aid our 
understanding of Milton’s poem and its background.  
Selden is careful throughout his work to dissociate pagan religious practices from 
imputations of lewdness or impropriety. The crucial distinction, for Selden, is that the vices 
associated with idolatrous worship, including that of the idols of Baal, were rather set up and 
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performed by the surrounding communities, such as that of the Moabites in Numbers. The 
names of idols in the Old Testament were actually, in most cases, names for places, derived 
from the towns or mountains where a certain divinity was worshipped. Accordingly, Selden 
frequently tries to restrain scholarly efforts to associate pagan religious practices with lewd, 
indecorous, and damnable acts. Take, for example, Selden’s discussion of Baal-Tzephon. 
Selden structures his note first to discuss the mistaken, Rabbinic perception that this Baal is 
an idol constructed by Pharaoh to receive astrological influences as a guard against the 
Israelites escaping, a sort of spy in the desert. But this is not true at all, says Selden, though 
“nec piguit tamen in Syntagma nostrum de erroribus impiorum etiam & hunc magistrorum 
errorem retulisse” (2:291) (it does not grieve me to have brought up this scholarly error in my 
own book of heathen errors). For even the well-meaning scholar can make mistakes 
alongside the heathens. As Selden corrects this error, “Baaltzephon autem urbs seu oppidum 
erat” (ibid.) (Baal-Tzephon was rather a city or a town). The town was actually an outpost for 
the Egyptians, and the astrological associations were simply the result of the morally biased 
interpretations of later scholars. Indeed, the name referred to the fact that the town looked to 
the north.  
When Selden moved on to Baal-Peor, he found similar problems with the scholarly 
tradition surrounding this idol. Many had thought, Selden notes, that Baal-Peor, or Baal-
Phegor, was an analogue for Priapus, and that the idol was thus associated with obscene or 
lewd rituals. Some argued from a rather tortured etymology, as did St. Jerome, to the effect 
that “Phegor in lingua Ebraea Priapus appellatur” (2:308) (Phegor in the Hebrew tongue 
means Priapus). Selden himself had argued something similar when he published a preview 
of De Diis Syris in Samuel Purchas’s Purchas his Pilgrimage in 1613: “Baal. Phaeor . . . 
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forsan Priapus, cui obscoena pars sine veste aperta erat, vti in Priapeis lusit ille, quod nec ab 
ipso Phaeor abludit” (Baal-Peor . . . perhaps Priapus, whose obscene part was open and 
unclothed, so that he can delight in Priapic rites, in this respect he does not differ from 
Peor).236 But Selden reversed his opinion for the first edition of De Diis Syris in 1617 and 
even added a chapter on Priapus in the 1628 edition. As he argues, “Foedae enim illae 
libidines, quae in historia Moabitidum recensentur, & vindicta veri Dei puniuntur, non minus 
sunt a Phegorii cultu alienae, quam Salomonis stupra a ritu Sidoniorum” (2:309). (these 
impure passions, which are recorded in the history of the Moabites, and which are punished 
by the vengeance of the true God, are no less alien to the worship of Phegor than Salomon’s 
debauchery was to the rites of the Sidonians). Selden’s point is that Salomon had engaged in 
the Sidonian rituals merely to get closer to the Sidonian women who also practiced those 
rites. The idolatry at Peor was not, in itself, lewd but was simply an accumulation of rites 
carried out in honor of the distant celestial bodies or the spirits of the departed. The collective 
morality of Moabite society is not wholly bound up with its religious rituals. 
However, religious rituals and practices do serve to bind a given community by 
uniting the specifics of cultural memory to universal norms of religious experience. This 
sense of the purpose of ancient religion leads Selden to focus so much on the places and 
spaces of the pagan idols. Thus, in the chapter on Baal-Peor, Selden strives to separate the 
name “Peor” from any moral connotations. Rather, he says, “Mons enim in Moabitarum 
regione Peor dictus erat, ubi, ni fallor, Baal hic & delubro & sacris honorabatur” (ibid.) (In 
fact, there was a mountain called Peor in the land of the Moabites, where, unless I am 
mistaken, this Baal was honored with a shrine and religious rites). It is not surprising that the 
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site of such devotion should be on top of a mountain: “Montium summitates ante alia loca 
divinis rebus olim destinatas, non est cur adjungerem: id pueri sciunt” (ibid.) (There is no 
reason to add why mountain tops, rather than other places, were once dedicated to divine 
things: any schoolboy knows this). Every boy would know that mountains are closest to the 
celestial bodies, and that many gods were said to have been born on mountains, as was Zeus 
himself. So, Baal-Peor participates in a very common norm of ancient culture. And the actual 
rites of Peor that Selden does describe are those of standard cultural memory common to 
many other ancient religions: conventional “sacrificia mortuorum” (2:310) (sacrifices for the 
dead), justly done. The local details of these idols and their attendant rites provide Selden the 
leverage with which to undo previous scholarly mistakes. The pagan deities appear to be 
simply one part of the complex biblical societies with which they interact, and their rites 
more structural and utilitarian than absolutely damnable in themselves.  
 It is precisely the complexity and plurality of pagan deities, manifest in Selden’s 
polysemous portrayal of the biblical idols and their surroundings, that inform Milton’s ode on 
Christ’s nativity. In his concluding catalogue, the deities are often represented in their plural 
forms: 
Peor, and Baalim, 
Forsake their temples dim, 
 With that twice battered god of Palestine, 
And mooned Ashtaroth, 
Heaven’s queen and mother both, 
 Now sits not girt with tapers’ holy shine 
       (197–202) 
 
Peor was of course one of the Baalim, and the plural “Ashtaroth” encompasses the many 
incarnations of Ashtoreth. In Selden’s De Diis Syris, Ashtoreth also appears in many forms. 
Her name may derive, Selden thinks, from “Asheroth,” or “lucos” (sacred groves). Those 
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groves were then metonymically taken to signify the wooden idols that stood in her temples 
(2:343–44). There was also, as with the other idols Selden discusses, a city sharing the name 
of Ashtoreth, but the provenance of the name is unclear: “An ab hac urbe Deae, an a Dea urbi 
nomen translatum, an neutrum horum fuerit, non habeo dicere. Sane a lucis, urbibus, 
montibus, antris, ubi coluntur numina, nomina item accipi tam certum est, quam de huius 
Deae nomine omnia esse omnino incerta” (2:345). (Whether the name was applied from the 
city to the goddess or from the goddess to the city, or whether neither of these cases is true, I 
cannot say. Doubtless it is just as certain that names are taken from the groves, cities, 
mountains, and caves where spirits are worshipped, as that everything about the name of this 
goddess is altogether uncertain.) Selden’s correlation of the numinous with the nominal 
(numina/nomina) contributes to his overall thesis that pagan idols arose from the religious 
significance attached to specific places and sacred spaces, and that those names then 
transform and are themselves constitutive of even more religious meanings. Moreover, 
because of the centrifugal, various nature of pagan devotion in general, much of pagan 
religious worship was highly contingent on specific circumstances rather than based on a 
coherent set of doctrines, a point he would return to throughout his writings on non-Christian 
religions.237 
 Thus, it is appropriate that Milton chooses to focus on the ejection of the gods from 
their sacred places as evidence for the new order represented by Christianity; this new order 
unifies what were formerly local and variable modes of worship instantiated in the many 
versions of pagan deities. The poem poses an implicit question, though: what happens to the 
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sites of religious devotion inhabited by the pagan gods after their forceful ejection? At the 
very least, the poem adumbrates this question, since its action exists on several distinct 
temporal planes.238 The first is the instant of Christ’s birth, which has immediate effects on 
mundane existence. But the musical harmony engendered by the birth has another effect; 
listening to it, “Time will run back, and fetch the age of gold” (135). The birth will replicate 
the lost age of innocence, but it will also eventually bring about “the world’s last session” 
(163). The narrator himself is writing in a time before that last session, however; perhaps like 
Milton himself he is a vates futurus (poet yet-to-be), an epithet from the title page of the 1645 
Poems that looks forward both to Milton’s own poetic maturity and his role as prophet of 
things to come.239 Back in the past, the catalogue of pagan deities ousted from their temples 
fills in the time between the ancient golden age and the coming of Christ to earth. Since the 
time of primitive man, religious devotion has devolved into institutionalized forms of idol 
worship, localized in “Temples dim” (198). Christ’s incarnation ends their influence, but also 
points ahead to the “last session,” indicating the long space between his death and his return. 
The stanzas describing Christ are full of the abstract language of disembodied harmony and 
otherworldly power, the unseen, indeed barely perceived, forces of the heavens: “Ring out, 
ye crystal spheres, / Once bless our human ears, / (If ye have power to touch our senses so)” 
(125–27). This music originates, Milton writes, in the time  
when of old the sons of morning sung,  
While the creator great 
His constellations set, 
 And the well-balanced world on hinges hung, 
And cast the dark foundations deep,  
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And bid the welt’ring waves their oozy channel keep. 
       (119–24) 
 
The poem’s temporal frame stretches back even to the beginnings of creation, before 
plunging back into the particular moment of Christ’s birth. In contrast to the airy flight of 
heavenly bodies and their music, the stanzas on the pagan gods emphasize the local, earthly 
places that have been given religious significance through the ages before Christian 
revelation. 
 In fact, Milton’s poem explicitly represents the confrontation between a new religion, 
which has not yet inhabited its places of worship, and an old religion that has built up many 
layers of successive meaning derived from the land. Thus Milton’s language becomes more 
concrete as he passes into the catalogue: 
The lonely mountains o’er 
And the resounding shore, 
 A voice of weeping heard, and loud lament; 
From haunted spring, and dale 
Edged with poplar pale, 
 The parting genius is with sighing sent, 
With flower-inwoven tresses torn 
The nymphs in twilight shade of tangled thickets mourn. 
       (181–88) 
 
The mountains, shores, springs, dales, and groves are the sites of the power of idols, here 
expressed in the unifying concept of the “genius,” a local power or deity that was worshipped 
in a particular place. As Milton would have read in Selden’s book, this was precisely the 
most important part of idol worship, the degree to which idols were embedded with traditions 
associated with places, spaces, and the communities surrounding them.  
 For Milton, idolatry represented the portion of religious devotion that looked to 
settlement and traditions as the basis for worship. The long history of pagan religion up to the 
point of Christ’s birth had generated many different forms of idol worship; each place had a 
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“genius” that governed the particular type of worship in that community. Milton reinforces 
this idea in the next stanza: 
In consecrated earth, 
And on the holy hearth, 
 The lars, and lemures moan with midnight plaint, 
In urns, and altars round, 
A drear and dying sound 
Affrights the flamens at their service quaint; 
  And the chill marble seems to sweat 
  While each peculiar power forgoes his wonted seat. 
         (189–96) 
 
Almost every line reaffirms the fact that pagan idols were bound to particular places and 
spaces, in “consecrated” and “holy” land, and on “altars round.” The flamens’ service is 
“quaint,” which means that their services are clever or intricate, suggesting a complex and 
ornate series of rites. And finally, there are many powers, each with a “wonted” seat of 
power that requires a specific set of services. There is, to be sure, a certain element of anti-
Catholic sentiment in these lines, as some critics have found in the catalogue in general.240 
But the main point of the catalogue seems rather to be a broader one still, a criticism of the 
tendency of all institutional religion to become entrenched, entangled, and enchanted with 
rituals and traditions. The sympathy that Milton injects into the poem—the “lonely 
mountains,” the moans and laments—suggests not that Milton banishes these gods from 
memory but that the false religion of idolatry needs to be confronted on its own terms. As 
Selden’s epigraph to De Diis Syris proclaims, quoting Lactantius, “Primus sapientiae gradus 
est, falsa intelligere” (2:202) (the first step toward wisdom is to understand false things).241 
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 So, what happens to the vacant spaces of pagan religion? The poem ends abruptly 
after the catalogue of deities, leaving little resolved in terms of their afterlife. Should we 
assume that Christ has purged the pagan temples, leaving them available for Christian use? 
Christ’s incarnation has ejected the pagan gods, but has it completely destroyed them? On the 
one hand, Christianity is attaining a kind of temporal power over the actual spaces once 
inhabited by pagan worshippers. If the temporal power is absolute, then it might be allowable 
to inhabit pagan temples and, perhaps, pagan intellectual spaces as well. However, the 
ambivalence in Milton’s poem regarding the pagan deities suggests that Christianity’s 
temporal power might not be absolute. In this sense, pagan space would indeed remain 
tainted by unreformed traditions and customs. The very nature of the development of 
Christianity matters for how we read Milton’s evocation of the flight of the pagan gods.  
 And in fact, the boundaries of Christianity, and its relationship with other beliefs and 
practices, were subjected to intense interrogation in the years before and after 1629. The altar 
controversy especially threw arguments about cultural and religious inheritance and 
development into stark relief. What might seem like inconsequential ideas about the 
relationship between ancient religions increasingly attained contemporary relevance as many 
writers became engaged with the problem of sacred space. What pagans practiced, alongside 
Jewish and early Christian practices, could thus serve to define contemporary matters of 
religious discipline in novel ways. 
 
II. Pagan Practices, the Right of Asylum, and the English Altar Controversy 
As Henry Ainsworth constructed the ceremonial law, it encompassed practices that were 
common throughout the ancient world. We have already seen his willingness to link Hebraic 
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religious habits to the habits of the gentiles in the story of Baal. But Ainsworth continues that 
formula throughout his book. Examples abound of his view of all ancient religions sharing a 
common set of ritual imperatives. In his commentary on chapter 4 of Genesis, Ainsworth 
relates the ubiquity of the kinds of offerings made by Cain and Abel:  
Kain brought of the fruit of the ground, which custome continued; so that in 
Israel men might eate neither bread nor corne, till they had brought an offring 
unto God, Lev. 23. 14. Among the Greekes also they used to sacrifice the 
fruits of the earth, Homer Iliad. 1. and Numa ordeyned the like among the 
Romans, who tasted not new corne or wine, before the Priests had sacrificed 
the first fruits, saith Plinie in book 18. chap. 2. and in the Roman lawes of the 
twelve Tables, the same oblation of corne is commanded: Derelig. tit. 1. 
lex. 4. The like was for sacrificing of beasts, as Abel did: which was used of 
Israel, and of all Nations till the comming of Christ. 
         (1.21) 
 
Here was a practice that had continued not only among the Israelites, but was also common 
among the Greeks and early Romans as well. But, crucially, such commonality of religious 
practice was abrogated by the coming of Christ. Throughout his commentary, Ainsworth 
draws on the wide variety of sources relating the details of pagan religious customs, all in 
order to compare those customs to those of the ancient Hebrews. Examples abound: the 
Hebrew ministers have sacrificial duties akin to those of Greek kings (1.57); the Israelites 
worshipped idols with dancing, just like the gentiles (2.17); and while leavened bread was 
prohibited at the paschal feast, the Roman flamen dialis was not allowed to touch leavening 
materials either (2.41). Ainsworth’s perspective is thoroughly comparative throughout. 
 But while Ainsworth generally sees conformity between rituals of ancient Hebrews 
and later gentiles, he sometimes cites evidence that the different religions had a more 
contentious relationship, especially when it came to the places or monuments of worship. In 
chapter 21 of Genesis, “Abraham planted a grove in Beer-sheba, and called there on the 
name of the LORD, the everlasting God” (verse 33). Ainsworth argues that  
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it is probable, that this plantation was for religious use, which before the law 
given by Moses, might bee lawfull; and was used generally of the nations, 
Deut. 12. 2. but after was forbidden, when God had chosen a place of worship. 
Yet as from Abrahams example, offring his sonne Isaak, Gen. 22. the Iewes 
would superstitiously sacrifice their children, Ier. 7. 31. and 19. 5. so from 
Abrahams grove, they used groves for religious use, and sacrificed 
under greene trees: 2 King. 17. 10. Ier. 17. 2. Esay 57. 5. But God forbad such 
things, Deut. 16. 21. yet the heathen Romans commanded them, saying, Lucos 
in agris habento: Leg. 12. tab. de relig. lex. 2.” (1.83) 
 
For Ainsworth, there is merely a difference of degree between the two kinds of superstition, 
though the development of religious practice under the Hebrews begins to the approach 
Christian discipline more nearly than the pagan custom. The Hebrew God occasionally 
institutes changes in religious practice that necessitate the alteration of heathen materials of 
worship. For example, in Genesis chapter 28, Jacob set up a pillar and called the place Bethel 
[house of the Lord] (verses 18–19). Ainsworth comments on the pillar, 
or statue, that is, a monument or title erected and standing up: This was here 
for a religious signe, as altars also were, Esay 19. 19. and Iakob did the like 
afterward, Gen. 35. 14. But when the Law was given by Moses, 
no pillars might any more be set up, Lev. 26. 1. Hos. 10. 1. but all such as the 
heathens had erected, were to be broken downe; Deut. 7. 5. and 12. 3. There 
were also pillars for civill monuments, Gen. 35. 20. 2 Sam. 18. 18.  (1.107) 
 
In this case, God’s command necessitated that the Israelites not only change their own habits 
but that they destroy the pagan sites of worship as well. In Ainsworth’s commentary we 
encounter two ways that ancient religions related to each other.  
There were many structural similarities and similarities of duty, which Ainsworth would term 
superstitions. But it also appears that ancient Judaism was successively refined by God’s 
commands, which differentiated Hebraic religion from that of the pagans. At the same time, 
however, Christ’s incarnation changed the rules of the game; after his birth, a new set of 
disciplines arose. 
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Ainsworth’s was one way to answer the problem of pagan spaces and their attendant 
rituals raised by Milton’s poem; according to his commentary, after Christ’s birth these 
rituals were totally abrogated by Christianity. But other scholars had a different perspective 
on the early years of the church, in which the early Christians struggled to differentiate 
themselves from Jewish and pagan customs. Other writers took up where Ainsworth left off, 
extending the narrative of religious comingling into the Christian and modern age. Lancelot 
Andrewes, bishop of Winchester and one of the most famous preachers of his day, wrote an 
extraordinarily learned account of the inheritance of pagan religious discipline in the 
Protestant English church. The provenance of this text is itself extraordinary, too. It was 
edited and published in 1653, 27 years after Andrewes’ death, by Edward Leigh, who was no 
friend of Cromwell’s and an “intimate of James Ussher.”242 As Leigh describes the treatise: 
upon speech between Bishop Andrewes and a Gentleman his neer neighbour 
about the Ceremonies, the Bishop a while after, and a quarter of a year before 
his death, delivered this to him as a collection of his own about that subject, 
which he had not time (he said) to polish and lick over. Had the Authour 
intended it for the Presse, it would no doubt have been more perfect, but I 
thought it worthy in regard of the Authour and Argument (which few have so 
generally handled) to be published.243 
 
Leigh is correct in that the treatise does handle a subject that few wrote on so forthrightly. In 
1653, however, the quasi-Laudian emphasis on the continuities between pagan and Christian 
notions of ecclesiastical discipline had to be distanced from the editor. As Leigh disclaims, “I 
do not thereby avow and justifie superstitious and needlesse Rites, as if the observation of 
them was necessary when they are imposed by Authority, nor every thing else therein 
contained” (sig. A3v). Andrewes’ work does indeed attempt to justify the relationship 
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between pagan and Christian practices in terms of traditions and practices that are approved 
by the authority of states and religious institutions. It is worth lingering over Andrewes’ 
arguments and sources since, as Leigh said, there were very few works that attempted 
something similar in the early seventeenth century. 
 His account employs a methodology similar to Ainsworth’s, but approaches the issue 
with arguments developed from Richard Hooker, as Andrewes makes clear at the beginning 
of his treatise. Andrewes gives a concrete answer to Milton’s implicit question about the 
remains of pagan religion, with Hooker as his guide: 
it is expressed by St. Paul, it is lawful for a Christian, so it be without scandal, 
to eat those things which are consecrated unto idols. Honestly then writes 
Mr. Hooker, that which hath been ordained impiously at the first, may wear 
out by tract of time, as the names of our heathen months and days used 
throughout all christendom without any scandal.244 
 
In fact, the stated purpose of his treatise is to show that many “paynim ceremonies were 
retained in England after Christianity was received” (365). Andrewes addresses one of the 
most common arguments for such ceremonial inheritance, the injunction in Deuteronomy 
that Jews may wed a foreign wife, “her nails and hair being pared and shaven” (367). 
Andrewes assumes that what comes from tradition is actually the most worthwhile for a 
religious community to imitate, the very position that many Presbyterians and independents 
would come to reject in the ‘30s and ‘40s. “This pedigree,” he writes, “of our ceremonies 
staineth not our christian policy, for that all good orders of the heathens came by tradition, or 
reading or seeing the ceremonies that God commanded among the Jews in the land of 
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promise” (368). And in fact, to deny the efficacy of tradition is to fall into the Manichaean 
heresy, a kind of Gnosticism that denies the value of all earthly rituals and traditions (366).245  
 But Andrewes thereafter introduces an even more forceful point, that ceremonies may 
become licit once given practical form in a religious commonwealth. “You may observe out 
of Josephus in the latter time of the Jews’ government,” he argues, “that Herod their first 
king brought much of the roman-heathenish discipline into their policy, and in this respect 
that many of our Christian ceremonies were formerly heathen, and afore that used in the 
commonwealth of Jewry, wherein God was the lawgiver” (368). This idea becomes 
Andrewes’ transition into his larger argument that “the ampleness of the common law” has 
admitted into England ecclesiastical laws before any kind of Catholic canon law; indeed 
those early laws were simply the “civil ordinance of the magistrate in the ages most remote” 
(369). Here Andrewes begins to defend paganism as a state religion, principally a system of 
religious discipline and practice that blended sacred and civic duties. Ceremonies themselves 
may be things indifferent, “but yet when they are enacted in a christian state, and made the 
laws of the land, they must be obeyed of necessity as unto a thing not indifferent” (370). 
Andrewes paraphrases Christopher St. Germain to the effect that “the laws of men not 
contrary to the law of God ought to be kept even of the clergy in the law of the soul” (ibid.). 
Andrewes’ main point is potentially very persuasive: if we accept that the common law 
originated time out of mind, and if we admit that the common law incorporates specific 
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cultural habits and practices into its evolving systems of laws, then we will have to admit that 
many laws even now in effect had their origin among the ancient pagans.246  
 The implications of this position are also potentially momentous. Andrewes does not 
quite argue that there are certain tenets of natural religion that might obtain everywhere 
despite God’s specific ordinance, but he comes close. Rather, he argues that ceremonies 
might touch on something eternal and transcendently true, but that they might also simply be 
indifferent; it is this indifference that matters, though. The standard of approbation is use, 
rather than belief, discipline rather than particular doctrine. This position clarifies what 
Hooker had left as a hazy area of his work on ecclesiastical laws. Thus, although some pagan 
ceremonies were imported directly into Catholic worship, some ceremonies were also 
incorporated into Roman legal code; the manner of incorporation matters too, for Andrewes. 
He argues that it is true that the Catholic church structures its ecclesiastical rules according to 
the Roman legal code, and that those rules are often derived from pagan ceremonies. But the 
Roman legal code itself also adapted pagan customs, and while the Catholic use of pagan 
customs is “superfluous and wicked” (370), Andrewes takes it as a matter of course that the 
Roman emperors, when they became Christian, retained many of the precepts contained in 
the Digests (373–74). State power, if just, may freely determine the “ecclesiastical 
ceremonies of the heathen which are or may be lawfully used in ours or any other christian 
state” (373). The crucial term is “christian state,” for Andrewes presupposes not total liberty 
of conscience but rather a liberty informed by obedience. 
 As Debora Shuger argues, this perspective tends to see the entire disciplinary 
inheritance of the church not as “divinely grounded in natural law” but as “legitimated 
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exclusively by the need for social order.” Thus all ceremonies and ecclesiastical policies have 
the potential to become “matters of civil religion.”247 But it is not simply the idea of 
borrowing that leads Andrewes to speculate on civil religion; his point is that the pagan 
rituals themselves tended to structure Christian religious government as a civil institution. It 
was the very nature of the pagan borrowings, their specific character even as practices 
indifferent to salvation, that influenced the Christian polity. Andrewes’ theoretical positions 
on state and legal authority thus also inform his pronouncements upon the specifics of pagan 
inheritance, and especially the matter of the appropriation of pagan places of worship among 
Christian religious polities. Andrewes argues that the very use of sacred places was a mark of 
the increasing civility of pagan peoples. Whereas formerly pagan temples were merely 
sepulchers, “when the people heathen began to be civil, their temples were built, and altered 
fairer both within and without.—Moreover the very name of the heathen assemblies among 
the Athenians and the cities of Asia, was ecclesia, which retaineth the name of the churches 
among the christians at this day” (374). He also argues that very early Christian churches 
were round, much like temples to Vesta, Bacchus, and the Sun, and that Numa forbade the 
worship of images in the temples. But the more important question was what happened to 
those pagan temples with the advent of Christianity. 
 Andrewes finds that ultimately many Christian authorities chose to retain pagan 
temples as places of worship and devotion. Here he uses the urgency and immediacy that 
Milton lent to his description of the pagan gods ousted from their temples to explain why 
Christian kingdoms often appropriated those same temples and spaces. 
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But yet without controversy, when kingdoms and states turned from idolatry 
or paganism to christianity, and that in short time (so powerful was the Holy 
Ghost), many of the heathen temples were not overthrown, but of necessity, 
after some ceremonies accomplished, were used for Christian prayers and 
assemblies; by means whereof the alteration in the state was not so great, the 
temporal world with Democritus being not to be new made ex atomis, and 
men sooner and easier embraced public christian religion: and this is the 
reason that by the common law of England a man may be said to be patron of 
a christian church although he never built it, if he only endow the church with 
revenues. (376) 
 
It was the speed, the very unexpectedness of Christian revelation that necessitated such a 
gradual transition from paganism. And again, for Andrewes the most important consideration 
is the impact of new beliefs and practices on the stability and continuity of the state. For 
Christianity to be a successful institutional religion, it needed to appropriate the civic 
religious forms of pagan culture. This was no sin, according to Andrewes, as long as the old 
temples were “hallowed and sanctified” by Christians (ibid.).  
 Andrewes also perceived the complex dynamic of church and state that the issue of 
sacred space raised for the early Christians. State authorities can grant heathen spaces to the 
church, but the church also has a role to play in their sanctification. He argues: 
as lawfully the civil and supreme magistrates gave the temples of the heathens 
to the christians, as well St. Augustine notes in one epistle, that the christian 
emperors did pass over to the true catholics the churches and revenues which 
were given by donatists to error and schism; yet, before the heathen temples 
were consecrated and purged, the christians would not use any christian 
service in them. (378) 
 
 State power was thus also constrained by the necessity to respect the power of sanctification. 
Andrewes recounts the story, out of the fourteenth-century Greek historian Nicephorus 
Callistus Xanthopulus, that Constantine made a portable church to carry with him when he 
engaged in military campaigns (ibid.). Nicephorus calls this a “µεταφορητήν εκκλησίαν” 
(moveable church), which Constantine built so that he would not have to worship in 
  
 247
unconsecrated places.248 Concepts of sacred places were indeed in a kind of transitional 
moment, necessitated of course by the religious, political, and social ramifications of the 
process of converting paganism to Christianity. 
Andrewes was remarkably prescient in his recognition of the cultural complexity of 
late antiquity, much of which crystallized around the problem posed to the differentiated 
powers of church and state by the changes in conceptions of sacred space. As the story of 
Constantine and his portable church demonstrates, the awareness of the need to convert 
pagan spaces of worship was widespread. Indeed, Constantine has been at the center of 
modern scholarly attempts to reconstruct the transition to Christianity as a state religion in 
late antiquity. As Andrewes anticipated, scholars have found a high degree of pagan 
remnants in the early church and have concluded that any kind of “transition” must be seen 
as very gradual indeed. As Gerald Bonner argues, “the extinction of paganism and its 
supersession by Christianity, despite the factors of legal coercion and physical violence 
which accompanied them, are best understood not as a catastrophic event but as an 
evolutionary process.”249 Constantine of course did introduce ever stricter prohibitions 
against pagan religious practices, closed many  temples, and in general avoided pagan sites 
altogether.250 Christian churches were built on pagan sites, but not until memories of pagan 
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practices had faded.251 Constantine himself often conceived of the church in essentially 
pagan terms; for the emperor, when the ministers of the church “offer worship to God they 
confer an incalculable benefit upon the state” (351). This symbiosis of church and state was 
one of the primary legacies of pagan religious thought passed on to Christian leaders.  
This period of history proved quite receptive to early modern historical parallels in 
the course of scholarly and religious investigation of early ecclesiastical history. And indeed, 
for modern scholars, too, this period has provided the basis for dueling conceptions of the 
relationship between religious and secular affiliation. If Constantine and the Theodosian 
emperors were influenced by a pagan worldview, they also had to contend with more ascetic 
notions of what it meant to participate in true, Christian religion. As Peter Brown has argued 
extensively, increasingly in these decades Christian writers such as Augustine argued that 
paganism was not something that could be ignored and indifferently incorporated into a 
church that enjoyed supernatural superiority; indeed, that very supernatural superiority 
tended to allow Christians to continue viewing the lower, quotidian operations of the state 
church as similarly sacred, endowed with the authority of the one, true God. For Augustine 
this was dangerous, and he tended to argue that pagan incursions into the church and state 
needed to be purged and a more absolute divide set up between the two “cities” of his City of 
God.252 Early modern scholars of this period of history were sensible to the same conflicts as 
they studied the early Christian emperors.  
Unsurprisingly, one of the most pressing concerns for in the early Christian empire 
was what to do with the pagan temples, shrines, and altars that remained standing and 
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provided unavoidably reminders of the empire’s bisected religious heritage. The eloquent 
Libanius, a Hellenist who was sympathetic to the Theodosian regime, produced an 
noteworthy oration to Theodosius about this very subject, the destruction of pagan temples. 
This oration found an appropriate editor in Jacques Godefroy, a professor at the University of 
Geneva, who in the 1630s was working on an edition of the entire Theodosian Code, the set 
of laws partially concerned with explicating the relationship of the new religion with the old 
religions of the empire. He edited Libanius’s oration in 1634 and dedicated it to Sir William 
Boswell, an English diplomat intimately connected both to major scholars of antiquity such 
as Selden and G. J. Vossius and to Laud himself and others in the religious establishment. 
The dedication to Boswell reflects the growing interest in early imperial Christianity and 
church history from this period, upon both of which Libanius’s oration sheds light.  
Godefroy’s short opening treatise assumes that the fourth century saw the triumph of 
institutional Christianity but at the same time the failure of that institution to completely 
purge paganism. His introductory remarks reflect the complexity of the religio-political 
maneuverings of the early empire. After noting that Libanius’s oration is a significant 
contribution to ecclesiastical history, he argues, 
Cuius opinor haud vulgaris ea quoque portio est, uti liquido constare possit, 
quibusnam gradibus paganae superstitionis error, qui tribus saeculis in fidem 
Christianam imponenter saevierat, quarto demum saeculo Evangelicae luci 
toto gradu cesserit, locumque fecerit: per quos item Principes, quid quantumve 
illi detractum, a quibus potissimum viris negotium istud administratum: 
quibus rationum momentis erroris inlecebras, & in his Templa, adimere 
paulatim visum fuerit. Viceversa, quam contumaces sese pagani hanc in 
partem praebuerint: quibus inter haec argumentis se suaque defendere 
sategerint: qui qualesque viri suffliminandae rei Gentilitiae accesserint.253 
 
[I think that this forms no vulgar part of this history, as it is able to clearly 
show the process by which the error of pagan superstition, which raged 
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impotently in the first three centuries of the Christian faith, finally ceded in 
the fourth century to the light of the gospel, and gave way all at once. 
Likewise it shows under which princes just how much was detracted from 
paganism, and by which men this business was principally managed; and by 
which impulses of reasoning, little by little, it came to seem like a good idea 
to seize the allurements of pagan error, including temples themselves. On the 
other side, it shows how the pagans themselves became stubborn on their own 
behalf, and with what arguments about these things they strived to defend 
themselves and their things; and what men these were who were hostile to the 
repression of the gentile way of life.]    
 
Godefroy reports two, somewhat conflicting, notions of the development of Christianity in 
relation to paganism. First, he argues that paganism ceded to its Christian competitor all at 
once, toto gradu. But then, as the new religion developed it needed administrators, whose 
decisions blended the two religions. This later process occurred little by little, paulatim, 
whereby the men in charge of the empire thought it was a good idea to try to convert the 
remnants of paganism to their own purposes.  
Libanius himself is a representative of this gradual process of re-paganizing the 
Christian empire. Godefroy, like Peter Brown many years later, is also struck by the great 
license that Libanius seems to arrogate for himself.254 Godefroy notes that Libanius was free 
to malign Constantine for despoiling the revenues of the temples and coming to a very bad 
end for doing so. Still more licentious was Libanius’s praise of the next emperor, the pagan 
Julian. Godefroy argues, after all this, 
Ut dubitare liceat, maiorne illius licentia, an Theodosii tum lenitas extiterit, 
qui haec atque id genus alia tam aequo tulerit animo: eo etiam, ut quod 
eiusdem Libanii testimonio & exemplo patet, paganos non eo minus ad 
summas quoque dignitates subvexerit, epulisque adhibuerit. (sig. [¶4v]) 
 
[That one may doubt which is greater, the license of Libanius or the leniency 
of Theodosius, who bore all these things and others of this kind with such a 
calm spirit; even to the point, as is made clear from the testimony and 
example of Libanius himself, that he advanced pagans to no less than the 
highest political ranks, and invited them to his feasts.] 
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Godefroy’s interest seems chiefly historical, but this period obviously has much 
contemporary relevance. For instance, Godefory also finds much of interest in Libanius’s 
arguments “de Religione non cogenda” (that religion should not be forced). As Libanius 
writes,  “for these are things to which men ought to be persuaded, not compelled. And when 
a man cannot accomplish that, and yet will practise this, nothing is effected, and he may 
perceive the weakness of the attempt. It is said that this is not permitted by their own laws, 
which commend persuasion, and condemn compulsion. Why then do you run mad against the 
temples? When you cannot persuade, you use force. In this you evidently transgress your 
own laws.”255 Libanius’s appeal to moderation in religious outreach takes its force from his 
defense of conformity and submission to state authority. A leader both religious and political 
should, in theory, want to export the same stable order he expects in the state into the 
religious realm. 
When he turned the importance of sacred space, Libanius also argues for pagan 
temples as emblems of social stability. He makes a very common rhetorical gesture at the 
opening of his oration, associating the building of temples and sacred sites with the idea of 
security, both literal and metaphorical safety from attack: “and in every city . . . next to the 
walls were temples and sacred edifices raised, as the beginning of the rest of the body. For 
from such governors they expected the greatest security” (Lardner ed., 8:442; Godefroy ed., 
8–9). Even more importantly, if the temples are despoiled it will upset the traditional 
agricultural way of life that sustains much of the empire. As he argues, if the temples are 
despoiled it prevents tributes being taken from the local farmers, because they will not work 
as hard if they believe their labors are not watched over by a god. Libanius acknowledges 
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that religious practices in some sense can anchor a community and make it best able to 
contribute to society as a whole. The overarching problem, though, is the negotiation 
between the very real effects of religious furor, in this case in Christians, and the practical 
strokes necessary to contain such furor within imperial authority. Libanius sets up a contrast 
between the religiously inspired Christians and the loyal, obedient, peaceful pagans who bow 
to the authority of the state. This way of describing the effect state power could have on 
religious life obviously had great contemporary value in the 1620s and 30s.  
In fact, the view of Libanius, that religious benefits are interrelated to the benefits of a 
Christian state, was shared generally by many ecclesiastical writers during the Theodosian 
dynasty.256 Milton himself, and he was by no means alone, was devoting serious 
consideration in the 1630s and 40s to this period of church history, the political and religious 
problems it faced, and the solutions it lent to them.257 Apart from being a subject of general 
interest to theologians and scholars, this dynasty also drew the attention of early modern 
scholars who were investigating the origins of the idea of asylum and its relationship to 
sacred spaces in the early years of the church and late antiquity. The idea that some places 
might confer special meaning and protection was certainly inherited from earlier religions 
and was reinforced by the fact that pagan sites continued to have significance across Europe 
as the empire receded and local religious imperatives established new sacred places. The 
spirit of pagan place-devotion, if not always the exact sites, translated easily into forms of 
Christian place-devotion.258 The concept of asylum proved a nodal point for arguments about 
the role of sacred places in church and state. Early modern scholars would have known the 
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policy of asylum in the early church from the Theodosian Code of 392 AD, which enacted a 
very specific law of asylum; but this law allowed scholars to assume that a larger body of 
laws concerning asylum was in place, which would allow for modifications. The emperors 
Arcadius (of the eastern empire) and Honorius also introduced legislation about asylum, 
concerning Jews who applied for asylum by promising to convert to Christianity.259 The 
question that interested many early modern scholars was whether the power of granting 
asylum was a secular or a religious one. Because the power of asylum was partially a legal 
one, the power to obviate a crime, it was conceivable that the power originated with the state; 
but because an asylum could prevent violence and bloodshed it might properly be classified 
as a religious prerogative.  
This aspect of the Theodosian religio-political negotiation proved a crucial point of 
scholarly investigation to those who were interested in the progress of church-state relations 
in the seventeenth century. The question was certainly not unimportant in seventeenth-
century England. The right of asylum had long been important in English society and had 
been defended by its courts. But during the reign of Henry VIII the force of asylum as a legal 
concept had diminished, and in 1623 Parliament abolished it altogether, stating “that no 
Sanctuarie or Priviledge of Sanctuary shalbe hereafter admitted or allowed in any case.”260 
Canon lawyers and anti-papal republicans alike had for years argued, though for different 
reasons, that the right of granting asylum was properly derived from human authority rather 
than divine law. The Jesuit scholar Pietro Gambacurta argued that granting asylum was 
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merely a human custom that was given force by secular lawgivers.261 Paolo Sarpi weighed in 
on the debate in 1627, arguing that the original right of asylum in the fourth century was 
granted by imperial authority, which was exercised to control abuses of ecclesiastical 
privilege. The first historical evidence about asylum was the edict of Arcadius and Honorius 
concerning Jews who sought asylum in exchange for conversion. But until then there was no 
mention made of the immunity of churches even among the pagan Romans. Ecclesiastical 
immunity, he argues, was introduced to the Christian state de facto, from the practice of 
infidel debtors seeking relief from their debts in exchange for promising to convert to 
Christianity.262 As he concludes, “Ecclesiasticos Praesules iis temporibus ne cogitasse 
quidem ad officium suum pertinere, ut leges aut constitutiones conderent de Ecclesiarum 
immunitate, immo vero, cum certo scirent, Principis esse id statuere, ab eo leges accepisse” 
(13) (Indeed, in those times the church leaders did not think that it was part of their authority 
to make laws and ordinances about the immunity of churches, no indeed, because they knew 
for certain that it was the duty of the prince to make such laws, and they accepted those laws 
from him). Sarpi’s point is that the state always had the right to legislate wherever crime was 
concerned; the English Parliament had agreed and had ended a system it associated with the 
overstepping of clerical authority.263 
However, this conclusion in favor of state control over sacred space reflected ongoing 
discussion about the very nature of religious practice among Christians and non-Christians 
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alike. For Sarpi, these arguments were buttressed by the nature of sacred places even in 
pagan cultures, and his work stretches back to describe the nature of asylum among the 
Greeks and Romans as well. An important focal point for arguments over ancient asylum, 
Romulus and his sacred space on the Capitoline might be viewed as a religious site of refuge 
that had also contributed to the creation of the Roman state. But Sarpi wants us to view this 
act from a different perspective: 
Romulus in Romae aedificatione, immunitatem cuidam loco tribuit, qui hac de 
causa Graeca voce Asylum appellatus est; non divini cultus causa, ne ut in eo 
sibi subjecti populi sese adversus justitiam protegerent: sed quo novam 
redderet civitatem incolis refertam, constituit finitimorum populorum 
subjectos, qui ob delicta commissa, vel aes alienum in eorum regionibus 
contractum, ad Asylum confugerent, quo deinde Romani incolae essent, 
defendi debere adversus omnes qui adversus eos jus haberent. (167–68) 
 
[Romulus, in building Rome, gave immunity to a certain place, which is 
called for this reason “Asylum” in Greek; but not because it was a place of 
divine worship, nor so that in that place people subject to Romulus might 
protect themselves from justice. Rather, it was a place where he could found a 
new city by filling it with foreigners, and so he made subjects out of 
neighboring peoples, who could flee to his asylum on account of crimes 
committed or money borrowed in their own lands. They would then become 
Roman residents, to be defended against all who had a legal right against 
them.] 
 
This foundational act defined asylum for the Romans, and indeed, Sarpi argues, religious 
asylum was extremely uncommon among them. He also argues that religious asylum was 
never meant to impede justice, only to grant the weak, such as mistreated slaves, access to 
the process of justice (166). He included at the end of this work a collection of writers, 
classical and modern, who had written on asylum, and their conclusions are much the same. 
For Sarpi, it appears, the entire concept of a “sacred space” depends on an original act of 
institution by a state authority. This does not preclude sacred space from religious 
significance, of course; it simply means that the religious significance of such places is 
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always bound up with the rites done in that place and their effects in the secular realm. Sarpi 
mixes, probably purposefully, religious and legal terminology in his summary of Romulus’s 
institution of his asylum: “Romulus suum Asylum aperuit ad lucum opacum & vallem inter 
Capitolium & arcem seu Palatium in sacro loco quod Quercetum vocitatur, hic locus sacer & 
consecrationis lege tutus a direptione quo profugii libertatisve causa Ius erat confugere, ad 
quem confugientes sine summo piaculo avelli non poterant” (184–85) (Romulus founded his 
asylum in a dark grove and vale between the Capitoline and the citadel, or Palatine, in a 
sacred place which is called the oak forest; this place is sacred and by a law of consecration it 
is protected from pillage. In this place there was a law so that if people fled there for refuge 
or freedom they could not be taken from there without committing the gravest kind of 
offense). Certainly, he argues, no asylum suffers homicides to shelter; rather, they were all 
set up for the truly innocent, those who only initially appeared to have committed a crime, 
such as Orestes, or slaves fleeing abusive masters. Milton, too, wrote in his commonplace 
book that “Refuge from hard-hearted masters was given to slaves by civil law” (YP, 1:411). 
Sarpi finds an example of this idea in Plutarch’s life of Theseus to the effect that Theseus’s 
tomb granted “free libertie of accesse for all slaues & poore men, (that are afflicted & 
pursued, by any mightier then themselues).”264 But this is the essence of a sacred space, for 
Sarpi: it is instituted by the state according to the principles of justice, which are themselves 
divinely inspired. 
 One finds a similar interest in the relationship between the sacred and the civic in 
John Selden’s own commentary on asylum, written a year after Sarpi’s in his notes on the 
Marmora Arundelliana (1628). In his commentary on some of the marble inscriptions in this 
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collection, Selden discusses concepts of asylum and sacred space among the Hellenistic 
peoples who made the inscription.265 He remarks first that the inscriptions expand the notion 
of what could be considered an “asylum” to an entire city: “ex urbe nemo qui vicinis 
damnum injuriamve intulerat, in deditionem repetendus” (2:1530) (no one who was bringing 
in crime or injury from neighboring places could be reclaimed from the city as a right of 
possession). Selden also notes an even more expansive sense of asylum, by which ancient 
writers—Selden cites Proclus in particular—could refer to the British islands themselves as 
sacred places of asylum (ibid.).266 For Selden, the notion of asylum is especially flexible, 
because it seems to contain a concept that is common to many different religions. Among 
pagans, groves and temples could be asylums, and the temple at Mecca was an asylum in the 
Koran (2:1530–31). “Sed christianorum in universum omnia, post adultum fere 
christianismum, templa confugis salutem praestabant: Et majestatis crimen erat eos abducere, 
etiam verberibus, tonsura, & deportatione luendum” (2:1531) (But in general all the temples 
of the Christians, after Christianity became established more broadly, offered safety to 
refugees; and it was treason to abduct them, punishable even by whipping, tonsure, and 
exile). Moreover, and as Sarpi also indicated in his work, the concept of asylum is one in 
which the sacred and the civic converge in the commentary tradition. Selden points to the 
richness of the topic, “juris tum civilis tum sacri utriusque imperii commentarios, & varios 
singularium gentium mores, quibus & firmatum saepius est & mutatum asylorum in ecclesiis 
jus” (ibid.) (the commentaries on both civil and sacred law and on the authority of each, as 
well as the various habits of many peoples, by which the law of asylum has frequently been 
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confirmed and changed in their churches). This is the crux of the notion of asylum, for 
Selden, namely that it can instantiate and unite concepts of sacred and civil authority in the 
mutual negotiations between them. 
 To illustrate this expansive sense of asylum, he offers his readers a manuscript 
account of a fifteenth-century English legal case involving the right of asylum. After citing 
Sarpi’s “liber singularis” on asylum, Selden writes: 
Nec vero omnino ingratum forsan fuerit si de singulari asylorum jure, quo 
etiam in universis suis aedibus gaudebat olim tam Templaiorum, dum stetere, 
sodalitium, quam Hospitalariorum, decisionem Anglicanam, eamque non 
contemnendam, ex vetusto rerum Hospitalariorum codice MS. hic obiter 
adjecero. (ibid.) 
 
[It would not be altogether unwished, perhaps, if I discussed here an English 
legal decision, not inconsiderable in itself, and drawn from an old codex of 
things relating to the order of the Hospitallers, concerning that very singular 
right of asylum, which the society of Templars, and of Hospitallers, once 
enjoyed in all of their temples, while they stood.] 
 
The case that Selden then transcribes concerns John Gore, who, after having committed a 
felony, fled to “Spittlehouse,” a sanctuary owned by the Order of Hospitallers of St. John of 
Jerusalem.267 The details of the case are vague, but it suffices to say that Gore was taken out 
of their temple by force and then demanded his right of restitution. A jury of twelve was 
called, which in turn granted Gore the restitution, but the two judges in the case doubted 
whether this was actually legal. The case was adjourned until the next summer, when the 
matter was referred to royal agents so that they could decide whether the privilege of asylum 
applied to Gore’s case. The royal overseers agreed with the jury, and the case was settled in 
Gore’s favor. Selden seems pleased with the elegance of the case, and the way in which the 
matter of asylum, an idea applied to broadly and generally among all the great peoples of the 
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world, found a manifestation in the legal processes of the island that Proclus himself had 
termed an asylum. The end of his note contains a hint of regret: “Sed sub Henrico Angliae 
rege VIII, legibus in ordinum comitiis latis antiquata sunt huiusmodi asylorum jura; & plane 
apud nos evanuere” (2:1533) (But under King Henry VIII, laws were made in the Parliament 
that rejected laws of this kind concerning asylums; and clearly among us such laws have 
totally vanished). Henry tore down the buildings of the Hospitallers, and of course in 1623 all 
right of sanctuary was abolished. Even from the case that Selden cites it is evident that the 
right of asylum ultimately depended on state authority, but, for Selden, the most interesting 
thing about asylum was clearly the way that arguments about sacred places touched on issues 
important to both civil and sacred powers. 
 It is clear that both Sarpi and Selden saw in asylum a proving ground for the 
interaction of religious and civil communities in the early modern world. Neither author 
would subjugate the church to the state; rather, they would have the legal processes of that 
state be informed by the long history of religious traditions and practices not just of the 
people in the state but of many peoples, Christian and non-Christian. For Sarpi and Selden, 
the relevance of pagan culture to this debate about asylum was not its importation of 
arguments from natural reason but rather the ways in which that culture found ways to 
manage numinous commands for the sanctity of holy places with the legal imperatives to 
punish crime and maintain order in the state. Pagan religious practices are being judged with 
an eye to their effectiveness and function, along with their universal validity. And yet both 
are concerned with how these practices define particular nations, peoples, and religious 
communities. Selden’s note, especially, prompts us to ask what it means to see the nation 
itself as a sacred place, a place of asylum. By adducing the very particular case of John Gore 
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Selden implicitly links the numinous sense of Britain as a place of refuge with the changing 
legal formulas that instantiate the numinous within the nominal letter of the law. That an 
entire nation could be a place of refuge and protection would continue to be a powerful 
imaginative force in early modern Europe, and a troubled one.   
 Of course, Selden had the luxury of writing for a highly educated, thoughtful 
international audience; other constructions of sacred places partook of coarser associations 
with pagan religions in polemical discourse.268 And indeed, the very concept of sacred space 
came under intense scrutiny throughout the 1620s and ‘30s. For the French minister Francis 
de Croy, the Catholic Church is in conformity with “Gentilisme” in the matter of asylums: 
your Churches receiue in differently all manner of transgressors, and this 
priuiledge of Sanctuarie, hath beene graunted also to Bishops houses, though 
they were not contiguous with the Churches. And from whence haue you 
learned this manner of doing but from Gentilisme? The Athenians had 
an Asylum, whose priuiledges were excessiue. Romulus did before that time 
open the same vnto all manner of fellons, to the end that his bloudie citie 
might be the better inhabited. The Emperours statues had this priuiledge, and 
we should neuer haue done, if we would set downe the seuerall places of 
Refuge for all sort of crimes, whereof the vse was great among the Gentiles.269 
 
De Croy imputes to Catholicism the same multiplicity of sacred sites that he decries in 
paganism. To this multiplicity he links the proliferation of privileges that sacred places 
supposedly license. In fact, many polemicists argued along the same lines, that the very 
concept that one place might contain more holiness than another could then give rise to 
abuses of those places by those seeking absolution from their crimes. The same worry 
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extended, albeit more abstractly, to altars, that to bind divinity to one place or many would be 
to grant authority over the divine to human agents. 
 Paganism thus played a central role in constructing debates about the placement and 
function of altars in the 1630s. Shortly after the accession of Charles I in 1625 and the 
ascendancy of William Laud as dean of the royal chapel in 1626, altar policy began to 
change. Canon 82 of 1604 had allowed that the communion table could be placed in any 
convenient position for the ministers and parishioners. According to Julian Davies, 
“Parishioners, left to interpret the most convenient position, placed and used their tables as 
they wished. For those who saw the table as the focus of order or greatest residence of God 
on earth this was an intolerable state of disorientation.”270 Indeed, in the words of Laud 
himself the altar is “the greatest place of God’s residence upon earth.”271 Accordingly, some 
ministers inclining to this position changed the communion table from its east-west 
orientation to a north-south, or “altarwise,” orientation and placed it in the east end of the 
church. The public controversy played out during 1636–37, with treatises from John 
Williams and Peter Heylyn, among others. Historians have argued over the reception of 
Caroline altar policy, and it appears that there was a significant range of opinion, 
participation, and discussion among ministers, the people, and civil authorities alike; some 
supported the policy and indeed moved the altars on their own accord, while others actively 
fought against the policy.272 In terms of the intellectual origins of the conflict, Kenneth 
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Fincham and Nicholas Tyacke have related the controversy to the ongoing debates about the 
nature of idolatry and its relationship to the polemical battle over the influence of 
Catholicism in the English church.273 This controversy, however, was also one in which 
conceptions of paganism and sacred places in the early church played crucial roles. 
 It became, too, a polemical struggle that served to concretize some tenets of what is 
now known as Laudianism. In his essay defining the doctrines that made up Laud’s view of 
the world, Peter Lake argues that Laud’s and his sympathizers’ attitudes toward sacred space 
were part of the archbishop’s efforts to redraw “the division between the sacred and the 
profane in tight spatial and temporal terms.”274 The Laudians wanted to reclaim the 
boundaries of the sacred from “puritans,” who “allowed the sacred or the holy to spill out of 
the church and into the world.”275 This reclamation would reinvest the sacred with strong 
institutional authority and actually expand its power by making it a structuring force for 
communal, social, and religious life. The two perspectives Lake presents are certainly not 
unique to this decade, as we have seen. Early modern Christians were constantly shifting 
from a model of the sacred that saw its diffusion in the world as a representing the constant 
struggle against omnipresent evil, and a model that placed the sacred within the bonds of the 
institutional church as an authority that obviated the need for its continual conflict with the 
profane. It comes as no surprise that much of the published polemic constituting the altar 
controversy in print took up the question of pagan notions of sacred space and their influence 
on Christians views of the same. The issue boiled down to whether the divine presence could 
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be said to favor one place over another or if, as some argued, that presence lent all places an 
equal claim to be sacred—and, thus, all places mixed the sacred and profane.276    
In 1637 John Williams introduced the multitude of authors who have discussed the 
altar by citing Walafrid Strabo, a ninth-century German monk. Strabo says that “Christians in 
the beginning did place their Altars indifferently, in diversas plagas, East, West, North, and 
South; and gives a reason for it not to be easily refuted; Quia non est locus, ubi non est Deus. 
God is as well the God of the West, North, and South, as he is of the East: and it 
is Paganish (as Minutius Felix well observes) to make him more propitious in any one 
Corner of the world, then he is in another.”277 Here was the issue in a nutshell, expressed 
rather succinctly. Could the divine numen be said to confer special distinction on one place 
rather than no one place in particular? This was not merely a theological question, or at least 
not in the same way as the question of transubstantiation and the real presence was. Williams 
goes on to argue simply that altars, or tables, should be placed indifferently rather than only 
at the eastern end of the church. The question for him was not if or how a specific object or 
rite summoned the divine, but rather how the human manipulation of the physical world for 
the purposes of social, religious, and even political existence could be linked to the divine. 
Indeed, the debate about altars joined other discourses in this period that were expanding 
conceptions of what could properly be called religious discipline, and doing it explicitly 
through historical arguments about the relationship between Christians and non-Christians.    
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  Peter Heylyn’s reply to Williams argues against Strabo’s notion that to place an altar 
in a particular place is paganism; rather, Heylyn argues that the “natural law” itself has 
enjoined different peoples throughout history, and without access to scripture, to set up altars. 
Heylyn thus wants to reframe the discussion in terms of a competing notion of how pagan 
practices, and Jewish, might relate to Christian practices. Of those people even before Moses, 
“The light of nature could informe them that there was a God, had not their Parents, from the 
first man Adam, beene carefull to instruct them in that part of knowledge: and the same light 
of nature did informe them also, that God was to bee worshipped by them; that there were 
some particular services expected of him from his Creature.”278 But of course, since the light 
of nature urges these practices, it also urged the pagans into practices which, formally at 
least, are similar to those enjoined by the Christian God: 
The severall gods in Rome, the Temples unto them belonging, the Altars in 
those Temples, and Colledges of Priests attending on those Altars, are things 
so generally knowne; that it were losse of time to insist upon them. The like 
may also be observed in all other places, and of all Idols whatsoever. For 
whatsoever the Idol represented, and by whomsoever it was worshipped, if it 
were once set up and honoured as a Deitie, it drew along with it all those 
necessary attendants, which were by God himselfe thought fit to wait upon the 
true religion. The Groves and high places, the Priests and Altars destinated to 
the service of that foule Idol Baal, mentioned in the holy Scriptures, were 
proofe enough of this, were there no proofe else. (section 2, p. 5) 
 
For Heylyn, that such congruity might exist is not surprising, since Christians have merely 
modified the practices of Jew and Gentile alike. His argument is that the modification of 
content and even form must not, therefore, depart from the practices commanded by the 
“light of nature.” And thus Christians must have altars, and their placement matters. 
 Heylyn reminds us that this argument ultimately derives from Hooker, who also 
assumed that religious practices could be justified or rejected according to natural law 
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applicable to all peoples everywhere. He paraphrases “our incomparable Hooker” later in his 
comments on the early patriarchs: “Nature informed them in the maine, that proper and 
peculiar places were to be set apart to Gods publick worship, and God himself informed them 
in the circumstance thereof, for the forme and fashion, both when the Church was moveable 
and when after setled. The Tabernacle fashioned by his direction, was a moveable Temple; 
the Temple fashioned by that patterne, was a settled Tabernacle” (section 2, p. 69). Again, 
this is justified by the public service that God demands. The argument for setting aside 
particular places for worship is that natural law, which commands “peculiar” worship, 
interacts with divine commands that then specify how circumstantial necessities are to be 
integrated with the dictates of natural law. Part of the force of this argument comes from 
Heylyn’s notion that the practical dimensions of religious worship are, like the Temple and 
Tabernacle in the wilderness, “moveable.” But, and perhaps counter-intuitively, this mobility 
argues against identifying the veneration of certain spaces as pagan. Indeed, Heylyn responds 
to Williams’ citation of Wilifrid Strabo by arguing that devotional mobility—the indifference 
of altar placement—among the early Christians only obtained for a short time (section 2, p. 
84). As Christianity attained civil relevance, its adherents found it appropriate to differentiate 
particular places in their worship. 
 Heylyn’s arguments partake of Hookerian notions of the relationship between natural 
law and religious rites; however, Hooker’s ideas of universal application of religious 
impulses to worship need to be compared and contrasted with more specifically scholarly, 
antiquarian constructions of ancient religious rituals and their continuing relevance. As 
Jonathan Sheehan has argued, while Hooker would justify rituals by the light of nature, 
antiquarian scholars such as Selden found that “rites were functional, not natural practices. 
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Rites were precisely the dimensions of religion constitutive of political and social 
communities.”279 For another scholar of early modern concepts of idolatry, what we are 
witnessing in this period is the confrontation of two competing notions of the development of 
pagan idolatry within Christian culture. He argues that we can see here “The uneasy 
coexistence of a concept of civilization based on classical ideas of the growth of the polis on 
the naturalistic basis of utility and necessity, and the Christian emphasis on idolatrous 
degeneration from a primitive monotheism.”280 Heylyn seems to be privileging both: that 
gentiles imitate the Jews, and yet that both groups are guided by universal principles of 
religious worship. Indeed, religious discipline was the sticking point, because the refinement 
of practice was undeniably the effect of a process of civilization and socialization, which was 
difficult to pin on the refinement of doctrine. 
Moreover, in the religious culture of seventeenth-century England, these narratives of 
the development of paganism found concrete expression in debates about the value of 
tradition itself, especially in the writings of the fathers and within the world of the early 
church. As Jean-Louis Quantin’s extensive treatment of this question has revealed, the very 
notion of appealing to the written authority of the representatives of the institutionalized 
church in the several centuries after Christ’s death was fraught with problems. To accept the 
governing force of “traditions” was, implicitly, to seek the truth outside of scripture in the 
human interpretations of God’s laws. Antiquity itself was made into a polemical chip to be 
deployed or decried. For a scholar such as Isaac Casaubon, to appeal to tradition alongside 
scripture was to acknowledge that religious culture must take a middle course between divine 
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revelation and human interpretation.281 Laudians of the 1630s, and Heylyn chief among 
them, took up this notion as a core principle and applied it to religious controversies. “They 
were,” Quantin argues, “wont to plead for ecclesiastical traditions as ultimately derived from 
the Apostles by uninterrupted succession.”282 But “antiquity” was not limited to Christian 
antiquity merely, as Heylyn’s extensive treatment of pre-Christian religious practices 
demonstrates; classical and biblical polytheism could also provide grounding rationales for 
defenses of ceremonies in the English church. For Laudian divines, the consensus of 
unwritten traditions and practices, even outside of the church or Christianity itself, formed a 
legitimate area of discussion because, in their opinion, they were arguing in the realm of the 
“light of nature.” As Andrewes had argued, the common law provided a model for religious 
polity: just as the country was governed by long-standing traditions, so too could the church, 
as a governing body, form itself according to actions outside of God’s specific dispensations 
and commands. The problem of sacred space tested this idea, though; it forced its defenders 
to argue that a certain place was sacred by virtue of God’s special, differentiated presence, 
while at the same time arguing that pagan practices that reflected this sense of divine 
enclosure also demonstrated the eternally valid principles informing this practice. 
Thus, the status of sacred places was important for defining the valences of religious 
discipline: the alternate mobility and fixity of sacred spaces seemed increasingly to reveal the 
often complicated interaction of religious ideology with social circumstance and necessity. 
This complexity defines Joseph Mede’s extensive interventions in the cultural and religious 
debates about sacred space in the 1630s. Mede was professor of Greek at Cambridge in the 
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1620s and ‘30s, which meant that his purview was primarily the world of the New Testament 
and early church. And indeed, he was extraordinarily well read in the texts that defined the 
intellectual scope of that world. Though he is known to modern scholarship mainly through 
his eschatological thought and thus his influence on a wide range of radical, millenarian 
ideology, Mede himself was a ecclesiastical moderate.283 It may come as a surprise, as it did 
even to some of his contemporaries, that he fully supported the idea that some spaces and 
places must be set aside as sacred and given due devotion. He tirelessly argued for this point 
during the last years of his life and even in the works published after his untimely death in 
1638. 
 William Twisse was one of many Puritan admirers of Mede who was nonetheless 
surprised that Mede held such views of sacred places. Twisse oversaw the posthumous 
publication of Mede’s The Apostasy of the Latter Times in 1641, wherein he wondered that 
Mede could have stood with Laud on this issue. In his preface, Twisse responds to what he 
sees as both Hooker’s and Mede’s essential argument, that “Eadem est ratio loci & temporis, 
There is the same reason of time and place.” “For where it doth hold,” Twisse argues instead, 
“it holds only in relation to time, and place, naturall. And indeed, time is only naturall; but 
place may be artificial, and such is a Temple.”284 As Twisse sees it, the duty to build places 
of worship was emphatically not a moral duty; furthermore, it would be impossible to keep a 
proportion of space, though it is certainly possible to keep a proportion of time. The reason is 
that God’s creation proceeded in natural time, and so worshipping him on certain days is 
permissible; but to build a structure proportional to him would require more than man’s 
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ability. And in fact it is important to note the ways in which the Apostasy of Latter Times 
does revise Mede’s earlier advocacy of the sanctity of place, expressed in works published at 
the end of the 1630s. 
 In these earlier works, Mede justifies altars and other sacred places through 
arguments not from the light of nature, as Heylyn and Hooker had done, but through 
historical arguments from the importance of decorum and order as manifested in religious 
practice. He entered the debate in 1637 with his The Name Altar, or Θυσιαστήριον, Anciently 
Given to the Holy Table; he clearly intended his treatise on Christian altars to be an 
authoritative survey of all extant writings on the subject from the early years of the church. 
His goal is two-fold: to argue that the early church did have altars and that these altars were 
different, in kind and purpose, from the altars of pagan idols. Pagan authors such as Celsus 
had impugned Christians because they had no temples, and this assertion gave ammunition to 
those Protestants arguing that the early Christians did not have altars or particular sacred 
spaces. Mede responds, however, that “as for Temples, their meaning was, they had no such 
claustra Numinum as the Gentiles supposed Temples to be, and to which they appropriated 
that name; viz. Places, whereunto the gods, the power of spels and magical consecrations, 
were confined and limited.”285 But, he makes clear, the early Christians did have altars and 
that these altars were sacred places differentiated from others. “For in times past,” he argues, 
“(when men perhaps were as wise as we are now) it was thought fit and decent, that things 
set apart unto God, and sacred, should be distinguished not only in use, but in name also from 
things common. For what is a Temple or Church but a House? yet distinguished in name 
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from other Houses” (389). The nature of the practice is thus one of the main components of 
the sacred itself. It is the use of Christians themselves, not the habitation of pagan gods, that 
gives significance to Christian places. Mede’s distinction between Christian and pagan sacred 
places seems, actually, to be fairly weak; in practice, the two religions approach the 
construction and worship of sacred places in similar ways. It is only doctrine that separates 
them. 
 By the 1630s, Mede had been thinking through the problems of arguing about sacred 
places for many years. Indeed, his first theological tract was on this very topic, De Sanctitate 
Relativa, which he presented to Lancelot Andrewes and which moved Andrewes to offer 
Mede the position of his household chaplain (which Mede refused). This was probably 
around the year 1610, and Mede revised his treatise for a sermon to the clergy, Concio ad 
Clerum, which he preached in 1618 (as Worthington notes, p. xxx). In the Concio, Mede says 
that he is trying to avoid the extremes toward which arguments about sacred space are prone 
to drift: some bring in “Venerationis praetextu Idolatriam” (398) (idolatry under the pretext 
of veneration), while others react to this by introducing “Contemptum . . . omnis rei Sacrae” 
(contempt of all things sacred).286 Mede solves the problem by carefully defining the essence 
of what he calls “relative” sanctity: “Hanc autem definio Peculiaritatem rei versùs Deum à 
certo Praesentiae ipsius aut Dominii modo” (399) (I define this as the peculiarity of a thing 
involving God by a fixed measure either of his presence or ownership). By this he means that 
places are made sacred from being set apart from others, either by means of God’s presence 
in that place or by virtue of a place being subject to ecclesiastical laws of ownership.  
It is with this distinction that Mede is particularly interested in refuting the argument, 
which he imputes to his opponents, that “Omnia Loca esse hodie aequè sancta” (400) (all 
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places today are equally sacred). Of course, for Mede the very notion of worshipping divinity 
loses its meaning if all places and times are made “fas et liberum” (ibid.) (free and available). 
The point of worship is practice, and practice demands a division of places and things into 
the sacred and non-sacred. But this very division then licenses the careful consideration of 
church policy to best suit the needs of the people. As Mede concludes one section of his 
Concio, “Non ego tamen hanc vel illam Externae venerationis formam urgeo, sed Externam 
tantùm urgeo quacunque formâ, modesta modò sit, & Gentis cujusque moribus 
accommodata, & rebus Christianis decora” (405) (I do not recommend this or that particular 
form of external worship, but I do recommend external worship in some form, if it is modest, 
and if it is adapted to the habits of a given people and it is appropriate for Christian matters). 
The idea that we can talk about God’s presence in terms of “peculiarity” provides the 
rationale for Mede’s careful consideration of the importance of external worship. But this 
peculiarity is also his way of responding to the argument that veneration of places is 
somehow pagan because it localizes the deity and divides his essence. For Mede, though, 
sanctity itself can be relative to the mysterious workings of God and his actions in the human 
realm: he reveals his presence at some times rather than others and dispenses laws and 
distributes goods to some people rather than others. All this necessitates the dual human 
responses of decorous worship and carefully considered ecclesiastical policies, responses that 
can be observed throughout all religious societies.  
 Mede developed these ideas even further in his longer treatise on churches published 
in 1638, Churches, that is, Appropriate Places for Christian Worship. His argument there 
turns on the interpretation of specific ritual prescriptions and their relationship to moral 
duties enjoined by God. As an example, he cites “that Divine admonition given first to 
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Moses, and afterward to Iosua, Put they shoes from off thy feet, &c. in that Law, Reverence 
my Sanctuary; in this Instruction by Solomon, Look to thy feet when thou comest to the House 
of God” (350). In fact, argues Mede, neglect of these prohibitions “is condemned of 
Phophaneness by the practice of Iews, Gentiles, Pagans, Mahumetans, all Religions 
whatsoever: if any to be excepted (proh pudor & dolor!) it is our selves.” This is not an 
argument from the light of nature; rather, Mede is saying that the very notion of holding 
particular rites sacred stems from the fact that God himself produces “peculiar” relations to 
his worshippers. Certain places thus “ought to be used with a different respect from things 
common: and God’s House (as you have heard) hath something singular from the rest.” 
Mede premises this argument on the simple concept of decency: it is good to make some sign 
of respect when we enter someone’s house. But Mede does not prescribe the rituals to be 
used in the church; “that belongs to the discretion of our Superiours and the authority of the 
Church to appoint, not to me to determine” (ibid.). Mede’s theoretical thrust is to associate 
man’s natural moral duty with the necessity to understand the specific duties enjoined by 
God in his revelation; these revealed duties are not necessarily moral, but they are certainly 
coterminous with morality. To bow when one enters the church is not really a moral duty 
from the perspective of the natural law; but God’s laws, filtered through human authority, 
interact with the natural law to create obligation. 
 This fuzzy way of describing the interaction between divine decree and moral duty 
perhaps conditions the historical examples toward which Mede gravitates in his other works 
on sacred space. In his posthumously published Diatribae: Discourses on Diverse Texts of 
Scripture (1642), he becomes particularly interested in the multiplicity of sacred spaces 
among the ancients, and especially among the Jews. In discourse eighteen, he addresses the 
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apparent contradiction arising when Joshua places a stone under the oak that was “by the 
sanctuary of the Lord” (Joshua 24:26). How could there be a sanctuary of the Lord in 
Sichem, where Joshua set the stone, when the ark and tabernacle were still in Shiloh? Mede 
thinks this place was a “proseucha,” or a place of prayer that was surrounded by trees and 
open to the air, like a court (66). He relies on the account of Epiphanius in his Panarion, 
wherein he compares these proseuchae among the Messalians to the fora of the Gentiles.287 
At the end of his long discourse, Mede reaches some significant conclusions about the nature 
of sacred places. First of all, he argues, in the Old Testament the Jews were able to make 
places of worship almost ad libitum; their devotion did not depend on the actual presence of 
the ark but rather was constructed by the particulars of their practice. More importantly for 
Christians, he argues, “we may learn from hence, That to have appropriate places set apart 
for Prayer and Divine duties, is not a Circumstance or Rite proper to Legal worship only, but 
of a more common nature” (69). The idea that religious rituals modify what was previously 
“common” and make it distinct through a process of discrimination formed the lynchpin of 
Mede’s justification of the sanctity of place. As he concludes: 
Yea, when the Tabernacle and Temple were, the Altar of God stood still in 
an open Court; and who can believe that the place of those Altars of the 
Patriarchs was not bounded and separated from common ground? And from 
these patterns in likelihood, after the Altar for Sacrifice was restrained to one 
only place, was continued still the use of such open places or Courts for 
Prayer, garnished with Trees, as I have shewed Proseucha's to have been. 
(ibid.) 
 
And the reason that “common ground” can be “bounded and separated” is that God’s 
revelation demands the particular responses necessitated by “Circumstance.” Indeed, the 
relationship between the universal moral duty to worship and the particular circumstances of 
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that worship provides argument enough, for Mede, for the idea that maintaining the form and 
beauty of sacred places constitutes a religious obligation in itself. 
 But the implications of this argument, and its universal application among Christians 
and non-Christians alike, were genuinely problematic for Mede. Just as pagan temples were 
similar to Christians in the abstract concept they instantiated—the binding of devotion—so 
too the very idea of sacred place seemed very similar to the idea of demonic protection 
invoked by Old Testament pagans and later, classical pagans as well. Mede’s primary 
purpose in the Apostasy of the Latter Times is to argue for the proper meaning of the 
“doctrine of demons” that will supposedly creep into the church in the latter days. For Mede, 
this doctrine is not that which is made up by demons, but rather the doctrine that flows from 
the recognition of the power of demons themselves. Mede’s distinction represents a 
contribution to the culture-wide efforts to explain sources of demon worship with a view to 
historical origins, and thus to locate the problems of the church within historical 
circumstances.288 Thus, Mede identifies this impulse in the worship of the saints in the early 
church and the proximity of this worship to pagan ancestor worship. The historical moment 
of the expulsion of the pagan gods forms the temporal pivot at which pagan demons became 
Christian objects of devotion. He quotes Theodoret, a historian writing during the 
Theodosian dynasty, to show him arguing for the similarities between pagan demons and 
Christian martyrs. In Theodoret’s De Curandis Graecorum Affectionibus (On Cures for the 
Maladies of the Greeks), he concludes that “Our Lord God hath brought his Dead (viz. the 
Martyrs) into the room and place (the Temples) of your Gods, whom he hath sent packing, 
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and hath given their honour to his Martyrs. For in stead of the Feasts of Iupiter and Bacchus 
are now celebrated the Festivals of Peter and Paul” (642).289 “Demons” have simply changed 
their guise from gods to martyrs, but they retain their essential nature as protecting spirits 
invoked to guard people in the present both from social ills and divine wrath. 
 The problem thus extended far beyond the actual question of pagan demons and 
practices infiltrating the church; rather, the problem might be posed in terms of the very 
concepts of protection and guardianship provided by religious institutions. Laud himself 
characterized external forms of religious ceremony as the “Hedge that fence the Substance of 
Religion from all the Indignities, which Prophanenesse and Sacriledge too Commonly put 
upon it.”290 Mede was troubled by this association of worship and devotion with the idea of a 
protective boundary. He viewed this problem through a millenarian framework; he was justly 
well known for his scholarship on Old Testament prophecy, and especially his decoding of 
obscure passages in Daniel. One of his longest notes in the Apostasy of the Latter Times 
purports to explain the significance of chapter 11 of the book of Daniel, wherein the prophet 
predicts that, in the last days of the Roman empire, the people will fall to worshipping 
Mahuzzim. As Mede argues, Mahuzzim “are Protectores Dii (such as Saints and Angels are 
supposed to be)” (669). He defines the root, “Mahoz, which in the abstract signifies 
sometimes Strength, sometimes a Fortress or Bulwark. . . . But the Hebrews use Abstracts for 
Concretes.” Thus, Mede argues, the Mahuzzim really signify something that “strengthens or 
fortifies, that is a Protector, Defender, Guardian, Helper” (670). Mede continues on to the 
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real problem with this definition: “Will not then the valiant Martyrs and Champions of the 
Faith well bear the name of Mahuzzims?” Additionally, “The True God is called a Rock; 
Baalim and False Gods are also Rocks: The True God, or Christ himself, is often by David 
call’d Mahoz; why may not then False Gods, or Plurality of Christs, be called Mahuzzim? 
Rock and Fortress are not words of so great difference” (ibid.). Mede answers this question 
by arguing that Daniel’s words refer to the introduction of saint worship into the early 
church. Many of the early fathers, Mede notes, linked the martyr cults to the idea that, by 
scattering the relics of the saints, God set up national and religious boundaries, assigning 
each province or district a kind of protector. He quotes St. Chrysostom on the importance of 
such protection:  
Those Saints bodies (saith he) Τειχίζει, Fortify our City more strongly than an 
Impregnable Wall of Adamant; and as certain high Rocks hanging on every 
side, repel not only the assaults of those Enemies which are sensible and seen 
with the eye, but also overthrow and defeat the ambuscades of Invisible 
Fiends, and all the Stratagems of the Devil. Here you see are Mahuzzims too. 
(673)   
 
Of course, for Mede the Mahuzzim signify the undue reliance on guardians and, indeed, 
particular spaces as totemic representations of God’s special protection. But, at the same 
time, Mede also defended the idea that Christians should respect God’s sacred places and 
even appoint specific rituals to demonstrate that respect. This anxiety reflects not only 
Mede’s ambivalence in the face of cultural change, but also the very real ambivalence of 
many toward the implications of setting aside places as sacred. 
 
III. Milton, the Genius Loci, and the Boundaries of Nation and Church  
The problem of defining sacred space that arose during the altar controversy was thus also a 
much larger issue, encompassing ideas of nationhood and the boundaries and limitations of 
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the church and even of the nation. As Mede indicated, guardian spirits could be assigned to 
entire nations, not just a particular mountain or valley. This very pagan idea was perhaps not 
so pagan; after all, the notion of a genius loci, or spirit of a place, was not very different from 
the guardian angels that many different cultures invoked. As Selden himself noted in his 
commentary on Michael Drayton’s Poly-Olbion (1612), “anciently both Iewes, Gentiles, 
& Christians haue supposed to euery Countrey a singular Genius.”291 Milton, too, recognizes 
the importance of this concept in his early poetic efforts. In his Nativity Ode he portrayed a 
“parting genius” (186), ejected from its local seat where it was enshrined in a thicket and 
enmeshed with flowers. This, however, was merely the first of many geniuses that inhabit 
Milton’s early poetry. As Joad Raymond has argued extensively, Milton was intensely 
concerned with the nationalist implications of a presiding spirit force, which could assert “an 
association between the people and the land that is above and beyond worldly politics.” 
Moreover, it could privilege a kind of belonging “that links landscape, community, 
neighbourliness, religion, and, through the notion of protection, well-being.”292 As I will 
argue in this concluding section, Milton’s relationship to this idea of a protected nation 
changes throughout his early career; charting his engagement with debates over sacred space 
and pagan religions provides an index of such change. Milton’s early poetry creates worlds 
filled with spirits, geniuses, attendants, and demons; and as Milton poetically transmutes the 
larger cultural dialogue of sacred space, he is also constructing his complex later stances on 
paganism, idolatry, and religious purity.  
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It is clear that the notion of a place-specific “genius” fascinated the young poet. His 
early poems display an ever expanding sense of the importance and implications of the 
“genius” trope. For example, Milton translates the “parting genius” of the Nativity Ode into 
his Arcades, the pastoral entertainment he wrote for the Countess Dowager of Derby in 1634. 
But here the “Genius of the Wood” that greets the shepherds is a “protective force” that also 
serves as a representative, at least partially, of “divine will.”293 As he states, “For know by lot 
from Jove I am the power / Of this fair wood” (44–45). His role is to protect the plants from 
harm, and to assist them in their growth, “And from the boughs brush off the evil dew, / And 
heal the harms of thwarting thunder blue” (50–51). Milton clearly knew the tradition of this 
figure, which in the classical world was often associated with birth and growth.294 This 
“Genius of the Wood,” however, also has a connection to the immutable realm of celestial 
harmony. After he is finished visiting “every sprout / With puissant words” (59–60), he 
listens to “the celestial sirens’ harmony” (63). The essential function of this genius is provide 
a connection between the two realms, being partly physical and partly spiritual. It is 
important in this respect that the genius derives his power from the “lot” he received from 
Jove. He has a connection to the higher orders of what he calls the “adamantine spindle 
round, / On which the fate of gods and men is wound” (66–67); and yet, in his “lot” he also 
instantiates a certain degree of chance and contingency that is manifested in the natural 
world. He is, in a sense, a mediatory figure, manifesting the Platonic notion that demons 
provide a medium for the transcendent forms to interact with the material world. 
                                                 
293
 Mary Ann McGuire, “Milton’s ‘Arcades’ and the Entertainment Tradition,” Studies in Philology 75 (1978): 
463–64.  
 
294
 For the background of this idea of “genius,” see D. T. Starnes, “The Figure Genius in the Renaissance,” 
Studies in the Renaissance 11 (1964): 234–44. 
  
 279
Thus the genius, with its connections to a vaguely non-Christian demonology, is a 
figure of uncertainty and instability, a representative both of the fixity and stability of place 
and of the fleeting numen that only occasionally touches on human things. In Il Penseroso, 
Milton’s speaker is awoken to “sweet music” coming from “Above, about, or underneath, / 
Sent by some spirit to mortals good, / Or the unseen genius of the wood” (151–54). Many of 
the speaker’s places of contemplation seem marked by what Mede called claustra Numinum, 
the enclosures of divinities. When night approaches, he asks the goddess to bring him 
To arched walks of twilight groves, 
And shadows brown that Sylvan loves 
Of Pine, or monumental oak, 
Where the rude axe with heaved stroke, 
Was never heard the nymphs to daunt, 
Or fright them from their hallowed haunt. 
There in close covert by some brook, 
Where no profaner eye may look, 
Hide me from day’s garish eye. 
     (133–41) 
 
This speaker, like the Genius of the Wood in Arcades, finds some connections between the 
power of enclosed, natural spaces—the sacred grove or the “hallowed haunt”—and the music 
that seems to have no physical source. One might remember that the adjective “profane” 
derives from “pro- fanum,” literally “before the temple,” a recognition that this hallowed 
space is a kind of natural temple. And it seems to be this very “close covert” that generates a 
kind of poetic or musical power; indeed, at the end of the poem this speaker moves from the 
natural grove into the manmade cathedral with its own enclosures, the “studious cloister’s 
pale” (156). 
 In fact, Milton subtly revises what many might assume to be the very essence of 
pagan religion in the Renaissance. Instead of seeing in the pagan deities emblems of change, 
he likes to imagine the sylvan gods and nymphs as inhabiting fixed positions in the natural 
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world.295 In his fifth elegy, on the coming of spring, Milton ends with the idea that the golden 
age would involve a kind of re-fixing of the natural deities in their proper places: 
Dii quoque non dubitant caelo praeponere sylvas, 
 Et sua quisque sibi numina lucus habet. 
Et sua quisque diu sibi numina lucus habeto, 
 Nec vos arborea dii precor ite domo. 
Te referant miseris te Iupiter aurea terris 
 Sacula, quid ad nimbus aspera tela redis? 
      (131–36) 
 
[The gods, too, unhesitatingly prefer these woods to their heavens, and each 
grove has its own particular deities. Long may each grove have its own 
particular deities: do not leave your homes among the trees, gods, I beseech 
you. May the golden age bring you back, Jove, to this wretched world! Why 
go back to your cruel weapons in the clouds?]296  
 
This initially seems an odd thing to pray for. In a poem on seasonality, with its 
acknowledgement of the importance and beauty of natural change, to ask for stasis is slightly 
indecorous. But that is the poetic tension Milton hopes for; if the gods were to stay in their 
trees it would bring back the golden age, when divinity was perfectly aligned with 
metamorphic natural processes. It is suggestive that for Milton in his early Latin elegies 
poetic power comes from the easy association of divinity with specificity. His plea for divine 
permanence resembles the vatic moment of classical oracles, such as the Cumaean Sybil of 
the Aeneid: “deus ecce deus!” (a god is here, a god!), which provides the proper time to seek 
out oracles (poscere fata / tempus).297 According to Don Cameron Allen, the entire fifth elegy 
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is about the “ecstasy of poetic insight.”298 This inner sight is also a function of the indwelling 
of the god, a traditional notion to be sure, but here externalized into the enclosed groves and 
woods where inspiration differentiates the vatic poet.   
 The idea that religious inspiration could and should be externalized was fully 
consonant with the policies and programs of the established English church of Milton’s day. 
As Thomas N. Corns has argued persuasively, Milton, at least before the composition of 
Lycidas in 1637, had no real criticism to level at the Laudian church. Corns argues that 
Milton’s early poetry does not necessarily support Laud, but neither is it critical of the 
religious and social changes brought about the Laudian ascendancy. The cultural moment of 
Laudianism thus serves as the backdrop of Milton’s poetic development: the values of his 
early poetry are “the dominant values of its age; much of the Laudian agenda has been 
bought into (or at least provisionally subscribed to).”299 This argument is even more 
persuasive once we consider the legacy of pagan customs that I have been tracing throughout 
this chapter. Corns is responding to influential readings of Milton’s early works such as that 
by Barbara K. Lewalski, who labors to explain, among other things, Milton’s seemingly 
hagiographic treatment of Lancelot Andrewes in his third elegy. For Lewalski, the main 
purpose of this elegy is to lament the lost Protestant heroes of the Thirty Years War, not 
really to commemorate Andrewes’ passing.300 However, for Corns the choice of Andrewes 
indicates at least an implicit sympathy for the anti-Calvinist ministers who claimed Andrewes 
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as their forebear.301 Even more importantly, Corns reads the poem primarily in terms of 
Milton’s fascination with the funeral elegy and the memorial rituals sanctioned by the 
church; as he notes, “Attitudes to burial rites constituted one of the more surprising 
touchstone issues which defined religious ideology in the early Stuart period.”302 In fact, 
Corns has more recently found in this idea one of the causes of Milton’s gradual break with 
the Laudian church. 
Along with Gordon Campbell, Corns has argued that it was the official reaction to the 
placement of the gravestone of Milton’s mother that precipitated some dissatisfaction in the 
young poet toward the established church. It was John Williams, author of The Holy Table, 
who insisted on ecclesiastical inspections in 1637, while he himself was imprisoned in the 
Tower of London. Williams sent the archdeacon, who visited Horton in 1637 and noted the 
odd placement of Sara Milton’s grave. As Campbell and Corns recount, 
He noted approvingly Laudian details such as the kneeling bench by the rails, 
but was concerned that some of the seats were too high, including that of ‘Mr 
Milton’, and noted that the rector’s surplice did not conform to requirements. 
He also noted that ‘the two Tombestones in the Chancel in the pavement are 
laid the wronge way’; the two tombstones in the floor of the chancel include 
that of Sara Milton.303  
 
This objection reflects the intrusive form often taken by insistence on the specificity of 
sacred places in the Laudian ecclesiastical system. As another scholar argues, this “document 
reveals the Laudian church’s presence and intrusion into Milton’s Horton years.”304 Indeed, 
this event may have indicated to Milton some of the ideological and institutional tensions 
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within the official ecclesiology of the 1630s and thus contributed, as Campbell and Corns 
argue, “to the erosion of the younger Milton’s allegiance to the Caroline church, evident in 
his only major vernacular poem of the Horton period, ‘Lycidas.’”305 
 However, this one event must be seen as only one part of Milton’s gradual trend 
toward the positions he would take in his prose of the early 1640s. While we can see clearly 
that Milton was already thinking through his anti-clericalism in “Lycidas,” it is more 
difficult, but for that reason all the more necessary, to find his religious sympathies in the 
group of texts representing Milton’s masque for the Earl of Bridgewater. Corns claims that 
the “Maske” is Milton’s “most ambitious poem of the 1630s” and “his most sustained 
engagement with the theory, as well as the style, of anti-Calvinism.”306 This perhaps goes too 
far; I would argue more cautiously that the content of that anti-Calvinism, where it appears, 
shows Milton in a transitional moment in his religious and cultural affiliations, which are 
partially filtered through the complex representation of sacred objects, rituals, and places in 
the masque. In fact, in the importance attached to place in this work we can see the terms of 
the Laudian program of the sacred interact uneasily with more expansive notions of what it 
means to consider a space sacred and the long inheritance of genres, forms, and figures that 
Milton deploys to construct his idea of the sacred. The masque is neither firmly a reformist 
text nor a Laudian one; its religious politics exist against a complex theological and 
mythographical background, which itself could be mobilized in the service of sectarian 
polemic. 
 One of the most important background figures in Milton’s depiction of Comus is 
obviously Bacchus, “that first from out the purple grape, / Crushed the sweet poison of 
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misused wine” (46–47), and who fathered Comus with Circe.307 Both Bacchus and Circe lie 
behind Comus’s enchanted cup and its disorienting brew, but Bacchus especially could 
represent, more generally, the tendency of religious inspiration to override its normal social 
boundaries. He was also the subject of contemporary religious polemic in the early 
seventeenth century. For example, Bacchus and his ritual celebrations were the subject of a 
short treatise by Ambrosius de Bruyn published in 1619 that expanded on precisely this 
aspect of the ritual celebrations of this god. De Bruyn was a Dutch scholar, and he dedicated 
his book to George Abbot, a powerful English clergyman who had taken an interest in the 
internecine Protestant conflicts in the United Provinces in the 1610s. The work in question is 
a summary, with digressions, of book 39 of Livy’s history of Rome, wherein Livy recounts 
the threat to the social order posed by clandestine Bacchic rituals. In the second century BC, 
Roman authorities uncovered an illegal cabal of religious enthusiasts who worshipped 
Bacchus at night and in secret. Livy describes their rites as extremely indecorous, 
transgressive, and dangerous: 
Since which time that these sacrifices and ceremonies were thus divulged, and 
men and women intermingled togither, and the licentious liberty of the night 
time also to help all forward, there is no act so wicked, no fact so filthie, but 
there it is committed: and more sinfull and unnaturall abuse there is, of 
mankind one with another, than there is of women. If any are either unwilling 
to suffer this soule filthinesse, or bestirte themselves more dully in the beastly 
action and performance of that villanie, such presently are to be killed and 
sacrificed as beasts. And this is supposed amongst them, the principall point 
and summe of their religion, To hold and beleeve that nothing is unlawfull 
whatsoever.308 
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The Senate decided, upon hearing the account of these rites, “That proclamation be made at 
Rome, and edicts sent out throughout all Italie, that no person whatsoever, who had beene 
sacred and prosessed religious by the priests of Bacchus, resort any more into assembly or 
conventicle for those sacrifices, ne yet doe ought pertaining to such divine service” (1031). 
Their reasoning was that there was “nothing so forcible to ruinate and overthrow religion, as 
when divine service is celebrated after some straunge and forraine fashion, and not according 
to the auncient custome of the place” (1033). Livy’s account argues that secret religious 
rituals, those done at night and not under the auspices of the civil authorities, endanger the 
security of the entire state, not least because they encourage many people to participate in the 
same rite and thus foster an alternate, divergent religious community. 
 Thus it is no surprise that de Bruyn links this rather obscure historical episode to 
developing confessional controversies unfolding both in England and in the Netherlands. In 
fact, de Bruyn links the transgressive Bacchanalian rites described by Livy to enthusiastic 
Protestant sects that have traditionally threatened civic unity: 
Ostendam, Deo & Musis faventibus, per dies Baccho sacros, in pretio fuisse & 
nonnullis in locis esse constupratores, homines fanaticos, coetus nefarios, 
scelera, libidines vagas & promiscuas, strepitus & clamores nocturnos 
Cyclopicos. Me hercle, rem ex re iudicare si volumus accuratius pressiusque, 
ab Anabaptisticis furoribus & sacris parentum nostrorum memoria haud 
auspicate introductis, non omnino discrepare videtur, hic, qui Baccho sacer 
cultus, stulte creditur atque insulse.309  
 
[I will show, with the help of God and the muses, that, on days sacred to 
Bacchus, it was held as a good thing in some places to have debauchers, 
crazed men, illegal gatherings, promiscuous and wild passions, shouts, and 
nocturnal, Cyclopic howlings. Indeed, is we wish accurately and deliberately 
to appraise the matter from its essence, then it will appear that this foolish and 
stupid belief in the sacred worship of Bacchus accords completely with the 
belief of those furious Anabaptists, whose rites were inauspiciously 
introduced in our parents’ time.]   
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Yet, as de Bruyn indicates, all these nefarious activities are actually thought to be religious 
by the minority who practice them as such. This proves the ancient maxim: “Religio velum 
est, quod scelus omne tegit” (sig. B3r) (religion is the veil that covers every crime). The 
Anabaptists, along with other Protestant sects, throw up the veil of “religion” over various 
practices that actually work against civic order. Crucially, it is this civic order that should be 
the ultimate goal of religious practice, says de Bruyn. And for him this accords with a 
temperate, modest Christianity that respects authority; indeed the responses of the Roman 
consuls proceed according to de Bruyn’s conception of true religious authority. They 
suppress the rites but allow some expressions of traditional Bacchic worship. The parallel is 
so clear that de Bruyn feels he needs to explain that while the Bacchic rites do anticipate later 
Christian rituals of baptism, modern baptismal practices have often been tainted by those 
who merely profit from the name of Christ but deny the fact of his humanity (quicunque 
saltem hominis personam sustinent & nomen profitentur; sig. [B4v]). These are the Arians, a 
particular bugbear of George Abbot, but they also stand in for all those who profit from the 
name, or form, of religion while using it to veil illicit deeds. 
 This historical episode thus had clear resonances within seventeenth-century religious 
culture, which show up in Milton’s masque in the licentious rituals of temptation practiced 
by Comus and his crew. This is not to deny the similarities of Comus’s rites with licit ritual 
celebrations such as Mayday games; I simply mean to suggest that these rites need not be 
seen only as a parody of Laudian ceremonialism, though they lend themselves readily to that 
interpretation.310 Comus’s rites seem to be rather explicitly an inversion of licit ritual, which 
suggests that Milton is not so much parodying acceptable rituals as showing the dangers 
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posed by the wrong kind of rituals altogether. Like the nocturnal worshippers of Livy’s 
account, Comus and his followers revel in the secrecy and claustrophobic conditions of their 
rites. As Comus says shortly after his first appearance on stage: 
Come let us our rites begin, 
‘Tis only daylight that makes sin 
Which these dun shades will ne’er report, 
Hail goddesse of nocturnal sport 
Dark-veiled Cotytto, to whom the secret flame 
Of midnight torches burns; mysterious dame 
That ne’re art called, but when the dragon womb 
Of Stygian darkness spits her thickest gloom, 
And makes one blot of all the air, 
Stay thy cloudy ebon chair, 
Wherin thou rid'st with Hecat’, and befriend 
Us thy vowed priests, till utmost end 
Of all thy dues be done, and none left out, 
Ere the blabbing eastern scout, 
The nice Morn on th’ Indian steep 
From her cabined loop hole peep, 
And to the tell-tale sun descry 
Our concealed solemnity. 
     (125–42) 
 
Comus, a divine being himself, also worships another divinity, here the goddess Cotytto, a 
Thracian goddess whose nocturnal rituals were filled with dancing and debauchery. But this 
makes sense because he stiles himself and his companions “vowed priests.” They are also 
punctilious in their worship of the goddess: “all thy dues be done, and none left out.” The 
tone is one of inversion. The very word “solemnity” seems to imply a ritual performed under 
the sun (Latin sol) and thus open for all to see, but Comus revels in the concealment of his 
rites. There is a strong sense of social transgression here, too. “Daylight,” for him, stands in 
for social and religious rituals that enjoin a degree of accountability on the worshipper; it 
“makes sin” precisely because it is the communal element of religious practice that is open to 
judgment by outside eyes, not to mention the eyes of god. But Comus has a different kind of 
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community, one sustained by mutual adherence to the minute performance of secret rituals 
outside of the public gaze. 
 Therefore, it is fitting, though problematic in some ways, that Comus disguises 
himself as a “harmless villager” when he wants to trick the Lady (166). Comus actually does 
seem to be a rustic god. He initially wonders, after hearing the Lady’s song, if she is the  
goddess that in rural shrine 
Dwell’st here with Pan, or Sylvan, by blest song 
Forbidding every bleak unkindly fog 
To touch the prosperous growth of this tall wood. 
      (266–69) 
 
The Lady seems like the “genius of the wood” of the Arcades entertainment, who protects the 
plants in his care from inclement weather. This initial reaction proves prescient, but between 
here and the end of the masque Comus presents himself instead as an authority on the 
specifics of the locale. The Lady takes him to be a villager intimately acquainted with the 
landscape. She asks him for directions, to which he responds: 
I know each lane, and every alley green 
Dingle, or bushy dell of this wild wood, 
And every bosky bourn from side to side 
My daily walks and ancient neighborhood, 
And if your stray attendance be yet lodged, 
Or should within these limits, I shall know 
Ere morrow wake, or the low-roosted lark 
From her thatched pallet rouse, if otherwise 
I can conduct you lady to a low 
But loyal cottage, where you may be safe 
Till further quest. 
      (310–20) 
 
Comus describes himself as a guardian angel, one who knows the land and who seems to 
have an acquaintance with the traditions of his “ancient neighborhood.” In fact, his self 
representation is fairly accurate, because Comus does represent the extremes of religious 
investiture of specific places with sacred significance. His power derives in part from the 
  
 289
enclosure of his world, “within these limits.” Yet, Comus’s impression of the Lady as a 
guardian spirit is a clue that it is actually she who represents the correct way to understand 
the religious significance of sacred space because she imports heavenly, abstract principles 
into “each lane” of the “wild wood.” 
 Of course, Milton gives us a real guardian angel in the figure of the Attendant Spirit, 
who provides an entry point for ideas of local protection that Comus and the Lady confront 
later on. As Carey notes, in the Trinity and Bridgewater manuscripts Milton made it clear 
that this spirit was, as the Trinity MS has it, a “guardian spirit, or daemon” (p. 175). The 
spirit’s speech, from the beginning, sets up the notion that the earthly realm itself is, from the 
point of view of heaven, an enclosure of sorts. He lives, as he tells us, 
In regions mild of calm and serene air, 
Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot, 
Which men call earth, and, with low-thoughted care 
Confined, and pestered in this pinfold here, 
Strive to keep up a frail, and feverish being. 
      (4–8) 
 
Humans, implies the spirit, are pressed together like cattle in their mortal enclosure. This is 
simply the way of earthly life, so much so that the gods have divided the earth and assigned 
guardians to the different parts. Milton was indebted to Plutarch’s Moralia for the notion that 
demons were assigned to specific places, an idea that William Camden repeats in his 
Britannia.311 But certainly the idea was familiar to him, if only from his Nativity Ode, that 
each place had a specific “genius” or spirit associated with it. Yet this guardian belongs just 
as much to the Christian tradition of guardian angels as the pagan tradition of genius. The 
Spirit’s opening dialogue establishes the authority of the Earl of Bridgewater in Wales while 
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simultaneously providing a superstructure of “blue-haired deities” (29) that link the “noble 
peer” (31) to the rest of the nation. It is important, though, that this spirit or demon is not 
necessarily a god, as Comus styles the Lady when he first sees her, but rather something in 
between a god and a human. His power is less direct than a god’s would be; he is more like a 
facilitator or guide, who only works from a distance.  
 When Comus reveals himself to the Lady, though, he portrays the natural world’s link 
with God as functionally unmediated. For him, God has created nature for use; thus, the 
various spirits and mediating guides are unnecessary once the function of natural objects has 
been established. But the Lady ferrets out a contradiction in Comus’s lengthy praise of 
natural indulgence, which would actually consign all the abundance to a few people; the 
Lady notes that this would preclude each just man from having his fair share, because 
“riotous” people would take it all (762). Comus claimed that “Beauty is Nature’s brag, and 
must be shown / In courts, at feasts, and high solemnities” (744–45). The Lady’s speech is 
thus meant to indict aristocratic “riot,” which allocates nature’s abundance to a few and 
encloses it within the terms of “the enjoyment of itself” (741). Comus seems to see sacred 
value everywhere in nature; for him there are religious reasons to appropriate nature’s 
abundance for earthly uses. But it is important that this view of the sacred is somewhat a 
parody of arguments from God’s omnipresence. The Lady argues for more equitable ways of 
distributing nature’s gifts: 
If every just man that now pines with want  
Had but a moderate and beseeming share 
Of that which lewdly-pampered Luxury 
Now heaps upon some few with vast excess, 
Nature’s full blessings would be well-dispensed 
In unsuperfluous even proportion. 
       (767–72) 
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David Norbrook interprets these lines as an oblique reference to the problem of enclosing 
common land for private purposes, which often damaged the livelihood of poor rural farmers. 
Indeed, a puritan preacher was arrested in 1631 for advocating “universal equality” in the 
face of aristocratic arguments for the magnanimous distribution of goods within a system of 
enclosure.312 Norbrook’s linkage helps to explain the paradox of Comus’s seeming liberality, 
how it can actually be a version of enclosure, drawing nature’s benefits toward a private, 
select group. In a way this is also the justification for rituals themselves: God has marked out 
some times, and some people, as better than others and so he demands that we respect those 
time and people with an outward show and “high solemnities” (745). But it is important to 
note that Comus’s enclosure is not meant as a criticism of all sacred spaces, but rather of 
those enclosed spaces that require overly formal, institutionalized rituals that can hide 
malevolence and privilege the excesses of the few in power.  
The Lady argues for a more geometrical notion of the relationship between the 
natural sacred and political distribution. She links the distribution of natural beneficence to 
merit, whereby the “just man” would receive his fair “share.” But if we are to reject Comus’s 
defense of ritual display—albeit a hyperbolic parody of such arguments—then with what 
does the Lady replace it? What rituals and practices does she prize? In this context, it is 
important that Sabrina intervenes as a representative of the local, historical, familial, and 
even ritual connections to the land. As the Attendant Spirit describes her, this “goddess of the 
river” still retains 
Her maiden gentleness, and oft at eve 
Visits the herds along the twilight meadows, 
Helping all urchin blasts, and ill-luck signs 
That the shrewd meddling elf delights to make, 
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Which she with precious vialed liquors heals. 
For which the shepherds at their festivals 
Carol her goodness loud in rustic lays, 
And throw sweet garland wreaths into her stream 
Of pansies, pinks, and gaudy daffodils. 
      (842–50) 
 
In the Spirit’s telling, Sabrina is a traditional pastoral object of devotion. But the underlying 
concept of pastoral protection, sealed with flowers thrown into the water, seems to extend 
beyond the pastoral setting. Given the connotations of Comus’s defense of aristocratic 
privilege, enclosure of land, and secret rituals, Sabrina occupies a position completely 
antithetical. Milton might easily have had in mind pagan goddesses who became symbols of 
public beneficence in the face of private greed. In Ovid’s Fasti, Flora holds this honor; her 
games were instituted precisely to correct the imbalance of private power overtaking public 
land. As she says in Ovid’s poem: 
venerat in morem populi depascere saltus, 
idque diu licuit, poenaque nulla fuit. 
vindice servabat nullo sua publica volgus; 
 iamque in privato pascere inertis erat.313 
 
[it had become a custom to graze the public pastures, the thing was suffered 
long, and no penalty was exacted. Common folk had no champion to protect 
their share in public property; and at last it was deemed the sign of a poor 
spirit in a man to graze his cattle on his own land.] 
 
Sabrina is at least partially a champion for the Lady’s notion of temperance and justice, 
which would resist the enclosure both of land and of chastity. Sabrina’s “office” is, as she 
says, “To help ensnared chastity” (907–8).  
 The Attendant Spirit, in his praise, fashions her still further as a kind of Cybele, the 
goddess who presides over the higher forms of civilization represented by the temperance 
and art manifested in “cultivation” of all kinds. “May thy lofty head be crowned / With many 
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a tower and terrace round” (933–34), he intones. We might look to any number of classical 
sources for this image, but especially to Ovid once again. As the Fasti’s narrator asks one of 
the Muses of Cybele, “at cur turrifera caput est onerata corona? / an primis turres urbibus illa 
dedit? / annuit.” (But why is her head weighted with a turreted crown? Is it because she gave 
towers to the first cities? The goddess nodded assent).314 It makes sense at this particular 
moment to have Sabrina as a representative of cultivation and civilization, as the Attendant 
Spirit goes on to make a further distinction between holy and profane spaces. He advises the 
Lady: 
Not a waste or needless sound 
Till we come to holier ground, 
I shall be your faithful guide 
Through this gloomy covert wide, 
And not many furlongs thence 
Is your father’s residence, 
Where this night are met in state 
Many a friend to gratulate 
His wish’d presence. 
    (941–49) 
 
In a landscape alive with goddesses and spiritual protectors, ground can indeed by “holy”; 
and it is important that what makes some ground holy is, apparently, human civilization, 
specifically the community realized in familial identity. Sabrina as Cybele, with her towers 
and terraces, represents the impulse to make boundaries and protect your own kind from 
intrusions. But, Sabrina as Flora also is meant to evoke the communal responsibilities that 
such boundaries enjoin on the one erecting the walls.315  
 Milton may have also been influenced, albeit obliquely, by Lucretius’s lengthy 
description of Cybele’s worship, which according to Lucretius manifests the importance of 
                                                 
314
 Ibid., 204–5. 
 
315
 For Sabrina as a representative of hierarchical order, see Cedric C. Brown, John Milton’s Aristocratic 
Entertainments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 125–28 
  
 294
protecting boundaries, especially boundaries associated with nation and family. This poet 
notes her “muralique . . . corona” (turreted crown), owing to her role as sustainer of cities. 
But crucially, the “Magna Mater” (Great Mother) was escorted in her processions by armed 
attendants, as Lucretius writes, “quia significant divam praedicere ut armis / ac virtute velint 
patriam defendere terram / praesidioque parent decorique parentibus esse” (because they 
indicate the command of the goddess that with arms and valour they be ready to defend their 
native land, and to be both protection and pride to their parents).316  The Lady seems indeed 
to be a source of pride for her parents, but it is also clear that virtue needs arms, or some kind 
of extra assistance. This aid is provided both by the Attendant Spirit and Sabrina, as 
manifestations both of the land and of the spiritual help offered to the land by the gods. But 
most importantly, the worship of the Great Mother is a way to defend one’s patriam, or 
native land. It is of course evident that in the masque chastity is not only a private virtue but 
is coterminous with family honor and national honor. Of course, Lucretius saw this source of 
national honor as ultimately empty and baseless, because for him the gods do not take an 
active role in protecting earthly life: “omnis enim per se divom natura necessest / immortali 
aevo summa cum pace fruatur / semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe” (p. 146) (For the 
very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed 
and separated from our affairs). Milton’s concluding lines directly contradict this message, 
however. In the words of the Attendant Spirit: 
Mortals that would follow me, 
Love Virtue, she alone is free, 
She can teach ye how to climb 
Higher than the sphery chime; 
Or if Virtue feeble were, 
Heaven itself would stoop to her. 
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    (1017–22) 
 
The sentiment is fully consonant with the masque’s faith in demonic assistance and 
guardianship. Far from viewing God or the gods as remote from the world, Milton’s Maske 
locates them in the rivers and groves of a domesticated, though still spiritual, landscape. 
Sabrina’s protective yet liberating rituals do not, however, have exact parallels with 
contemporary practice. Their connection with the land and with family is simply meant to 
contrast with Comus’s invocations of strange, foreign gods and unfamiliar rituals. The 
international, alien character of Comus’s riotous crew and libertine arguments only serves to 
underscore the potentially unifying effects of keeping the gods constrained in their native, 
English groves. This constraint, however, allows Milton to see expansive sacred significance 
within that landscape because the pagan inflections of the past now work for Christian virtue 
in the present. Crucially, the rites of Comus are not somehow adapted or cleansed in 
Sabrina’s rites; they are abrogated and nullified. The two gods both have pagan origins, and 
also represent two poles of pagan religion itself: Comus the mysterious, secretive, and 
subversive, and Sabrina the communal, natural, and traditional. There is little anxiety about 
the pagan resonances of guardianship not because they are in fact Christian but because 
Christian virtue simply parallels the corresponding pagan drive to regulate the earthly 
manifestations of divine directive by means of demons and guardian angels. Ultimately, of 
course, these questions of guardianship are resolved in the psychological allegory of 
heavenly assistance: “Or if Virtue feeble were, / Heaven itself would stoop to her” (1021–
22). Yet, these lines point to a world in which heaven invests its mediators in the earthly 
realm, and within a landscape receptive to such mediation. 
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Milton’s complex representation of pagan rituals and of the underlying problem of 
heavenly mediation does not align completely with a Laudian or anti-Laudian position. 
Rather, it shows Milton rethinking the role of the sacred within his evolving literary 
explorations of classical genres and themes. Thus, when we move to “Lycidas,” we can find 
a similarly complicated and ongoing evolution in Milton’s representation of sacred objects 
and practices. However, this poem introduces the conflicts of institutional religion into the 
mix, which ultimately constrains Milton’s attempts to rethink and expand the poetic efficacy 
of sacred rituals and practices. Samuel Johnson’s famous critique of the poem’s blend of 
sacred and profane remains strikingly relevant for how we as scholars continue to approach 
the poem, especially its pagan borrowings and anti-clerical theology. His purpose was to 
criticize the ecclesiastical digression—or perhaps more properly the ecclesiastical focus—in 
the middle of the poem, framed as it is with pagan pastoral images and sentiment: “With 
these trifling fictions are mingled the most awful and sacred truths, such as ought never to be 
polluted with such irreverent combinations.”317 Johnson’s comment stands both as an 
indicator of his own poetic tastes and as a valuable insight into the poem itself, which gains 
power precisely as it blends the sacred and profane. It is important to note, however, that 
“Lycidas” actually divides the reception of paganism into two categories. That is, there is one 
realm wherein pagan rituals and ideas exist on the same continuum as Christian ones as long 
as they share similar sympathies toward sacred experience, such as guardian angels and the 
objects of pastoral devotion. But then Milton also introduces the specter of an institutional 
religion that sees in such notions of universal sacred significance an opportunity to make 
artificial, doctrinal distinctions and to divide the privileged clergy from lay sources of 
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protection and identity. For the institutional church, pagan rituals exist in the realm of 
historical traditions with the potential to “infect” of “pollute” the contemporary church. It is 
this side of pagan religious practice to which Milton objects; indeed, this increasing religious 
binary between the institutional and the intellectual—or poetic—legacies of pagan culture 
would inform Milton’s polemical definitions of paganism in his Of Reformation and 
elsewhere. 
 In “Lycidas,” though, the content and structure of the poem continually set up pagan 
customs of pastoral devotion as appropriate to the poet’s lament and then undercut those 
expressions as insufficient, fictitious, and fleeting. There are more than a few connections 
with Milton’s earlier representation of pastoral customs, especially in the Maske. The flower 
passage, which appears to be a later insertion by Milton (Carey and Fowler, p. 250), shows 
the poet calling on nature herself to honor Lycidas with  
The white pink, and the pansy freaked with jet, 
The glowing violet 
The musk-rose, and the well-attired woodbine, 
With cowslips wan that hang the pensive head, 
And every flower that sad embroidery wears: 
And daffadillies fill their cups with tears, 
To strew the laureate hearse where Lycid lies. 
For so to interpose a little ease, 
Let our frail thoughts dally with false surmise. 
      (144–53) 
 
We saw the Attendant Spirit recounting Sabrina’s pastoral worship, when shepherds would 
“throw sweet garland wreaths into her stream / Of pansies, pinks, and gaudy daffodils” (849–
50). The similar catalogue in “Lycidas” ends with the speaker noting the imbecility of such 
pastoral designs; to see in these flowers a palliative for death is but to “dally with false 
surmise.” There is a similar emptying of significance of those “rural ditties” (32) that Lycidas 
and the speaker used to sing, while “Rough satyrs danced, and fauns with cloven heel, / From 
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the glad sound would not be absent long” (34–35). “But O the heavy change, now thou art 
gone” (37). The pagan sources of security have failed to protect Lycidas on his journey. As 
the speaker says to the nymphs, “Had ye been there . . . for what could that have done?” (57). 
Such representatives of festivity are not up to the task of finding ultimate meaning in 
death.318 
The poem’s unfolding seems to promise us that heavenly reward awaits but only if we 
reject the wanton nymphs and what they represent, if we refuse “To sport with Amaryllis in 
the shade” (68). But then we are returned to the animist world of river spirits, who parade by 
until finally comes the “pilot of the Galilean lake” arrives to criticize the clergy. There is 
some connection here between the wanton shepherds who “sport” with Amaryllis and those 
that “scarce themselves know how to hold / A sheep-hook, or have learned aught else the 
least / That to the faithful herdman’s art belongs!” (119–21). Even more importantly, these 
negligent shepherds affect their flock adversely by infecting them with “wind” and “rank 
mist.” The sheep “Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread” (126–27). The poem now 
portrays these pastoral shepherds and their herds as tightly organized hierarchical 
organizations, for which false doctrine and teaching causes infection to spread from within. 
Johnson was certainly correct in thinking that this is a jarring change of tone from the 
conflicts presented so far in the poem. Up to this point the problem has been how to align 
rituals of devotion to sufficiently mourn a fallen friend. And indeed after this passage we 
return to differing interpretations of natural objects. But this passage suggests that the real 
struggle for “shepherds” and those in their “flocks” is an internal one, with the source of 
conflict welling up from within and spreading outward through the entire herd. The 
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ecclesiastical metaphors take us from a pagan world where death and mourning are matters 
external, to a world in which the problem involves a correct interpretation of doctrinal 
priorities within an hierarchical structure. 
The flower passage immediately follows the pilot’s speech; but its failure to assuage 
points onward to yet another source of value in Milton poems. In contrast to the problems of 
internal, hierarchical conflict, the poem then sends its readers outward to follow the journey 
of Lycidas’s drowned corpse: 
Whether beyond the stormy Hebrides 
Where thou perhaps under the whelming tide 
Visit’st the bottom of the monstrous world; 
Or whether thou to our moist vows denied, 
Sleep’st by the fable of Bellerus old, 
Where the great vision of the guarded mount 
Looks toward Namancos and Bayona’s hold; 
Look homeward angel now, and melt with ruth. 
And, O ye dolphins, waft the hapless youth. 
      (156–64) 
 
The tide has swept Lycidas all the way to the south of England, to Bellerium or Land’s End, 
where a chapel dedicated to St. Michael the archangel looked out over the sea. In contrast 
with inward rot we now see Michael as an outward looking guardian who is nevertheless 
encouraged to “look homeward,” to reinvigorate the land with protection. This figure is 
intended to stand between the options for religious devotion introduced so far in the poem, 
either wanton sport and fame seeking, or a reliance on a broken system of ecclesiastical 
supervision.  
 The figure of guardian angel or genius of the place worked so well for Milton because 
it was an ecumenical notion, not specifically pagan or completely Christian but rather 
holding the two in suspense. Lycidas himself becomes a genius loci at the end of the poem; 
by this point the guardian of the shore is not only a pagan god of place but also a 
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Christianized protector of the nation, guarding the flock against the corrupted shepherds. He 
is, as Lawrence Lipking argues, a linkage between the “old gods” of classical poetry and the 
nationalist and religious imperatives of Milton’s early poetry.319 Lycidas as guardian is an 
informing presence for the land, at once both spiritual and physical, partially a nature god but 
also a manifestation of a kind of collective consciousness.  
But Milton is at pains to license this concluding sense of sacral expansiveness by 
contrasting Lycidas with the failings of the pastoral institutions in present-day England. 
Lycidas’s reincarnation marks a point of departure for the nation, imagined as the community 
of mourning shepherds: “Now Lycidas the shepherds weep no more; / Henceforth thou art 
the genius of the shore” (182–83). The pagan associations of this figure are only acceptable if 
they are de-institutionalized, and this is what Milton gives us. The temporal language, the 
“no more” that has been the speaker’s refrain, is here part of an imperative. The time is the 
present, and the shepherds have stopped weeping. These two lines look back to the famous 
crux of the poem, both thematically and syntactically: “that two-handed engine at the door, / 
Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more” (130–31). The “engine at the door” 
resembles the “genius of the shore” because both are figures of boundaries and guardianship. 
And both verses rely on the underlying root word ingenium, a power or force that has been 
put to some use for a specific purpose. The liminality of both figures is important because 
both would mark out moments of change and discontinuity within religious culture and 
national identity. 
In many ways, “Lycidas” marks a culmination in Milton’s interest in paganism 
throughout the 1630s. On the one hand, he was clearly enamored of the idea that the pagan 
deities could represent local guardians and devotional practices rooted in community and the 
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land. He often gestures to the importance of keeping the gods in their groves and invigorating 
spaces with spirits and guardians. On the other hand, he is clear that the problem with these 
deities lies in their propensity to nourish institutional corruption through tradition and 
custom. In the Nativity Ode, the embedded representatives of paganism—the urns and altars 
and idols—had to be banished. But the idea of local consecration had pan-religious 
significance and was safe not because it was cleansed and adapted to Christian culture but 
simply because it existed in the realm of non-Christian religion. That is, the pagan gods were 
already subjects of culture and art, but that subjection allowed them to have religious 
significance precisely in those areas that were contested by religious authorities. So, if the 
Laudian church was trying to appropriate pastoral devotion and pagan ideas of guardianship, 
those same ideas were acceptable if they were seen to originate from outside of the church, in 
the realm of history, art, and culture. But if pagan practices originated within the church, then 
they formed a part of the “new-vomited Paganisme” that Milton indicts in Of Reformation 
(YP, 1:520). In this way it appears that Milton’s representation of paganism was somewhat 
coherent in his early poems; “Lycidas” simply shifts the discourse to a criticism of the clergy. 
That poems begins to see the possibility of corruption appearing within the church once 
again, rather than imagining that a supernatural dispensation has removed the threat of 
contagion. Instead, the ecclesiastical digression shows how ideas of sacred space could 
increasingly be yoked to ideological differences and linked to problems of institutional 
authority. Milton increasingly comes to see the idea of sacred space as a dangerous one, and 
rejects the idea of nationalistic, or ecclesiastical, protection because it so easily leads to 
institutional overreach and corruption. 
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In Of Reformation, published four years after he wrote “Lycidas,” Milton develops 
his ideas of ecclesiastical corruption to include both a resurgent pagan idolatry and the 
improper blending of sacred and secular realms. Milton’s great test case for both processes is 
the late-antique Christianization of the Roman empire under Constantine, who “must needs 
bee the Load-starre of Reformation as some men clatter” (YP, 1:555). This treatise is, after 
all, intended to touch on “Church-Discipline in England” (517); thus he has to justify why the 
first three centuries of Christianity provided a better model of church government based on 
scripture. Some say, he writes, that it was “a time not imitable for Church government, where 
the temporall and spirituall power did not close in one beleife, as under Constantine” (553–
54). But for Milton, the union of the two realms under Constantine was a step in the wrong 
direction: 
I am not of opinion to thinke the Church a Vine in this respect, because, as 
they take it, she cannot subsist without clasping about the Elme of worldly 
strength, and felicity, as if the heavenly City could not support it selfe without 
the props and buttresses of secular Authoritie. (554) 
 
Milton has to discount almost the entirety of the Eusebian tradition of ecclesiastical history in 
order to argue that Constantine’s government was more interested in secular authority than 
heavenly zeal. He responds by implying that these writers, the chroniclers of Constantine’s 
piety, were influenced by the emperor’s favor. “They extoll Constantine because he extol’d 
them” (ibid.).  
 More important than this imputation of corruption among historians, though, is 
Milton’s claim that Constantine, far from being the zealous iconoclast of pagan religion, 
actually allowed paganism into the church:  
And what Reformation he wrought for his owne time it will not be amisse to 
consider, hee appointed certaine times for Fasts, and Feasts, built stately 
Churches, gave large Immunities to the Clergie, great Riches and Promotions 
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to Bishops, gave and minister'd occasion to bring in a Deluge of Ceremonies, 
thereby either to draw in the Heathen by a resemblance of their rites, or to set 
a glosse upon the simplicity, and plainnesse of Christianity which to the 
gorgeous solemnities of Paganisme, and the sense of the Worlds Children 
seem'd but a homely and Yeomanly Religion, for the beauty of inward 
Sanctity was not within their prospect. (556) 
 
Milton’s argument anticipates his later, mature thinking about true religion and the 
relationship between paganism and Christianity. A relapse into paganism is more than a 
remote possibility for Milton; the ceremonies that Constantine introduced could be seen as 
ways to entice pagans through “resemblance” of their own rituals. The outward manifestation 
of Christian religion must always struggle, according to Milton, with the “inward Sanctity” 
that discriminates true religion. But paganism is also an internal threat in this passage: by 
showering gifts and favor on the clergy and ecclesiastical elites, he makes them more prone 
to accept the goods of the world as their proper concern. In language that recalls his 
ecclesiastical “digression” in “Lycidas,” Milton writes, the clergy under Constantine forsook 
their duty to God alone and “set themselves up two Gods instead, Mammon and their Belly, 
then taking advantage of the spiritual power which they had on mens consciences, they began 
to cast a longing eye to get the body also, and bodily things into their command.” They 
supported “their inward rottenes by a carnal, and outward strength” (577).320 The test for the 
clergy is their inward righteousness, or lack thereof; this inner corruption leads them to 
forsake their duty to the god above the world and seek to worship a god that is of the world.  
 Milton’s critique in Of Reformation is implicitly aimed at a version of political 
theology expounded by Eusebius of Caesarea in his account of Constantine’s supposed 
success in overthrowing paganism completely. In his Life of Constantine, Eusebius shows 
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how Constantine brought the interests of empire into line with the interests of religion; and 
indeed, for Eusebius one of the emperor’s greatest achievements was to realize that the sites 
of paganism represented a threat to the newly institutionalized Christian religion. Eusebius 
includes a detailed description of Constantine’s despoiling and destruction of pagan idols, 
temples, and sacred shrines. In book 3 Eusebius describes how Constantine renovated the site 
of Christ’s sepulcher; this was necessary, “For impious men, or rather the whole Tribe 
of Daemons by the assistance of such men, had heretofore made it their business, wholly to 
involve that admirable monument of Immortality in darkness and oblivion.”321 But, as 
Eusebius argues, the efforts of those “impious men” were doomed from the start, because 
Christ’s death had produced a kind of supernatural victory: “For the power of our Saviour 
(which shines with a light far more resplendent than the Sun, and which does not illustrate 
Bodies [as the Sun does,] but the souls of men,) had now filled the whole world with its own 
Raies of Light” (586). And so, with “God who was his Assistant” (ibid.), Constantine gave 
the order to ruin and demolish the pagan temples. The emperor even makes sure to remove 
the very building materials of the pagan temples and to ship them away, “thrown at a vast 
distance without the confines of that Region” (ibid.). This act was at once symbolic, 
practical, and revealing. For Constantine, the materiality of pagan practices needed to be 
changed; but the very assumption that physical nature was somehow important in producing 
true religious belief was itself a pagan one. Constantine and his elites seem to assume that the 
earthly realm is still alive with spirits and forces that need to be controlled by the governing 
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authority; that this control informs religious life is a key facet of Constantine’s ecclesiastical 
regime.  
 In fact, Constantine had nothing against pagans as people; rather, he persecuted only 
those who practiced the rituals and forms of ancient religion. It is with the practices and the 
temples, the sites of ritual performances, that Constantine is most concerned with. This 
seemed to rankle Milton a good deal, and leads him to decry Constantine’s efforts to entice 
pagans to Christianity. In fact, Constantine went even further. Like Theodosius after him, he 
allowed pagans to serve in his government, provided that they simply changed their worship 
habits. One of his first acts as emperor is of course to install his own governors:  
And in the first place, most of those he sent as Governours of the Nations 
distributed throughout the Provinces, were persons dedicated to the salutary 
Faith. But, if any of them seemed addicted to Gentilism, it was forbidden them 
to Sacrifice. The same Law was imposed also upon those, who in dignity 
preceded the Presidents, as likewise on them that had obtained the highest 
pitch of honour and the power of the Praetorian Praefecture. For either, if 
they were Christians, he gave them permission, that they should perform what 
was correspondent to their Appellation: or else, if they were otherwise 
affected, he ordered them not to worship Idols. (565) 
 
His actions illuminate Eusebius’s conception of the proper method of church governance. For 
Eusebius, Christ’s death was a kind of supernatural victory: pagans were easily integrated 
into the fold through a simple change of discipline. Eusebius is almost giddy at times in his 
praise of the great Christian empire that is on the verge of an unprecedented triumph over 
paganism, manifested in external grandeur and power. Constantine orders the “structures of 
the Oratories to be raised to a vast height, and the Churches of God to be enlarged both in 
length and breadth; as if all mankind (I had almost said) were about to unite themselves to 
God, and as if the madness of Polytheïsm had been wholly destroyed” (566). It is patent to 
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Eusebius that such a change of religion must accompany the large-scale political changes that 
Constantine was enacting. 
 And as some argued in the seventeenth century, Constantine represented a fine 
example of a godly ruler. His decision to unite church and state was mere prudence. As 
William Barlow wrote in 1609, such a strong central power actually had the effect of 
strengthening both religion and the empire. Barlow quotes Eusebius to the effect that 
Constantine’s court was “Ecclesiae instar,” like a church assembly, or a university.322 
Furthermore, the emperor’s efforts to enforce religious conformity were based on universal 
rules governing religious practice: 
it must needs be dishonourable for a truly-Religious King, to encertaine that 
into his Realme, which no Christian Emperor or King, ancient or moderne 
(were he a Prince absolute and hereditary, not elected vpon condition, nor 
enforced by violence, nor wrought vpon by feare, nor induced by irreligeous 
Policies) would euer endure, as in Constantine, Theodosius, Gratian, 
Arcadius, Honorius, and others is manifest: yea, which the very Heathens in 
their Common-wealth would not admit; who enioyned, that none but 
their Romane God, should bee adored, and THEY after no other manner but 
their owne Country fashion; Interdicting any priuate Shrine, or particular 
worship Different from their publike Order in Religion. (116) 
 
Barlow again cites Eusebius, appropriately enough, because the Greek historian was 
similarly a celebrant of the idea that state power had to enforce religious conformity. The 
underlying question for Protestant Englishmen was, according to Debora Shuger, how to 
“instantiate the holy in some sort of institutional form” without overly blending the political 
and the mystical or sacramental.323 Reformation-era religious politics often encouraged an 
uneasy political theology that promoted policies aimed at maintaining “publike Order in 
Religion.” For writers such as Barlow, the emperor’s political method of enforcing religious 
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conformity was actually the best way to maintain religious cohesion and, strangely, 
toleration. The supernatural overthrow of paganism paradoxically allowed Christian rulers to 
appropriate its practices and even its conceptual underpinnings of the “Heathens in their 
Common-wealth” into their own systems of government. But if Milton is correct and religion 
is a matter of inner righteousness, then the external expressions of religious devotion in the 
early Christian empire are still lamentably entangled with paganism. And he is especially 
scornful of the idea that political theology strengthened both; rather, if Constantine and his 
men “draw to themselves a temporall strength and power out of Caesars Dominion, is not 
Caesars Empire thereby diminisht?” (YP, 1:577). If paganism represents the confluence of a 
respect for earthly rewards and an inward inclination toward idolatry, then the process of 
extricating Christian culture must proceed by successive resistances and reformations that 
proceed from the inspiration of “inward Sanctity.” 
 Paganism is represented not only as a historically bounded set of ideas and practices, 
but also as an inward bent of mind that must be refined by conversion or else completely 
rejected. In Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton includes a long chapter on the 
necessity of divorcing “unbelievers” if they do not convert: 
Therefore the Apostle 2 Cor. 6. Mis-yoke not together with Infidels, which is 
interpreted of marriage in the first place. And although the former legall 
pollution be now don off, yet there is a spirituall contagion in Idolatry as 
much to be shunn’d; and though seducement were not to be fear’d, yet where 
there is no hope of converting, there always ought to be certain religious 
aversation and abhorring, which can no way sort with marriage (YP, 2:262). 
 
This sentiment accompanies Milton’s overarching message that there is such a thing as 
absolute spiritual incompatibility. Accordingly, there must also be a disjuncture between 
believers and unbelievers, pure and impure. He continues to employ the “spirituall contagion 
in Idolatry” as an explanation for a lack of inner holiness. The essential issue in play in this 
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treatise is rather the liberty of Christians to manage their own relationship with the ever-
present perils and temptations of paganism; thus, not being able to divorce is just as “if 
Christian liberty and conscience were left to the humor of a pagan staying at pleasure to play 
with, or to vexe and wound with a thousand scandals and burdens above strength to bear” 
(YP, 2:267). It is important to note that, increasingly for Milton, paganism is not only a 
historical set of practices and rituals; rather, it is an eternally threatening inward disposition 
that impels people to idolatry and represents an obstacle to true religion.  
 But Milton obviously also advocated, strongly, the engagement with pagan learning 
and art and their value for Christians. In Areopagitica he says that Julian’s banning 
Christians from pagan learning was a great detriment to the faith: “So great an injury they 
then held it to be depriv’d of Hellenick learning; and thought it a persecution more 
undermining, and secretly decaying the Church, then the open cruelty of Decius and 
Diocletian” (YP, 2:509). In his commonplace book, Milton includes an entire section on 
knowledge of “profane writers.” It appears there that Milton saw pagan “poetry, rhetoric, and 
philosophy” primarily as tools to combat pagans and even heretics. He calls them “weapons,” 
and notes that “The Waldensians observed that skill languages is very useful even in the 
Church, so that the faithful, whether driven from their native land or sent abroad by their own 
churches, were thereby better fitted for teaching” (YP, 1:376–79). He would return to this 
theme in his sonnet on the “Late Massacre in Piedmont,” the home of the Waldensians: 
Avenge O Lord thy slaughtered saints, whose bones 
 Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold, 
 Even them who kept thy truth so pure of old 
 When all our fathers worshipped stocks and stones. 
        (1–4) 
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The Waldensians are here early puritans, using their learning to combat idolatry.324 It seems 
that for Milton the chief use of pagan learning was martial: it was a good weapon for 
Christians to adapt to their own cause. This idea has a long pedigree, perhaps expressed most 
influentially by St. Augustine, who argued that Christians must take not only pagan learning 
but also pagan secular institutions and turn them to Christian uses.325 But in Milton’s works it 
gets an even more aggressive application. 
 We can assign this aggression to the fact that for Milton, like Augustine, the secular 
realm was often “theologically neutral”326 and thus only corrupted by the powerful urge of 
idolaters to mix the sacred and the secular. In Of Reformation Milton ranges back to 
Constantine once again to reorient the modern reforming impulse not to the emperor’s 
“donation” but to the propensity toward idolatry that the emperor introduced into the Western 
empire. In previous centuries, Constantine’s donation had formed a crucial point at which 
“reform” within the church and empire began to be necessary. As Robert Black has 
demonstrated at length, Italian humanists and earlier critics of the church often associated the 
donation with the idea that Constantine had begun the process of destroying the pagan arts.327 
For Lorenzo Ghiberti, for example, after the “Christian faith was victorious in the time of 
Emperor Constantine . . . Idolatry was persecuted in such a way that all the statues and 
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pictures of such nobility, antiquity and perfection were destroyed and broken to pieces.”328 
For him and others, the time of Constantine oversaw the end of the culture of pagan 
antiquity. Milton disagrees with this line of argument, however. The crucial act, for him, was 
the Western church’s denial of the eastern emperor Leo’s program of iconoclasm. He writes, 
“Mark Sir here how the Pope came by S. Peters Patrymony, as he feigns it, not the donation 
of Constantine, but idolatry and rebellion got it him” (YP, 1:578). That is, the Bishop of 
Rome used the pretense of the threat of iconoclasm to arrogate secular authority to the 
church. The important distinction here is that for Milton the “reformation” must not be aimed 
at recovering a lost, uncorrupted church. The ever-present threat of idolatry always leads to 
the mixing of the sacred and secular.  
Because pagan learning is a weapon for Milton, he is skeptical of associating such 
pagan arts too closely with any one historical period that can be recovered in tandem with a 
religious reformation. For the Italian reformers, Constantine and his deputies had persecuted 
idolatry too harshly, and so the recovery of pagan arts, literature, and knowledge would be a 
redress for wrongs done in history. Their antiquarian investigations aimed at reconstructing a 
lost knowledge and implicitly reducing the improper authority the church claimed over the 
secular realm. While Milton also lamented the intrusion of the sacred into the secular, for 
him recovery of historically specific forms of sacred and secular culture should not be the 
goal of reform, for a very simple reason. Milton thinks that “antiquity” does not necessarily  
distinction on historical religious structures or cultural and artistic artifacts, because God 
gave wisdom to all alike.329 He quotes Lactantius, who associated this argument with those 
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pagans who only believed in religion if it was traditional. He argued, according to Milton, 
that “wisdom, which being given alike to all Ages, cannot be prepossest by the Ancients; 
wherefore seeing that to seeke the Truth is inbred to all, they bereave themselves of 
wisedome the gift of God who without judgement follow the Ancients, and are led by others 
like bruit beasts” (YP, 1:562).  This point applies to pagan learning, as well. It was important 
for Christians to have access to learning in order to combat persecutory pagans; but Milton is 
only concerned with learning per se, not that this learning must be recovered in all its 
historical glory. The Italian reformers were concerned with precisely that historical crux; to 
recover the lost arts was also to recover a time when secular culture remained distinct from 
religious culture. According to many of them, the overly aggressive persecution of idolatry 
by Constantine was part of his program to take the forms of the secular pagan culture of the 
time and hand it over the church (whether or not they accepted the veracity of a historical 
“donation”). For Milton, alternatively, Constantine did not go far enough in his persecution 
of idolatry; and idolatry, the urge to worship both God and Mammon, leads to sacred 
institutions intruding upon Caesar’s dominion and taking on the forms of temporal authority. 
This mixture was, for Milton, the result of trying to invest sacred significance in 
particular things, or places. Adam’s mistake at the end of Paradise Lost is also the mistake of 
those who revere antiquity and tradition; to assume that God only reveals himself in 
particular places and times is to forget that God has dispensed wisdom equally to all. The 
veneration of places is the same, for Milton, as the veneration of an ideal, uncorrupted 
church, which never actually existed. It assumes that God’s presence can be localized, 
whether in particular places or particular historical moments; and this was, for Milton and 
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many others, one of the chief tenets of paganism. Importantly, though, for other scholars and 
poets, this aspect of the pagan inheritance demonstrated the extent to which Christianity itself 
participated in rituals and practices consonant with the light of nature.  
What we see in this period is an increasing bifurcation of the significance of religious 
culture in terms of its historically received practices. On the one hand, universalizing 
discourses of natural religion and natural law could privilege the sacred significance of even 
the most remote historical circumstances. This privilege was based on the idea, familiar from 
the Eusebian tradition, that Christianity had entirely overcome its pagan foes; thus, the 
political and social integration of religious discipline proceeded according to God’s wish that 
Christianity should incorporate and overtake other religions while retaining traditional forms 
of religious discipline that have been accommodated to Christian practice. On the other hand, 
writers like Milton increasingly advanced the idea that the only “universal” religious 
narrative that mattered was the one that argued that religious discipline was eternally divided 
between the pure and the idolatrous. Furthermore, this division implicated the secular realm 
because idolatry itself entices its adherents to blend the sacred and the civic in illicit ways. 
Thus, for Milton and others, paganism remained an eternally present threat to the religious 
and social orders. Milton fought that threat by linking sacred significance not to historical 
forms of devotion but with more immediate forms of religious experience, both material and 
abstract, which were nevertheless integrated, uneasily, into national identity. English 
religious culture in the years after Milton’s first poetic efforts debated intensely and 
creatively these dual narratives of the significance of pagan religions and their implications. 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 5 
Robert Herrick and Little, Sacred Things 
 
Toward the end of Robert Herrick’s Hesperides (1648) we find this short poem, called “The 
smell of the Sacrifice”: 
The Gods require the thighs 
Of Beeves for sacrifice; 
Which rosted, we the steam 
Must sacrifice to them: 
Who though they do not eat, 
Yet love the smell of meat.330 
 
In another poem, Herrick again writes about sacrificing smoke to the gods, when he and Julia 
prepare to sacrifice a “holy Beast”: “And (while we the gods invoke) / Reade acceptance by 
the smoake” (H-870). (He elsewhere styles himself a Rex Sacrorum [H-974], a priest who 
makes sacrifices.) Herrick is gesturing to a story, or an idea, as old as Hesiod’s Theogony, 
which Herrick was certainly reading around the time he published Hesperides.331 In Hesiod’s 
poem, Prometheus tricks Zeus into accepting bones instead of meat as a sacrifice. From that 
time, when Zeus discovered the trick, “human beings upon the earth burn white bones upon 
smoking altars for the immortals.”332 Among the rituals of ancient religion that Herrick 
invokes, this one has a particular resonance for him. There is a recurring theme in the 
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mythology of ancient pagan religions of the movement from a time when the gods ruled over 
men to a time when men began to rule themselves. One of the earliest symbols of this process 
is Prometheus’s substitution of the edible with the inedible in his sacrifice to the gods: this 
explains why humans get to eat meat while the gods are left with the bones and smoke.  
 Even more generally, this idea encompasses the rationale of ancient sacrifice as a 
representation, involving fictions of the human form rather than human bodies themselves. 
Book 5 of Ovid’s Fasti, for example, recounts the process by which a practice of human 
sacrifice in the Tiber was replaced by a sacrifice of effigies made of river rushes. This is an 
important feature of how religion works for Ovid; the symbolic form overtakes and replaces 
the requirements of violence and sacrifice: 
Now from the timber-bridge the Vestall chast  
The rushie pictures [simulacra] of old men doth cast.  
Who thinks old men of sixty years to be  
Thus drown'd, too much doth tax Antiquitie.  
Old fame reports that when Saturnia  
This land was call'd th' old Prophet thus did say,  
Ye people to the Sickle-God deliver  
Two men, thrown down into the Tuscane river.  
This gift each yeare to that Leucadian power  
Was given, till Hercules pitch'd on this shore.  
He strawy [stramineos] Nobles o're the bridge threw down:  
From whose example pictures [corpora falsa] since were thrown.333 
 
The false bodies replace the requirements of human sacrifice, the result of Hercules’ 
interventions in Italy. The replacement remains a representation of the human form, though, 
only composed of straw and rushes; the point is that nothing of “value” is being exchanged 
here, only the method of signification in sacrificial practice. Ovid has the Tiber itself give an 
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alternate version of this process of sacrificial substitution, wherein Greek settlers wanted 
their heirs to throw their bodies into the Tiber so that they could be washed back to Greece: 
"Yet of their countrey they had oft a sense;  
"And divers dying left these testaments;  
My body into Tyber throw, that so.  
My dust at length may to my countrey go.  
"The Heir was much displeas'd at his command,  
"And tombs his father in th' Ausonian land.  
"A rush-weav'd image [imago] into me is cast  
"In stead of him, to float to Greece at last.334  
 
This substitution is acceptable, Ovid seems to imply, because the image encourages the act of 
remembrance that the original sacrifice, or quasi-sacrificial act, was meant to enforce. It is a 
movement away from violence and toward the sophisticated rituals of modern Rome that 
Ovid is explaining. And the fact that Ovid almost always provides several explanations for a 
modern ritual suggests that what is most important for the poet is the fact of progress and the 
fact that modern religion obviates the need for violence, sacrifice, and loss of money and 
status to the gods.335  
 I want to suggest that this movement of religious ritual toward representation and 
substitution—which we might call a constant habit of religious thinking in ancient pagan 
cultures—suffuses Herrick’s poetry and provides a way to read the perplexing and elusive 
religiosity of his Hesperides. Indeed, this way of reading Herrick’s poetry also provides a 
way to argue for Herrick’s unassuming importance in a particular narrative of the 
interpenetrations of literary art with developments in early modern religion. In brief, I will 
argue that Herrick’s interest in paganism, much noted and much interpreted, was primarily as 
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a system of religious representation that foregrounds the symbolic manipulations of human 
art. Herrick’s immersion in ancient religion provides him with the tool to portray religious 
values in two, seemingly antithetical ways: first as a progression from violence to peace 
through the diminished powers of divinity and the ascendancy of human art, but second as a 
reinvestment in the power of symbols and representations as the repository of religious value. 
In the Hesperides, Herrick’s poems often see “religion” as a way to carve out artificial 
symbols and invest them with representational force; religion in this sense also provides the 
basis for a culture in which the histories of objects and their materiality provide meaning for 
human life. Herrick’s “pagan” religion encourages the idea that to lodge the divine in 
representations and fictions preserves the power of divinity while effectively limiting the 
potential of religious distinctions to cause strife. 
 
I. Herrick’s Poetic Pagan Religion and Its Sources 
Herrick’s poetic engagement with pagan religion is more of a representational strategy than a 
consciously constructed argument for one or another contemporary religious or political 
faction. Nonetheless, there are important ways in which this representational basis of pagan 
religions played a crucial role in developments in seventeenth-century intellectual culture, 
and thus in shaping Herrick’s poetics. Herrick himself was undeniably influenced by the 
Laudian conception of ecclesiastical polity and its attendant views on order, decorum, and 
the beauty of holiness. For Laud and Laudians, the English church was a part of an 
historically continuous tradition of changing rituals; Richard Hooker’s inclusive conception 
of adaptable church rituals played an important role in defining the place of the sacred in 
society.  
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Yet, there were two directions that a Laudian notion of the sacred could pull. As Peter 
Lake has argued, Laud’s and his sympathizers’ attitudes toward sacred space were part of the 
archbishop’s efforts to redraw “the division between the sacred and the profane in tight 
spatial and temporal terms.”336 The Laudians wanted to reclaim the boundaries of the sacred 
from “puritans,” who “allowed the sacred or the holy to spill out of the church and into the 
world.”337 Yet, Achsah Guibbory, while aligning Herrick with a Laudian view of ceremony, 
also argues that Herrick’s poetry represents an attempt to expand the reaches of the sacred, 
by incorporating different strands of religious tradition. She says that “The hallmark of 
Herrick’s poetry, in fact, is an eclecticism that derives from his passion for enlarging the 
boundaries of the sacred.”338 Moreover, “Herrick persistently mingles the sacred and the 
secular throughout the Hesperides,” asking us to “reconsider the categories of sacred and 
profane.”339 I take these comments by Lake and Guibbory both to be true, in essence: the 
Laudianism that wanted to contain the sacred also wanted to show its expansiveness. And 
they are both applicable to Herrick, and in Herrick especially we see the tensions, 
contradictions, and even the paradox, in this idea. But this tension, between restricting the 
sacred to narrow bounds and expanding the sacred to encompass historical and social 
experience and tradition, can also help to explain some of the parallel tensions among 
modern critics of Herrick. Both kinds of tension can, I suggest, be loosened if we look at 
Herrick’s artistic method and the religious context of that method. We will discover that 
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Herrick’s “paganism,” long a cherished and heavily qualified idea, was actually a lot more 
important than has been recognized. But, and maybe even more importantly, we will see 
Herrick as participating in some of the wider shifts in early modern religious culture, 
especially as he revises the meaning of paganism, “false religion,” and the place of art in 
religion itself. 
Guibbory’s and Lake’s terms can provide us with a starting point for revision. When 
both of these scholars write about Laud’s and Herrick’s interest in the “profane,” they are 
using the term to mean something like “secular” (hence Guibbory’s interchangeable use of 
both terms in her essay). That is, they take the profane to be everything that is not 
emphatically “sacred” or set apart from everyday life. Yet this is not at all how most writers 
understood the “profane” in the early modern world. For them, profane meant something 
closer to “evil,” or that which was diametrically opposed to the sacred.340 Among “profane” 
things, then, might be numbered pagan religions, especially as they were considered to be 
“false” creations of demons or of human priests, legislators, or poets. But focusing on this 
aspect of paganism in Herrick’s work might be a good way to speak of his poetry both as an 
engagement with the most pressing questions of his time but also as an imaginative product 
that creates its own space apart from the world. I find in Herrick’s poetry, especially in his 
tendency to miniaturize natural objects and produce “little” things, the same impulse 
celebrated by pagan poets to produce representations and symbols that deflect the forces of 
religious violence and strife into a realm of fiction, where they can be interpreted and 
understood as fictions.  
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This focus on the artifice of pagan religion and its symbols provides a way of 
interpreting Herrick’s poetry that splits the differences among his critics. As recently as 
2011, his most important interpreters were debating the efficacy, even the possibility, of 
placing Herrick in his historical context.341 The formalist criticism of the mid-twentieth 
century produced important readings of Herrick’s poetry that are still very valuable for the 
way they view his art as responding to sometimes competing, sometimes sympathetic pagan 
and Christian traditions. These readings attentive to form also emphasize the mythic, 
ahistorical quality of Herrick’s art, often in explicitly structuralist terms, associating his 
poetry with natural cycles and ceremonies and thus with the interactions between the art of 
nature and the art of the poet that creates poetic meaning.342 But Herrick was also, as 
Guibbory and others have forcefully demonstrated, a poet deeply enmeshed in his the 
religious and political circumstances of the 1630s and ‘40s.343 The “paganism” of Herrick’s 
poetry, from this point of view, is coterminous with the Laudian project of ritual renewal, and 
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works to lend legitimacy to the traditional, non-Christian ceremonies that remained in use in 
the English church. This is how “paganism functions” in Herrick, according to Leah Marcus: 
“Herrick’s extreme ritual eclecticism does not undercut the traditional pastimes he celebrates, 
but rather helps to sustain them by asserting their participation in a sacramental pattern of 
‘long continuance.’”344 But as some have observed, Herrick’s religious affiliations were 
complex, and his artistic method never exactly aligns with a Laudian or even post-Laudian 
aesthetic; indeed, his poems often parody or even subvert the religious ceremonialism so dear 
to the embattled Laudians in the mid-seventeenth century.345  
All this is beside the point that Herrick’s poetry is making about art and religious 
culture. We need, and Herrick practically demands, to read his poetry about religion in terms 
of his art; that is, we have to see his religion as artistic at the same time that we say his art is 
religious. Roger Rollin has suggested as much, that Herrick “makes a religion of his art,” 
though for Rollin Herrick’s art relied on the syncretism of “Christian humanism” to evade the 
necessity of making distinctions between true and false religion.346 But Herrick’s artistic 
religion was much more invested in the changing religious distinctions of his time than 
Rollin argues; any kind of “art religion” had undeniable political and cultural implications, 
staking a claim for the symbolic basis of religious forms that structured the secular realm of 
lived experience.  
In fact, to view Herrick’s religion as coterminous with his art is to claim him as 
sympathetic to a certain kind of Laudianism, the kind that wanted to find ways to contain and 
limit the sacred to certain places and times, but with a distinction. For Herrick, religious 
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ritual and ceremony are not exactly natural, if by natural we mean that rituals align the world 
of nature with the world of the divine, bridging the gap between the human and the holy if 
only for a moment. The form of ritual was the most important aspect of it for Hooker and his 
Laudian acolytes like Peter Heylyn, because by respecting the form and not the historical 
meaning of a ritual Hooker could solve the problem of religious inclusiveness, allowing a 
diversity of non-Christian rituals if only they were adapted to the English church. But ritual 
in Herrick’s poetry does not function this way at all. More important than the form of a ritual 
was its function. In the intricate constructions of his small forms, Herrick can represent a 
world of shifting forms that nevertheless contains another world of aesthetic and religious 
power. Herrick could have found a longstanding tradition associating small forms with 
symbolic power in both pagan and Christian theologies. But even closer in time he could 
have found the mythographers and scholars of his own day, who were increasingly fascinated 
with the mechanisms of pagan religions, the way that a “false” religion worked by creating 
fictions and rituals as symbolic units of meaning that responded to the needs of a certain 
culture in a certain time and place. 
As a way in to Herrick’s religious symbolism, one could focus on his obsession with 
“little” things in his poetry. This obsession is evident in the titles of many of his poems: “No 
want where there’s little” (H-100); “Love me little, love me long” (H-143); “The captiv’d 
Bee: or, The little Filcher” (H-182); “To the little Spinners” (H-442); “Littleness no cause of 
Leannesse” (H-461); “Little and loud” (H-600); and, most famously, “A Ternarie of littles, 
upon a pipkin of Jellie sent to a Lady” (H-733). The epithet “little” also appears 
conspicuously and often throughout the collection. Before I discuss the effects of Herrick’s 
poetic “littles,” though, it is important to note that the way that we approach littleness, 
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whether formally or symbolically, has consequences for how we understand Herrick’s 
poetry. If we take Herrick’s little forms to be a way for him to parody or mock the things that 
he has shrunk, then “littleness” is best understood formally as a reduction of size without a 
simultaneous refinement of subtlety. But, if we take Herrick’s little things as refinements, 
evidence of increasing artifice and representational complexity inversely related to 
magnitude, then we will see his small forms as symbols of natural and divine power. This 
latter conception of smallness seems most appropriate for Herrick’s poetry, because most of 
the time if something is “little” it is, to put it simply, good. “Littleness no cause of 
Leannesse,” as Herrick reminds us.  
Herrick’s insects and faeries also have a philosophical and religious ground to claim 
as their own. The idea that nature displays her craft more subtly in small things than in large 
was a principle that Pliny the Elder discussed at length. In Philemon Holland’s translation: 
in no thing elsewhere, is more seen the workmanship of Nature, than in the 
artificiall composition of these little bodies. In bodies of any bignesse, or at 
leastwise in those of the greater sort, Nature had no hard peece of worke to 
procreat, forme, and bring all parts to perfection; by reason that the matter 
whereof they be wrought, is pliable and will follow as she would have it. But 
in these so little bodies (nay prickes and specks rather than bodies indeed) 
how can one comprehend the reason, the power, and the inexplicable 
perfection that Nature hath therein shewed? . . . . there is nothing wherein 
Nature and her whole power is more seene, neither sheweth she her might 
more than in the least creatures of all.347 
 
This idea also took on theological connotations, suggesting that God often works the greatest 
miracles by means of the smallest things.348 The Plinian idea that natural artifice is best 
displayed in little things thus encourages a method of reading that sees size inversely related 
to significance. It was a common interpretive pivot to find in lowly, humble, and small things 
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evidence for the greatest workings of divine art. But we will mistake Herrick’s purpose if we 
completely align him with this tradition. Rather, Herrick’s little things resist inversion into 
the highest things; they resist transcending their forms and actually seem to emphasize the 
loss implied by their relation to a normative “bigness.” But this loss forms the center of their 
symbolic power: they represent the shrinking down of religious imagery, its reduction to the 
small form that remains small. But by remaining small, Herrick’s little things come to 
represent the dislocation of religious power into natural objects transformed into socially and 
civilly useful art objects.  
 And in this respect, the idea that Herrick’s little things are best read as indications of 
artifice (whether Herrick’s or nature’s), aligns Herrick with a particular kind of interpretive 
work being done on pagan religions by his contemporaries. For in the seventeenth century, 
pagan religions were often read as religions of various kinds of reductions and detractions 
from “true” religion. This was not always the case. Mythographers and religious thinkers 
alike had often considered pagan religions to be the result of what happened when natural 
reason was left alone to come up with conceptions of the divine. Natural reason suspected, 
fairly intuitively, that the good things of this world should be worshipped; consequently, the 
rituals of natural religion were themselves natural. Of course, this is a best-case scenario: in 
practice, rituals could be contaminated by priests or poets, or evil ones could become 
entrenched through tradition. This was, essentially, an allegorical way to look at pagan 
religions, assuming that the allegory always had its basis in natural reason. But this is not 
how Herrick seems to view pagan religions: they are decidedly messier for him, more rooted 
in an uneasy interplay between human art and natural objects. Indeed, Herrick’s natural 
forms are consciously and purposefully changed, most often shrunk down. And for a certain 
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group of scholars of pagan myth, this artistic license might have made perfect sense. Among 
the literati of Europe interested in such things, pagan religions were increasingly seen as 
artful deformations, either of sacred scripture, sacred rituals, or of natural objects (or perhaps 
of all three at once). Read in this way, pagan religions tend to be portrayed as fictions, 
shadow representations of already established sacred truths; moreover, this way of 
interpretation argued that pagan religions were simply representational systems, designed 
consciously as symbolic economies reflecting the mores of a given society. The artificial, 
rather than the natural or allegorical, was the most important mode for pagan religion. 
 As might be evident, the natural and the artificial views of religion jostled with each 
other even in the seventeenth century. The former view, entailing a faith in a natural religion 
that was continuous with Christian history, was favored by Laudian polemicists interpreting 
Richard Hooker. The latter view was perhaps more complicated; its view of natural religion 
was radically discontinuous with Christianity because it essentially blamed the pagan 
“mistake” on a misinterpretation of nature, a failing of natural knowledge. This discontinuity 
made it seem that the pagan religion was an emulation of the ancient Hebrew religion and, 
consequently, an attempt to reduce monotheism into the discrete idols and objects of 
polytheistic worship. The polymathic John Selden, to whom Herrick dedicates one of  the 
poems of Hesperides, provides a characteristically complicated explanation of this 
phenomenon in his De Diis Syris (1617, 2nd ed. 1629). In this work, Selden argues that the 
pagan religion was not necessarily trying to detract honor from the one true God by assigning 
divinity to created things; rather, it was also trying to emulate sacred truths, though it ended 
up turning them into profane trifles: “Ita certe quotquot nova Numina venerati sunt, non 
honori tantummodo Dei Opt. Max. divinitatem rebus ascribendo creatis, plerumque 
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detraxere, verum & sacro illius verbo sive scriptis sive ore tradito, ad profanas suas, quae 
sacra vera etiam saepissime aemulabantur, affanias sunt abusi”349 (Thus certainly they 
venerated any number of new deities, not solely to take away honor from the supreme God 
by ascribing divinity to created things, but also to be sure they frequently emulated sacred 
truths derived from the word of God or from holy writ or tradition, and they perverted them 
into their profane babblings). This is the point of Selden’s subsequent citation of 1 
Maccabees 3:48, “And [the Israelites] laid open the book of the law, wherein the heathen had 
sought to paint the likeness of their images.”350 Selden is trying to figure out whether the 
Gentiles looked through the sacred Hebrew scriptures in order to create their own gods in the 
mold of the Hebrew gods, or whether the Gentiles wanted to show that the Jews are idolaters, 
or whether they wanted to compel the Jews to worship pagan gods.  
He cites examples of all three, but he seems to think the passage means that the 
Gentiles were trying to model their idols on the gods of sacred scripture: “Haud satis capio; 
nisi tunc temporis idola sua non sine norma aliqua e Sacris Literis deprompta formari 
voluerint” (2:230) (I do not fully understand this passage; unless it means that in that time 
they wished their idols to be formed by a certain pattern drawn from holy scripture). But he 
goes on to complicate this idea: “Sed demum ut simpliciora illa πολυθεότητος initia tam male 
acceptae sacrae cabalae, quam admiranti, & dum coelestia corpora suspiciebat, coecutienti 
rationi naturali deberi quis jure autumet, satis reddidimus manifestum” (2:231) (But finally it 
appears unmistakable that the more genuine origins of polytheism are owed to both the 
malicious application of sacred practice, and to blind natural reason, which produces wonder 
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when it gazes up into the heavens). The idea of the insufficiency of “blind natural reason” is 
one of Selden’s favorites;351 his point here though is that natural reason, taken up by itself, is 
often insufficient to understand the phenomena it attempts to explain. So, pagan theology, for 
Selden, is the result both of a parody of sacred practices and of the misinterpretation of 
natural bodies. 
 This misinterpretation is based on the idea of worship as divided from its sources in 
the heavenly bodies. The media of worship are the idols and symbols by which the pagan try 
to close the gap between themselves and the heavenly gods.352 Their divinities were 
worshipped via “symbola, seu divinitatis velut tesseras sive indicia” (2:241) (symbols, which 
are tokens or signs of divinity): “Cum enim ob coelestium corporum distantiam, sacra eis ad 
votum fieri haud ita commode potuerint, symbola huiusmodi, quae viderentur inprimis 
congrua, in eorum honorem consecrare pium esse judicabant” (ibid.) (on account of the 
distance of the celestial bodies, they were not able easily to make religious offerings to them, 
and so they thought it a matter of duty to offer in their honor these sorts of symbols, which 
seemed especially fitting to them). And as Selden concludes, this method of dealing with 
distant objects of devotion led to the blurring of the distinction between the object and its 
earthly representation, so that eventually “Neque ita intererat, an symbolum, an numinis 
ipsius, an symboli figuram adorarent” (2:243) (it made no difference whether they 
worshipped the symbol, the form of the god itself, or the form of the symbol).353 The religion 
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that Selden describes is a complex system for transferring symbolic meaning. It is also 
mimetic, in that it imitates truly sacred practices gleaned from the Hebrews; but even more 
importantly, it was designed to imitate, and thus alleviate, the distance between humans and 
the divine via symbols and idols, through a symbolic transfer of meaning from sacred to 
profane. The importance for Selden was the fictive, imitative force of pagan religious forms; 
this is what made them work, though also what made them confused and false. 
 As Peter N. Miller argues, in Selden’s hands the study of pagan religions reached 
“back to the earliest human history; study of their worship, in turn, linked religion to the 
beginning of symbolic representation.” “Art and religion” thus had a common origin, in rites 
commemorating the dead, but pagan religions eventually blurred the lines between art and 
religion. Selden’s theory of “symbol-creation” made sense of pagan religions as a constantly 
shifting symbolic structure in which worship lodged by turns in the god, his symbol, and its 
figure.354 By way of investigating pagan theology as a system of symbol creation, Selden is 
also injecting ambiguity into the very idea of a “symbol” as a unit of meaning. For Plato, the 
“symbol” had denoted loss and separation, not a very stable foundation upon which to 
construct religious worship.355 But for his followers, such as Porphyry, symbolism formed 
the basis of pagan religion, because every god perfectly matched up with a natural 
phenomenon, of which the god was the symbol.356 And it should go without saying that this 
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kind of allegorical interpretation of paganism had been deployed by many during the 
Renaissance to license reading pagan myths. Selden’s analysis of the disjuncture of god, 
symbol, and figure in ancient paganism is extraordinary because he is subverting that 
tradition. The “symbols” of pagan religion do not really signify anything essential because 
they are interchangeable with divinity itself or with a representation of that divinity. Thus the 
gods of paganism are merely symbols, and the symbols are the gods. One might expect to 
hear something like this from Jacques Derrida rather than a seventeenth-century philologist! 
Like Derrida, Selden insists on the fundamental identity, at least in pagan religions, of the 
representation with that which is represented.357 Selden argues that pagan theology is a 
theology of spiritual emptiness because it exists purely in representations: the pagans put the 
gods in symbols and tokens, which eventually became gods themselves. It is a theology of 
small forms in that it consciously seeks to shrink the objects of its devotion into idols, small 
objects whose symbolic power derives purely from their status as representations.  
 Selden’s definitions contributed to a discourse of pagan theology that was attaining 
ever more complexity in the seventeenth century. Partly, this discourse was spurred on by the 
seemingly urgent necessity to distinguish true from false religion. Alexander Ross was not 
alone when he acknowledged in 1655 that “all Societies of men in all Ages, and in all parts 
of the Vniverse, have united and strengthened themselves with the Cement of Religion; 
finding both by experience, and the light of nature, that no human Society could be durable, 
without the knowledge and feare of a Deity, which all Nations do reverence and worship, 
                                                                                                                                                       
356
 See Porphyry’s thoughts on pagan symbolism quoted in Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, 
trans. E. H. Gifford, 2 vols. (1903; reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 1:122–26.  
 
357
 See Derrida’s discussion of symbols and the representamen in his Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 45–50. 
  
 329
though they agree not in the manner of their worship.”358 The ubiquity of religion was a 
widely held, commonplace belief, but its particular force appears clearly in this historical 
moment, when scholars like Selden were setting up ever more complicated distinctions 
among differing religions. Ross, on the other hand, was looking for the commonalities 
between paganism and Christianity, and finding pagan religions to be especially good civil 
religions:  
In the View of all Religions, we may observe how the Children of this world 
[i.e., pagans] are wiser in their Generation than the Sons of God [i.e., 
Christians]; for they spare no paines and charges, they reject or slight nothing 
commanded them by their Priests and Wizards; they leave no meanes 
unattempted to attaine happinesse: See how vigilant, devout, zealous, even to 
superstition they are; how diligent in watching, fasting, praying, giving of 
almes, punishing of their bodies, even to death sometimes; whereas on the 
contrary we are very cold, carelesse, remisse, supine, and luke-warme in the 
things that so neere concerne our eternal happinesse. They thought all too 
little that was spent in the service of their false gods, wee think all is lost and 
cast away which wee bestow on the service of the true God. They reverenced 
and obeyed their Priests, wee dishonour, disobey and slight ours; they 
observed many Festivall daies to their Idols, we grudge to give one day to the 
service of the true God. They made such conscience of their Oaths taken in 
presence of an Idol, that they would rather loose their lives, than falsifie these 
Oaths: But wee make no more scruple to take the name of God in vaine, to 
sweare and forsweare, than if we worshiped Iupiter Lapis, meer stocks and 
Stones; such reverence and devotion they carried to their Idols, that they durst 
not enter into their Temples, nor draw near their Altars, till first they were 
purified; they did not onely kneel, but fall flat on the ground before their 
feigned Gods; they knock their breasts, beat their heads to the ground, teare 
their skines, wound and cut their flesh, thinking thereby to pacifie their false 
gods: Whereas we will not debarre our selves of the least pleasure or profit to 
gaine Heaven. 
     (“To the Reader”; bracketed portions 
added)  
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It is important to recognize that though this was a very familiar project—finding paganism to 
be a repository of exemplary religious ethics as a way to critique modern Christianity359—it 
seems that at this point in the seventeenth century the very idea of “religion” threatens to 
become hollow. If all that “religion” means is obedience to conventional social mores, then 
distinctions of “true” and “false” are difficult to apply. Ross wants to have it both ways: he 
wants to call pagan religions (and many others) false, but that distinction is blurred when he 
goes to great lengths to explain how they have been useful to society. By creating and 
applying distinctions of natural and social knowledge, Selden is resisting Ross’s leveling 
impulse, which threatens to unmoor religion from natural or revelatory truths. In studies of 
paganism, the definition of “religion” was moving in two directions, as evidenced by 
Selden’s and Ross’s works. It was becoming synonymous with socially approved morality 
and practice, on the one hand. On the other, it was increasingly seen as a way to understand 
human relationships systematically, in terms of the way they created meaning. Thus, Ross 
focuses on ethics and Selden focuses on the interplay between natural knowledge and modes 
of religious representation: symbols, idols, and other fictions. 
 So, for the scholars of pagan religions, the problem was increasingly how to square 
the social, exoteric functioning of ancient religion, and perhaps all religions, with the various 
mistakes that the ancients made when translating natural knowledge into practice. This 
problem, of reestablishing the links between natural truth and religious practice, was taken up 
by G. J. Vossius, the Dutch scholar who was a sometime canon of the Church of England. 
His massive De Theologia Gentili et Physiologia Christiana (1641) was dedicated to the 
English clergy, lending his work at least some polemical urgency. Vossius, like Selden, was 
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attuned more to the esoteric aspects of pagan theology; but in the process of examining 
esoteric religions—and here again like Selden—he was trying to explain the exoteric forms 
of all religions by looking at how they integrated natural knowledge into their modes of 
worship. However, Vossius complicates Selden’s symbol theory of pagan religions. Vossius 
distinguished between two types of pagan worship, one symbolic and the other “proper”: 
“Proprium voco, quando, quod colitur, proprie & in se Deus esse existimatur. Qualis fuit 
cultus solis ipsius, vel Herculis, sive Thebani, sive alterius gentis. Symbolicum appello, cum 
quid colitur, non quia credatur Deus; sed quia Deum significet. Quomodo Sol cultus in igni 
Vestali, Hercules in statua” (I call it proper when what is worshipped is thought to have God 
in it. This is the worship of the sun itself, or Hercules, whether as the Theban Hercules or that 
of another nation. I call it symbolic when what is worshipped is not done because it is 
believed to be God but because it signifies God: just as the sun is worshipped in the Vestal 
fire, or Hercules in a statue).360 He also distinguishes between “spiritual” and “corporeal” 
proper worship. The spiritual has further divisions: “Spiritus vel est summus, vel medius, vel 
imus. Summus, ut mundi opifex; cuius veneratio in falso cultu consideratur, quatenus 
corrumpitur, si inter eum & alterum honos divinus dividatur: vel si Deus colatur in idolo. 
Medius spiritus est angelus bonus, malusve, quorum utrumque daemoniorum nomine 
Platonici intelligent. Imus spiritus est genius, sive anima defuncti” (30) (The “spiritual” 
worship is either of the high, medium, or low variety. The highest kind is the worship of the 
creator of the world, veneration of whom may be considered false worship when it is 
corrupted, if the divine honor is divided between him and another, or if God is worshipped in 
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an idol. The middle kind is the worship of a good or bad angel, both of which the Platonists 
call by the name of demons. The lowest kind is the worship of a guardian spirit or the spirit 
of the dead). Vossius seems to be arguing that idol worship is not the kind of “symbolic” 
worship that Selden thought it was; rather, it was a kind of spirit worship, but for Vossius the 
key point was that pagans conceived of the “spirit” in an immanent sense. That is, they 
thought the spirit actually resided in the object of worship, whereas in Selden’s account there 
is at least the possibility that symbols, or tokens, represent abstractly the celestial bodies that 
were the true objects of worship. This is all to say that Vossius is even more convinced than 
Selden that all worship depends on the natural conditions of that worship. Idols are inherently 
divided things: they represent the division of honor owed to the one, true God. Vossius 
restricts the signifying power of natural objects pretty severely, arguing that for worship to be 
“symbolic” it must involve objects that are artistic and are explicitly recognized as such. The 
Vestal fire and the statue of Hercules, both exist in the realm of ceremony and art recognized 
as such. Vossius, more so than Selden, sees the histories of art and the history of religion 
diverging rather than converging in ancient religion. 
Both Selden and Vossius, though, see pagan religion as the result of a certain kind of 
reduction or division of divine significance. And this idea of symbolic reduction made 
paganism a religion that was constantly seeking out ways to fit the objects of human art into 
their necessary place in the symbolic system. Pagan religion, as related by these scholars, 
reflects the logic of sacrificial substitution with which I began this chapter, wherein symbolic 
sophistication represents an advance of civilization over the cruel demands of the primitive 
gods. Both Selden’s and Vossius’s work is interested in the correspondence between the 
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symbolic economy of pagan theology and the way that economy translates into lived 
experience in the practices of pagan societies.  
 
II. Herrick’s Poetry of Miniatures  
We can find this same correlation of symbolic thinking and real-world consequence in 
Herrick’s poetry, which often seems like a meditation on the ways that meaning is created by 
seeking the kind of symbolic “fit” that Selden saw in the pagan worship of god, symbol, and 
figure. But Herrick is more interested in a version of Vossius’s idea of “proper”—as opposed 
to symbolic—worship, in which natural objects used religiously do not signify as symbols 
but only as evidence of how the divine is “divided” by reducing it to the earthly realm.  
 Consider Herrick’s “Ternarie of Littles” (H-733), which combines several ideas that I 
have been discussing. Herrick’s poem withholds a straightforward valuation of “little” things. 
His littles seem unimportant at first glance, a catalogue of the poet’s lack of material things. 
We may be meant to set “littleness” against a normative “bigness,” or at least a kind of ideal 
“mean.” But Herrick complicates this idea by coupling the word “little” with the word “fit” 
in each line. His little things somehow “fit” different kinds of containers that Herrick selects 
for them. This is more than merely a decorous way of organizing things by size, though. And 
here there is a parodic intent on Herrick’s part: he is suggesting that symbols do not get their 
meanings from their inherent signifying power bur rather from their setting, which has only 
to do with size. Assuming that Herrick knew that little things were supposedly more complex 
than big things, it is notable then that Herrick focuses not on the intricacy of small things but 
in fact on their size relative to their containers. But once we see the parody of symbolic 
meaning, we realize that this is a very “pagan” poem indeed because pagan religious 
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symbolism pointedly confused the relationships between symbols, figures, and what they 
ultimately signified.  
 There is an ethical dimension of Herrick’s poem, too, which complements the 
symbolic play. Herrick’s speaker is, as he is in other poems, content with little. Here, though, 
this littleness seems to structure more than simply the speaker’s relationship to his “stuff”: 
A Little Saint best fits a little Shrine, 
A little prop best fits a little Vine, 
As my small Cruse best fits my little Wine. 
     (H-733) 
 
It seems not to matter for Herrick whether the container or the contained comes first in his 
lines; what matters is the “fit” between the two. The point here is that framing produces 
meaning, that “little” things reach their full significance by being framed by other little 
things. On one level, this is a poem about the aesthetics of form: Herrick’s little things 
achieve some dignity by being fitted to appropriate settings. This is how Herrick copes with 
the diminution of his own, or his speaker’s, symbolic significance. It is important, then, that 
the poem begins with the “saint” in its “shrine”: what might connote an “idol” of Catholicism 
has been reduced to a “little” thing alongside Herrick’s “little Wine” and “little Bread.” 
Herrick has assured that these religious symbols only signify through their formal frames, 
instead of through their correspondence to transcendent qualities. He has disrupted the lines 
of correspondence between the symbol and its divine referent, to be sure, but he has also 
played with the figure by which the symbol is expressed. The saint, wine, and bread, along 
with everything else in the poem, are always contained in something else that frames and 
changes their meaning.  
 This poem stands for many others in Herrick’s collection in its disruption of natural 
meaning, the idea that symbolic language gets its meaning from the natural correspondence 
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of word and thing. Selden had investigated precisely that aspect of the development of 
symbolic language in his De Diis Syris, when he argued that the mistakes, and outright 
fictions, of the pagans could produce the linguistic and semantic confusion of symbols. I 
want to suggest, though, that Herrick could find pagan fictions to be artistically and 
religiously generative. The parody of symbolic meaning in the “Ternarie of Littles” turns out 
to have a positive spin: by seeking the “fit” between little things, Herrick shows us how the 
diminution of symbols can actually serve a civilizing purpose. Just as pagan religion saw 
itself becoming more sophisticated the more it relied on representations, Herrick finds that 
religious imagery benefits from increasing levels of symbolic and formal abstraction. The 
form of Herrick’s “little” things is coterminous with their content, in the sense that what 
appears initially as a lack of something one might want to have more of—like “Wine,” or just 
“stuffe”—becomes framed as a gain by the mediating idea of “fitness.” This is not mere 
decorum, because we are dealing with inherently undignified, “little” things to begin with. 
But Herrick’s littles turn out to serve much the same function as the pagan sacrifices, as 
objects whose reduced size and power nonetheless cement social and political bonds. As he 
concludes, Herrick reminds us that we are reading a poem about a gift: 
A little meat best fits a little bellie, 
As sweetly Lady, give me leave to tell ye, 
This little Pipkin fits this little Jellie. 
 
By the end of the poem, the little things of Herrick’s environment do take on a kind of power 
as objects that he can use to promote civility and community. But they do this not as symbols 
of the highest things but as artistically wrought and reduced symbols of immanent, rather 
than transcendent religious values. 
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What is remarkable about this poem is how Herrick resists the easy move that he 
might have made to encourage us to see in these lowest of things symbols of the highest of 
things. The “Ternarie” verse form might easily mimic the holy trinity, and the small things of 
Herrick’s surroundings might come to seem powerful precisely because of their potential for 
inversion. We expect this from other Renaissance writers who were interested in what 
Rosalie Colie defined as the “small form,” an intricately constructed emblem poem of sorts, 
in which meaning depends on the constant analogical shifting between high and low, divine 
and earthly.361 But Herrick does not do this, or at least he blocks what would have been a 
familiar mode of interpretation. Rather, he actually revels in the loss of power of the 
traditional religious imagery he includes. The religious imagery is reduced, shrunken, in 
order to redirect its focus to the horizontal bonds of community and individual. Writing about 
these religious objects in terms of their size and “fitness” confuses the traditional notion of 
small things acting as intricate symbols of larger things. In Herrick’s poetry, it is important 
not to ignore the reality of religious imagery that is reduced and diminished: in his hands the 
symbolic meaning of “little” religious objects does not act in a simple inversion but as a 
dispersal of “religious” significance. This dispersal makes the parodic bent very important 
and real; however, the parody is not necessarily aimed at a particular religious tradition but 
rather attempts something larger: a reorientation of religion itself as a system of symbolic 
refinement that sees in “little” things potential sources for non-transcendent signification.362 
What prevents Herrick from becoming a poet of transcendence is his reluctance to 
rely solely on form for meaning. The form of the little things in the “Ternarie of Littles” is 
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not as important as their “fit,” the way they function in tandem with their container or what 
they contain. “Content, not cates” (H-312), as he remarks elsewhere: “’Tis not the food, but 
the content / That makes the Tables merriment.” The food functions differently depending on 
the poet’s mood. A similar sentiment arises from time to time in Hesperides. “Devotion 
makes the Deity” (H-288), he argues, and “Who formes a Godhead out of Gold or Stone, / 
Makes not a God; but he that prayes to one.” Practice determines value here, not necessarily 
the form or the material of the idol. Devotion also gives religious worship its particular 
forms, which are complex products of history and tradition. In “Corinna’s going a Maying” 
(H-178), the poet says that “Devotion gives each House a Bough, / Or Branch” (lines 32–33), 
which were symbols of pagan worship. What makes a symbol mean something, for Herrick, 
is not that its form might correspond to some idea or object beyond itself; rather, symbols 
work because they are broken, lacking in some way, and thus depend on an imposition of 
meaning—in “devotion” or other forms of practice—to make them function.  The symbolic 
“break” can be expressed in terms of size, as in Herrick’s little food or little wine, or in terms 
of a lack of divine presence, as in the idol. What vivifies a symbol is the realization that it 
does not signify apart from its context, or the “fit” between its form and its function. Thus, in 
a poem full of the old-fashioned imagery of the pilgrimage, the religious imagery revolves 
around the idea that they “fit” the current situation of Herrick himself: 
My Crosse; my Cord; and all farewell. 
For having now my journey done, 
(Just at the setting of the Sun) 
Here I have found a Chamber fit, 
(God and good friends be thankt for it) 
Where if I can a lodger be 
A little while from Tramplers free; 
At my up-rising next, I shall,  
If not requite, yet thank ye all. 
Meane while, the Holy-Rood hence fright  
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The fouler Fiend, and evill Spright, 
From you or yours this night. 
    (“On himselfe,” H-306) 
 
The force of the last three lines is that this symbol of Christ’s death is functioning in a purely 
private way, almost as a familiar spirit or Penates, a household god to frighten away evil 
spirits. This is not exactly a throwback to traditional, popular religion: Herrick is not 
advocating the religious system of late-medieval religion. Rather, he is suggesting that its use 
is only applicable as a private source of meaning, legitimated by his “Chamber fit.” 
 So far I have been arguing that Herrick’s poetry was informed by the symbolic 
ambiguity associated with the “mistake” of idolatry and pagan religions, but I have not cited 
his explicitly “pagan” poems. The pagan poems are so obviously biased toward pagan 
notions of literary and artistic representation that it might appear that these poems are mere 
hyperbole. But I have been trying to argue that these poems are actually the norm for 
Herrick; they are typically the longest poems of his collection, the most complex, and, at the 
same time, the most explosively imagistic. These are the centerpieces of the Hesperides, 
though: they are so intricate and original that they are often taken to be parodies of sorts. 
They are indeed parodic, though, as I have suggested, parody for Herrick entailed the same 
kind of symbolic diminution and refinement that characterizes religious progress. Just as a 
religious representation can assume the requirements of sacrifice in pagan religions, so too 
Herrick’s small forms—along with his idols and pagan gods—parody and at the same time 
suggest the refinement of the religious sensibility. 
 “The Welcome to Sack” (H-197) is a prime example of Herrick’s tendency toward 
parody that slowly reveals its symbolic complexity. Herrick’s “sack” is no fine Falernum 
wine, but he loads it with mythological and ritual significance throughout his poem dedicated 
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to it. He starts out as a penitent idol worshipper: “Why won’t my Saint confer / Favours on 
me, her fierce Idolater?” (lines 25–26). This is not really a slight to Catholic or ceremonialist 
worship so much as it is a miniaturizing of the stakes of such a comparison. Herrick is not 
asking us to see idol worship as analogous to worshipping wine; rather, he is asking us to see 
that the pleasure he takes in “sack” makes calling it a saint or an idol seem slightly 
ridiculous. Again, the symbolic significance of religious imagery is skewed by withholding 
the kind of parodic inversion that we would expect if the poet’s intent were explicitly 
moralistic. Instead, Herrick reveals that his status as sack’s “fierce Idolater” miniaturizes 
himself as well as the idol: 
thy Iles shall lack 
Grapes, before Herrick leaves Canarie Sack. 
Thou mak’st me ayrie, active to be born, 
Like Iphyclus, upon the tops of Corn. 
Thou mak’st me nimble, as the winged howers, 
To dance and caper on the heads of flowers, 
And ridge the Sun-beams. 
     (lines 47–53) 
 
The fact that Herrick enlists himself in the effects of sack is, I think, the salient point here. 
His appearance in the poem prevents the little things from signifying a kind of transcendence. 
The transport that sack produces is not ultimately divine but nor is it purely earthly, either. 
The small forms here are at once earthly and also mythical. And, lest we are tempted to 
identify the earthly pleasures of sack with a total absence of the divine, Herrick immediately 
goes on to set his own worship of “sack” in the context of other pagan deities of the earth: 
Illustrious Idol! co’d th’Aegyptians seek 
Help from the Garlick, Onyon, and the Leek, 
And pay no vowes to thee? who wast their best 
God, and far more transcendent then the rest? 
     (lines 57–60) 
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The “transcendent” epithet in the last line above has to be taken seriously as a real distinction 
between the values of certain kinds of pagan idols. Of course, we are far from the realm of 
transcendence, and we have just seen that the effect of this “transcendence” is actually to 
shrink Herrick himself down to the size of a fly dancing on the heads of flowers. But again, 
the effect is not of inverting the low and the high, but of seeing an immanent rather than 
transcendent scale of values among low things. 
 The sources Herrick used for his list of alliaceous vegetables provide a historical 
dimension to Herrick’s own poetic idolatry. He is purposefully conflating at least three 
sources when he writes of the Egyptians’ deification of garlic, onions, and leeks. Pliny the 
Elder writes in his Natural History that the Egyptians swore oaths on onions and garlic 
(19.35). Juvenal mocked the Egyptians for holding leeks and onions to be sacred: “porrum et 
caepe nefas violare et frangere morsu / (o sanctas gentes, quibus haec nascuntur in hortis / 
numina!)” (It’s a violation and a sin to crunch your teeth into a leek or an onion. Such holy 
peoples, to have these gods growing in their gardens!).363 Numbers 11:5 recounts the 
Israelites suffering in the wilderness, as they remember the plenty they enjoyed in Egypt: 
“We remember the fish, which we did eat in Egypt freely; the cucumbers, and the melons, 
and the leeks, and the onions, and the garlick.” These two types of sources, the classical and 
the biblical, tell two, equally important stories that inform Herrick’s poem. In Juvenal’s 
poem, he mocks the Egyptians because they hold inviolate the onion while they feed on 
human flesh (carnibus humanis vesci licet [488]). Even more broadly, Juvenal’s point is that 
the human race has degenerated into barbarism and petty religious divisions since the time of 
the heroes, and we have literally become smaller: “terra malos homines nunc educat atque 
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pusillos” (492) (Nowadays the earth produces humans who are nasty and puny). His poem 
ends up as a plea for compassion and understanding couched in terms of religious and social 
progress. Humans may have shrunk from their original size, but the subsequent refinements 
of sensibility and civilization ideally should have made us clement and peaceful. Juvenal’s 
pacifism has a point of contact in Herrick’s poem, along with the idea of humans shrinking. 
When sack makes Herrick himself shrink, it brings “love” into his life and presents his 
“Genius” with “blandishment” (55–56). But, Herrick writes, those who do not worship the 
sack are prone to violence, like “Cassius, that weak Water-drinker” (61). Juvenal ends with 
an appeal to Pythagoras, who abstained from eating meat and would not even eat every kind 
of bean. In Herrick’s poetry, beans, along with garlic, often signal a kind of contentedness 
with little. “One feeds on Lard, and yet is leane; / And I but feasting with a Beane, / Grow fat 
and smooth” (H-461). Elsewhere he laments his departure from his country home by writing 
to “Larr”: “No more shall I (I feare me) to thee bring / My chives of Garlick for an offering” 
(H-333). The vegetable worship of the Egyptians seems to signify, for Herrick, a pacifism 
that accompanies certain kinds of reductions: of size, of expectation, of social standing. But 
these reductions also resist the idea that as humans become small they become more violent, 
as Juvenal had suggested. 
 The biblical analogue in Herrick’s poem does something slightly different from the 
Juvenalian parallel. The leeks, onions, and garlic represent, for the Israelites in Numbers, the 
sensuous pleasures they enjoyed in Egypt. More generally, they represent the customs and 
traditions of pagan religion, which Exodus suggested might be adapted to Judaic religion. 
This notion that the customs of the pagans might be cleansed and made conformable to the 
Jews has an important resonance in Herrick’s poem. His poem implicitly poses the question 
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of how one goes about converting pagan traditions. What does it mean that “sack” joins the 
vegetables that the Egyptians worshipped and that the Israelites enjoyed in Egypt? It might 
be that this is how Herrick proposes to “convert” the sensuous pleasures of pagan traditions. 
He adds his own pleasures to the pleasures that the Israelites desired in the desert. Thus he 
suggests some continuity between his own desires and those of the Israelites, but he also 
leaps ahead to a time when those desires are fulfilled. Herrick himself enjoys his garlic, along 
with his wine. He suggests that the proper way to adapt pagan ceremonies might be to get 
creative with them. If they are, after all, only detractions of what were originally Hebraic 
anyway, to supplement them with your own traditions might be an acceptable way of 
interpreting them. And by his own reduction, shrinking to the size of a bee, Herrick implies 
that the symbolic mode of his interpretation of paganism is not one of theological inversion 
but of immanence. He does not allegorize the leeks, onion, and garlic—or his “sack”—but 
rather presents them as significant objects in a personalized scheme of religious history.  
So, Herrick’s paganism here signifies how religious reduction encourages pacifism, 
and also how this manipulation of religious symbols can participate in a fulfillment of 
biblical religious history. But Herrick is suggesting that the end of the Christian tradition’s 
antagonism with pagan forms of religion might come from a redefinition of the very meaning 
of the “profane” world. If religious history is interpreted as a history of symbolic refinement 
(in a vaguely pagan way), then the “profane” is merely the repository of symbols that can 
potentially carry religious significance. Herrick’s miniatures demonstrate the artistic 
methodology by which he manipulates religious imagery, and thus makes his own religious 
symbolism. 
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III. Puppets and Profanity 
The center of Herrick’s religious-cum-pagan poetry, and one of Herrick’s most sustained 
experiments with small forms, is his “The Fairie Temple: or, Oberons Chappell” (H-223). 
This poem is about a fairy religion that resembles pagan religion and a kind of Catholicism, 
even though ultimately it is neither. In form, it initially appears to resemble other “fairy” 
poems of the seventeenth century, such as Michael Drayton’s Nymphidia (1627). But unlike 
Drayton’s poem, Herrick’s is explicitly and unavoidably religious. His fairies are not merely 
imps involved in amorous intrigue: they are idolaters, priests, congregants, and worshippers. 
The poem also encapsulates the way that the Hesperides portrays religion throughout its 
poems. The miniaturizing effects introduce an element of parody: to represent the materials 
of this hybrid fairy religion as tiny and almost powerless does suggest that this religion and 
its idols are inconsequential, perhaps false and even ridiculous. But at the same time that we 
perceive the parody we also perceive the efficacy of the little things and the intricacy of their 
rituals. This poem especially seems to imply that, for Herrick, the union of the small natural 
forms and the power of their symbolism represents the continued, if blunted, power of the 
rituals that the poem parodies. 
 As Herrick writes of the fairies, “Theirs is a mixt Religion. / And some have heard the 
Elves it call / Part Pagan, part Papisticall” (lines 23–25). In 1648, these lines might have 
seemed to be a familiar way to denigrate Laudian religion and the Anglican Church, as either 
overly pagan or overly Catholic, or simply both. Even if Herrick wrote it in the 1620s the 
lines would have had at least a little polemical complexity. The lines also take on parodic 
complexity: they could be setting up a criticism of the Catholic church, the Anglican church, 
or they could be parodying the mockery of those churches. Such complexity necessitates that 
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we take Herrick’s fairy religion as a new kind of thing, or at least that we acknowledge the 
difficulties of pinning it to one particular religious or ecclesiastical tradition.  
 So, when Herrick begins his poem with the various idols that the fairies worship, he is 
actually using idolatry to do several things at once. The passage describes the “Halcion’s 
curious nest” (line 4), 
Into the which who looks shall see 
His Temple of Idolatry: 
Where he of God-heads has such store, 
As Rome’s Pantheon had not more. 
His house of Rimmon, this he calls, 
Girt with small bones, instead of walls. 
First, in a Neech, more black than jet, 
His Idol-Cricket there is set: 
Then in a Polisht Ovall by 
There stands his Idol-Beetle-flie: 
Next in an Arch, akin to this, 
His Idol-Canker seated is: 
Then in a Round, is plac’t by there, 
His golden god, Cantharides. 
    (lines 5–18) 
 
The idolatry in the temple is meant to be ridiculous but it is also meant to reveal something 
important about what idolatry does and how it works. Herrick may not have been thinking 
about Vossius or Selden explicitly when he wrote this, but the idolatry in his poetic temple 
does something similar to the scholarly accounts. First of all, there is the chronological 
ambiguity, which underscores the way that paganism has borrowed from Judaism and then 
how Christians borrowed from pagans. The temple is called “Rimmon” after an idol temple in 
2 Kings 5:18, by which Herrick recalls the proximity of pagans and Israelites, and the 
occasional forays into polytheism by the Israelites, in the Old Testament. But the temple is 
also somewhat like the Roman Pantheon, a pagan temple that was converted to Christian 
uses. There is a clear historical dimension to the idolatry in the fairy temple, which 
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emphasizes the continual negotiations between pagans, Jews, and Christians throughout 
history.  
 Herrick’s “Temple of Idolatry” also shows off the logic of idolatry, which functions 
by multiplying images and essences in a process of simultaneous rupture and investment of 
divine signification. Idols rupture the divine by dividing it into parts, here various insects that 
live in the tree that has momentarily become a fairy temple. But idols also invest meaning in 
natural objects, typically in objects that serve some purpose in themselves and do not signify 
merely because they are symbols. As Vossius argued, an idol was part of a “proper” mode of 
worship; it was worshipped because it was thought that the idol itself had something divine 
in it. But Herrick, by making his idols purposefully low and ridiculous, reveals something 
essential about idols: they recognize the function of various parts of nature or the cosmos. Of 
course, idolaters arrive at this recognition of function through a mistake, by transferring 
God’s power into the created world. The idols, though, are doing in essence the same thing 
that Herrick’s poetry is doing. They divide and most importantly reduce the forms of the 
natural world in order to privilege some things, in some situations, over others. This is the 
ingenuity of Herrick’s “paganism,” that he can use the logic of idolatry to show how defunct 
or “false” religious traditions retain their power even when reduced to near insignificance.  
Herrick’s list of saints pushes what might have been a standard Protestant critique of 
Catholicism to its absurd conclusion, wherein the Catholic saints appear smaller and smaller, 
but permeate more and more of the world: 
Saint Will o’th’Wispe (of no great bignes)  
But alias call’d here Fatuus ignis. 
Saint Frip, Saint Trip, Saint Fill, Saint Fillie, 
Neither those other-Saint-ships will I 
Here goe about for to recite 
Their number (almost) infinite, 
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Which one by one here set downe are 
In this most curious Calendar. 
    (lines 30–37) 
 
The Protestant critique, that Catholics, like pagans, can make a saint out of anything, is taken 
to its absolute limit as the saints become “(almost) infinite,” seemingly in proportion to their 
reduction in size. The result of this critique, Herrick implies, is to define the fairy religion, or 
Catholicism or paganism, as coterminous with the mystical forces of nature itself and the 
popular beliefs therein. It is a reduction that turns into a kind of expansion, a dispersal of the 
power of invoking the saints back into the natural world, as if taking seriously the Protestant 
idea that the saints were mere idols to begin with. By 1648, the association of the spirits of 
“popular” or “traditional” religion with paganism and Catholicism would have seemed a very 
worn-out trope indeed. Amidst the waning of popular beliefs, though, Herrick does 
something different: his spirits are tiny, artistic miniatures, whose small size indicates their 
reduction in importance and influence among sophisticated readers. Herrick again resists 
making his fairy saints symbols of a unified, plenistic cosmos in which religious signification 
matched up with the mystical forces of the natural world. There is real loss here: Herrick’s 
poem implies that if we really want to argue that paganism and Catholicism are sympathetic, 
then the Protestant animus against them both threatens to destroy, or maybe has already 
destroyed the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between natural objects of devotion 
and the assignment of divine significance to them. Surely this is what Herrick’s small forms 
are attempting to correct, by substituting an artificial symbolic system, wherein small forms 
stand for religious progress though not religious integration, for a system of purely natural, 
magical symbols. 
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 But Herrick did not want to imply that Protestantism should become more Catholic 
(or more pagan!). Rather, he is doing something else, creating a new mixture of religions by 
miniaturizing the paraphernalia of other religions. In the next section of the poem, this 
religion begins to emphasize the role of artifice in religion, an idea latent in the idolatry that 
is so prominent in the fairy religion. This artifice takes the form of a “puppet-priest”: 
First, at the entrance of the gate, 
A little-Puppet-Priest doth wait, 
Who squeaks to all the commers there, 
Favour your tongues, who enter here. 
Pure hands bring hither, without staine. 
A second pules, Hence, hence, profane. 
    (lines 38–43) 
 
This is the only instance of the word “puppet” in Herrick’s poetry, but it comes in a very 
important place and it signals a highly charged concept. Herrick’s puppet acts as a guard 
against another important word for Herrick: the “profane.” The lines he quotes belong to 
Horace, signaling the boundaries of an esoteric religious space, which seems odd after the 
poet has noted the dispersal of the fairy saints throughout the natural world. But the puppet 
priest represents a hidden power in the fairy’s religion, one not readily apparent to the 
uninitiated. This power depends on the distinctions that ritual observance creates; indeed, the 
power may represent only the idea of ritual boundary, the idea that the division between 
esoteric and exoteric forms of religion imparts power to religion. And this is what Herrick’s 
poem is all about, the way that a ridiculous, obscure, and manifestly “false” religion 
maintains its force by creating ever smaller divisions and distinctions. Herrick’s “puppet 
priest” represents the possibility that this kind of symbolic reduction of religious forms can 
actually mitigate religious conflict—by couching all religious distinctions as artificial, 
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contingent, circumstantial negotiations—and that they should be treated as the fanciful 
creations that they are. 
As Herrick’s use suggests, the “puppet” had significant religious connotations in the 
seventeenth century, often as a term of abuse directed toward supposed idols or the trappings 
of ceremonial religion. The “puppet” made manifest many things that writers criticized about 
pagan religion, or pagan-influenced Christian religions. For one thing, the puppet implies a 
human, not divine, source of movement and control. This is why Henry Burton could 
compare church ceremonies to a mere “Puppet-play” in his Replie to a Relation of 1640.364 In 
a common polemical gesture, he suggests that ancient pagans saw in their puppet idols a 
representation of divinity, while modern Catholics and other ceremonialists give the “same 
honour to the Image, which is due to that, which it representeth.”365 Linking puppets to 
images as a source of representational confusion was not at all uncommon in the 1640s, 
especially for critics of Laud. William Prynne’s account of Laud’s prosecution includes a 
story (unconfirmed, though that scarcely matters) about someone who took offence to the 
painted windows in his parish. The glass depicted the biblical creation story, but the painter 
had also depicted “God the Father, in form of a little old man clad in a blew and red coat, 
with a pouch by his side, about the bignesse of a Puppet.”366 So, for Prynne one of the malign 
meanings of the religious puppet is its size; painting God, or confining him in any kind of 
representation, is a kind of reduction of his power or even his essence. This reduction also 
leads to the misconception of what is and is not a representation, just as Burton had argued. 
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Prynne’s story includes old women making “low curtesies” before what they took to be “God 
the Father in the Glasse window.” But Prynne returns to his principal complaint, which is 
that the image of God in the window somehow reduces God, and that this reduction in size 
accompanies a reduction in power. But why should the size of the image matter for Prynne? 
He seems to concede at least a little to the power of images and representations: “For how 
can God a most pure spirit, whom man never saw, he expressed by a grosse body, or visible 
similitude? or how can the infinite Majesty and greatnesse of God incomprehensible to mans 
minde, much more not able to be compassed with the sense, be expressed in a smal and little 
image?”367 Would a larger image have been more appropriate, or does a concern for the 
propriety of images enter into Prynne’s argument at all? I would suggest that yes, it does, at 
least on some level; the puppet’s size is important because the symbolic reduction of God’s 
image is the parallel of the ceremonialist’s argument for making certain times and places 
sacred while some are not. This process of ritualistic worship was, in the eyes of Prynne, an 
unacceptable reduction of God’s essence. 
In a related sense, puppets were implicated in ongoing debates about obscenity and 
profanity, debates that also commonly invoked pagan religions. In a sermon published in 
1641, Cornelius Burges links “puppet Gods” to “abominable” idols, and goes further to link 
“idolatry and adultery.”368 This meaning of puppet, along with the abuse of the word 
“abominable,” had survived apparently unscathed from Ben Jonson’s dismantling of it in his 
Bartholomew Fair in 1614. The scene of debate between Zeal-of-the-land Busy and the 
puppet pretty obviously inspired Herrick, even down to his puppet priest invoking the 
“profane,” an epithet that Busy applies to the “Puppet Dionysius.” After the puppet show in 
                                                 
367
 Ibid. 
 
368
 Burges, The First Sermon, Preached to the Honourable House of Commons (London, 1641), 12.  
  
 350
act 5, Busy thunders, “Down with Dagon, down with Dagon! ’Tis I will no longer endure 
your profanations.”369 One of the purposes of the exchange between the puppet and the 
Puritan is to redefine what “profane” means. Busy calls on his “zeal” to “fill me, fill me, that 
is, make me full” (5.5.39). Winwife comments, “What a desperate, profane wretch is this!” 
(40). Busy and the puppet then have an absurd back-and-forth argument about whether the 
puppet’s “profession is profane”: “It is not profane!”, “It is profane”; “It is not profane;” and 
so on they go (59–65). Busy’s (eventual) argument is that the puppets mix male and female 
clothing and are thus somehow profane. But as the puppet replies, 
It is your old stale argument against the players, but it will not hold against the 
puppets; for we have neither male nor female amongst us. And that thou 
may’st see, if thou wilt, like a malicious purblind zeal as thou art!  
The puppet takes up his garment. 
   (91–94) 
 
So, the puppet’s confutation of Busy does two things. It makes the accusation of “profanity” 
almost meaninglessness, since the term seems to have no real meaning outside Busy’s own 
mind. And besides, Winwife’s imputation of “profanity” to Busy suggests that true profanity 
might have more to do with social decorum and propriety than with religious distinctions of 
good and evil. Secondly, the puppet lifting up his clothing signifies the absurdity of religious 
zeal directed against idols, but especially against artistic representations such as the puppet 
himself. The “puppet,” for Jonson, was not a good analogue for false worship or obscenity, 
because the puppet itself represented both the insignificance but also the potential 
transformative power of art. That the puppet’s art resembles the Puritan’s inspiration 
suggests that the idea of the “puppet” served to upset religious distinctions by throwing those 
distinctions into the indeterminate realm of artistic manipulation.  
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Jason P. Rosenblatt and Winfried Schleiner argue something similar when they 
examine this scene in terms of Jonson’s exchange with John Selden about cross-dressing 
gods in antiquity and in the bible. In Jonson’s rebuke to Busy via the puppet, the puppet 
appears not as a pagan idol but as something almost beneath the moralistic distinctions that 
the word “pagan” would imply. As Rosenblatt and Schleiner note, “Although the puppet uses 
religious rhetoric (‘we have neither male nor female amongst us’), it does not transcend sex 
but rather is beneath it.”370 The puppet is not obscene or profane: rather, its apparent 
similarity to Busy’s “inspiration” makes the whole concept of inspiration seem more than a 
little akin to simple ventriloquism or mechanical manipulation. The puppet also seems, at 
least for Selden, to redefine the meaning of the “profane.” In his Table Talk, Selden remarks 
on the back-and-forth “debate” between Busy and the puppet over whether puppetry is 
profane: for Selden, the back and forth shows that religious disputes of sacred and profane 
“will never be ended, because there wants a measure by which the business should be 
decided.”371 I would argue that Jonson and Selden are both interested in redefining the force 
of the term “profane,” associating it as they do with puppets and Puritans. And indeed, in 
their account puppets and Puritans are similar because neither one is in control of their 
actions: the Puritan misattributes his inspiration to God when really he is being guided by his 
own desires. This is perhaps why Jonson and Selden wanted to take the “profane” appellation 
out of the hands of the clerics as a potential tool for making religious distinctions. And the 
puppet helps Jonson to show the essential absurdity of calling an object profane. 
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But Jonson does not let the puppet or the puppeteers escape criticism. As Rosenblatt 
and Schleiner note, one MS variant of Selden’s Table Talk shows Selden misremembering 
the debate in Bartholomew Fair as “Inigo Lanthorne disputing with his puppet.”372 This 
indicates that Jonson was, among other things, also trying to associate his then enemy Inigo 
Jones with puppetry as a mechanical art. Here is yet another meaning of puppets, as 
mechanical devices that had the potential to mislead and distract those not attuned to the 
artificial motions. Indeed, Jonson had criticized Inigo Jones’s theatrical machinations as 
“puppets,” which mirror the unreliability and inconstancy of Jones’s character.373 Jonson’s 
fear drew on claims being made about mechanical devices in early modern England, 
especially that they might be able to mimic natural motions. This mimetic power might even 
be used, as one sixteenth-century author boasted, to “keep the ‘common people’ in awe.”374 
The puppet in Bartholomew Fair is thus intended as a critique of two things at once. Its 
ventriloquism aligns with the inspiration of the Puritan as a way to deflate the pretensions of 
the religiously inspired, implying that they are no more than puppets to their own zeal. But 
the puppet’s disrobing itself also functions as a criticism of the hidden arts of theater and 
religion: the unveiling of its nether regions could symbolize the hollowness of theatrical and 
religious deceptions, which have the potential to deceive the credulous and the zealous alike. 
Mechanical mimicry could thus enforce religious distinctions between the 
incredulous multitude and learned initiates. But Jonson was altering a tradition of associating 
puppets with exactly the kind of thing that Busy was indicting. The Greek satirist Lucian had 
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made the orgies of Dionysius in ancient Syria famous for featuring automata, self-moving 
puppets that played a part in the god’s ritualistic festivities. These puppets were specifically 
designed to emphasize their pudenda. Lucian writes, “The Greeks erect phalli for Dionysius, 
upon which they mount the following sort of thing: little wooden men with large penises. 
They call these neurospasta.”375 One can find a similar description of the neurospasta 
[literally “things moved by strings”] in Herodotus: 
For the manner of Greece is in this banquet to weare about their neckes the 
similitude of a mans yard named Phallum, wrought and carued of figtree, in 
stead whereof, the Aegyptians haue deuised small images of two cubites long, 
whiche by meanes of certayne strings and coardes they cause to mooue and 
stirre as if they had sence and were liuing.376 
 
In the ancient writers, the puppets were associated specifically with the worship of the 
phallus during the festival of Dionysius. But the principle involved in the use of puppets in 
religious worship seems to be the same for the ancients as for Jonson. The logic of the puppet 
is one of substitution. Herodotus is explicit about this: the Egyptians substitute the puppets 
“in stead” of the stationary phallus. The puppet is designed to mimic life; the reason to use 
puppets in religious worship is, on some level, so that real people would not have to be used. 
The puppet takes on the requirements of religious devotion while remaining a simulacrum, an 
object invested with significance as a symbolic stand-in.  
While Jonson dispenses with the large genitalia, the rationale is similar in 
Bartholomew Fair. The puppet show is art at its purest, art that declares itself as art and yet 
invites the investment of symbolic meaning; and the puppet is a kind of blank upon which the 
community and the spectators can put whatever they want. In 1642 the philosopher Henry 
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More defined the Greek word Neurospast as “a Puppet or any Machina that’s moved by an 
unseen string or nerve.”377 The “neurospast” is simply the “outward form” of the body, that 
which depends on the “soul” to animate it.378 Essentially an empty husk, the puppet 
nevertheless can become the vessel for various kinds of religious devotion, depending on 
what soul pulls its strings. A religious puppet points out the instrumental nature of religious 
devotion, opposed to the idea that religious devotion proceeds from inspiration or zeal: for so 
many both in the ancient world and in the seventeenth century, a puppet is a religious 
machine. 
 Returning to Herrick’s poem with this complex history in mind, we can see that 
Herrick is drawing on the various connotations of the “puppet” in the seventeenth century 
while also supplementing them to suit his purposes. Herrick follows Jonson in associating his 
“puppet-priest” with a conception of the “profane” that is more purely classical than it is 
Christian. (“Hence, hence profane,” says Herrick’s puppet, quoting Horace.) The classical 
idea of the “profane” did not necessarily connote something “evil” so much as something 
uninitiated, appropriate for the vulgar people. The fairy religion is more interested in esoteric 
and exoteric distinctions than it is in distinctions of true and false or good and bad. 
Furthermore, the manifest absurdity and miniaturized proportions of the fairy rites makes it 
seem that any real distinction of sacred and profane being made in the poem is in the process 
of disintegrating. If the fairies stand for traditional Catholicism, then its standard of 
sacredness is rapidly losing its force. The esoteric secrets of the fairy religion appear 
thoroughly ridiculous from an outside perspective, as the rest of the poem goes on to relate 
the details of the fairies’ worship: 
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Hard by, i’th’shell of halfe a nut, 
The Holy-water there is put: 
A little brush of Squirrils haires, 
(Compos’d of odde, not even paires) 
Stands in the Platter, or close by, 
To purge the Fairie Family.  
Neere to the Altar stands the Priest, 
There off’ring up the Holy-Grist: 
Ducking in Mood, and perfect Tense, 
With (much-good-do’t him) reverence. 
    (lines 44–53) 
 
The fairies’ worship is full of odds and ends of the Christian, mainly Catholic, liturgy and 
ceremonies. Their altar is made of a “Transverce bone” (line 57), whose “Linnen-Drapery is 
a then / Subtile and ductile Codlin’s skin” (lines 60–61). There is a “Fairie-Psalter, / Grac’t 
with the Trout-flies curious wings” (lines 71–72). The logic again is one of puppetry: 
traditional, quasi-magical religious rituals are undergoing a process of substitution that 
reduces them to fairy rituals. Herrick is showing us the strings, here: the rituals are being 
revealed as ridiculous just as Jonson’s Puppet Dionysius revealed Busy’s screeching 
accusations of “profanity” to be mere words hurled at an inanimate object. 
 But unlike Jonson, Herrick does not seem as dismissive of the significance of the 
puppet itself. Like Jonson, he wants to redefine the nature of the “profane” back to its 
classical sense, which preserved the social distinction of initiated versus uninitiated. Herrick, 
though, pushes this idea even further. For Jonson “profanity” seemed to be more properly 
social than religious: Busy is a “profane” wretch because he lacks decorum. Herrick’s 
“puppet-priest” invokes the profane as a religious concept that depends on ritual actions that 
are manifestly ridiculous, parodies of Catholic practices. The point of Jonson’s puppet debate 
was to debunk “inspired,” overly personal religion in favor of communally oriented religion; 
and while Herrick’s poetry is perhaps also arguing for a more communal religion, part of the 
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effect of his puppet-priest and his mysteries is to demonstrate where the esoteric mystery 
religion has ended up. If we assume, rightly I think, that the content of the fairy religion is 
inconsequential, then the form certainly is not; and the fairies do seem to have a sense of 
decorum, charity, and duty. For while their rites are ridiculous, they are performed with care: 
No, we must know, the Elves are led 
Right by the Rubrick, which they read. 
They have their Text for what they doe; 
I, and their Book of Canons too. 
And, as Sir Thomas Parson tells, 
They have their Book of Homilies: 
And other Scriptures, that designe 
A short, but righteous discipline. 
The Bason stands the board upon 
To take the Free-Oblation: 
A little Pin-dust: which they hold 
More precious, then we prize our gold: 
Which charity they give to many  
Poore of the Parish, (if there’s any). 
    (lines 74–90) 
 
Herrick’s fairly religion is an esoteric religion, but one whose esotericism does not much 
matter in the traditional sense. This poem is recounting, or maybe summing up, the decline of 
esoteric, ritualistic religions; what does matter here is the form of the fairies’ worship, how it 
reflects “righteous discipline,” a concept that does not seem to be subject to parody. If all the 
miniaturized parodies of ritualistic religion are making an argument, it is that esoteric 
religion as such, a religion that contains some element of hidden or partially revealed 
mysteries, is increasingly available only as a series of culturally significant symbols. 
Herrick’s poem is at least partially a critique of Catholic rituals, but the critique seems half-
hearted: this religion is merely little and silly rather than evil or malicious. The fairies have  
Their Holy Oyle, their Fasting-Spittle, 
Their sacred Salt here, (not a little.) 
Dry chips, old shooes, rags, grease, and bones; 
Beside their Fumigations. 
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      (lines 117–20) 
The traditional fairy spirits are being asked to take on the significance of spiritual forms that 
were rapidly losing their ability to make meaning.  
 Thus, the materials of the fairy worship have become symbols of religious decline, 
the realignment of religious meaning toward formal practice on the one hand and internal, 
private belief on the other. For one wants to ask: what, for the fairies, would count as 
“profane?” The “sacred” in this poem is practically meaningless, associated with the small 
forms of the fairy religion and not capable of producing any real distinctions. The profane 
would thus seem to signify the human world, or at least the world outside the micro-realm of 
the fairies. As much as this is something of a joke for Herrick, there is still a sense in which 
he is tapping into a trend in religious thought of the middle of the seventeenth century and 
beyond. Herrick, like Jonson, wanted to mock the simplistic, accusatory connotations that the 
term “profane” had taken on during the lengthy religious polemics of the past hundred years.  
Yet it was also clear that this accusatory tone had been a near-constant of 
Christian/pagan polemic, at least since the early church. Even Eusebius in his Preparation 
for the Gospel sounds a bit like “rabbi Busy”:  
For I am not going to be frightened by the arrogant voice which said, ‘I speak 
to those who lawfully may hear: / Depart, all ye profane, and close the doors.’ 
Not we at all events are profane, but those who declaimed that such foul and 
unseemly legends about beetles and brute beasts were the thoughts of a wise 
theology—they who, according to the admirable Apostle, ‘professing 
themselves to be wise, became fools,’ seeing that they ‘changed the glory of 
the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of 
birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things.’379  
 
Eusebius is trying to redefine the meaning of “profane” from something denoting initiation 
and esotericism to something denoting the malicious misinterpretation of divinity. And 
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Eusebius was successful indeed: his definition still formed the basis for religious debate 
when Jonson and Herrick wrote their plays and poems. 
 But Jonson and Herrick were a part of the generation that began to change the terms 
of this debate. For a sense of how Herrick played with notions of the sacred and the profane, 
we should turn briefly to his Noble Numbers. Of crucial importance is his epigraph, from 
Hesiod’s Theogony, spoken by the shepherds of the wilderness: “We know how to say many 
things that bear the guise of truth, and we also know when we intend to state the truth.”380 As 
I suggested at the outset, the Hesperides is interested in the implications of Prometheus’s 
deception of Zeus in the Theogony: the entire collection is a celebration of artistic 
manipulation, especially of size and shape. The Noble Numbers is thus Herrick’s attempt to 
“state the truth,” as Hesiod’s shepherds say. And what does the “truth” of the Noble Numbers 
look like? Herrick’s pious pieces describe a God who is beyond knowing, access to whom is 
limited to specific times and places, and even then the access is fleeting: “God is above the 
sphere of our esteem, / And is the best known, not defining Him” (N-4). Access to God does 
seem to be granted in specific moments of ritual celebration, though. In “Another New-
yeeres Gift, or Song for the Circumcision” (N-98), Herrick begins by distinguishing sacred 
from “profane” in the classical sense of the uninitiated: 
Hence, hence profane, and none appeare 
With any thing unhallowed, here: 
No jot of Leven must be found 
Conceal’d in this most holy Ground. 
    (lines 1–4) 
 
However, when Herrick is not participating in sacred rituals, the “profane” seems to be 
something not only foreign to God but also evil and unclean as well. In “To God” (N-113) he 
writes, 
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Pardon me God, (once more I Thee intreat) 
That I have plac’d Thee in so meane a seat, 
Where round about Thou seest but all things vaine, 
Uncircumcis’d, unseason’d, and prophane. 
But as Heavens publike and immortall Eye 
Looks on the filth, but is not soil’d thereby; 
So Thou, my God, may’st on this impure look, 
But take no tincture from my sinfull Book. 
 
These two definitions of the profane are both in play in the Noble Numbers, but the classical 
sense seems to govern access to the divine, or the transcendental sacred. While the profane 
might be impure to God, Herrick at the same time identifies it with the quotidian world 
outside of sacred rituals.  
 One finds this ambivalence in Herrick because the nature of the profane was in flux. 
In Hesperides, as we have seen, the “profane” is refracted through levels of religious parody, 
symbolic reduction, and artistic manipulation of religious images. So it makes sense that in 
Noble Numbers Herrick shows us the consequences of his expansion of the realm of the 
profane into the realm of the religious. As a result of this expansion, the “sacred” is only 
accessible at particular moments, but is all the more powerful and significant for that. In fact, 
this concept of the sacred seems so usual for us that it is easy to miss how unusual it might 
have seemed in the seventeenth century.  
Scholarship on Herrick relies on distinctions between sacred and profane, but only 
rarely does it reflect on their provenance. For example, in an article that is not often cited by 
scholars of Herrick, Frances P. Malpezzi proposes that Herrick’s concept of the sacred can be 
understood by comparing it to that of the twentieth-century religious thinker Mircea Eliade. 
Malpezzi argues that in some of the longer poems of Noble Numbers, “Herrick leads his 
audience through an active, participatory meditation.” The ritual event “transcends time,” and 
thus accesses what Eliade calls “sacred time.” He quotes Eliade’s explanation of the logic of 
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religious festivities: “The participants in the festival become contemporaries of the mythical 
event. In other words, they emerge from their historical time—that is, from the time 
constituted by the sum total of profane personal and intrapersonal events—and recover 
primordial time, which is always the same, which belongs to eternity.”381 What I find so 
interesting about Malpezzi’s collocation of Herrick and Eliade is that Malpezzi’s argument 
actually makes sense and is not as anachronistic as it appears to be at first glance. As 
Jonathan Sheehan has argued, what most people meant by “profane” in the seventeenth 
century is not what Eliade would have understood by that term. Even in the passage quoted 
above, Eliade uses “profane” to mean something like everyday life, “personal and 
intrapersonal events.” But early moderns usually understood the “profane” not as something 
theologically neutral but as something theologically evil or impure, and certainly antithetical 
to the divine.382 Even so, one can actually find the more modern meaning of “profane” in 
Herrick’s poetry, both in Hesperides and Noble Numbers.  
Herrick’s poetry can thus help us to see how art can change religion, and vice versa. 
Herrick found in pagan religion and pagan culture in general a way of creating religious 
meaning that diverged significantly from the Christian tradition. He was no allegorist: he did 
not share a faith in any kind of sweeping allegorical synthesis of pagan and Christian 
religions via symbolic interpretations. Herrick’s “symbols” signified in much the same way 
that Selden described in his De Diis Syris, in which the pagan symbols function as 
representations of divinity but then become significant objects in their own right. Similarly, 
Herrick’s symbols, his religious objects, are marked by their reductions: in size and in power. 
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His fairy religion in particular is an enclosed religious system unto itself, a religion that 
nevertheless gets its structure from real-world religions. But the small things of the fairy 
religion, by virtue of their absurdity and the obvious fact of their fabrication, provide a model 
for religion in Herrick’s own time. The violent debates, and the physical violence as well, of 
seventeenth century religion have little effect on the enclosed religion of the Hesperides. By 
constantly refining and shrinking the contentious objects of religion, Herrick mimics the 
movement he found in pagan religion of increasing division, multiplication of significant 
objects, and symbolic sophistication. This is how ancient religion becomes modern once 
again in the seventeenth century: people like Herrick were finding that a religion of blunt and 
obvious fictions could reduce the necessity for religious strife. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion: The Poetry of False Religion and the Religion of the Secular World 
 
In many ways, this project has looked forward to a crucial figure in the history of religious 
thought: Giambattista Vico, author the The New Science. Vico thought that pagan theologies 
provided the inevitable starting point for any investigation of religion. The reason was that 
paganism lifted the veil of religious mystery and revealed what Christians denied was the 
truth: namely, that all religions were “poetic” creations. They were born of “poetic 
metaphysics,” they developed through “poetic logic,” and they culminate in “poetic politics.” 
These are of course his terms in book 2 of The New Science, which itself is called “Poetic 
Wisdom.”383 The impetus of Vico’s project came from his feeling that the world lacked a 
truly social history of religion and of the effects of God’s providence. “The philosophers,” he 
writes, “have not yet contemplated His providence in respect of that part of it which is most 
proper to men, whose nature has this principal property: that of being social” (3). Vico is 
attempting a “rational civil theology of divine providence” (4), the basis of which is “poetic 
wisdom” (6). Furthermore, the “knowledge of the theological poets” forms a way to discover 
“the first true origins of the institutions of the historic time” (6). By wedding philosophy to 
philology, Vico purports to discover something like a history of knowledge, based on 
“authority.” Vico is arguing for a reinterpretation of the poetry and “fables” of the pagans, 
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and as he ultimately concludes: “the fables were true and trustworthy histories of the customs 
of the most ancient peoples of Greece” (ibid.).  
 All of this seems respectable to us. We are still interested in the religious origins of 
human civilization, and the first religions do indeed appear to be polytheistic, just as Vico 
and David Hume thought they were.384 Only recently, archaeologists unearthed new evidence 
about the earliest religious societies in modern Turkey. As an article in a 2011 issue of 
National Geographic sums up the findings at the ruins of Göbekli Tepe, “We used to think 
agriculture gave rise to cities and later to writing, art, and religion. Now the world’s oldest 
temple suggests the urge to worship sparked civilization.”385 The religious temples of 
Göbekli Tepe are much older than the surrounding remains of agricultural development; this 
suggests that the site drew in people from the surrounding area and led to the necessity of 
feeding this religious community, and hence of the development of agriculture. This 
formulation reflects the similar urgency of Vico’s project. He too wanted to know the origin 
of the arts and their relationship to religion and human development. But it is important to 
note that the more recent way of thinking about religion owes much to Vico’s idea that 
religions develop in purely social and natural ways, and that the human understanding of the 
divine as something beyond this world always nevertheless has consequences for how 
institutions develop in this world. 
 So, Vico looked to paganism for his study because it was a religion that developed in 
purely social and natural ways. But his view of paganism was the product of the long history 
of Christian attempts to understand the relationship between paganism and the Judeo-
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Christian religious tradition. My dissertation has been an attempt to trace only the very last 
part of that history, in which paganism as a “false religion” began to be decoupled from the 
revealed religion that made it appear as “false” in the first place. And indeed there was one 
signal event that can provide a perspective on how this decoupling was taking place in the 
seventeenth century.  
 John Spencer (1630–93) was, in his lifetime, a respected but little-known scholar of 
Hebraic religions at Cambridge. In 1685 he published a lengthy and difficult text with the 
innocuous sounding title of De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus et Earum Rationibus Libri 
Tres (On the Ritual Laws of the Hebrews and their Rationales, in three books). John Spencer, 
though, has been credited with reversing the Hebraic precedence of pagan religions, arguing 
instead that God adapted the rituals of pagan Egypt for the uneducated and wandering 
Israelites after their exodus. He states his premise very clearly; he is setting out to prove that 
“Deum ritus aliquos inter Gentes olim usitatos in Legem cultumque suum transtulisse. . . . 
Ritus autem inter Gentes usitatos ullis Hebraeorum institutis ansam dedisse  (God transferred 
into the law some of the rites and worship that were once in use among the Gentiles. . . . And 
these rites provided the occasion for similar ones set up by the Hebrews.)386 This argument is 
itself an adaptation of Maimonides’ argument that God’s ritual laws are rational, done for the 
specific purpose of turning the Israelites from idolatry. Spencer makes much the same point, 
with the Christian caveat, against Maimonides’ insistence on the eternal duration of the laws, 
that the force of the laws is also adaptable.387 But this is precisely why Spencer’s book is so 
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important. It suggests that God is a historical actor, and the laws that he adapted for the 
Hebrews were themselves not eternal (the crucial distinction set up by Maimonides) but 
contingent, set up for a rapidly changing historical situation. Spencer’s God is cunning, and, 
ultimately, his laws are capable of being understood by human reason; if only human reason 
looks to history it can detect how God works in time, and it can adapt social needs to 
historically rooted divine revelations. Spencer was thus part of a long-standing dialogue 
about God’s accommodation of his truths to man.388 
The doctrine of accommodation that Spencer invoked and deployed had immense 
implications for the culture of the late seventeenth century, extending even to Vico’s new 
science.389 For one thing, it resonated with some of the radical theological currents of the 
seventeenth century, especially Socinianism. Spencer himself was rumored to have Socinian 
sympathies, having received in his rooms in Cambridge a noted adherent to this kind of 
theology.390 And as Sarah Mortimer has argued, Socinianism was fundamental to much of 
the religious turmoil in England surrounding the civil wars and even beyond.391 It was 
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stridently anti-Trinitarian, arguing for God’s singular action. Even more importantly, its 
adherents argued that God’s actions have to be interpreted rationally, in quasi-legalistic terms 
as a series of shifting covenants with humanity. Socinianism granted human societies a good 
deal of autonomy in deciding the calibration of divine law and human agency that would 
structure a particular society. It said, humans are endowed with reason, and while God does 
help us by revelation, those revelations have to be interpreted through human institutions, 
which also change and develop through time. This theology could seem radically subversive 
to church authority, but it also seemed to support political authority. By denying the all-
encompassing efficacy of the internal light of God for each individual, Socinianism threw the 
burden of interpretation on human institutions as a rationally derived and changing set of 
customs and values. 
So where does the Socinian triangulation between God, reason, and history leave the 
inheritance of pagan literature and culture in the Christian world? On one level, it reminds us 
that the provenance of the arts was up for grabs in the new historical theologies of the 
seventeenth century. Even more importantly, the distinctions of “true” and “false” religion 
were also up for debate; and central to these distinctions was the charge that pagan religions 
were false because they were based on poetic fables or perhaps even on Hebraic culture 
itself. For the state of this idea in the late seventeenth century, we can turn to John Milton’s 
last poetic productions, Paradise Regain’d and Samson Agonistes. 
A handful of scenes from these two poems, published together in 1671, demonstrates 
the importance of distinguishing pagan from Hebraic and Christian in the face of the new 
theologies and politics of the European world. In book 4 of Paradise Regain’d Satan begins 
his final push to tempt Jesus from his mission in the wilderness. One of the most enticing 
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temptations is pagan wisdom, the temptation for Jesus to immerse himself in Greek culture in 
order to convert the pagans. “Be famous then / By wisdom,” Satan says, 
All knowledge is not couch’t in Moses Law, 
The Pentateuch or what the Prophets wrote, 
The Gentiles also know, and write, and teach  
To admiration, led by Natures light; 
And with the Gentiles much thou must converse[.]392 
 
Satan runs through all the learning and arts of classical civilization, “the Olive Grove of 
Academe” (244); “Lyceum there, and painted Stoa next” (253); “Aeolian charms and Dorian 
Lyric Odes” (257); the “famous Orators . . . / whose resistless eloquence / Wielded at will 
that fierce Democratie” (267–69); and finally “Socrates” (274), the “Peripatetics” (279), and 
the “Sect / Epicurean, and the Stoic severe” (279–80). To reject the temptation of these 
classical arts and philosophies, Jesus’s response relies on distinctions of what is true and 
what is false. 
 And at times this response reveals the uneasiness that many, including Milton 
himself, must have felt about religious truth in the 1660s and 70s. In fact, Jesus’s response, 
for perhaps the first time, seems confused and unclear, even to the point of tangled and crude 
syntax:  
Think not but that I know these things, or think 
I know them not; not therefore am I short 
Of knowing what I aught: he who receives 
Light from above, from the fountain of light, 
No other doctrine needs, though granted true; 
But these are false, or little else but dreams, 
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm. 
     (286–92) 
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Jesus needs no other doctrine except the one that is “granted true” from the light above. Does 
this mean that the “Light from above” grants things true merely by its whim, or is there some 
basis in nature and the created world for this distinction of truth? This is the trap Satan was 
trying to spring, but Jesus does seem to imply that only some people receive the light apart 
from nature, and that this light creates a truth unknowable by others. But Jesus also appears 
to imply that the light can give out doctrines that are not necessarily true. “Though” in line 
290 could thus mean “as long as” or “if,” implying that there is a separate process of deciding 
what is true apart from the light granting doctrine to someone. This is a very important point, 
and Jesus leaves ambiguous the mechanism of God’s provision of “truth.”  
It is a fairly weak distinction to rely on when Jesus then claims that Greek culture is 
“false.” But he continues the language of true and false throughout the rest of his rejection of 
pagan arts and ideas: 
Who therefore seeks in these  
True wisdom, finds her not, or by delusion 
Far worse, her false resemblance only meets, 
An empty cloud. 
     (318–21)  
 
These philosophies and arts are “worth a spunge,” or “pibles on the shore” (329–30). But as a 
further basis for his rejection of pagan culture, he rehearses the argument that their arts are 
not original but rather derive from Hebraic culture: 
Or if I would delight my private hours 
With Music or with Poem, where so soon 
As in our native Language can I find 
That solace? All our Law and Story strew’d 
With Hymns, our Psalms with artful terms inscrib’d, 
Our Hebrew Songs and Harps in Babylon, 
That pleas’d so well our Victors ear, declare 
That rather Greece from us these Arts dervi’d; 
Ill imitated, while they loudest sing 
The vices of thir Deities, and thir own 
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In Fable, Hymn, or Song, so personating 
Thir Gods ridiculous, and themselves past shame. 
     (331–43) 
 
It is not clear why the derivation of the art forms should matter, though. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with the art forms of Greece; rather, they are simply bad imitations of 
Hebrew originals. Of course, not just the form but the content is also the problem. The pagan 
gods are obviously “ridiculous” and the singers and poets celebrating them “past shame.” But 
Jesus also seems to be arguing that art needs inspiration to be worthwhile. “Sion’s songs” 
(347) are “from God inspir’d” (350), but the pagan poems are not, “Unless where moral 
virtue is express’t / by light of Nature not in all quite lost” (351–52). But this last statement 
takes us back to Jesus’s original distinction of true doctrine granted by the “light” from 
above. We can only make sense of Jesus’s condemnation of pagan poetry by doing away 
with absolute distinctions of true and false; we have to believe along with Jesus that pagan 
arts are not outright fabrications but are merely copies. Finally, Jesus does return to an 
absolute standard of divine inspiration, but just as soon as he does, he also expands that 
standard to include “moral vertue” as a criterion of good art. 
 The most important point here is that the place of art and culture is implicated within 
distinctions of true and false. It matters which kinds of art are appropriate for expressing the 
divine. But it is entirely unclear from Jesus’s explanation where the standard of truth lies and 
whether or not it is one that applies to all. It certainly seems not to be a historical standard, 
and yet Jesus also uses a historical argument to suggest that pagan arts were mere copies of 
Hebrew arts. Why does the provenance matter at all if ultimately inspiration is to be the 
standard by which art is judged? It matters because of the very arguments that would occupy 
John Spencer and had occupied scholars of Hebraic culture in the seventeenth century. Did 
  
 370
God adapt pagan rituals and customs (including arts) for the Hebrews? Or the other way 
around? Was God rational? Can we provide an explanation of God’s creation of various 
kinds of culture, or is the shifting, elusive standard of “truth” ultimately too personal to be 
used as a historical criterion? 
 When we turn the page to Samson Agonistes, these questions are muddied even 
further. They are the most important questions of the poem, though. Samson’s place, and the 
place of Israel itself, amongst its enemies provides the occasion for Samson’s anxious 
musings about his connection to God. He chose Timna, the “daughter of an infidel” (221), 
because he “knew / From intimate impulse” that he “motion’d was of God” (222–23). This 
impulse haunts Samson in his imprisonment, because he was of course supposed to be 
Israel’s protector. His choice of wife thus matters a great deal. Did God wish Samson to 
marry not one but two pagan women, and if so, to what purpose was God commanding him 
to mix with the Canaanites, his “faithless enemy” (380)? Samson’s “intimate impulse” 
represents the unknowable dictates of faith, the surety that comes from accepting divine 
commands that are only accessible to each individual believer. Samson curses himself for 
divulging his secret and causing his own woes and his enemies’ exultation: “Sole Author I” 
(376), as he phrases it. The “infidels” around him materialize in the person of Dalila, who 
comes to justify her actions. Her religion, in contrast to Samson’s, is mediated by priests and 
by the interests of society. As she describes her motivation to Samson, she is “Adjur’d by all 
the bonds of civil Duty / And of Religion” (853–54). Furthermore: 
the Priest 
Was not behind, but ever at my ear, 
Preaching how meritorious with the gods 
It would be to ensnare an irreligious 
Dishonourer of Dagon: what had I 
To oppose against such powerful arguments? 
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     (857–62) 
 
Finally, she is convinced by “that grounded maxim” (865), which states “that to the public 
good / Private respects much yield” (867–68). Dalila’s religion is evidently a civil religion, or 
at least one that attempts to manage private affections and public interest in the name of 
religion.  
 Samson, though, thinks that this kind of religion is not true religion at all. “I thought 
where all thy circling wiles would end; / In feign’d Religion, smooth hypocrisie” (871–72). 
Samson could mean that Dalila is feigning her adherence to her religion, but it seems more 
likely that Samson is calling her religion a “feign’d” religion. It appears from her account 
that the Philistine religion is a state religion, though with an emphasis on the “state” rather 
than the “religion.” Samson’s next speech effectively demolishes the pretenses of state 
religion, arguing that religion merely gives the state’s leaders the excuse it needs to expand 
its borders. He says that the Philistines had no authority over him, and  
if aught against my life 
Thy countrey sought of thee, it sought unjustly, 
Against the law of nature, law of nations, 
No more thy countrey, but an impious crew 
Of men conspiring to uphold thir state[.] 
     (888–92) 
 
That is bad enough, that the Philistines had no jurisdiction over Samson. Worse yet was the 
way that their false, idolatrous religion licenses Dalila’s sense of devotion: 
But zeal mov’d thee; 
To please thy gods thou didst it; gods unable 
To acquit themselves and prosecute their foes 
But by ungodly deeds, the contradiction 
Of their own deity, Gods cannot be: 
Less therefore to be pleas’d, obey’d, or fear’d, 
These false pretexts and varnish’d colours failing, 
Bare in thy guilt how foul must thou appear?  
     (895–902) 
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Samson is not necessarily arguing that Dalila was acting out of self-interest; rather, he 
acknowledges her “zeal,” a kind of indefinable sense of religious devotion that produces 
action. Religion is actually her motivation, but this particular religion is of course “ungodly” 
and full of “false pretexts.” So, what kind of “zeal” does this false religion produce? Is it a 
“false” zeal, or does it even make sense to describe zeal that way? Milton is circling once 
again around the problem that Jesus raised when he defended himself against Satan. The 
internal dictates of god are the final and highest standard of religious action, but how do we 
know if they are true or false? If all religions are capable of producing zeal, a feeling beyond 
reason, then who gets to decide which religion is correct? 
 Samson’s ultimate response to these questions argues that “conscience and internal 
peace” get to decide what religion is false and what true; furthermore, conscience gets to 
decide that if a religion is false then it may be destroyed. Samson is eloquent at the end of the 
poem when he faces the Philistine officer; he argues that his mind is free to obey or disobey 
the commands of his captors: “Can they think me so broken, so debas’d / With corporal 
servitude, that my mind ever / Will condescend to such absurd commands?” (1335–37). As 
the Chorus sums up Samson’s position, “Where the heart joins not, outward acts defile not” 
(1368). The problem, though, is fairly obvious. Where is God here? Does God himself direct 
Samson’s conscience, or is the process a bit more hazy? As Samson goes on to say, the 
darker side of religious conscience is zeal, and zeal may be created by purely human desires: 
Lords are Lordliest in thir wine; 
And the well-feasted Priest then soonest fir’d 
With zeal, if aught Religion seem concern’d: 
No less the people on thir Holy-days 
Impetuous, insolent, unquenchable[.] 
     (1418–22) 
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Ultimately, of course, Samson’s own belief leads to the ruin of the Philistines and himself. 
His final act brings about another mixture of heathen and faithful, which had been the cause 
of the problem in the first place. As the Messenger says, recounting Samson’s destruction of 
the Philistine “Lords, Ladies, Captains, Councellors, [and] Priests” (1643), “Samson with 
these inmixt, inevitably / Pulld down the same destruction on himself; / The vulgar only 
scap’d who stood without” (1647–49). The final mixture joins Samson with his idolatrous 
enemies in a heap, and it is Milton’s final image of religious mixture. 
 Samson thus ends by suggesting that any mixture between the faithful and the 
unfaithful will result in destruction. But Milton inserts one final distinction into the 
destruction when he leaves out the “vulgar . . . who stood without” (literally the “profane,” 
those who were “in front of the temple”). Why include this detail? Samson and the Philistines 
were engaged in a kind of war of truth, with each side trying to reduce the religion of the 
other to personal or national interest. The God of Israel, after all, was still an ethnic God, 
ruling over a particular people even if he was the one true God. Dagon also stands in for a 
particular people who have particular rituals and customs. As John Rogers has shown, the 
entire poem turns on who has access to “secrets,” to private information both human and 
divine.393 Samson ends with the competing esoteric religions destroying each other. Only 
those outside of the wars of religious belief escape destruction, while the upper echelons of 
Philistine society are punished for believing in the wrong god. 
 The critical response to Milton’s later works, especially Samson Agonistes, has 
recently fixated intensely, and understandably so, on the problems I have been discussing. In 
his insistence on putting religious belief in dialogue with national identity, Milton does 
indeed invite characterizations such as Feisal G. Mohamed’s, who terms Milton a “pre-
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secular” poet.394 In fact, Milton demands to be read within recent reevaluations of secularism 
and secularization in the late seventeenth century. As Mohamed claims, “Milton and his 
contemporaries took it for granted that the spiritual peace offered to the upright soul could 
express itself in justified slaughter if God so desired.” Milton’s extremism should force us, he 
argues, to “interrogate the coding of Christianity and Western culture as fundamentally non-
violent, and turn a skeptical eye to any argument for the purity of a religious or cultural 
tradition.”395 But Mohamed seems to be saying that Milton’s Samson is claiming the purity 
of his cultural tradition, and that Milton would indeed adhere to a view of religious purity. 
We should be skeptical instead, he argues, of those who argue that religious and cultural 
purity can ever be non-violent. Mohamed is certainly too ready to describe Milton as a poet 
of rigidly held belief, as if his later poetry is utterly clear-sighted about its demarcations of 
true and false. (Nevertheless, his terms are valuable and we should not avoid this kind of 
discussion.) I have been suggesting that Milton’s poetry is not at all clear about demarcations 
of true and false, but Milton’s heroes certainly do deploy belief against what they perceive as 
false religions, and illegitimate governments. The formulation that Samson uses against 
Dalila remains troubling: your gods are false, he says, and thus your priests are liars, and thus 
the very foundations of your society are false. The consequences of this argument were 
unsettling for Milton, very obviously.  
Pagan religion in this case acts as an index of Christian belief precisely because it 
depends on the kind of civil structure that Samson critiques. This is why, in the end we have 
to place the development of pagan religion in the Renaissance within a larger narrative of the 
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“secularization” of religion in the seventeenth century.396 As the argument goes, religion and 
its rituals increasingly come under the control of the state in this period. Edward Muir terms 
this phenomenon “Government as a Ritual Process.”397 Furthermore, this process of 
government taking over the rituals of religion forms the pre-history of the separation of 
church and state; indeed, religious freedom itself starts out as something guaranteed by the 
state once it takes on the responsibility of policing religious distinctions.398 And this is one of 
the cornerstones of what it means for a society to be a “secular” society. Belief moves into an 
internal realm, which then licenses various forms of external expression that will in turn be 
unique to a particular belief system. As C. John Sommerville writes, in early modern 
England “Religious culture” changes to a “religious faith . . . in the sense of a separation of 
almost all aspects of life and thought from religious associations.”399 For Blair Worden, the 
rise of “civil religion” coincided with the rise of republican politics, but the idea of a civil 
religion itself was “only an extreme form of the transforming tendency evident within 
orthodox Christianity across the post-Restoration period: the shift of emphasis from faith to 
conduct.”400 Sommerville’s movement from culture to faith and Worden’s movement from 
faith to conduct are actually sympathetic processes. As faith moves inward the outward forms 
of religion become less subject to the demands of faith and more to the civil magistrate. 
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So, according to these recent formulations, “secularization” signifies a process of 
gradual alignment of religious ritual and social custom. According to Charles Taylor, for 
example, the force of religious institutions declines in proportion to religious imperatives to 
regularize disciplinary norms for the laity. He attributes the decline of religious belief to the 
rise of what he calls a “disciplinary society,” in which the bonds of church and state become 
differentiated even as rituals become homogenized.401 Taylor’s account culminates in his 
description of the “immanent frame” of modern life;402 as Peter Gordon explains it, Taylor 
means that in the modern world “there has been a rupture between God and nature” and “it is 
at least possible to describe the cosmos . . . without reference to a non-human or transcendent 
source of meaning.”403 This kind of “immanence” proceeds not only from an increasing state 
control over rituals, but also from a gradually encroaching “disenchantment” in the world. 
This idea has been challenged and complicated by scholars such as Alexandra Walsham, who 
finds plenty of belief in the seventeenth century where it was once thought to have fled. 
Walsham also argues that we should consider the history of religious change in the 
Restoration and Enlightenment in decidedly more contingent terms than we usually do, as 
“successive loops in a perpetual spiral of desacralization and resacralization.”404 But even 
Walsham acknowledges that something was changing in the late seventeenth century: 
religion was becoming something other than the all-consuming force it once had been.405  
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And as the example of Milton’s late poetry demonstrates, notions of false religion are 
crucial for these debates about secularization, disenchantment, and state control of religion. 
As so many argued, religions such as paganism could indeed be false if they relied on 
simulacra, idols, and representations that diverted devotion to the true God. Samson 
Agonistes itself recounts a movement from desacralization to resacralization, from the 
worship of idols to the affirmation of the power of the Israelite’s one God. The Renaissance 
always had a powerful and troubling model of a purely civil religion in the pagan cultures it 
revered. It could look back on the secularized societies of ancient Greece and Rome, as 
negative models that gradually and almost imperceptibly regained their force in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But distinctions of true and false religion never lost 
their force, they simply moved off of center stage. The modern, comparative, cultural view of 
religions as neither true nor false was a product of the Renaissance expansion of the category 
of false religion to include the civil religions of the post-Restoration religious landscape. But 
as Milton’s late heroes struggle against false religion, we can see the legacy of the ways that 
false religion had been defined, analyzed, and rejected. The Western world was moving 
toward a new definition of religion that would blunt the force of distinctions of true and false, 
but these distinctions never lost their force or their potential to generate violence. Vico, on 
the other hand, validated the relevance of the pagan view of religion as “poetic,” thereby 
crystallizing a viewpoint that resembles that of Émile Durkheim, Mircea Eliade, and other 
scholars of religion in the twentieth century. While those scholars would not argue that any 
religion is false, it is incumbent upon us as scholars of the early modern world to struggle 
with what it means to call a religion false, and to believe that it is. 
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The history of pagan religion as poetry, as a human creation against which true belief 
could be exercised, or toward which human society could tend, is an important one. And as I 
have suggested throughout this dissertation, literature and especially poetry has been central 
to the construction of pagan religions as false. But the history of the interpenetrations of 
poetry and false religion reveal why we are able now to think about literature as a religious 
phenomenon and about religion as a poetic creation. There exists religious poetry just as 
there exists poetic religion, though early moderns assigned different values to each. The 
consequences of this kind of discourse of religious and poetic distinction are becoming more 
and more evident in our post-secular world, and certainly their importance was unavoidable 
in the early modern world. 
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